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LIBRARY  OF  CONGRESS. 


Chap. Copyright  No. 

Shelf_.B_Fj3^^ 

UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA. 


CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY 


A 
TREATISE  ON  THE  HUMAN  SOUL 


Rev.  JOHN   T/JDRISCOLL,  S.  T.  L. 


JUN  101898 


of^^ 


ALBANY 
JAMES  B.  LYON,  PRINTER 


1090  ^p-.  ^^ 

398. 


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H228 

I  have  carefully  examined  Father  Driscoll's  philosophical 
treatise,  and  hereby  testify  as  to  its  orthodoxy  and  thorough 
Catholic  soundness.  The  quotations  are  numerous  and  ex- 
cellent. The  entire  work  reflects  great  credit  on  its  author 
and  will  be  productive  of  instruction  and  edification  to  our 
Catholic  community. 

F.  X.  McGOWAN,  O.  S.  A., 

Cen.  Lib, 

Christian  Philosophy  by  Rev.  John  T.  Driscoll,  S.  T.  L., 
alumnus  of  the  Catholic  University  of  America,  has  been  duly 
examined  by  our  Censor  Librorum,  who  has  declared  it  to  be 
orthodox  and  thoroughly  Catholic. 

We,  therefore,  most  willingly  grant  our  imprimatur, 

+    THOMAS, 

Bishop  of  Albany, 


Copyright,  1898. 
JAMES  B.    LYON. 


1 


TO  THE 

AMERICAN  STUDENT 

in  the  hope  that  its  reading  will  rouse  to  the 
dignity  and  value  of  a  life 

THIS  VOLUME 

is 

RESPECTFULLY  AND  AFFECTIONATELY 

INSCRIBED. 


PREFACE, 


This  treatise  is  an  attempt  to  set  forth  the  main  lines  of 
Christian  Philosophy,  as  enunciated  in  the  catechism  and  as 
systematized  by  the  schoolmen,  especially  S.  Thomas. 

At  the  present  time  philosophical  studies  occupy  the  atten- 
tion of  very  many.  This  is  true  in  a  special  manner  of  Psy- 
chology. The  mind  instinctively  craves  the  knowledge  of  its 
nature  and  destiny.  Unfortunately,  the  theories  proposed  in 
the  name  of  philosophy  bring  confusion  not  precision,  ob- 
scurity not  light.  In  our  schools  and  colleges  text-books  on 
Psychology  are  put  into  the  hands  of  students  with  the  result 
that  false  notions  are  implanted  and  the  true  value  of  our 
dignity  is  blurred  or  lost.  In  certain  quarters  the  physical 
sciences  have  been  popularized  and  extended  beyond  just 
limits.  To  answer  this  need  of  the  soul  for  a  knowledge  of 
itself,  to  set  forth  briefly  the  principles  of  a  true  and  sound 
philosophy  is  the  aim  of  this  work. 

The  method  followed  is  comparative.  The  question  is  pro- 
posed; various  solutions  are  classified;  the  theories  are  con- 
trasted; that  one  is  held  which  is  the  best  able  to  answer  the 
facts. 

As  far  as  possible  the  questions  have  been  treated  for  the 
ordinary  student.  Henc^  the  uninterrupted  text,  the  division 
into  paragraphs  and  sections.    At  the  same  time  any  one  who 


VI  PREFACE. 

desires  more  extensive  information  need  only  look  up  the 
notes  at  the  foot  of  the  page. 

Some  special  questions,  e.  g.,  sense  and  intelligence,  the 
faculties,  etc.,  have  been  omitted,  inasmuch  as  they  pertain 
more  directly  to  other  departments,  e.  g.,  the  Philosophy  of 
Mind. 

If  this  small  volume  awaken  in  a  reader  the  consciousness 
of  his  nature  and  dignity;  if  it  strengthen  a  faith  weakened  by 
erroneous  notions;  if  it  lead  one  to  embrace  that  religion  of 
which  it  is  the  handmaid,  the  writer  will  consider  his  labor 
more  than  repaid. 

Watervliet,  N.  Y., 

Feast  of  Pateon^age  of  S.  Joseph,  1898. 


CONTENTS. 


I.  Notion  and  subject-matter  of  Psychology. 

II.  Sources: 

(a)  Introspection:  S.  Augustine,  S.  Thomas;  Compte,  S.  Mill, 

Spencer,  Maudsley,  James,  Sully,  Hoffding. 

(b)  Objective  aids. 

III.  A  science:  ' 

Proper  object,  means  and  method:     Hoffding,  Lewes,  Spencer, 
Bain,  James,   Ladd. 

IV.  Difficulties: 

Subject-matter;   method;   phraseology,   inadequate   conceptions 
of  man. 

V.  Relation  to  other  sciences: 

Logic,  lethics,  pedagogics,  politics. 

VI.  Division: 

(a)  Psychology  of  soul,  of  mind,  of  ("will. 

(b)  Psychology  of  soul  and  modern  writers,  e.  g..  Sully,  James, 

Murray,  Davis,  Koelpe,  Hoffding,  Ladd  and  Bowne, 

VII.  Scholastic  philosophy: 

Historical   importance;   its   interest  to-day;   failure   of  modern 
philosophy. 

PROEMIUM. 
Question  stated;  method  followed. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Substantiality  of  Soul. 
I.  Theories: 

(a)  Transcendental  view,  e.  g.,  Kant  and  Wundt. 

(b)  Phenomenal  view,  e.  g.,  Hume,  Mill,  Davis,  Hoffding,  Sully, 

Murray,  James. 

(c)  Agnostic   view,    e.    g.,    Locke,    Thomson,    Spencer,    Laing, 

Hamilton,  Bowen. 


Vlll  CONTENTS. 

I.  Theories  —  Continued: 

(d)  Materialistic  view,  e.  g.,  Tyndall,  Huxley. 

(e)  Scholastic  theory,  e.  g.,  Aristotle,  S.  Thomas,  S.  Augustine. 

II.  Proof: 

(a)  From   analysis  of  notion   of  substance:   Its  elements  are: 

Being,  potency,  stability,  subject  of  modifications. 

(b)  Application  to  the  soul. 

(c)  Concept  more  clearly  defined. 

III.  Errors: 

(a)  Transcendental  ego,  i.  e.,  the  /  is  not  a  real,  but  only  a 

logical  subject. 

(b)  Phenomenal  ego;  the  contention  of  the  school  of  Associa- 

tionists;  examination  of  S.  Mill. 

(c)  Buddhist  theory. 

CHAPTER  II. 
Materialism. 

I.  History: 

(a)  Ancient  and  modern  materialism. 

(b)  Origin  and  leaders  of  modern  materialism,  e.  g.,  Moleschott, 

Vogt,  Buchner. 

(c)  Scientific  materialism,  e.  g.,  Tyndall,  Huxley. 

II.  Doctrine:  , 

(a)  Inorganic  world,  organic  world,  man.  i 

(b)  Spencer's  attempt. 

(c)  Two  diverging  tendencies:  (i)  Logical  position;  (2)  double- 

aspect  theory,  e.  g.,  Clifford,   Bain,  Spencer. 

III.  Arguments  drawn: 

(a)  From  fact  that  soul  is  only  known  in  matter. 

(b)  From  mental  processes. 

(c)  From  dependence  of  mind  on  body. 

(d)  From  evolution. 

IV.  Criticism: 

(a)  One-sided  and  partial. 

(b)  Based  on  confusion  of  concepts. 

(c)  Method  not  scientific. 

V.  Influence: 

(a)  Reason  of  its  influence. 

(b)  Opponents  in  France,  England,  America. 


CONTENTS.  IX 

.  CHAPTER  III. 

Simplicity  of  Soul. 

I.  Soul  a  unity. 

II.  The  soul  a  simple  unity: 

(a)  Not  a  collective  unity,  e.  g.,  Hume,   Mill,   Spencer,   Bain, 

Davis,  Koelpe. 

(b)  Not  a  potential  unity,  e.  g..  Prof.  Ladd,  Hegel. 

(c)  Soul  not  a  result,  i.  e.,  Positivist  position,  e.  g.,  Taine,  Ribot. 

(d)  Proof  of  simple  unity: 
(i)  From  consciousness. 

(2)  Ab  absurdo. 

(3)  Criticism  of  Kant. 

III.  An  immaterial  simple  unity: 

(a)  Mind  and  matter  differently  known. 

(b)  Mind  and  matter  known  as  different  things, 

(c)  From  deaf-blind  mutes. 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Positivism, 

I.  History: 

(a)  A  philosophy,  a  sociology,  and  a  religion. 

(b)  Origin,  author,  and  different  schools. 

II.  Doctrine: 

(a)  Fundamental   tenets:    Positive   method,    denial    of   what    is 

above  sense,  idea  of  humanity. 

(b)  Law  of  historic  filiation. 

(c)  Classification  of  sciences. 

(d)  Man  and  the  science  of  man. 

(e)  Relation  to  Agnosticism  explained: 
(i)  By  interdependence. 

(2)  By  their  common  source  in  Hume. 

III.  Influence:  | 

(a)  In  general. 

(b)  In  England,  France,  Germany,  America. 

(c)  Adverse  criticism. 

IV.  Criticism: 

(a)  Fundamental  law  is  false. 

(b)  Not  a  philosophy. 

(c)  Doctrine  of  man  is  false. 

(d)  Proofs  are  assumptions. 

(e)  Positivism  a  misnomer.  ; 


X  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  V. 

Spirituality  of  Soul. 

I.  Explanation  of  terms: 

(a)  Spirit,  pure  spirit,  spirit  and  soul. 

(b)  Question  stated. 

II.  Argument: 

(a)  From  acts  of  intelligence: 

(i)  Superorganic  notions  and  abstract  sciences. 

(2)  Manner  of  conceiving  material  objects. 

(3)  Self-consciousness. 

(b)  From  acts  of  will: 

(i)  Tendency  to  abstract  classification. 

(2)  To  superorganic  objects. 

(3)  From  conscience. 

(4)  From  free-will. 

(c)  From  human  speech. 

CHAPTER  yi. 
Spirituality  of  Soul  and  Modern  Science. 

I.  Correlation  of  thought  to  structure  of  the  brain: 

(i)  From  quantity  of  brain-matter: 

(a)  Weight:  absolute,  relative,  of  races  and  of  individuals. 

(b)  Measurement. 

(2)  From  quality  of  brain-matter: 

(a)  Chemical  qualities. 

(b)  Physical  qualities,  e.  g.,  convolutions  and  gray-matter. 

II.  Localization  of  function: 

(i)  Theory  of  Gall. 

(2)  Cerebral  physiology: 

(a)  Sensation. 

(b)  Nervous  movement. 

(c)  Reason. 

III.  Psycho-physics: 

(i)  Origin  and  basis.  -     . 

(2)  Criticism: 

(a)  Intensity. 

(b)  Duration. 

(c)  Extension.  , 


CONTENTS.  XI 

CHAPTER  VII. 
Pantheism. 

I.  Sources  of  modern  Pantheism; 

(i)  Spinoza. 

(2)  German  Pantheism  of  Kant,  Fichte,  Sclielling,  Hegel,  Schof- 

fenhauer,   Hartman. 

(3)  The  VedaVta. 

II.  Influence:  \ 

(i)  In  England,  e.  g.,  Coleridge,  Carlyle,  Arnold,  Wordsworth. 
(2)  In  America,  e.  g.,  New  England  Transcendentalism:  Emer- 
son, Dr.  Royce. 

III.  Neo-Hegelian  School: 

(i)  Its  beginnings. 

(2)  Its  leaders  in  England  and  America. 

(3)  Professor  Green's  teaching. 

IV.  Criticism.  , 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

Soul  and  Body. 

I.  Question  stated. 

II.  Theories: 

(i)  Exaggerated  Spiritualism,  e.  g.,  Des  Cartes,  Malebranche, 
Leibnitz. 

(2)  Accidental  union,  e.  g.,  Plato,  Locke,  Lotze,  Ladd,  Rosmini. 

(3)  Monistic  theory,  e.  g..  Prof.  Clifford,  Bain,  H.  Spencer. 

(4)  Scholasticjtljeory,  i.  e,,  matter  and  form. 

(a)  A  duality  in  every  substance  as  shown  by  science  and 
by  ordinary  observation.  1 

(b)  Hence  the  inference  to  a  duality  in  its  composition. 

(c)  "  First  matter  "  and  "  substantial  form." 

(d)  Hierarchy  of  forms. 

(e)  Duality  in  man:  hence  body  and  soul:  and  place  of  soul 

in  human  body. 

CHAPTER  IX. 
Brain  and  Thought. 
I.  "Thought  produced  by  the  brain:" 

(i)  Battle-ground  between  Christian  and  non-Christian  philos- 
ophy. 


XU  CONTENTS. 

I.  "  Thought  produced  by  the  brain  "  —  Continued: 

(2)  Meaning  of  word  "  thought." 

(3)  Meaning  of  word  "  produced." 

II.  Brain  and  sensation: 

(i)  Simple  subject  necessary.  i 

(2)  Sensation  is  quantitative. 

(3)  Hence  animated  organism  is  subject  of  sensation. 

III.  Brain  and  thought: 

(i)  Mind  essentially  different  from  sensation. 

(2)  Cerebral  activity  a  condition  for  thought. 

(3)  Hence  body  not  organ  of  thought. 

IV.  Thought  not  cerebral  motion: 

(i)  Opinions  of  Spencer,  Tyndall,   Clifford,   Bain,  James. 

(2)  Criticism. 

(3)  Testimony  of  Du  Bois,  Reymond,  Ferrier,  Tyndall,  Ladd. 

CHAPTER  iX. 

Origin  of  Soul. 
I.  Theory  of  emanation,  i.  e..  Pantheism. 
II.  Theory  of  traducianism,  i.  e.,  Tertullian. 
III.  Theory  of  manifestation,  i.  e..  Prof.  Ladd. 
IV.  Theory  of  evolution,  i.  e,  Mr.  Spencer. 
V.  Theory  of  creation,  i.  e..   Christian  philosophy. 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Immortality. 

I.  Theories: 

(i)  Materialistic,  e.  g.,  vulgar  and  scientific  materialism. 

(2)  Pantheistic. 

(3)  Sceptical,  e.  g.,  S.  Mill,  Emerson,  Arnold,  G.  Eliot. 

II.  Substitutes: 

(i)  Indestructibility  of  material  elements  of  the  body. 

(2)  Conservation  of  energy. 

(3)  Doctrine  of  Karma. 

(4)  Immortality  of  Glory. 

III.  The  fact: 

(i)  Belief  in  future  life  is  universal. 
(2)  Exceptions: 

Early  Jews. 

Buddhists. 


'> 


CONTENTS.  ^  ,  xm 

IV.  Reasons  for  the  belief: 

(i)  Psychological,  e.   g.,   S.  Thomas,  criticism  of  Prof.   Ladd. 

(2)  Moral. 

(3)  Philosophical: 

(a)  From  intellect. 

(b)  From  will. 

(c)  From  fundamental  desires. 

(4)  Analogical  —  no  such  word  as  annihilation. 

CHAPTER  XII. 

Personality. 

I.  Definition  of  personality  the  task  of  Christian  philosophy. 

II.  Theories: 

(i)  Memory,  i.  e.,  Locke  and  Mill. 

(2)  Consciousness,  i.  e.,  Kant. 

(3)  The  Bampton  Lecturer  of  1891.  ; 

(4)  Of  evolution,  e.  g.,  Ribot. 

III.  Christian  philosophy: 

(i)  Definition  of  S.  Thomas. 

(2)  Person  embraces: 

(a)  Rational  nature. 

(b)  Individual  substance. 

(3)  Illustrated: 

(a)  In  Incarnation. 

(b)  In  civil  law. 

(c)  In  human  speech. 


INTRODUCTION. 


I. 

§  I.  Psychology,  from  the  Greek  ^'o^ij-  and  /^o^'o?, 
means  a  disputation  or  treatise  about  the  soul. 
Taking  the  word  in  its  widest  signification  it  means 
a  philosophy  of  the  soul,  in  contradistinction  to  Cos- 
mology, which  is  the  philosophy  of  the  external  world.^ 
By  the  soul  is  meant  the  principle  of  life,  the  principle  Notion. 
which  animates  and  vivifies  an  organism.  We  can 
distinguish  three  grades  of  life:  vegetative,  sensitive 
and  intellectual.  Plants  possess  vegetative  hfe;  i.  e., 
they  grow;  animals  possess  vegetative  and  sensitive 
life;  i.  e.,  they  grow  and  feel;  man  possesses  vegetative, 
sensitive  and  intellectual  life;  i.  e.,  he  grows,  feels, 
thinks.  Man,  therefore,  possesses  life  in  all  its  fullness. 
With  the  plant  he  grows  and  nourishes;  with  the  ani- 
mal he  grows  and  feels;  but  over  and  above  he  has 
what  is  characteristic  of  his  nature,  marking  him  off 
from  other  living  beings;  i.  e.,  thought  and  will.^  Psy- 
chology, therefore,  means  the  philosophy  of  the  soul 
of  man,  of  the  soul  as  the  principle  and  source  of  sen- 
sitive and  especially  of  intellectual  operations,  and  has 
been  designated  the  "  science  of  mental  life."  ^ 

^  Dr.  Ward  says  Psychology  cannot  be  defined  because  we 
cannot  limit  its  subject-matter,  i.  e,,  we  cannot  distinguish 
at  the  outset  between  internal  and  external  experience,  cf. 
Encyc.  Britt.  art.  Psychology.  This  is  not  true.  Conscious- 
ness testifies  to  the  contrary. 

2  S.  Augustine  De  Lib.  Arb.  1.  II,  n.  13. 

3  For  history  of  the  term  "  Psychology,"  cf.  Sir  W.  Hamil- 
ton's "  Metaphysics,"  I,  p.  130. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY, 


Subject 
matter. 


Conscious- 


§  2.  The  subject-matter  of  Psychology  is  set  forth 
in  its  definition.  By  mental  life  is  miderstood  con- 
sciousness, our  states  of  consciousness,  the  sum-total 
of  our  conscious  experience.  In  this  sense  we  speak 
of  mind  as  subjective  in  relation  to  the  external  world 
which  is  objective.  However,  Psychology  employs 
objective  methods,  as  we  shall  see.  It  does  not  con- 
sider the  mind  as  personal,  but  as  the  endowment  of 
the  human  race;  it  does  not  view  the  mind  as  inde- 
pendent and  apart,  but  treats  of  the  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness in  themselves  as  such,  in  their  relations  to 
the  principle  producing  them,  i.  e.,  the  soul,  and  to 
what  conditions  their  actual  exercise,  i.  e.,  the  bodily 
organs.  Hence  its  complete  subject-matter  is  ani- 
mated body  or  a  "  sound  mind  in  a  sound  body."  It 
places  before  our  view  all  the  operations  and  phe- 
nomena of  our  conscious  life.  Thus  it  investigates 
sensations,  thoughts,  wishes,  desires,  feelings,  imagi- 
nations, memories,  afifections  and  emotions.  It  formu- 
lates the  laws  which  rule  their  working,  and  finally 
from  these,  as  data,  determines  what  we  are  to  hold 
concerning  their  source  or  internal  cause,  and  the  rela- 
tion of  this  principle  to  the  bodily  organism. 

§  3.  In  employing  the  term  consciousness  we  must 
guard  against  ambiguity.  The  word  has  more  than 
one  meaning,  (a)  In  the  most  general  and  widest 
signification  it  is  used  to  designate  mental  life  as  a 
whole,  i,  e.,  our  states  of  consciousness,  as  opposed 
to  unconsciousness.  In  this  sense,  as  we  have  seen,  it 
includes  emotions,  volitions,  etc.,  and  forms  the  sub- 
ject-matter of  Psychology,  (b)  It  designates  immedi- 
ate and  direct  knowledge  which  the  mind  has  of  its 
own  acts  or  of  something  external  acting  upon  it.     In 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

this  sense  it  includes  only  cognitive  acts  of  a  special 
kind,  and  is  opposed  to  mediate  and  reflex  knowledge, 
(c)  Finally,  it  signifies  the  reflex  and  deliberate  act 
by  which  the  mind  attends  to  its  own  operations 
or  states,  and  recognizes  them  as  produced  by  its  own 
activity.  In  this  sense  it  is  more  properly  called  self- 
consciousness.  It  is  thus  a  special  kind  of  mental 
activity  which  investigates  and  studies  the  working 
of  our  minds,  brings  out  clearly  and  distinctly  what 
we  have  directly  experienced.  In  the  second  and 
especially  in  the  third  meaning  consciousness  becomes 
the  chief  method  and  instrument  of  Psychology. 

§  4.  By  keeping  in  mind  the  different  meanings 
which  the  word  consciousness  has,  we  can  easily  under- 
stand the  position  of  writers  who  at  first  sight  seem  to 
disagree.  The  mistake  of  confounding  different 
things  shall  thus  be  avoided.  Thus  Rabier^  distin- 
guishes two  theories  and  two  schools  divided 
on  the  nature  of  consciousness:  (a)  Those  who 
hold  that  consciousness  means  the  very  essence  of 
psychical  phenomena,  the  common  form  of  all  the 
faculties  of  the  soul,  and  is  to  them  as  light  is  to  color. 
This  view,  he  says,  is  the  opinion  of  Aristotle.^  (b) 
Those  who  consider  consciousness  as  an  accident,  an 
additional  phenomena,  somewhat  as  light  is  to  objects 
without  which  they  cannot  be  conceived.  Thus  it 
becomes  a  distinct  faculty  and  its  function  is  to  per- 
ceive the  acts  of  inner  life.  It  is  the  open  eye  of  the 
mind,  the  witness  of  our  psychic  phenomena.     This, 

^  Psychologic,  p.  52. 

^ ''  The  interior  hght  that  illumines  everything  that  takes 
place  in  the  soul."  Cousin  History  of  Mod.  Phil,  xi,  p.  247; 
Stuart  Mill  Logic,  BI,  ch.  i,  §§  3,  5. 


4  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

he  says,  is  the  opinion  of  Reid,  Stewart/  Royer- 
Collard,  Hamilton.  But  on  a  close  examina- 
tion there  is  no  real  opposition.  Consciousness 
is  both  one  and  the  other.  In  the  first  mean- 
ing it  is  the  common  form  of  all  our  mental  activi- 
ties. In  the  second  it  is  the  eye  and  witness  of  our 
mental  life.  In  the  former  it  is  what  we  study;  in  the 
latter  it  is  the  chief  source  and  instrument  of  our 
knowledge.  For  we  not  only  are  conscious  of  mental 
states,  but  we  also  have  the  power  of  viewing  self  as 
the  subject  and  agent  of  our  mental  states.  This  per- 
fection is  the  crown  of  our  intellectual  life  just  as  the 
power  of  self-determination  is  the  crown  and  glory  of 
the  acts  of  volition. 

II. 
Sources. 
intro-^  §  5.  The  subject-matter  of  Psychology  is  conscious- 

method,  ness.  The  states  of  consciousness  are  only  observed 
by  the  act  of  self-consciousness  or  introspection,  i.  e., 
by  "  looking  within."  This  is  the  subjective  or  intro- 
spective method.  It  is  the  primary,  direct,  immediate 
source  through  which  a  knowledge  of  mental  life  is 
obtained.  Socrates  was  the  first  to  make  self-examina- 
tion a  philosophical  method.  His  principle  was 
**  know  thyself."''  The  science  he  elaborated  by  its 
aid  was  more  moral  than  mental.  With  St.  Augustine 
this  principle  and  method  was  of  great  value.  'T  de- 
sire," he  says,  "to  know  God  and  the  soul;  nothing 

^  Cf.  Hamilton  Met.  Lect.  xii,  p.  145.  "  It  is  the  recog- 
nition by  the  mind  or,  ego,  of  its  acts  and  affections." 
Hamilton  Met.  Lect.  xi,  p.  133;  yet  the  same  author 
writes  "  The  fundamental  form,  the  generic  condition 
of  all  modes  of  mental  life."  Met,,  p.  127;  cf.  Porter,  the 
Human  Intellect,  p.  83. 

7Cf.  Phaedros. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  5 

more."^    For  this  it  is  necessary  to  enter  into  one's  self. 
From  the  knowledge  of  self  man  can  rise  to  a  knowl- 
edge of  God.^    With  St.  Thomas  introspection  is  the  ^^j^ethod^ 
basis  of  a  beautiful  and  profound  exposition  of  the  gpiJuon. 
virtues  and  vices.^° 

§  6.  Compte  ^^  maintains  that  direct  observation  Compte. 
by  introspection  is  impossible.  To  him  direct 
contemplation  of  the  mind  by  itself  is  an  illu- 
sion for  two  reasons:  (a)  The  thinker  cannot 
divide  himself  in  two,  of  whom  one  reasons  while  the 
other  observes  him  reason.  "  The  organ  observed 
and  the  organ  observing,"  he  says,  *'  being,  in  this 
case,  identical,  how  could  observation  take  place? 
This  pretended  psychological  method,  therefore,  is 
null  and  void."  (b)  Internal  observation  gives  almost 
as  many  divergent  results  as  there  are  individuals  who 
practice  it.  This  objection  is  well  met  by  J.  Stuart 
Mill,  who  holds  "  that  a  fact  may  be  studied  in  two 
ways,  either  by  direct  knowledge  at  the  very  time  or 
through  the  medium  of  memory  a  moment  after." 
And,  he  adds,  "  Mr.  Compte  would  scarcely  have 
observed  that  we  are  not  aware  of  our  own  intellectual 
operations.  This  simple  fact  destroys  the  whole  of  his 
argument.  Whatever  we  are  directly  aware  of,  we 
can  directly  observe."  ^^ 

^ "  Deum  et  animam  scire  cupio.  Nihilne  plus?  Nihil 
omnino."  Soliloq.  1.  I,  7;  cf.  Trin.  xiv,  7;  Confess,  x,  17, 
24,  25;  de  Ordine,  n.  47. 

^ "  Noli  foras  ire,  in  teipsum  redi,  in  interiore  homine 
habitat  Veritas;  et  si  tiiam  naturam  mutabileminveneris,  trans- 
cende  et  teipsum.  Sed  memento  cum  te  transcendis,  ration- 
antem  animam  te  transcendere.  Illuc.  ergo  tende  unde  ipsum 
lumen  rationis  accenditur.     De  vera  relig.  72. 

i<^  Cf.  Sum.  Theol.  2a,  2ae. 

11  Positive  Philos.,  London,  1875,  vol.  i,  pp.  381-389;  Cours 
de  Phil.,  Posit.  I,  34  sq. 

12  Aug.  Compte  &  Posit.,  p.  64;  cf.  Sully  Illusions,  pp. 
208-211. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


Maudsley. 
James. 


Spencer.  §  y^  ]\ji-_  Spencer  holds  that  no  one  is  conscious  of 
what  he  is  but  of  what  he  was  a  moment  before.  His 
reason  is  that  it  is  impossible  for  the  mind  to  be  at  the 
same  time  subject  and  object.^^  We  admit  that  it 
may  be  difiFiCult  to  thus  conceive  the  mind;  never- 
theless it  is  a  fact.  Dr.  Maudsley/*  and  Mr. 
James/^  say  that  in  observing  our  mental  states, 
we  lose  them  or  modify  them  so  that  they 
are  no  longer  the  same.  Mr.  James  is  unre- 
served in  praising  Compte's  reasoning.  He'  writes 
'*  that  a  feeling  to  be  named,  judged  or  perceived  must 
be  already  past;  that  no  subjective  state  while  present 
is  its  own  object,  e.  g.,  when  I  say  '  I  feel  tired/  'I  feel 
angry/  the  present  conscious  states  are  not  the  direct 
feelings  of  fatigue  or  of  anger.  It  is  the  state  of  say- 
ing-I -feel-tired,  or  of  saying-I-f eel-angry ,  entirely  dif- 
ferent matters,  so  different  that  the  fatigue  and  anger 
apparently  included  in  them  are  considerabe  modifica- 
tions of  the  fatigue  and  anger  directly  felt  the  previous 

Hoffding.  instant."  ^^  So  Hoffding:  ''In  the  moment  when  I 
wish  to  observe  a  state  of  consciousness,  that  state  is 
already  past,  or  has  blended  wdth  other  elements. 
What  has  been  fully  and  clearly  experienced  will 
remain  in  memory  and  by  means  of  memory  can  be 
examined."  ^^ 

§  8.  Thus  introspection  becomes  retrospection. 
This  position  cannot  be  held.  It  is  true  that  I  can 
recall  past  states  in  order  to  observe  them;  but  it  is 


^2  Cf.   Spencer's  First  Principles,  p.  65. 

1^  Physiology  of  Mind,  ch.  i. 

15  Psychol.   I,  pp.   189,   190. 

1^  Vol.  I,  pp.  189,  190.  Mr.  Hamilton  also  says  that  the 
phenomena  can  only  be  studied  through  it  reminiscence. 
Met.  xix,  p.  263. 

1"  Outlines  of  Psychology,  p.  17. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  7 

also  a  fact  verified  by  the  conscious  experience  of 
every  one  that  I  can  directly  observe  my  own 
thoughts  and  emotions;  or,  in  the  language  of  Mr. 
Mill,  "  Whatever  we  are  directly  aware  of,  we  can 
directly  observe."  Mr.  James  again  falls  into  an  error 
in  his  reflection  upon  the  value  of  introspection.  He 
holds  that  the  only  grounds  on  which  the  infallible 
veracity  of  the  introspective  judgment  might  be  main- 
tained are  empirical.  "  If  we  had  reason  to  think  it 
has  never  yet  deceived  us,"  he  \xrites,  "  we  might  con- 
tinue to  trust  it."  ^^  The  mistake  is  in  confound- 
ing the  primitive  testimony  of  consciousness  with  a 
judgment  formed  by  associations  of  ideas  or  habits, 
e.  g.,  consciousness  of  a  sensation  and  the  localization 
of  the  organic  part  affected.  These  are  found  joined 
together.  The  former  is  a  fact  immediately  known  in 
consciousness;  the  latter  is  a  judgment  based  on  the 
association  of  ideas  and  whose  correctness  depends  on 
bodily  sensibility  and  the  development  of  acquired 
sense-perceptions.  The  judgment  may  be  erroneous, 
as  we  shall  see. 

§  Q.  To  establish  a  science  of  the  mind,  introspection  intro- 

-^  .  '■  spective 

emplovs  objective  means  of  verification  and  of  control,  method 

'^      '  ■^  aided  by 

Hence  the  external,  indirect  and  mediate  source  which  objective 

sources. 

embraces  all  those  means  of  acquiring  a  knowledge  of 
mental  life  which  are  outside  of  and  beyond  the  imme- 
diate observation  of  my  own  mental  states.  In  obtain- 
ing material  from  this  source  w^e  reason  by  analogy, 
i.  e.,  we  reason  on  the  ground  that  other  persons  have 
like  motives  and  acts.  By  the  testimony  of  my  own 
consciousness  I  might  write  Confessions,  as  St.  Augus- 
tine, Memories  as  Rousseau,  an  Apology  pro  Vita  Sua, 

18  lb.  I        .  ,  . 


8 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


These 
sources 
are  (a) 
ordinary 
observa- 
tion. 


(b)  Science 
literature 
and  art. 


(c)  Study 
of  mental 
develop- 
ment in 
the  indi- 
vidual. ' 


as  Card.  Newman;  bint  the  result  would  not  be  Psy- 
chology. It  would  be  an  important  contribution  to  the 
study  of  mental  life,  but  not  a  scientific  treatise.  My 
own  individual  experiences  as  such,  however  beautiful 
and  valuable,  are  only  personal;  whereas  Psychology 
is  the  science  of  the  human  mind,  and  treats  not  of  the 
individual  but  of  the  species,  of  mankind.  Introspec- 
tion, therefore,  calls  to  its  aid  the  object  ire  method. 
This  method  consists :  (a)  In  the  observation  of  others. 
We  watch  their  words  and  actions,  their  looks  and 
gestures.  From  these  we  strive  to  learn  their  mental 
states,  their  habits  and  tendencies.  In  the  class-room, 
on  the  street,  in  society,  we  study  Psychology.  This 
can  be  done  indirectly,  as  when  we  infer  the  condition 
of  mind  from  an  ordinary  conversation  or  behavior;  or 
directly  when  another  in  words  makes  known  his  de- 
sires, thoughts,  sentiments  or  passions,  and  sets  forth 
their  interdependence  or  the  part  they  play  in  his  men- 
tal life,  (b)  The  products  of  the  mind  in  science  and 
in  art  furnish  rich  stores  of  information.  Science  is 
the  effort  and  proof  of  intelligence.  Art  is  nature  as 
mirrored  in  the  human  soul.  Poetry,  literature  and 
the  fine  arts  are  the  highest  and  most  perfect  work  of 
the  soul.  They  reflect  the  noblest  sentiments,  they 
express  the  most  delicate  thoughts.  The  man  is 
revealed  in  his  work,  (c)  Great  assistance  is  derived 
from  the  study  of  the  mind,  in  its  various  stages  of 
development.  Thus,  a  new  department  of  Psychology 
has  been  opened  up  by  investigations  into  the  child- 
mind.  The  information  gained  is  put  to  account 
in  devising  the  best  means  of  education.  Action 
of  environment,  influence  of  home,  religion,  so- 
ciety, education  are  taken  into  account.  Not 
only     the     development     of     the     individual     is     of 


!  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  9 

value.  The  records  of  civilized  life  and  growth  of  J?  J^'^^^'^^' 
nations  contain  rich  stores.  History  is  the  world's 
stage.  The  customs,  institutions,  laws,  civil  and  politi-  • 
cal  annals,  religion,  traditions  —  all  these  express  the 
efforts  of  the  human  soul.  There  imagination,  taste, 
genius  in  war  or  in  the  peaceful  avocations,  the  great 
and  noble  faculties,  expand  and  bloom.  Side  by  side 
we  behold  heroic  and  sublime  resolves  which  uplift 
and  ennoble,  and  low  and  fatal  passions  wdiicli  bring 
degradation  and  ignominy.  Man  appears  before  us  at 
his  best  and  at  his  worst,  (d)  Animal  Psychology,  as  ^^^/^'J? 
it  is  called,  brings  light  from  another  quarter.  It  pre-  f^}^^^^ 
sents  the  results  of  studies  concerning  the  instincts, 
habits  and  activities  of  the  lower  animals.  Care  must 
be  taken,  however,  not  to  apply  these  conclusions  to 
human  life  with  too  much  rigor.  Man  is  an  animal 
and  shares  with  the  animal,  sensation,  instinct  and 
lower  sensitive  feelings.  Thus  their  action  can  be  illus- 
trated to  a  certain  extent  from  animal  life.  But  man  is 
more  than  a  mere  animal.  He  possesses  intelligence 
and  free  will.  These  must  be  taken  into  account  in  the 
analogies  drawn  from  the  lower  forms  of  life, 
(e)  Physiology  and  Anatomy  supply  us  with  much  g^^|^,^^ 
useful  information.  They  explain  the  structure  and  ^"^y^*^ 
functions  of  the  different  parts  of  the  nervous  system. 
They  give  the  physical  bases  of  the  operations  of 
sense.  Psychology  studies  the  human  mind  working 
in  the  body.  Hence,  brain  and  nerve  Physiology  is 
necessary.  It  shows  that  phenomena  of  thought 
are  accompanied  by  phenomena  of  the  nerv- 
ous system.  Formation  of  habits,  transmission  of 
hereditary  tendencies  are  questions  for  the  solution  of 
which  we  depend  more    or    less    on    these    studies.^^ 

1^  Cf.   Aristotle's   Psychology  by   E.   Wallace,   Introd.,    pp. 
XXX,  cxxvii. 


10  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

parati^e  (^)  Another  source  is  langauge  and  the  study 
philology.  Qf  language.  The  connection  between  language  and 
thought  is  intimate.  The  one  is  the  expression  of  the 
other.  The  thinker  may  pass  away  and  his  place  taken 
by  another,  but  his  thought  has  a  permanent  embodi- 
ment in  the  written  word,  and  lives  on  for  the  instruc- 
tion and  delight  of  future  ages.  The  study  of  lan- 
guage is  the  study  and  discipline  of  mind.  Its  words 
reveal  the  nicer  shades  of  thought,  the  endless  variety 
of  conceptions,  as  in  the  Greek  or  Latin,  or  the 
imagery  and  comparative  poverty,  as  in  the  speech  of 
savages.^"  Its  structure  shows  the  forms  of  thought, 
the  characteristic  turn  and  traits  of  their  minds.  The 
labors  of  Whitney,^^  of  Muller,^^  are  of  great  value  to 
the  Psychologist.  Sufficient  attention  has  not  been 
given  to  the  help  which  these  studies  afford.  "  It  is 
remarkable,"  writes  M.  Ribot,^  "  that  EngHsh  con- 
temporary Psychologists,  who  have  profited  so  largely 
by  the  recent  progress  of  physiolog}^,  have  borrowed 
nothing  from  linguistics."  He  expresses  a  belief  that 
comparative  philology  will  reveal  things  to  us  of  much 
more  intimate  and  delicate  bearing  upon  the  mechan- 
ism of  the  soul  and  its  rariations  than  physiology. 
dfseSes*^^  (g)  Finally,  we  have  recourse  to  Pathology,  the 
science  of  organic  disease.  Criminals,  persons- under 
hypnotic  influences,  the  deaf  and  dumb,  eccentrics,  the 
insane,  are  examined  and  studied  with  a  view  to  illus- 
trate mental  activities.  Abnormal  mental  operations, 
e.  g.,  dreams,  illusions,  somnambulism,  hallucinations, 
are  explained  and  traced  as  far  as  possible  to  their 

20  Cf.  Quatrefages  the  Pigmies. 

21  Cf.   Language  and  Study  of  Language. 

22  Science  of  Language. 

23  Engl.  Psych.,  pp.  50,  51. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  II 

causes.  It  is  wise  to  avoid  the  mistaken  notions  of 
some  writers,  e.  g.,  Dr.  Maudsley,  '^^  E.  W.  Cox  in  Me- 
chanism of  Man,  Ribot,^^  who  lay  too  much  stress  on 
this  study.  These  activities  are  abnormal  and  must  be 
so  regarded.  They  therefore  furnish  no  positive  data  on 
which  to  build  the  science  of  Psychology.  Nor  are 
they  to  be  considered  as  constituting  the  proper  and 
direct  subject-matter  of  our  study.  Psychology  inves- 
tigates "  the  sound  mind  in  the  sound  body,"  and  ab- 
normal phases  or  states  should  be  viewed  in  this  light. 

§  10.  By  uniting  the  results  obtained  in  these  various 
ways  to  the  subjective  method  a  normal  psychology  of 
introspection  is  established.  By  it  we  study  the  mental 
phenomena  in  each  human  being,  and  study  them  in 
each  condition.  Psychology,  therefore,  does  not  treat 
of  what  is  personal,  accidental  or  particular,  but  of 
what  is  essential  and  universal. 

§  II.  It  is  true  that  introspection  is  the  real  basis, 
just  as  an  anatomist  by  dissecting  one  human  body, 
finds  there  materials  to  construct  a  science  of  the  struc- 
ture of  every  human  being.  So,  when  I  know  myself, 
I  know  human  nature.  But  comparison  of  knowledge 
thus  acquired  with  the  other  sources,  help  me  to  sepa- 
rate the  particular  from  the  universal,  the  personal 
from  what  is  part  of  our  human  nature.  Philosophers 
as  Plato,  Aristotle,  St.  Augustine,  St.  Thomas;  moral- 
ists as  Seneca,  Pascal;  poets  as  Homer,  Euripides, 
Horace,  Shakespeare;  novelists  as  Goethe,  Scott, 
Dickens, Thackeray; preachers  as  St.  Chrysostom, Bos- 
suet,  Newman,  did  not  speak  of  the  individual  simply, 
but  of  man;  not  of  man  in  one  countr}-  and  time,  but 
of  universal  man.    In  studying  them  we  study  human 

^  Cf.  Physiology  of  mind. 
25  Diseases  of  Personality. 


12  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

nature.  We  see  reflected  in  a  masterly  manner  the 
thoughts,  sentiments,  wills  which  throb  in  our  own 
souls.  Thus  internal  and  external  methods,  both 
united,  give  a  true  scientific  basis  to  Ps}xhology. 

III. 

A  Science. 
§  12.     Psychology  seeks  to  know  the  nature  of  the 
soul,  the  nature  and  laws  of  mental  and  moral  phe- 
nomena.    It  claims  to  be  and  is  a  true  science.     The 
conditions  and  processes  which  go    to    constitute    a 
(a)  proper  science  are  here  found,     (a)  First  of  all  it  has  a  real 

object.  ,  ^  ^   ^      ^ 

and  proper  object.  It  investigates  sensations,  senti- 
ments, ideas,  memories,  judgments,  reasonings,  de- 
sires, passions,  etc.  These  are  as  true  and  as  real  as 
the  circulation  of  the  blood,  as  the  existence  of  physi- 
cal or  chemical  forces.  Even  materialists  who  deny 
the  existence  of  the  spiritual  principle  in  man,  must 
admit  that  they  think,  and  feel,  and  wall.  This  subject- 
matter  is  proper  to  Psychology,  and  constitutes  a  field 
apart  where  no  other  science  enters.^  Thus,  m.athe- 
matics  studies  the  general  properties  of  material  bodies 
in  a  most  abstract  manner;  physics  deals  with  forces; 
physiology  and  anatomy  with  the  functions  and  struc- 
ture of  the  human  frame.    Only  Psychology  claims  as 

26  It  is  not  true,  therefore,  to  maintain  that  "  Psychology 
must  be  regarded  as  a  branch  of  general  biology."  cf.  Hoff- 
ding  Elements  of  Psychology,  p.  25;  G.  Lewis  cf.  Ribot 
English  Psychology,  p.  287;  also  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind, 
1st  Series,  p.  loi;  or  to  hold,  with  H.  Spencer,  that  there  is 
no  precise  line  of  demarkation  between  physiological  and 
psychological  facts,  cf.  Ribot,  p.  148  sq. ;  or  with  Hoffding, 
that  Physiology  and  Psychology  "  deal  with  the  same  matter 
as  seen  from  two  different  sides,  like,  e.  g.,  the  convex  and 
concave  sides  of  the  same  curve."  Outlines  of  Psychology, 
p.  69. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  I3 

its  own  the  varied  phenomena  of  mental  and  moral 
life.2^ 

§  13.  (b)  Again,  it  has  an  infallible  means  of  know-  ^^^^^^j. 
ing  and  investigating  its  subject-matter.  This  instru-  sources. 
ment  is  self-consciousness  or  introspection.  Intro- 
spection reveals  the  inner  life  with  all  its  phenomena 
of  sensation,  of  intelligence,  of  appetite  and  will.  Care 
must  be  taken,  however,  not  to  attribute  solely  to  self- 
consciousness  facts  which  are  the  outcome  of  judg- 
ments in  which  an  element  of  experience  or  of  associa- 
tion of  ideas  is  found,  as,  e.  g.,  the  localization  of  a 
sensation. 

§  14.  (c)  It  has  a  scientific  method.     Method  is  an  re)  a 

,     T     ^   ^  ,  .         ,  ,  .  .  -    scientific 

orderly  process  of  arrangmg  facts  and  reasonmgs  with  method. 
a  view  to  form  a  compact  and  well-connected  whole. 
It  embraces  the  statement  of  facts,  the  formulation  of 
laws  which  explain  them,  and  finally  their  systematic 
classification.  Now,  Psychology  acquires  its  facts  by 
observation.  The  student  enters  into  himself,  views 
his  own  mind  working,  and  notes  down  its  processes 
and  their  results.  To  observation,  experimentation  is 
added.  In  this  act  we  recall  a  past  fact  through  mem- 
ory, analyze  it,  compare  it  with  a  present  fact  of  con- 
sciousness. Having  possession  of  facts  which  have 
stood  the  test,  we  then  proceed  to  discover  the  laws 

^  Dr.  Bain  seems  to  hold  that  mental  phenomena  are  not 
distinguished  from  material  by  any  common  character.  This 
is  the  contention  of  Materialism,  cf.  Bain  Sense  and  Intel- 
lect Intr.,  ch.  I,  2.  Prof.  James  holds  that  there  is  only  one 
kind  of  conditions  which  the  student  of  scientific  Psychology 
cares  to  know  about,  and  these  are  the  brain-states;  and  that 
until  some  Gahleo  or  Lavoisier  arises  with  a  psycho-physic 
law  that  will  govern  all  mental  facts,  we  can  have  no  science 
of  Psychology,  cf,  "is  Psychology  a  Science?"  by  Prof. 
Ladd,  in  Amer.  Joun.  of  Psych.,  1894,  vol.  i,  p.  392,  coll. 
p.  286.     cf.  also  Philos.  Rev.,  1892,  vol.  i,  pp.  24,  146. 


14 


CHRISTIAN  -PHILOSOPHY. 


This 

method 

followed. 


which  regulate  their  interaction,  the  faculties  or  prin- 
ciples whence  they  spring,  the  nature  of  the  thinking 
principle  which  is  the  bond  of  their  unity.  This  pro- 
cess is  induction  and  seeks  to  formulate  the  principles 
and  laws  of  the  human  mind.  These  laws  are  then 
subjected  to  a  process  of  verification,  for,  by  means  of 
deduction,  their  practical  application  is  tested.  Our 
own  personal  experience  is  illustrated  and  confirmed 
by  results  drawn  from  the  various  other  sources.  The 
interrelation  of  facts,  of  principles  and  of  laws  is  the 
basis  for  a  true  classification  of  mental  phenomena 
and  of  the  processes  involved  in  their  production. 
Finally,  the  conclusions  thus  established  are  thrown 
into  a  system  in  which  facts  are  brought  naturally  into 
relation  with  their  causes  and  with  one  another .^^ 

§  15.  This  method  is  pursued  in  the  following  pages. 
As  far  as  possible  erroneous  inferences  or  classifica- 
tions will  be  pointed  out  and  contrasted  with  the 
natural  and  true  processes  of  mental  life. 


(a)  the 
n  iture 
of  the 
phenom- 
ena. 


-  IV. 

Difficulties. 

§  16.  Every  science  or  department  of  study  has 
special  difficulties  which  must  be  understood  in  order 
to  pursue  investigations  with  a  prospect  of  success. 
Psychology  is  not  without  them.  A  practical  proof 
is  seen  in  the  many  systems  of  mental  philosophy 
which  have  in  the  past  and  do  now  hold  the  adhesion 
of  thoughtful  men. 

§  17.  (a)  The  main  difficulty  is  found  in  the  nature 
of   the   phenomena   which    Psychology    investigates. 

28  Hoffding  denies  that  Psychology  can  be  a  sharply  defined 
science;  to  him  there  is  not  one  Psychology  but  many  Psy- 
chologies.    Outlines  of  Psychology,  p.  26. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  ^  I5 

The  facts  of  mental  life  are  numerous,  varied,  rapidly 
passing,  and  complex.^^  Hence  it  is  possible 
to  confound  the  testimony  of  consciousness  with 
a  conclusion  which  is  based  on  the  associa- 
tion of  ideas,  e.  g.,  a  sensation  of  touch 
comes  immediately  from  consciousness,  its  localisa- 
tion is  determined  by  the  development  of  sense- 
experience;  or  to  confound  consciousness  with 
an  inference  from  it,  e.  g.,  in  the  perception  of  an 
external  object,  I  am  conscious  of  the  sensation,  but 
I  infer  the  distance  or  the  magnitude  of  the  thing  per- 
ceived. Only  by  close  psychological  analysis  we  dis- 
tinguish what  pertains  to  consciousness  from  what 
does  not.  Again  a  sensation  or  feeling  is  complex, 
difficult  to  analyze  and  take  apart,  e.  g.,  motives. 

§  1 8.  (b)  Another  difficulty  arises  from  the  method  J^etiuS 
of  our  study.  The  ordinary  mind  is  engrossed  with 
the  external  world.  A  difficulty  is  experienced  in 
turning  aside  from  the  objects  of  sense  to  concentrate 
attention  upon  the  facts  of  our  inner  life.  Repeated 
attempts  are  necessary.  Abstraction  and  introspec- 
tion are  the  employment  of  only  the  few.  Even  then 
there  is  a  danger  of  superficial  examination,  of  hasty 
and  partial  inferences,  of  an  untrue  classification. 

§  19.  (c)  A  third  difficulty  is  found  in  the  words  and  guage^.' 
language  used  to  describe  our  mental  life.  By  a  neces- 
sity of  our  nature  we  must  represent  the  phenomena 
of  mental  and  of  moral  life  by  analogies  drawn  from 
the  material  world.  Thus,  perception,  apprehension, 
i.  e.,  a  grasping,  conception,  judgment,  etc.  Here  there 
is  room  for  uncertainty  and  ambiguity.^" 

29  Cf.  Hamilton  Met.  Lect.  xix,  p.  264. 

30  Cf.  Leibnitz  Nouv.  Ess.  Ill,  i,  5- 


i6 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY, 


vfews^of^^^  §  20.  (d)  Finally,  inadequate  conceptions  of  mental 
mental  jjfg  ^^d  development  throw  a  stumbling  block  in  the 
path  of  many.  If  I  do  not  realize  what  man  is,  if  my 
conceptions  of  him  are  partial,  if  I  omit  from  consider- 
ation his  mental  capacities  in  whole  or  in  part,  or  con- 
ceive of  him  from  analogy  of  mere  mechanical  combi- 
nations and  movements,  I  shall  meet  countless  diffi- 
culties, and  fall  into  many  serious  and  vital  errors. 
Thus,  Materialists  fail  to  distinguish  in  man  the 
rational  from  the  animal;  or  others  as  Leibnitz  and 
Des  Cartes  exaggerate  his  spiritual  nature;  or  others 
with  our  modern  Sensists  confound  intelligence  with 
sensation;  or  finally,  like  the  Determinists,  deprive 
man  of  his  noblest  faculty,  the  crown  and  glory  of  his 
rational  nature  —  free-will. 


(a)  regu- 
lative 
sciences. 


(b)  educa- 
tional 
sciences . 

Peda- 
gogics. 


V. 

Bearings  on  Other  Sciences. 

§21.  Psychology  is  a  theoretical  science.  Its  sub- 
ject-matter and  methods  show  this.  Nevertheless,  it 
has  relations  to  a  number  of  practical  sciences  in  as 
much  as  it  furnishes  a  basis  on  which  they  rest. 

§  22.  Thus  (a)  It  supplies  rules  and  laws  for  the 
regulative  sciences,  so  called  because  they  determine 
the  rules  of  human  thought  and  action.  Hence,  Logic 
and  Ethics  are  based  on  Psychology,  and  take  their 
starting  point  therefrom. 

§  23.  (b)  Again,  it  is  the  basis  for  those  sciences  and 
arts  which  aim  at  influencing  the  minds  of  others. 
Hence,  Education  learns  from  Psychology  the  nature 
of  the  mind,  of  its  laws  and  processes,  and  with  this 
knowledge  is  enabled  to  estimate  the  value  of  the 
agents  or  means  employed  to  gain  the  desired  results. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  \J^ 

Oratory  is  another  illustration.  The  speaker  addresses  Oratory, 
his  audience  with  a  purpose  to  convince  their  minds 
and  commit  them  to  the  acceptance  of  certain  truths 
or  of  a  certain  line  of  conduct.  His  arguments, 
examples,  words,  are  all  directed  to  gain  this  control 
over  them.  He  must  know  how  to  appeal  to  reason, 
how  to  incite  the  passions,  how  to  gain  the  sympathies 
of  his  hearers.  All  this  supposes  the  knowledge  of  the 
mental  processes.  Finally,  Psychology  has  a  practical 
bearing  on  the  arts  of  Politics  and  Government.  As 
such  it  may  be  termed  the  science  of  Human  Nature, 
and  is  the  foundation  of  what  St.  Gresrory  calls  "  The  Govem- 

-.  ,  r  „  ment. 

art  of  arts,  the  government  of  men." 

VI. 

Division. 

§24.  The  division  of  Psychology  is  based  upon  its 
definition.  Psychology  is  the  science  of  the  soul.  The 
soul  exerts  its  activity  in  two  great  channels :  The  cog- 
nitive acts.,  e.  g.,  intellect  and  sensation,  and  the  appe- 
titional  acts,  e.  g.,  volition  and  desire.  Hence,  the 
existence  and  nature  of  the  soul  are  first  to  be  investi- 
gated and  established;  this  is  (a)  "Psychology  of 
the  soul."  With  a  definite  conception  of  the  thinking 
principle  we  can  examine  the  nature  and  modes  of  its 
activities ;  (b)  "  Psychology  of  Cognition  "  or  "  Psy- 
chology of  the  Mind."  Finally,  the  nature  of  the  Will 
and  of  the  emotions  are  set  forth  in  (c)  "  Psychology 
of  the  Will,''  or,  in  common  speech,  "  Psychology  of 
the  Affections."  Thus,  the  Soul,  the  Mind  and  the 
Will  form  the  logical  and  natural  divisions  of  a  com- 
plete knowledge  of  man's  rational  nature. 
3 


l8  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

inJ?of'a         ^  ^5-  ^^^^  following  treatise  is  proposed  as  the  initial 
oKhe'^souL  ^^^P  ^^  ^^^  effort  to  obtain  a  philosophical  knowledge  of 
bllS'Jf       ourselves,    (a)  It  treats  of  the  existence  and  the  nature 
nfe."^^^^^^  of  the  soul.     These  questions  underlie  all  our  studies 
in  mental  and  moral  life.    As  a  logical  necessity  they 
require  a  previous  treatment.    To  investigate  the  oper- 
ations of  the  soul  in  a  scientific  manner  without  know- 
ing its  existence  and  nature  is  to  build  without  a  foun- 
p)iieg-^     dation.    (b)  Because  of  its  neglect  by  contemporary 
modern       writers    on    Psychology.      Sully,    James,^^    Murray, 
Psychol-      Davis,     Koelpe,     Hoffding    and     others,     rigorously 
exclude    it    as    not   pertaining   to    Psychology    as    a 
science.     Hence,  the  phenomena    of    a    "  Psychology 
without  a  soul,"  so  universal  in  our  day,  and  the  con- 
sequent tendency  of  those  studies  to  approximate  to 
Physiology.^^ 
oi^pke-^*^^       §  26.  In  view  of  this  tendency  in  modern  thought  it 
ps^ikS-      is  interesting  and  instructive  to  read  the  vigorous  pro- 
test against  such  teaching  made  by  one  of  the  leading 
contemporary   professors    on    Psychology.     "  In    the 
universal    estimate,    whether    poptilar    or    scientific," 
writes   ]\Ir.   Ladd,   "  the  character  of  the   connection 
which  exists  among  psychic  facts  is  somewhat  peculiar. 
At  the  outset  of  our  investigation  we  wish  to  assume 
this  connection  in  a  manner  as  free  as  possible  from  all 
debatable  metaphysical  tenets.     In  some  manner,  how- 

^^  It  may,  however,  be  said  that  the  assumption  of  such  an 
ego  or  subject  is,  after  all,  extra-psychological.  No  psycholo- 
gist seeks  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  thought  and  feeling 
by  the  aid  of  such  a  conception,  which  consequently  becomes 
a  purely  formal  one.  Sully  "  The  Human  Mind,"  vol.  I,  p.  9. 
James  considers  the  soul-theory  to  be  "  the  line  of  least  logi- 
cal resistence,"  yet  feels  the  necessity  of  assuring  his  readers 
that  he  is  not  guilty  of  accepting  it,  but  considers  a  phenom.e- 
nal  Psychology  amply  sufficient.     Psych,  i,  pp.   181,   182. 

22  Cf.  Hofifding  Outlines  of  Psychology,  pp.  14,  25,  29;  Mur- 
ray Psychology;  Davis'  Elements  of  Psychology;   Koelpe. 


ogy 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  19 

ever,  we  are  obliged  to  assume  it  in  order  to  study  Psychol- 
ogy at  all.  For  this  universal  estimate  assigns  all 
psychic  facts  to  some  psychical  individual,  some  so- 
called  '  mind '  or  '  self.'  Indeed,  the  character  of 
the  consciousness  from  which  this  estimate  springs  is 
such  that  nothing  seems  more  absurd,  more  inconceivable, 
than  the  assumption  of  psychic  facts  which  belong  to  no 
one.  The  phenomena  of  human  consciousness,  in  gen- 
eral, can  be  observed  and  studied  only  on  the  popular 
assumption  that  they  always  appear  as  phenomena  of 
some  so-called  human  being.  All  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness are  facts  either  of  your  mental  life  or  of 
mine,  or  of  some  other  so-called  '  person '  in  the  popu- 
lar sense  of  the  word."  ^^ 

VII. 
Scholastic  Psychology. 
§  2y.  The  principles  set  forth  in  the  following  pages  Historical 
are  the  principles  of  scholastic  philosophy.     Histori-  schoiasti- 
cally  Scholasticism  has  many  claims  to  a  careful  con- 
sideration.    It  is  the  product  of  the  most  intellectual 
era  the  world  has  ever  seen.     It  is  the  greatest  monu- 
ment of  carefully  reasoned  and  connected  thought  that 
the  human  mind  has  produced.     It  gave  precision  and 
scientific  form  to  the  great  system  of  Christian  theol- 
ogy.    In  its  best  and  purest  form  it  lives  in  the  teach- 
ing of  the  Catholic  church.     Her  doctrines  are  worded 
in  the  phraseology  of  St.  Thomas.     When  we  teach 
"  matter  and  form  of  the  Sacraments ;"  when  we  main- 
tain that  "  the  soul  is  the  substantial  form  of  the  body,*' 
we  propose  truths  which  can  only  be  understood  after 
learning  a  fundamental  tenet  of  Scholastic  Philosophy. 

^^  Ladd  Psych.    Descrip.   &   Explan.,   p.   5;   cf.   also,   Prof. 
Bowne  in  "  Metaphysics,  a  Study  of  First  Principles,"  p.  351. 


20  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

tanc?ar"       §  ^^'  Furthermore,  the  problems  which  occupy  the 

tlme^^^^°*  time  and  thought  of  the  present  day  were  not  unknown 

to  St.  Thomas.     He  discusses  them  with  clearness  and 

vigor .^*    Mr.  Huxley  sees  in  it  "  an  open  country  which 

is  amazingly  like  his  dear  native  land."  ^^ 

§  29.  (c)  Finally,  a  brief  review  of  modern  Phil- 
modem  osophy  shows  that  it  has  failed  in  the  attempt  to  estab- 
p  1  osop  y  j.gj^  ^  scientific  theory  of  the  world  and  of  man.  Des 
Cartes  is  its  founder.  His  definition  of  substance  is 
the  basis  of  Spinoza's  Pantheism;  his  theory  of  the 
union  of  soul  and  body  gave  rise  to  the  doctrine  of 
exaggerated  spiritualism  formulated  by  Malebranche 
and  Leibnitz  and  developed  in  the  materialistic  reaction 
of  the  eighteenth  century  which,  in  its  inception,  was  a 
vindication  of  the  unity  of  man.  His  greatest  disciple 
was  Locke.  The  veiled  empiricism  of  Locke  became 
sensism  with  Condillac,  and  thus  furnished  a  source  of 
materialism.  The  phenomenalism  of  Locke  was  the 
source  of  Berkeley's  IdeaHsm,  and  through  Berkeley 
of  Hume's  specticism.  Hume's  influence  was  great. 
Kant  wrote  the  *'  Critic  "  in  the  hope  of  putting  philos- 
ophy again  on  a  sound  basis.  His  work  is  judged  by 
results.  In  Germany  Fichte,  Schelling  and  Hegel, 
taught  idealistic  pantheism  and  gave  rise  to  the  materi- 
alistic revolt  of  the  past  generation.  Hamilton 
attempted  to  reconcile  Reid  and  Kant.  He  broaches 
theories  which  have  produced  the  agnosticism  of  Hux- 

34  Cf.  I.,  q.  45;  q.  67,  a.  4;  q.  71,  q.  72,  a,  I;  q.  i8;cf.  Azarias 
Philosophy  of  Literature,  p.  97,  sq. 

^  Scient.  &  Pseudo-Scient.  Realism,  in  Essays  Upon  Some 
Controv.  Quest.,  p.  186,  sq.  On  the  objection  that  Schol- 
astic Philosophy  is  unintelligible,  cf.  Fr.  Harper  S.  J. 
"  Metaphy  of  Schools,"  Vol.  I,  intr.;  "  Lectures  by  a  Certain 
Professor." 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  21 

ley.  In  the  hands  of  Mill,  Hamilton  was  an  easy  vic- 
tim. Coming  from  Hume  in  direct  line  we  have  the 
school  of  French  and  English  positivists,  the  materi- 
ahsm  of  Priestly,  the  associationism  of  Mill,  Bain  and 
Spencer.  The  failure  of  modern  Philosophy  is  shown 
in  the  recent  attempt  to  reconstruct  a  system,  in  the 
cry  of  "  Back  to  Kant,"  and  in  the  "  Neo  Kantian  "  or 
"  Neo  Hegelian  "  teaching  of  our  day.  But  this  teach- 
ing is  only  ephemeral.  With  that  intimate  knowledge 
of  men  which  marks  the  statesman  and  the  philosophic 
mind,  with  that  wisdom  which  guides  the  elect  of  the 
Holy  Spirit,  our  great  PontifT,  Leo  XHI,  has  per- 
ceived the  intellectual  anarchy  of  our  time  and  has 
found  a  remedy.  This  is  the  study  of  Scholastic  Philos- 
ophy as  proposed  by  St.  Thomas,  its  greatest  teacher.^ 

^  Cf.  Encyc.  Aeterni  Patris. 


PROEMIUM. 

psychor^  §  I.  Psychology  of  the  Soul  treats  of  the  existence 
souUs*^*^  and  the  nature  of  the  soul,  of  its  union  with  the  body, 
necessary,  of  its  origin  and  duration.  These  problems  are  at  the 
basis  of  our  conscious  life.  They  are  assumed  in  every 
treatise  of  Experimental  or  Descriptive  Psychology. 
To  the  inquisitive  mind  of  the  youth  who  learns  in  the 
catechism  that  he  has  a  soul,  and  that  his  highest  aim 
is  to  mould  its  life  on  the  principles  of  Christian  faith, 
these  questions  rise,  it  may  be,  in  simpler  form.  The 
thoughtful  student,  hampered  by  erroneous  meta- 
physical notions,  or  frightened  by  the  exaggerated 
claims  of  physical  science,  sees  them  in  all  their  depth 
and  perplexity.  He  despairs  of  a  sound  solution,  and 
tries  to  satisfy  himself  in  tracing  the  development  of 
mental  life,  or  faces  the  question  manfully,  and  pro- 
poses an  explanation  which  is  at  variance  with  known 
facts  of  individual  experience.  There  is  not  one  who 
has  not  felt  the  demand  made  upon  himself  to  explain 
the  nature  of  his  own  being,  and  who  has  not,  with 
more  or  less  persistence  and  success,  attempted  its 
solution.^ 
^?^  .  ^       §  2.  The  g-eneral  line  of  reasoninof  is  from  effect  to 

method  of         ^  fc>  ^ 

reasoning  cause,  from  phenomena  to  their  subject  and  agent.  In 
lowed.  the  operations  of  mind  and  of  will  revealed  in  indi- 
vidual conscious  life,  is  found  existence  of  their 
source  or  principle,  which  is  called  the  human  soul. 
From  the  kind  of  activity  and  the  nature  of  the  action, 
is  inferred  the  nature  of  the  agent;  from  the  perfec- 

iCf.  Brownson's  Quar.  Rev.,  3d  Series,  vol.  Ill;  "Ques- 
tions of  the  Soul,"  S.  Augustine  de  Quant.  An.  n.  i. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  23 

tion  of  the  effect  is  ascertained  the  perfection  of  the 
cause.  The  conclusions  follow  one  after  the  other  in 
logical  sequence;  united  they  unfold  what  is  sought  for. 

§  ^.  A  distinction  is  drawn  in  Logic  between   the  pescrip- 

^  «^  ^  ,      tion  and 

definition  and  the  descripton  of  a  thing.  We  are  said  definition. 
to  describe  a  thing  when  we  separate  it  from  other 
objects  in  a  general  way,  by  calling  attention  to  the 
function  it  performs,  to  the  manner  of  its  production 
or  to  some  general  characteristic.  We  define  a  thing, 
however,  when  we  reveal  its  constitution  and  nature. 
The  former  logically  and  naturally  leads  up  to  the  lat- 
ter. A  description  presents  to  the  mind  an  object  dis- 
tinct from  others,  and  invested  with  one  or  more 
attractive  marks.  The  mind  is  aroused  and  stimulated 
to  examine  more  minutely,  to  penetrate  the  outer  form 
and  lay  bare  its  intimate  constitution.  This  it  does  by 
the  acts  of  analysis,  of  comparison,  of  classification, 
etc.,  but  not  always  with  the  same  success,  e.  g.,  in 
physical  objects.    The  result  is  the  definition. 

§  4.  It  would,  therefore,  be  contrary  to  the  rules  of  Descrip- 

•1  .  .        .    \  .        ,  \    ^    .  .  ,    ,      tion  of  the 

right  reasonmg  to  give  in  this  place  a  definition  of  the  soui. 
soul.  The  aim  of  the  work  is  to  do  that.  One  quality 
after  another  is  taken  up  and  examined.  Only  at  the 
conclusion,  therefore,  can  we  have  that  knowledge  of 
the  soul  which  would  justify  a  definition.  Neverthe- 
less, we  cannot  speak  of  something  which  we  do  not 
know.  Some  notion  is  necessary,  even  though  it  be 
vague.  Here  we  ask  for  that  knowledge  which  is  suffi- 
cient to  mark  the  soul  as  the  definite  object  of  our 
thoughts,  and  distinct  from  all  others.  This  is  attained 
by  saying  that  the  soul  is  the  principle  by  which  we 
live  and  move,  perceive  and  understand.^ 

2  St.  Thomas  Qiiaest.  de  an  II,  2;  Aug.  Enarr,  in  Ps.  137 
n.  4;  Lib.  de  Beata  Vita  n.  7. 


24  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

assSSp^°        §  5.  In  thus  telling  what  the  soul  is,  we  state  a  fact. 

tion.  j^s  truth  is  attested  by  individual  experience.     We 

know  that  we  have  the  life  of  the  body,  of  sensation 
and  of  thought.  This  life  is  manifested  in  certain 
forms  of  activity.  A  body  deprived  of  life  is 
dead.^  Accepting  the  fact  of  life,  we  conclude 
that  it  must  have  a  cause.  There  is  no  ne- 
cessity to  make  assumptions  with  "  the  right 
reserved,  as  the  result  of  the  process  of  investigation, 
to  criticise,  to  adopt  or  to  reject,  to  modify  and  to 
restrict  or  expand  —  this  very  same  assumption  with 
which  the  investigation  began."  ^  Such  a  standpoint 
is  illogical,  produces  confusion  and  a  dissatisfaction 
for  the  subject  treated.^ 

2  Cf.  Aug.  Serm.  65,  n.  6. 

^Ladd  Phil,  of  Mind,  p.  55. 

5  Utrum  aeris  sit  vis  vivendi,  reminiscendi,  intelligendi, 
volendi,  cogitandi,  sciendi,  judicandi;  an  ignis,  an  cerebri, 
an  sanguinis,  an  atomorum,  an  praeter  usitata  quattuor  ele- 
menta  quinti  nescio  cujus  corporis,  an  ipsius  carnis  nostri 
compago  vel  temperamentum  haec  eifficere  valeat,  dubitave- 
runt  honimes;  et  alius  hoc  alius  alind  affirmare  conatus  est. 
Vivere  tamen  et  meminisse,  et  intelligere,  et  velle,  et  cogi- 
tare,  et  scire,  et  judicare  quis  dubitet."  Aug.  de  Trin.  Ix, 
n.  14. 


SUBSTANTIALITY  OF  SOUL. 

§  I.  All  things  exist  either  as  substance  or  as  modi- 
fications of  substance;  they  have  either  a  substantial 
reality  or  they  are  activities,  qualities,  dispositions  of 
that  reality.  Aristotle  enumerates  nine  classes  of  acci- 
dents, or,  as  they  may  be  called,  substantial  modifica- 
tions; these,  with  the  one  class  of  substance,  make  up 
the  ten  categories  of  real  beings.^  The  discussion  of 
the  soul's  reality,  therefore,  is  primarily  resolved  into 
the  question:  Is  the  soul  a  substance  or  only  a  modi- 
fication of  a  substance,  i.  e.,  of  the  body.^ 

I. 

Modern  and  Scholastic  Teaching. 

§  2.  At  this  initial  point  of  our  investigation  modern  ^?derii^^ 
Philosophy  separates  from  Scholasticism.     Erroneous  ^^un|°J^^ 
opinions   on   the   notion   of   substance   lead   to   fatal  J^J-qI  ^f 
errors  in  its  applications.     It  is  impossible  to  have  a  substance, 
true  conception  of  the    Soul's    substantiality,    if    the 
wrong    notion    of    substance  itself  is  held.     Unable, 
then,  to  know  what  the  soul  really  is,  how  can  I  speak 
with  correctness  of  its  properties  or  of  its  relation  to 
the  body?     My  thought    and    language    are    vitiated 
throughout.    Such  is  the  condition  of  those  who  have 
followed  Modern  Philosophy. 

§  3.  Modern  writers,  who  have  eiTed  on  the  sub-  Sof^^' 
stantiality  of  the  soul,  may  be  classed  into  (i)  those  ^Sters 

^  Cf.  Aristotle  Metaphysics   i,  5. 

2  Cf.  Prof.  Bowne,  "  Metaphy,  a  Study  of  First  Principles," 
p.  352;  Aug.  de  Trin,  x.  n.  I5.. 

4 


2^  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

logica?^^    who  hold  the  soul  is  not  a  reality  but    only   a   logi- 
subject       cal     subject     of     our     mental     acts,     e.     g.,     Kant, 
(2)  Soul  is    Wundt.     (2)  Those     who     contend     that     the     soul 
bundfeof    ^^    ^^^^    ^    bundle    of    qualities,    e.    g.,    the    school 
sensations  q{   Associationists,    e.    g.,    Hume.^.     (3)    Those   who 
unknown^   affirm    that    the    soul    is    unknown    and    unknow- 
knowabie    ^^^^'  ^^^  Y^t  postulate  it  as  the  subject  of  our  con- 
scious states,  e.  g.,   Locke,^  Thomson,^  Spencer,^  S. 
Laing,''  and  James.^      "  The   term   soul  may  be   re- 
garded as  another  synonym  for  the  unknown  basis  of 
mental    phenomena."^     Prof.    Bowne    says    that    we 
m)souf^  ^^  know  nothing  of  the  nature  of  substance.-^"     (4)  Those 
who  deny  its  existence  altogether,  i.  e..  Materialists, 
ex  gr.  Tyndall,  Huxley. 
teidlfng!°        §4-  Scholastic  Philosophy,  with  Aristotle  and  the 
Christian  Fathers,  vindicates  the  true  dignity  of  man 
by  proclaiming  the  soul  to  be  a  substantial  principle. 

3  Human  Nature,  p.  i,  §  6;  Mill.  Davis:  "It  will 
be  better,  however,  to  exclude  all  consideration  of 
substance  and  use  the  word  mind  to  stand  merely 
for  a  complement  of  activities."  Elem.  of  Psych.,  'pp. 
52,  132.  Thus  Hoffding:  By  mind  we  mean  nothing  more 
than  the  sum  of  all  those  inner  experiences,  viz.,  sensations 
and  ideas,  feelings  and  decisions,  cf.  Outlines  of  Psychology, 
pp.  12,  29;  cf.  Sully,  Human  Mind  i,  p.  134.  Hence,  the  mod- 
ern school  of  Phenomenal  Psychology  or  "  Psychology  with- 
out a  soul,"  e.  g..  Sully,  Hoffding,  Murray,  James,  cf.  Jowett's 
Plato,  vol.  IV,  p.  175. 

* "  Our  specific  ideas  of  substances  are  nothing  else  but 
a  collection  of  a  certain  number  of  simple  ideas,  considered 
as  united  in  one  thing."  Ess.  on  the  Human  Understanding, 
B  II,  ch.  23,  §  14;  cf.  also  B  I,  §  18;  B  II,  ch.  13,  §  19,  c.  23, 
§  i;  ch.  23,  §§  2,  4. 

5  System  of  Psychology,  vol.  i,  p.  114. 

6  Princ.  of  Psych.,  p.  2,  ch.   i. 

^  A  Modern  Zoroastrian,  p.   126. 

8  Vol.   I,  pp.  355,  338. 

9  Hamilton  Metaph.  Bowen,  ch.  VI,  p.  88;  cf.  Hamilton  in 
Reid  nA,  §  2;  Metaph.,  p.  97. 

10  Cf.  Metaph.,  p.  7. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  2*^ 

St.  Thomas  refutes  Alexander,  who  said  the  soul  was  a 
determinate  mode  of  mixture  of  the  human  body. 
Empedocles,  who  held  that  the  soul  was  a  certain  har- 
mony.-^^  Those  who  maintained  that  the  soul  was  a 
bodily  substance;  Galen,  who  contends  that  the  soul 
was  a  temperament  of  the  body,^^  and  defends  the 
teaching  of  Aristotle.^^ 

II. 
Proof. 

§  5.  The  proof  is  drawn  from  an  analysis  of  the  con-  Proof, 
cept  of  substances.     Substance  is  defined  as  ''  id  quod  ^f^^];^^ 
per  se  stat,"  i.  e.,  a  being  which  exists,  per  se,  in  the  stance. 
sense  that  it  does  not  need  another  being  as  a  subject 
in  which  it  may  inhere,   e.   g.,  tree  is  a  substance, 
whereas  color  is  not,  because  it  can  only  exist  by  inher- 
ing in  some  other  thing. 

§  6.  A  more  searching  examination  of  this  definition  Analysis 
reveals  the  simple  elements  which  go  to  make  it  up.  definition. 
In  the  concept  of  substance  we  distinguish :  (a)  Being,  (a)  being, 
for  it  is  a  real  existing  entity  of  which  the  mind  has 
the  intuition,     (b)  Potency,  for  every  being  possesses  (b)  po- 
activities  which  flow  from  its  essence,  the  knowledge  of 
which  enables  us  to  form  some  conception  of  its  nature. 
It  was  this  potency,  inherent  in  substance,  which  Leib- 
nitz   emphasized    in    defining    substance    as    "  being 
possessing  active  power."     The  definition  is  correct  as 
far  as  it  goes,  but  is  insufficient  and  incomplete,     (c)  (c)  stabu- 
Stability:  The  fundamental  element  in  the  notion  of  ^  ^* 
substance.     As  we  look  out  into  the  world  about  us, 

11  Cf.  Aristotle's  Psychology,  by  E.  Wallace,  BI,  ch.  iv. 

^2  Complexio,  cf.  Aug.  de  Trin.  x,  n.  9,  10,  11. 

^  Cf.  S.  Thomas  Contra  Gentes  III,  ch.  61,  62,  63,  64,  65. 


28  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

two  great  facts  are  presented  to  our  intelligence:  The 
changes  and  the  permanence  of  things.  Everywhere 
changes  take  place;  there  is  a  constant  flux  and  reflux; 
what  is  now  was  so  in  the  past.  Heraclitus  based  his 
philosophy  on  this  fact;  his  fundamental  principle  was 
Travra  ps'tv.  Every  individual  object  takes  on  new 
appearances  under  the  influence  of  weather  or  of 
other  natural  causes.  Nevertheless,  amid  these  con- 
stant changes  there  is  observed  at  the  same  time  a  cer- 
tain stability.  The  tree,  e.  g.,  buds  in  early  spring,  is 
soon  covered  with  foliage,  it  flowers,  the  fruit  appears, 
grows  to  ripeness,  the  leaves  assume  the  many  rich 
hues  of  autumn,  slowly  drop,  the  branches  are  bare  and 
bleak;  yet  the  tree  abides  and  will,  year  after  year,  go 
through  the  same  round  without  ceasing  to  be  what  it 
is.  So  you,  e.  g.,  have  changed  very  much  in  the 
course  of  years,  from  childhood  to  youth,  to  manhood, 
to  old  age;  you  have  changed  in  your  disposition,  in 
your  hopes  and  ambitions,  in  your  joys  and  sorrows, 
but  you  remain  the  same.  It  is  you  who  have  under- 
gone all  and  suffered  all.  The  hopes  and  fears,  joys 
and  sorrows  come  and  go  with  varying  intensity  and 
duration  like  clouds  that  pass  over  the  face  of  the 
heavens,  some  quickly  flitting  by,  others  moving  low 
and  heavy.  What  is  abiding  and  stable  is  your  own 
self.  By  stability,  however,  Ave  do  not  understand  the 
indestructibility  of  an  object.^*  God's  power  is  infinite. 
Destruction  is  commensurate  with  creation.  What 
He  has  made,  the  same  He  can  destroy.     Moreover, 

i^Thus  Kant,  "That  I,  as  a  thinking  being,  continue  for 
myself  and  naturally  neither  arise  nor  perish  is  no  legitimate 
deduction  from  the  concept  of  substance."  Kant  Trans. 
Dialec,  p.  285;  Lotze  also  holds  that  the  "  conception  of  *  sub- 
stance,' l)er  se,  contains  the  predicate  of  indestructibility." 
cf.  Lotze  Outlines  of  Psychology,  ed.  by  Prof.  Ladd,  p.  112. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  29 

natural  forces,  either  of  themselves  or  under  man's 
directing  power,  can  cause  the  dissolution  of  many 
things.  Hence  the  word  has  a  relative  not  an  absolute  ^f^ac'jy®^* 
meaning,  (d)  This  element  of  stability  discloses  ^®''*^- 
naturally  the  final  element  in  the  composition  of  sub- 
stance, viz.,  substance  is  viewed  as  subjectum  acciden- 
tium,  the  subject  of  accidents.  An  accident  is  a  change 
or  modification  affecting  some  object,  e.  g.,  the  quali- 
ties as  color,  etc.,  the  forms  and  appearances  of  a  thing 
are  called  accidents.  The  thing  itself,  which  abides 
constant  and  identical  amid  the  variations  of  modifica- 
tions affecting  it,  is  considered  as  the  subject  in  which 
they  inhere.  Thus,  e.  g.,  I  am  variously  affected  in 
the  course  of  the  day  by  feelings  of  sadness,  of  indig- 
nation, of  resentment,  of  confidence,  of  joy.  They 
come  and  go  and  are  said  to  modify  me.  I  am,  there- 
fore, the  subject  which  suffers  them;  they  exist  in  me 
and  affect  me.^^ 

III. 

Application  to  the  Soul. 

§  7.  The  analysis  of  the  notion  of  substance  into  the  Ss  bSJd^" 
elements  of  being,  potency,  stability,  subject  of  accidents y  <^^^^<^*s- 
is  not  fanciful  deduction  from  abstract  thought;  nor 
is  it  an  unwarranted  assumption;  nor  a  substance 
unknown  and  unknowable  with  Locke  and  Spencer. 
Our  conception  of  substance  springs  from  individual 
experience,  and  its  analysis  is  based  on  and  verified  by 

i^In  being,  per  se,  Ladd  seems  to  conceive  either  "  beings 
abstracted  from  all  concrete  attributes  or  modes  of  activity 
in  relation  to  other  beings,  or  being  that  exists  totally  Isolated 
in  itself  and  by  Itself  (Phil,  of  Mind,  p.  117),  and  "  once  and 
for  all  let  it  be  tossed  over  into  the  death-kingdom  of  mean- 
ingless abstractions.  And  why  should  any  one  feel  that  real 
souls  have  suffered  thereby  the  slightest  loss."     P.  123. 


30  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

the  same  experience.    We  deal  with  facts  in  the  world 
of  facts.^^ 
such^a^^  ^^      §  ^-  Consciousness  reveals  our  inner  experience.    It 
being.         makes  us  aware  of  our  thoughts  and  sensations,  of  our 
volitions  and  feelings.    It  tells  me  that  I  think,  that  I 
will,  that  I  feel.    In  the  one  and  same  act,  by  which  the 
thought  or  feeling  is  grasped,  is  apprehended  the  subject 
which  thinks  or  feels.    This  subject  is  the  /,  the  Ego  or 
the  Me,    The  Ego  is  not  known  independently  of  its 
modifications;  nor  are  the  modifications  known  inde- 
pendently of  the  Ego;  but  both  are  known  in  the  one 
indivisible  act.    Just  as  in  external  nature  substance  is 
■     never  perceived  without  qualities,  nor  qualities  without 
substance;  but  in  the  one  concrete  act  both  are  appre- 
hended.^''   Thus,    the    Ego,    with    its    modifications, 
become  the  subject-matter  of  consciousness.     In  this 
It  has  the    very  fact  the  notion  of  substance  is  implied.     In  the 

elements  of  -^  ^ 

(a)  being.    Ego  are  revealed  (a)  the  element  of  being.    I  am  a  real 

existing     being.^^      The     knowledge     of     the     /     is 

(b)  po-        an    intuition    of    consciousness,      (b)    Potency.     The 

activity  of  the  Ego  is  a  fact  of  consciousness. 
I  act  in  many  ways,  and  my  activity  is  mani- 
fested variously.  I  am  conscious  of  a  source  of 
energy  within  me  which  is  never  exhausted.  Desire, 
ambition,  divers  motives,  incite  me  to  action.     I  reach 

i^Mr.  James  holds  that  the  only  positive  determination  of 
substance  is  Being.  Psych.,  vol.  I,  p.  344.  This  is  not  correct, 
as  the  analysis  shows.  Balmes  enumerates  five  elements  of 
substance:  Being,  unity,  potency,  permanence,  subject  of  acci- 
dents, cf.  Fundamental  Philosophy,  vol.  II.  Dr.  McCosh 
gives  three:  Being,  unity,  potency,  cf.  McCoch  Intuitions  of 
the  Mind.  But  his  analysis  is  not  complete;  the  characteristic 
note  of  substance,  i.  e.,  its  abiding  power  amid  various  modi- 
fications, is  not  mentioned. 

i^By  this  there  is  no  desire  to  deny  that  accidents  can  exist 
without  substance,  e.  g.,  as  in  the  Eucharist  the  accidents  of 
bread  remain  while  the  substance  is  changed. 

i^Cf.  Spencer  First  Principles,  p.  64. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  3I 

out  in  thought  and  in  hope  to  objects  beyond.  The 
power  within  me  is  unfaihng  and  unHmited.  It  throbs 
within  my  brain.^^  It  pulsates  in  every  nerve  and 
artery  of  my  body;  it  pictures  upon  my  imagination 
the  most  varied  and  striking  objects;  in  my  intellect  it 
is  busied  with  judgments,  reasonings  and  inferences; 
it  makes  my  will  strong  and  unbending;  it  is  mani- 
fested in  love  or  hatred,  in  anger,  pity  or  revenge. 
Hence,  Mr.  James'  resolution  of  all  I  am  and  know 
myself  to  be,  into  mere  passive  content  of  feeling,  is 
false.^°  In  all  my  conscious  acts  I  am  active  and  know 
myself  to  be  active;  I  am  conscious  not  only  of 
passive  impressions,  but  of  doing  something.^^ 
This  activity  working  here  and  now  within  me,  and 
conscious  of  its  activity,  is  no  figment  of  the  imagina- 
tion, "no  transcendental  being  of  inflated  meta- 
physics," but  something  real.  It  is  a  real  energy 
revealed  in  the  analysis  of  every  conscious  act."^ 

§9.  Stability:  Consciousness  reveals  a  constant  .^^^^  ^*^^^^- 
change  in  the  world  within  us.  Thought  succeeds 
thought;  emotion  gives  way  to  emotion.  To-day  I  am 
oppressed  with  a  feeling  of  sadness  and  despondency. 
Yesterday  I  was  happy  and  joyous.  To-morrow,  per- 
haps care  and  responsibility  will  affect  me.  Neverthe-  . 
less,  in  the  midst  of  all  these  changes  /  remain  the 
same.     This  Stability  of  the  Ego  enables  me  to  look 

i^This  meets  the  contention  of  Dubois  Reymond  that  men- 
tal phenomena  stand  outside  the  law  of  causality,  and  show  a 
breach  in  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason,  cf.  "  On  Limits 
to  the  Knowledge  of  Nature,"  Dubois  Reymond,  1872. 

20Psychology,  vol.  I,  ch.  IX,  X. 

2iCf.  Spencer  First  Principles,  §  26. 

22The  failure  to  detect  the  elements  of  potency  as  having  its 
source  in  substance  has  led  Hume,  Kant,  Fichte,  Hegel, 
Wundt,  to  consider  the  soul  as  activity  only.  cf.  Davis  Ele- 
ments of  Psych.,  p.  I32n.  Hence  the  just  criticism  made  of 
their  writings  as  "  Psychology  without  a  soul." 


dents. 


32  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

back  on  the  years  gone  by  and  collect  all  the  chang- 
ing experiences  of  a  life.  Childhood,  youth,  manhood, 
are  so  many  states  through  which  I  have  passed.  They 
appear  different  because  of  the  difference  in  my 
thoughts  and  affections,  in  the  circumstances  and  the 
duties  in  which  I  was  employed.  Yet  they  run  into 
one  another;  there  is  no  break  in  the  continuity;  and 
this  is  due  to  the  self-same  abiding  Ego.^ 

of  acc^^^°*  §  10.  This  last  element  naturally  follows  from  sta- 
bility. The  fact  that  /  abide  amid  the  constant  change 
of  emotion,  reveals  the  fact  that  these  are  only  modifi- 
cations of  the  Ego.  I  am  affected  by  them.  They  are 
referred  to  and  centered  in  me  as  in  a  subject.  They  are 
manifold,  but  I  am  one;  they  are  diverse,  but  I  am  the 
same;  they  come  and  go  in  constant  succession,  while 
I  abide.  Consciousness  reveals  the  ego  as  the  subject 
which  receives,  remembers,  compares  and  combines  or 
separates  the  ideas,  voHtions  and  feeHngs  which  make 
up  my  life.^* 

Conciu-  §  II.  The  elements,  therefore,  which  go  to  make  up 

the  notion  of  the  substance  are  found  realized  within 
us.  In  each  and  every  one  there  is  a  substantial  prin- 
ciple which  is  the  source  and  basis  of  his  life.  This 
substance  is  the  soul.  Hence  we  can  say  that  the  sub- 
stantiality of  the  soul  is  an  intuition  of  consciousness. 
In  face  of  this  what  can  we  say  of  James,  who  holds 
that  the  substantialist  view  of  the  soul  has  no  standing 
in  experience  and  is  quite  needless  for  expressing  the 
actual  subjective  phenomena  of  consciousness  as  they 

23Bp.  Temple,  from  the  knowledge  of  the  stability  of  the 
Ego,  draws  an  argument  against  the  Relativity  of  Knowledge, 
viz.,  that  we  cannot  know  things  in  themselves,  cf.  Bamp. 
Lect.   1884,  Lee.  11. 

^^Leibnitz  Nouv.  Ess.  Hi,  c.  27. 


sion. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  33 

appear.^^  "  Or  again  Transcendentalism  (i.  e.,  of 
Kant)  is  only  substantialism  grown  shamefaced  and 
the  Ego  onl}^  a  cheap  and  nasty  edition  of  the  soul."^^ 

IV. 
The  Concept  of  Substance  More  Clearly 

Defined. 

§  12.  Here    it   is    necessary    to    be    on    our    guard  Jf^^naivz- 
against  confusion  of  ideas.     Clearness  and  precision  jjfjf^^|' 
in  the   elem.entary   conceptions   are   ollen    neglected,  ^2>n?^" 
with  the  result  that  carefully  reasoned  conclusions  and 
elaborate  systems  of  knowledge  are  faulty  throughout. 
So,  too,  in  this  question.     At  the    basis    of    all    our 
knowledge    are    found    intuitions,    i.    e.,    self-evident 
truths.^^    The  fundamental  notions  are  intuitions.   The 
primary  principles  are  intuitions.     Thus  for  example 
the  concepts  of  being,  of  substance  are  intuitions.  This 
is  true  of  internal  as  well  as  external  experience.     A 
serious  difificulty,  however,  is  to  give  precise  definitions 
to  these  elementary  notions.    They  are  so  simple  that 
we  are  inclined  to  accept  them  readily  without  pausing 
to  examine  in  what  way  one  differs  from  another. 

§  13.  Thus  in  the  concept  of  substance  I  find  the 
elements  of  being,  of  potency,  of  stability  and  of  the  between  ^'^ 

substance , , 

25  Psych.,  vol.  I,  p.  344.  Snce!' 

26  Prin.  of  Psych.,  vol.  I,  p.  365.  "  Nullo  modo 
recte  dicitur  sciri  aliqua  res,  dum  ejus  ignoratiir 
substantia.  Quapropter,  cum  se  mens  novit,  substan- 
tiam  suam  novit;  et  cum  de  se  certa  est,  de  substantia 
sua  certa  est."  Aug.  de  Trin.  x,  n.  16.  "Nihil  enim  tarn 
novit  mens,  quam  id  quod  sibi  praesto  est:  nee  menti  magis 
quidquam  praesto  est  quam  ipsa  sibi."  ib.  xiv,  n.  7.  "  Cog- 
noscat  (mens)  ergo  semetipsam,  nee  quasi  absentem  se 
quaerat,  sed  intentionem  voluntatis  qua  per  alia  vagabatur, 
statuat  in  semetipsam,  et  se  cogitet.  Ita  videbit  quod  num- 
quam  se  non  amaverit,  numquam  nescierit."    de  Trin.  x,  11, 

27  Cf.  G.  W.  Ward  Philos.  of  Theism. 


34  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

subject  of  accidents.  All  these  are  integral  elements 
of  the  concept;  the  characteristic  and  distinctive  ele- 
ments are  stability  and  the  subject  of  accidents.  Now, 
any  being,  of  which  these  are  verified,  is  a  substance, 
e.  g.,  an  angel,  man,  brute,  tree,  stone  are  substances. 
They  are  beings,  possessing  activities  and  abide  in  spite 
of  successive  changes.  But  when  we  try  to  find  out 
what  kind  of  substances  these  are,  or  in  what  way  one 
differs  from  another,  we  have  passed  beyond  the  con- 
cept of  substance  and  are  occupied  with  that  of  essence. 
For  the  essence  of  a  thing  is  that  which  makes  it  what 
it  is.  Thus  it  is  evident  that  a  distinction  exists 
between  the  substance  and  the  essence  of  an  object. 
That  a  thing  is  a  substance  we  know  by  intuition ;  what 
however,  is  its  constitution  only  comes  to  us  after  rea- 
soning on  its  properties,  and  very  often,  especially  in 
physical  substances,  remains  unknown,  e.  g.,  that  a 
tree  is  a  substance  is  evident;  but  what  makes  it  a  tree 
is  an  inquiry  into  its  essence.  In  like  manner  the 
substantiality  of  the  soul  is  an  intuition.  The  confu- 
sion of  the  concepts  "  substance  "  and  "  essence  "  per- 
meates English  Psychology  from  the  time  of  Locke. 
Instead  of  a  definition  "  of  substance  "  in  reality  a  defi- 
nition of  ''essence"  has  been  proposed;  they  have 
passed  by  the  fact  in  the  effort  to  explain  the  nature 
of  the  fact.  Thus  we  have  the  ''  unknown  substance  " 
of  Locke,  "  the  unknown  something  behind  and  under 
phenomena "  of  Hamilton,  the  "  unknownable "  of 
Spencer.^ 

28  The  conclusion  drawn  was  that  the  substantiality  of  the 
soul  is  an  intuition  of  consciousness.  By  this  I  mean  a  self- 
evident  truth.  To  explain:  (i)  We  must  distinguish  between 
direct  and  reflex  knowledge;  direct  knowledge  is  had  from  the 
immediate  presence  of  the  object;  reflex  is  the  act  of  the  mind 
revolving  the  direct  knowledge  for  the  purpose  of  analysis 
or  of  clearer  perception.     (2)  The    elements    of    the    notion 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  35 

14.  But  it  is  false  to  suppose  that  an  intuition  of  the  Sj^resuit 

of  r> 
ing. 


substantiality  of  the  soul  should  enable  me  to  see  into  °^  ^^eason 


its  intimate  constitution;  that  I  should  detect  at  a 
glance  and  unfold  its  secret  springs  of  action;  that 
there  should  be  no  hesitation  or  doubt  or  discussion 
about  it.  This  is  a  confusion  of  concepts  and  a  logical 
fallacy.  The  concept  of  a  particular  essence  or  nature, 
which  is  essence  viewed  as  a  source  of  activity,  is  only 
obtained  after  reasoning  from  certain  data.^^ 

§  15.  These  data  are,  e.  g.,  that  it  is  a  substance,  that 
it  acts  in  such  a  manner,  that  it  has  certain  qualities 
or  characteristics.  Then  by  a  process  of  reasoning 
we  infer  what  must  be  the  nature  of  the  substance,  after 
an  analogy  to  our  inference  of  a  man's  character  from 
his  words  and  actions.  This  is  true  of  external  and 
of  internal  experience.  Thus  an  inquiry  whether  or 
not  the  soul  is  a  substance,  is  not  an  investigation  of  its 
nature.  The  former  is  only  preparatory  to  the  latter. 
Of  the  one  we  have  an  intuition;  the  other  is  the  pro- 
duct of  discursive  thought.^"     It  is  evident  that  Mr. 

of  substance  are  helng^  potency,  stabilitij,  subject  of  modi- 
fications; now  the  two  former,  i.  e.,  being  and  potency  are 
grasped  by  the  act  of  consciousness  alone;  the  other  two,  i.  e., 
stability  and  subject  of  modifications  are  known  by  the  pres- 
ent act  of  consciousness  joined  to  the  act  of  memory.  In 
stating  that  the  notion  of  the  soul's  substance  is  self-evident, 
I  refer  only  to  the  direct  and  ordinary  knowledge  or  convic- 
tion which  every  thinking  being  has,  in  holding  that  he  is 
some  being.  The  reflex  knowledge  or  the  analysis  of  this 
conviction  is  the  work  of  the  psychologist.  Thus  Fr.  Har- 
per says  that  the  conviction  of  the  soul's  substantiality  is  a 
"  spontaneous  judgment."  cf.  Metaphysics  of  the  Schools, 
Vol.   II,  p.  405-407. 

29  The  term  '*  intuition  "  is  used  in  its  scholastic  sense  as  a 
"  self-evident  truth."  It  has  no  reference,  therefore,  to  the 
"  sense-perception "  of  Kant  or  the  "  innate  idea "  of  Des 
Cartes;  in  both  senses  modern  writers  employ  the  word. 

2°  St.  Thomas  expresses  this  distinction  of  concepts  with  his 
usual  clearness:  "Ad  primam  cognitionem  de  mente  haben- 


certain. 


36  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

James  does  not  refer  to  Scholastic  Philosophy  v/hen 
he  writes :  "  The  commonest  spirtuaHstic  opinion  is 
that  the  soul  or  subject  of  the  mental  Hfe  is  a  metaphy- 
sical entity,  inaccessible  to  direct  knowledge,  and  that 
the  various  mental  states  and  operations  of  which  we 
reflectively  become  aware  are  objects  of  an  inner  sense 
which  does  not  lay  hold  of  the  real  agent  in  itself,  any 
more  than  sight  or  hearing  gives  us  direct  knowledge 
of  matter  in  itself.  From  this  point  of  view  introspec- 
tion is  of  course  incompetent  to  lay  hold  of  anything 
more  than  the  soul's  phenomena.  But  even  then  the 
question  remains.  How  well  can  it  know  the  phenom- 
ena themselves  ?^^ 
ciu^sion"'  §  16.  We  may  hold  then,  as  certain  that  the  soul  is  a 
substance.^^  The  testimony  of  consciousness  concern- 
ing the  fact  cannot  be  gainsaid.  I  hold  it  so,  I  am  con- 
vinced because  it  is  self-evident.  We  cannot,  there- 
fore, admit  the  contentions:  (a)  Of  Locke,  who  holds 
that  the  soul  is  a  substance  but  that  we  know  this  with 
full  certitude  from  Christian  revelation  alone  and  that 
reason  can  give  us  only  some  probability.^^  (b)  Of 
Lewes,  that  the  substantiality  of  the  soul  as  well  as  its 
simplicity  are  assumptions.^ 

dam  sujfficit  ipsa  mentis  praesentia,  quae  est  principium 
actus,  ex  quo  mens  percipit  seipsam,  et  ideo  dicitur  se  cog- 
noscere  per  suam  praesentiam.  Sed  ad  secundam  cognitio- 
nem  de  mente  habendam  non  sufficit  ejus  praesentia;  sed 
requiritur  diligens  et  subtilis  inquisitio:  unde  et  multi  nat- 
uram  animae  ignorant,  et  multi  circa  naturam  animae  erra- 
verunt."  Sum.  Theol,  I.  q.  87,  a.  i. 
21  James  Psychology,  vol.  I,  p.  187. 

32  We  cannot  agree  with  Hamilton,  "  We  know  nothing  of 
mind  and  matter  considered  as  substances;  they  are  known 
to  us  only  as  a  two-fold  series  of  phenomena  "  in  Reid,  note 
A2;  Met.,  p.  97;  cf.  Spencer's  Prin.  of  Psych,,  §  268,  sq. 

33  Cf.  Essay,  BIV,  ch.  3,  n.  6;  BII,  ch.  27,  Frazer's  edition. 

34  Cf.  Lewes  Problems  of  Mind,  ist  series,  p.  323. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  37 

§  17.  Having  the  conception  of  the  soul's  substan-  Errors. 
tiaHty  clearly  defined  and  proved  as  a  fact,  we  can, 
with  profit,  examine  more  closely  into  some  false 
views  which  have  exerted  a  great  influence  on  the 
student  of  Psychology.  These  errors  are  not  proposed 
only  as  the  convictions  of  individual  writers.  They  are 
indicative  of  certain  streams  or  tendencies  of  modern 
thought. 

V. 

Erroneous  Conceptions  op  the  Soul's 
Substantiality. 
§  18.  During  the  last  few  years  a  strong  reaction  i^^^^^Jf® 
to  Kant  has  been  manifested  among  conservative  non- 
catholic  writers.  It  arose  from  the  failure  of  Hegel's 
Idealism.  A  foothold  was  sought  to  stem  the  tide 
which  threatened  to  carry  men  to  materialism.  The 
cry  arose,  "  Back  to  Kant."  There  it  was  hoped  a  firm 
basis  could  be  found.  Thus,  Max  MuUer  sees  in  the 
study  of  Kant,  the  best  hope  of  a  philosophical  rejuve- 
nescence for  England  and  America,  even  more  than 
Germany.  We  see  the  leaning  to  Kant  in  Prof. 
Green,  Prof.  Ed.  Caird,  ^^  Mr.  Courtney,  of  New  Col- 
lege, Dr.  Wallace,  of  Merton  College,  Dr.  Watson,  of 
Queens  University,  Canada,  Max  Muller's  new  trans- 
lation. Dr.  H.  Sterling  Text-Book  of  Kant. 

The  Transcendental  Theory  of  the  Soul. 
§  19.  Kant  calls  the  substantiality  of  the  soul  the  Pj^^^^^g^. 
first     paralogism     of    Transcendental     Psychology .^^  JfToif  ^^^ 
He     defines     substance     as     "  that     the     represen- 
ts The  Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant,  2  vol.,  1889. 
36  Crit.  of  Pure  Reason,  Muller's  Trans.  Dialect  BII  c.  i., 
p.  284. 


38  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

tation  of  which  is  the  absolute  subject  of  our  judg- 
ments, and  cannot  be  used,  therefore,  as  the  determi- 
nation of  any  other  thing."  From  this  he  concludes 
that  the  "  I,  as  a  thinking  being  (soul)  am  substance." 
His  criti-         §  20.  Havingf  stated  the  arg-ument  in  his  own  words, 

cism  of  the  ,  ^         _  ... 

sourssub-  he  then  subjects  it  to  a  severe  criticism.     He  holds 

stantiality.  •' 

"  that  pure  categories,  and  among  them  that  of  sub- 
stance, have  in  themselves  no  objective  meaning 
unless  they  rest  on  some  intuition."  ^'^  He 
expressly  says  that  "  sensibility  alone  supplies  us  with 
intuition;  these  intuitions  become  thought  through  the 
understanding,  and  hence  arise  conceptions,"  ^^  that 
"  our  intuition  must  at  all  times  be  sensuous;"  ^^  that 
"  we  are  so  constituted  that  our  intuition  must  always 
be  sensuous,  and  consist  of  the  mode  in  which  we  are 
afifected  by  objects;"  ^^  that  "  the  understanding  is  not 
a  faculty  of  intuition ;"  ^^  that  ''the  internal  sense, 
by  means  of  which  the  mind  perceives  itself  or  its 
internal  state,  does  not  give  an  intuition  (Anschaung) 
of  the  soul  (Seele)  itself  as  an  object."  ^ 
o?thTcoS-  §^^'  What,  then,  he  asks,  is  the  value  of  the  con- 
Bubstance  ^^P^  ^^  substance?  And  the  answer  given  is  that  it  is 
to  Kant^^  practically  of  no  advlantage,  and  we  could  do  very  well 
without  it.  He  maintains  that  the  properties  of  per- 
manence, etc.,  cannot  be  drawn  from  the  pure  cate- 
gory of  substance;  nor  in  this  case  is  there  any  expe- 
rience to  lay  hold  of;  "  For  though  the  I  exists  in  all 
thoughts,  not  the  slightest  intuition  is  connected  with 

37  P.  284. 

38  Trans.  Aesth.,  p.  i. 

39  PI,  s.  II,  p.  28. 

40  P2,  Intro.,  p.  41. 
^1  P.  56. 

42  P.  I,  S.  I,  p.  18. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  39 

that  representation  by  which  it  might  be  distinguished 
from  other  objects  of  intuition.  We  may  very  well 
perceive,  therefore,  that  this  representation  appears 
again  and  again  in  every  act  of  thought,  but  not  that 
it  is  a  constant  and  permanent  intuition  in  which 
thoughts,  as  being  changeable,  come  and  go."  *^ 

§  22.  From  this  he  concludes  that  "  reason  imposes  Jt  is  the 

^    .         logical,  not 

Upon  US  an  apparent  knowledge  only  by  representing  the  real 
the  constant  losrical  subject  of  thoug-ht  as  the  knowl-  which 

^  .     -^  ^  the  mind 

edge  of  the  real  subject  in  which  that  knowledge  grasps, 
inheres.  Of  that  (i.  e.,  the  real)  subject,  however,  we 
have  not  and  cannot  have  the  slightest  knowledge. 
Besides  this  logical  meaning  of  the  I,  we  have  no 
knowledge  of  the  subject  in  itself;  the  proposition  that 
the  soul  is  a  substance  signifies  a  substance  in  idea 
only,  and  not  in  reality."  *^ 

§  23.  (a)  The  difficulties  which    Kant    attempts    to  Criticism 

of  Kant  s 

solve  are  not  inherent  in  the  question  itself,  but  spring  views  (a) 

Kant  s 

from  his  own  peculiar  principles.    They  are  the  logical  difficulties 

,  fliFG  tn.6 

results  of  his  theory  of  knowledsfe.     Kant's  attempt  to  conse- 

.  ,  quence  of 

reconstruct  the  philosophy  of  thouHit  was  a  failure,  his  own 

^  ^    -^  ^  principles. 

We  cannot  be  expected  to  admit,  without  protest,  prin- 
ciples which  led  Fichte  to  absolute  Idealism  or  Nihil- 
ism; developed  into  the  pantheism  of  Schelling  and 
Hegel ;  *^  gave  reason  for  the  revolt  against 
metaphysical  reasoning  led  by  Compte,  and  the  sub- 
stitution of  the  positive  philosophy;*®  influenced 
Hamilton  in  the  philosophy  of  the  conditioned,  and 

43  P.  285. 

4*  lb.     Hegel  holds  that  the  mind  is  a  subject,  not  a  sub- 
stance, cf.  Wallace's  Hegel  Proleg.,  ch.  VH. 

45  Cf.  Ed.  Caird  the  Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant,  vol.  II, 
p.  645. 

46  Cf.  Chapter  on  Positivism. 


40 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


His  mean- 
ing of 
"  Pheno- 
mena "  is 
false. 


through  him  gave  birth  to  the  Agnosticism  of  Mr. 
Huxley.*'' 

§  24.  (b)  It  is  not  true  to  say  that  we  know  only  ideal 
appearances,  i.  e.,  phenomena.  The  meaning  Kant 
gives  to  the  word  "phenomena"  is  false.  With  Kant 
a  phenomenon  is  a  thing,  in  as  much  as  it  is  the  object 
of  thought.  But  he  maintains  that  the  mind  in  the 
act  of  knowing  clothes  the  object  with  ideal  forms. 
Hence,  the  mind  grasps  the  ideal  appearance,  never 
the  real  appearance  of  the  object.  '  This  ideal  appear- 
ance is  his  "  phenomenon,"  as  distinguished  from  the 
"  noumenon,"  i.  e.,  the  thing  itself  in  its  real  concrete 
existence.  Now  this  strange  theory  is  contradicted  by 
common  sense;  we  know  things  manifesting  them- 
selves; the  phenomena  which  the  sense  grasps  are 
concrete  facts,  e.  g.,  my  own  existence.  Again,  this 
opinion  of  Kant  is  opposed  to  the  data  and  methods 
of  physical  science.  Science  deals  with  real  things. 
The  axioms  and  rules  of  mathematical  science  must 
be  verified  in  concrete  objects  in  order  that  the  calcu- 
lations founded  upon  them  may  have  any  validity.*^ 
The   same   is   true  of   Chemistry,*^  and   of   Physics.^^ 


^''XIX  Cent,  Feb.,  '95.  "There  is  absolutely,"  says 
Fichte,  "  nothing  permanent,  but  only  an  unceasing 
change.  I  know  absolutely  nothing  of  any  exist- 
ence, not  even  of  my  own.  Images  constitute  all 
that  apparently  exists;  images  that  pass  and  vanish  without 
there  being  aught  to  witness  their  transition.  I  myself  am 
one  of  these  images;  nay,  rather  a  confused  image  of  images. 
All  reality  is  converted  into  a  marvellous  dream  without  a 
life  to  dream  of,  and  without  a  mind  to  dream;  into  a  dream 
made  up  only  of  a  dream.  Perception  is  a  dream,  thought  — 
the  source  of  all  the  existence,  and  all  the  reality  which  I 
imagine  to  myself  of  my  existence,  of  my  power,  of  my  des- 
tination —  is  the  dream  of  that  dream." 

48  Cf.  Jevons  Prin.  of  Science,  p.  8. 

49  Cf.  New  Chemistry  by  Prof.  Cooke. 

50  Cf.  Tyndall  "  Light  and  Electricity,"  p.  60. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  4I 

Finally,  Ontology  is  a  science  of  real  being.  The  first 
principles  of  reason,,  e.  g.,  the  principles  of  contra- 
diction and  of  identity,  etc.,  are  not  purely  ideal.  They 
have  an  objective  value  beyond  the  range  of  sense- 
experience.  They  can  be  expressed  as  logical  or  as 
ontological  verities.  If  I  say  that  "  It  is  impossible  to 
affirm  or  deny  at  the  same  time  the  same  thing  of  the 
same  subject,  if  the  circumstances  be  the  same,"  I 
formulate  a  rule  which  is  our  guide  in  the  world  of 
affirmation  and  negation,  and  has  thus  a  logical  force. 
But  if  I  affirm  that  "  the  same  thing  cannot  be  and  not 
be  at  the  same  time,"  I  state  an  ontological  truth  which 
holds  sway  in  the  world  of  reality,  and  is  verified  of  all 
existences,  whether  or  not  they  be  the  objects  of  sense 
perception.^^ 

§  25.  (c)  It  is  not  true  to  say  that  intuition  is  purely  [fon^g^ot 
a  sensitive  act.  There  is  a  higher  order  of  truth  than  ^JJgltive 
that  of  sense;  thoughts  are  not  the  transformation  of 
sensitive  impressions.  We  have  pure  intellectual  ideas 
and  principles,  i.  e.,  pure  in  the  sense  that  they  are  not 
the  product  of  sensation.  In  the  Critic,  Kant  himself 
discusses  pure  intellectual  concepts  which  exist  as  sub- 
jective facts.  Now  sensitive  intuition  cannot  furnish 
these.     Finally,  if  sensitive  intuition  were  a  condition  x 

of  reality,  could  I  not  contend  that  the  pure  idea  of 
relation,  the  principles  on  which  the  phenomena  of 
light,  electricity,  affinity,  etc.,  depend,  are  nothing  but 
empty  words?  I  cannot  represent  these  in  sensitive 
intuition;  yet,  I  cannot  deny  their  real  existence. 

§  26.  (d)  It  is  false  to  say  th^t  the  concept  of  sub-  (d)  sub- 
stance has  no  objective  value,   and  that  it  is   los:ical  is  not  a. 

purely 
logical , 

siBalmes   BIV,  ch.   13,   14,   15,   16,  21,  22;   Ward  Phil,   of  ^^u'ty^^^^ 
Theism ;    Prof.    Bowne,    "Metaphysics,    a     Study     of     First  *      • 

Principles,"  p.  371,  sq. 

6 


42  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

only,  not  real.  The  logical  subject  or  substance  is 
something  conceived  of  in  the  mind  as  a  subject  hav- 
ing attributes,  whether  or  not  it  exist  in  reality,  e.  g., 
we  form  an  abstraction  or  personification,  and  describe 
them  as  real  beings,  with  qualities  and  attributes,  thus 
"The  quality  of  mercy,  the  redness  of  the  rose,"  etc. 
The  grammatical  term  "  abstract  noun  "  expresses  the 
logical  subject.  But  grammar  teaches  that  there  are 
concrete  nouns,  and  that  between  the  abstract  and  the 
concrete  noun  there  is  a  vast  difference.  The  latter 
expresses  a  reality  existing  as  such.  The  former  is 
only  a  generalization  of  an  adjective.  Now  the  adjec- 
tive expresses  a  real  quality,  and  the  abstract  noun 
formed  therefrom  can  only  be  understood  and 
explained  by  this  reality.  This  generalization  from  the 
concrete  to  the  abstract  is  a  process  of  thought.  It 
goes  on  constantly  within  the  mind,  and  is  exemplified 
in  ordinary  conversation  as  well  as  in  written  dis- 
course. But  it  is  false  to  hold  that  this  process  is, 
necessary  for  the  formation  of  every  concept  which  the 
mind  employs  as  subject  of  a  statement.  The  exist 
ence  of  concrete  nouns  shows  that  every  subject  is  not 
a  logical  subject.  And  a  careful  analysis  of  the  logical 
subject,  and  its  mode  of  formation  shows  that  the  real 
distinction  of  real  substance  and  of  modfications,  is 
presupposed. 
nSun^°^^  §  2y.  (e)  It  is  false  to  say  that  we  infer  from  the  pure 
from^the  Category  of  substance  that  the  soul  is  a  substance, 
purecate-    Such  an  inference  would  not  take  us  out  of  the  ideal 

gory. 

order.     On  the  contrary  the  general  idea  of  substance 
is  warranted  by  a  fact  of  experience.     A  close  analysis 
of  the  data  of  consciousness  reveals  the  elements  which 
go  to  make  up  the  concept. 
Revealed         g  28.  Consciousness  shows  the  distinction  between 


m  con- 


sciousness, substance  and  accident  by  testifying  to  the  distinction 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  43 

of  the  I  and  the  thoughts  or  feehngs  affecting  the 
I  as  a  primary  fact  of  ni}^  inner  Hfe.  All  my 
thoughts  and  feelings  are  referred  to  me;  in  me  they 
are  collected  and  united;  and  me  they  variously  affect 
and  modify.  If  the  I  were  not  a  reality,  how  could 
it  be  an  object  of  consciousness,  or  how  explain  the 
distinction  between  me  and  my  thoughts,  and  the 
relation  of  the  one  to  the  other?  In  every  thought 
and  feeling  the  I  is  present  as  a  real  fact  of  inner 
experience.  In  thus  asserting  the  real  existence  of  the 
I,  emphasis  is  laid  upon  an  elementary  truth.  Any 
artificial  system  of  thought  which  attempts  to  reason 
away  its  real  worth,  must  inevitably  fail. 

§  2Q.  Wimdt  sets  out  with  the  contention  that  the  Kant's 

■^  vie\\  re- 

"  soul  is  not  merely  a  subject  in  the  lo^fical  sense,  but  a  P^'oduced 

-^  •'  .     ^'       .  m  Wundt. 

substance,  a  real  being  as  whose  manifestations  or  trans- 
actions the  so-called  activities  of  the  soul  are  appre- 
hended." Nevertheless  the  influence  of  Kant  is  appar- 
ent when  in  the  development  of  the  task  he  regards  the 
soul  as  the  logical  subject  of  inner  experience,  e.  g.,  the 
soul  is  an  act  of  apperception  which  accompanies  all  our 
acts,  or  it  is  the  sum-total  of  psychic  acts.  To  the 
idealism  of  Kant  he  joins  the  Monism  of  the  modern 
German  school.^^ 

2°.  The  Phenomenal  Theory  of  the  Soul. 
§  30.  Phenomenalism  is  the  doctrine  of  those  who  Phenom- 
hold  that  we  know  appearances  only,  not  the  nature  of  realism. 
things.^^     Its  parent  is  Locke.     He  defined  substance 

52  Cf.  Ladd  Phil,  of  Mind,  p.  50.  With  Lotze  and  Wundt 
the  term  apperception  means  to  discern  the  relation  between 
objects  and  is  had  when  by  an  act  of  attention  mental  data 
are  unified  into  a  related  whole,  cf.  Baldwin  Psych.,  p.  56. 

52  Phenomenalism  treated  here  maintains  that  we  know  the 
real  objective  qualities;  in  this  sense  it  must  be  distinguished 
from  the  ideal  phenomenalism  of  Kant. 


44  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

as  the  unknown  support  of  a  heap  of  qualities.^*  Ber- 
keley pushed  this  definition  to  extreme  Idealism,  con- 
tending that  this  unknown  does  not  exist,  and  that  the 
only  realities  are  the  ideas  of  the  soul.  Hume  went 
even  farther  by  denying  the  substance  of  mind  and 
holding  it  to  be  only  a  group  or  series  of  states. 
assoSa-^^  §31.  Hume's  position  has  been  adopted  by  the 
tion.  English  school  of  Associationism.     They  bid  us  look 

into  our  conscious  mental  life,  where  we  find  the  ever-- 
present  thought  or  sensation  or  emotion,  which  gives 
way  to  another,  and  so  on  while  life  lasts.  The  present 
thought  or  feeling  thus  appear  as  waves  in  the  "  stream 
of  consciousness."  ''  The  wave  of  consciousness  con- 
stitutes the  mind,"  is,  according  to  ^Ir.  Morgan,  the 
answer  of  Empirical  Psychology.^^  "The  term  'mind'  is 
applied  not  merely  to  the  physical  wave  at  any  moment 
of  consciousness,  but  to  the  wave  of  consciousness  in 
its  totality.^^  Thus,  Mr.  Bain  glories  in  having 
destroyed  forever  the  material  principle.^^  To  Mr. 
Spencer,  mind  is  a  synthesis  or  aggregate  of  many 
feeHngs,  actual  and  nascent,  and  of  many  changes 
among  them.^^    He  only  differs  from  Mr.  Mill  in  using 

54  Mr.  Thomson,  "  Elem.  of  Psych./'  Vol.  i,  p.  114;  Mr. 
James,  "  Prin.  of  Psych.,"  Vol.  I,  p.  355,  express  themselves 
in  the  same  words. 

55  Cf.  Introd.  to  Compar.  Psychol.,  pp.  26.  31. 

56  Modern  Psychologists,  however,  differ  in  explaining  the 
nature  of  this  ''  stream."  Thus,  Hoffding  holds  that  the 
states  form  a  stream  "  in  memory  which  connects  them."  cf. 
Outlines  of  Psychology,  p.  49.  Sully  finds  its  basis  in  "  a 
healthy  and  well  nourished  condition  of  the  brain."  cf. 
Human  Mind,  vol.  I,  s.  13,  15;  so,  also,  Ribot  cf.  Diseases  of 
Personality.  Mr.  James  says  that  "  the  bond  is  the 
*  warmth  '  and  '  resemblance  '  to  the  central  spiritual  self  now 
actually  felt;  "  as  a  result  they  are  "  recognized  and  appro- 
priated by  the  "judging  Thought,"  i.  e.,  the  present  self.  cf. 
James  Psychology,  vol.  I,  pp.  356,  341. 

5^  Cf.  Senses  and  Intellect. 

58  Princ.  of  Psych.,  vol.  I,  p.  500. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  45 

the  word  ''  Unknownable  "  in  place  of  ''  possibilities  of 
sensation/'  ^^ 

Mill 

§  32.  No  work  of  the  past  generation  has  exerted  so  ^^^i- 
powerful  an  influence  for  evil  upon  the  English  mind 
as  Mr.  Mill's  "  S3^stem  of  Logic."  His  penetration  in 
detecting  the  weak  points  in  Mr.  Hamilton's  phil- 
osophy—  the  prevailing  philosophy  of  the  day,  and 
the  vigor  of  his  criticism,  gave  to  him  and  to  his  prin- 
ciples a  higher  position  and  greater  value  than  wxre 
just.^°  He  is  styled  the  logician,  i\Ir.  Spencer  the 
metaphysician,  and  Mr.  Bain  the  psychologist  of  the 
Associationalist  School.  An  examination  of  his  teach- 
ing, therefore,  means  a  criticism  of  the  most  power- 
ful and  influential  school  of  English  Philosophy. 

§  33.  Mr.  Mill's  theory  of  matter  and  mind  ™'s  ^^ 
provoked  strong  and  widespread  discussion  in  ^^^'^d. 
England.^^  He  resolves  the  belief  that  "  the 
mind  exists  "  into  the  belief  of  a  permanent  possibility 
of  our  states  of  consciousness.  In  this  he  is  a  faith- 
ful disciple  of  Hume.  To  Mill  the  knowledge  of  mind 
is  relative;  we  only  know  it  as  the  notion  of  something 
permanent  in  opposition  to  our  passing  states  and  acts. 
But  he  adds,  this  permanent  may  be  only  a  possibility. 
Therefore,  the  notion  we  have  of  mind  is  the  notion 
of  the  series  of  actual  sensations,  and  of  the  infinite 
possibilities  of  sensation.  He  calls  mind  "  a  thread  of 
consciousness,  supplemented  by  beHeved  possibilities 

59  Cf.  Balfour  Found,  of  Belief,  p.  124;  also,  S.  Laing,  "A 
Modern  Zoroastrian,"  p.  126.  Closely  akin  to  this,  in  sound 
at  least,  for  it  is  difficult  to  attach  any  sense  to  the  words,  is 
Mr.  Arnold's  "  tendency  making  for  righteousness." 

.60  Cf.  Examination  of  Hamilton  by  J.  S.  Mill. 

61  Exam,  of  Hamil.,  ch.  XXI. 


46  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

of  consciousness,"  or  "  a  series  of  feelings  with  a  back- 
ground of  possibilities  of  feeling."  But  he  continues, 
"  if  we  speak  of  mind  as  a  series  of  feelings,  we  are 
obliged  to  complete  the  statement  by  calling  it  a  series 
of  feelings  which  is  aware  of  itself  as  past  and  future; 
and  we  are  reduced  to  the  alternative  of  believing  that 
the  mind  or  ego  is  something  different  from  any  series 
of  feelings  or  possibilities  of  them,  or  of  accepting  the 
paradox  that  something,  which  ex  hypothesi  is  but  a 
series  of  feelings,  can  be  aware  of  itself  as  a  series." 
He  confesses  that  this  cannot  be  explained.  "  I  think," 
he  says,  "  by  far  the  wisest  thing  we  can  do,  is  to  accept 
the  inexplicable  fact,  without  any  theory  of  how  it 
takes  place,  and  when  we  are  obliged  to  speak  of  it  in 
terms  which  assume  a  theory,  to  use  them  with  reser- 
vation as  to  their  meaning."  ^^ 
?a}M?Sf-  §34-  (^)  ^^-  ^^^^  clearly  sees  the  difificulty, 
fhecmi-^  but,  like  Kant,  he  fails  to  recognize  that  it 
of^isTwh  springs  from  his  theor}^,  and  that  he  alone  is  respon- 
theory.  siblc.  His  false  conception  of  substance  as  a  collec- 
tion of  qualities;  his  failure,  with  Hume,  to  grasp  a 
real  entity  in  which  these  qualities  inhere,  and  which 
they  modify;  his  attempt  to  explain  all  mental  phe- 
nomena by  the  laws  of  association ;  his  mistake  in  view- 
ing the  mind  as  the  sum-total  of  actual  and  possible 
states,  instead  of  a  real  activity  producing  these  states, 
and  in  which  they  adhere;  his  blindness  in  taking  the 
shadow  for  the  substance,  or  rather  the  clothes  for  the 
reality,  have  led  him  to  explanations  which  break 
down  when  rigidly  analyzed  in  the  face  of  facts.  His 
whole  theory  falls  to  pieces  in  the  attempt  to  explain 
the  simple  act  of  memor}^^ 

^2  Exam.,  pp.  212,  213, 

63  W.  Ward  Phil,  of  Theism.  \ 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  47 

§  35-  0^)  To  explain  the  fact  of  consciousness  he  is  S^^-q 
reduced  to  the  strange  statement  that  ''  a  series  of  feel-  P^ncipii. 
ings  can  be  aware  of  itself  as  a  series/'  an  explanation 
approved  by  Mr.  Bain.^*    But  do  they  reflect  that  the 
"  awareness  "  is  something  different  from  the  "  series," 
and  that  it  sounds  like  a  poor  apology  for  the  soul? 

§  36.  (c)  The  fact  is  not  inexplicable.  Let  us  ^Q^^^Jg^. 
appeal  to  our  inner  life.  Do  our  thoughts  and  feelings  piicabie. 
and  volitions  show  us  a  "  series  of  feelings  aware  of 
itself,"  or  do  they  reveal  a  real  ego  permanent  and 
identical  in  the  midst  of  successive  changes,  which 
variously  modify  and  affect  it?  The  answer  comes 
without  hesitation.  The  substantial  reality  of  the  Ego 
is  a  primary  fact  of  conscious  experience,  the  only 
explanation  of  our  conscious  existence.  This  is  true 
not  only  of  the  learned  philosopher,  but  of  every 
thinking  being.  It  is  forced  upon  us  in  every  waking 
moment  of  our  lives. 

§  37.  (d)  Finally,  if  we  know  only  sensations  and  Sequences, 
groups  of  sensations  of  necessity  we  fall  into  the  error 
of  Phenomenal  Ideahsm.     This  is    illustrated   in   the 
case  of  Mr.  Mill  himself.^^ 

3°.  Buddhist  Theory  of  the  Soul. 

§  38.  Within  the  past  few  years  Buddhism,  as  a  phil-  jf^^B^'uddh- 
osophy  and  as  a  religion,  has  attracted  much  attention.  ^^"^• 
The  fascinating  character    of    Gotama,    the    singular 
charm  of  his  moral  system  have  led  many  to  consider 

64  a.  Mind  XI,  459. 

65  The  reader  may  peruse  with  profit  Jevons'  "  J.  S.  Mill  " 
in  Contemp.  Rev.,  January,  1878;  Prof.  Bowne's  "  Introduc- 
tion to  Psychological  Theory,"  p.  13;  where  a  criticism  of 
Mr.  Mill  is  found;  also,  Mr.  Courtney's  "  Metaphysics  of  Mr. 
Mill."  The  best  criticism,  as  Mr.  Mill  acknowledges,  is  found 
in  Philosophy  of  Theism  by  Dr.  W.  Ward. 


48  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

it  more  perfect  than  the  rehgion  of  Christ.    As  such  its 
treatment  belongs  to  another  department  of  Christian 
Apologetics.    At  present  we  shall  question  its  teaching 
concerning  man. 
its  teach-         §  30.  Buddhism  teaches    that  man    consists    of    an 

ing  on  '-'■^ 

man.  assemblage     of     different     properties     or     qualities. 

(Skandhas.)  These  are  material  quahties  (Rupa) 
twenty-eight  in  number,  sensations  (vedana)  which  are 
divided  into  six  main  classes,  abstract  ideas  (Sanna), 
six  in  number,  corresponding  to  the  six  classes  of  sen- 
sations, Tendencies  or  Potentialities  (sankhara)  in  fifty- 
two  divisions,  and  mental  pozvers.  (Vinnana.) 
Neither  the  qualities  nor  the  groups  of  them  are  per- 
manent. The  material  qualities  are  like  a  mass  of  foam ; 
the  sensations  like  bubbles  on  the  water;  the  ideas  are 
like  the  uncertain  mirage;  the  tendencies  are  like  the 
plantian  stalk  without  firmness  or  solidity;  the 
thoughts  are  like  a  spectre  or  magical  illusion.^ 

on  the  §  40.  The  soul  is  none  of  these  Skandras ;  nor  is  it 

the  result  of  a  combination  of  them  all.  Buddhism  is 
very  explicit  on  this  point.  "  Thus  mendicants,"  says 
Gotama,  "  the  unlearned  unconverted  man  regards  the 
soul  either  as  identical  w4th,  or  as  possessing,  or  as  con- 
taining, or  as  residing  in  the  material  properties,"  and 
so  on  of  the  other  Skandhas.  ''  By  regarding  soul 
in  one  of  these  ways,  he  gets  the  idea  '  I  am.'  But  the 
learned  disciple  of  the  converted  has  got  rid  of  ignor- 
ance and  acquired  wisdom,  and,  therefore,  the  ideas  of 
*  I  am '  do  not  occur  to  him."  ^'' 

there  is  §41.  The  soul,  therefore,  does  not  exist;  it  is  not 

DO  soul.  ^  ^  '  ' 

anything  real;  it  is  rather  a  conception  formed  from 

66  Cf.  Hardy  Manuel  of  Buddhism,  p.  424. 

67  Cf.  Abhidharma  Koshya  Vyakhya  cit  by  Burnouf.     In- 
trod.  a  I'histoire. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  49 

the  combined  action  of  the  Skandhas.  There  is  no 
abiding  principle  in  man ;  the  body  changes  and  is  dis- 
solved; the  Skandhas  change  and  expire  at  death. 
Death  is  the  breaking  up  of  the  combination;  it  is  not 
the  separation  of  soul  from  body,  but  the  dissolution 
of  body,  and  of  the  groups  of  elements  on  which  life 
depended.®^ 

§  42.  Buddhism  is  not  content  to  deny  the  existence  stamps, 

-     7  1     •     1  ^     .     ,.    r  '      -  •  1  this  belief 

of  the  soul;  it  brands  belief  m  its  existence  a  heresy,  heresy. 
In  the  first  stage  of  the  path  of  freedom  the  student 
must  abandon  Sakkayaditthi  "the  heresy  of  individ- 
uality/' one  of  the  three  primary  delusions.  Again, 
Attevada  or  "  the  doctrine  of  the  soul/'  is  classed  with 
sensuality,  as  one  of  the  four  Upadanas,  which  are  the 
immediate  cause  of  birth  and  death,  of  pain  and  sor- 
row. The  will  is  blinded  by  delusion  to  crave  for  per- 
sonal existence,  and  hence  the  source  of  the  belief  in 
an  immortal  soul.  This  egotistical  desire  binds  man 
to  life  and  hinders  salvation.  The  voluntary  surrender 
of  our  individuality  is  the  great  step;  we  then  are  free.^^ 
"This  ignorance  of  the  soul,"  says  Prof.  Davids,^" 
is  the  most  important  fact  in  the  history  of  Buddhism." 
And  it  is  indeed  worthy  of  surprise  that  a  religion 
preaching  this  Gospel  of  nescience  and  annihi- 
lation should  be  heralded  as  the  final  answer 
to  the  most  important  questions  concerning  man's  life 
and  destiny.  It  rests  on  the  low  plane  of  modern 
Agnosticism  and  Positivism,  and  is  to  be  treated 
accordingly. 

*68Cf.  Buddhist  Catech.  by  Subhadra  Bhikshu,  p.  7^  sq.; 
Copleston  Buddhism,  p.  113;  and  for  the  popular  form  of  this 
teaching  cf.  "  Questions  of  Mahinda." 

69  Cf.  Colebrooke  Essays  I,  ch.  X;  Prof.  Corvell's  ed. 

^"Man.  of  Buddhism,  p.  30. 

7 


no  variety 
in  its  main 
teaching. 


MATERIALISM. 

§  I.  The  history  of  Materlahsm  presents  little 
variety.  Whether  it  appears  as  a  tendency  more  or 
less  pronounced,  as  in  English  Philosophy  from  the 
time  of  Locke,  Hobbes  and  Priestley,  or  in  the  bold 
and  crude  form  of  a  system  as  proposed  by  Lucretius 
in  ancient  times,^  or  by  Buchner  in  our  own  cen- 
tury,^ its  teaching  can  be  summed  up  and  set 
forth  in  a  few  main  principles.  These  are:  The  eter- 
nity and  indestructibility  of  atomis;  nothing  produces 
nothing;  the  eternity  of  motion  and  the  infinite  possi- 
bility of  its  combination;  the  iron  sway  of  necessary 
laws  throughout  the  universe;  the  rejection  of  final 
causes;  the  principles  of  spontaneous  generation,  and 
of  natural  selection,  at  least,  in  germ.  Their  applica- 
tion to  the  material  and  organic  world,  to  human  life 
and  action,  both  of  the  individual  and  of  society,  gave 
rise  to  the  mass  of  teaching  embraced  under  the  term 
Materialism.^ 

§  2.  In  our  day  its  defenders  have  brought  to  eluci- 
date and  develop  their  principles,  facts  and  hypotheses 
drawn  from  the  progress  of  the  physical,  chemical  and 
physiological  sciences,  without,  however,  effecting  an 
essential  change  in  the  principles  themselves.  The 
passage  from  ancient  to  modern  Materialism,  there- 
fore, shows  no  change  in  the  standpoint  or  funda- 
mental principles;  it  only  reveals  a  new  collection  of 
facts  and  arguments  to  support   the    same    teaching. 

^  Cf.  de  Rerum  Natura;  Aug.  de  Utilitate  Credendi,  n.  lo. 

2  Cf.  Force  and  Matter. 

3  Cf.  Lange  Hist,  of  Materialism. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  5I 

The  clothes  in  which  it  is  dressed  are  new.  In  aim,  in 
principle,  in  thought,  it  is  the  same  as  the  primitive 
theory;  and  we  find  Mr.  Tyndall  in  a  public  address 
proposing  to  the  scientific  v/orld  the  doctrines  of 
Democritus  as  the  final  conclusions  of  modem 
thought.^ 

II. 
Modern  Materialism. 
§  3.  Modern    Materialism,    especially    in    Germany,  ^°?®^^, 
owed  its  oris^in  to  the  reaction  led  by  Schoppenhauer  ism  has  its 

*=*  y  jr  i  source  m 

and  Feuerbach  against  the  apriori  philosophy  of  Kant,  (^^  revolt 
as  developed  by  Fichte,  Schellins:  and  Hesrel.     The  (^priori 

r  J  1  e>  o  metaphys- 

result  was  the  inversion  and  transformation  of  Hegel's  i^s. 
Idealism  into  pure  Naturalism.  The  distrust  of  Meta- 
physics became  widespread;  it  was  held  to  deal  with 
idle  speculation  and  airy  nothing.  Philosophy  was 
considered  a  failure ;  it  had  attempted  to  solve  the  great 
problems  of  man's  life  and  destiny,  with  the  result  that 
theory  gave  way  to  theory,  until  at  last  the  mind  found 
itself  in  hopeless  confusion.  Des  Cartes  gave  birth  to 
the  Empiricism  of  Locke;  this  to  the  scepticism 
of  Hume;  to  confute  Hume,  Kant  wrote  the  Critic  of 
Pure  Reason;  Transcendentalism  became  with  Fichte 
a  Subjective  Idealism  in  which  "  life  was  a  dream  and 
he  himself  the  dream  of  a  dream,"  and  with  Hegel  de- 
veloped into  a  false,  exaggerated  system,  whose  foun- 
dation was  the  denial  of  the  Principle  of  Contradiction. 

§  4.  At  the  same  time  the  physical  sciences  rose  into  ^^^Jg^®^' 
prominence ;  under  an  almost    exclusive    study    they  piJ^^Jgai 
rapidly  developed,  and  by  the  steady  avowal  of  seeking  sciences, 
facts  according  to  the  methods   of  observation   and 

4  Cf.  Tyndall  Fragments  of  Science  Art,  "  Belfast  Address;" 
Prin.  Tulloch  Modern  Theories  in  Phil.  &  Religion,  Art. 
"  Scientific  Materialism." 


52 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


(c)  in  the 
prevailing 
Empiri- 
cism of 
France 
and  Eng- 
land. 


Leaders. 


Buchner. 


experiment,  they  seemed  to  promise  a  sure  basis  to  a 
mind  bewildered  by  the  groundless  and  conflicting 
assertions  of  a  false  philosophy. 

§  5.  In  France  many  were  prepared  for  the  new 
teaching  by  the  revival  of  the  Empiricism  of  the  Eigh- 
teenth century,  under  the  new  form  of  Compters  Posi- 
tive Philosophy,  and  we  have  the  refined  and  sensuous 
Materialism  which  pervaded  the  regime  of  Louis 
Napoleon.^  In  England  the  Sensism  of  Locke  devel- 
oped into  Scepticism  by  Hume  performed  a  like  ser- 
vice, and  produced  Mill's  theory  of  Association,  Spen- 
cer's Evolution  and  Bain's  identification  of  thought 
and  feeHng  with  bodily  motions.  In  both  countries 
the  prevailing  habit  of  thought  was  somewhat  alike, 
and  exerted  mutual  influence.^ 

§  6.  Its  leaders  are  Molleschott,''  Carl  Vogt,^  Buch- 
ner,  whose  work^  may  be  called  the  Gospel  of 
German  Materialism.  Buchner  gives  to  matter  the 
power  of  producing  life :  "  The  soul  is  the 
product  of  a  peculiar  combination  of  matter;" 
"  in  the  same  manner  as  the  steam  engine  pro- 
duces motion,  so  does  the  organic  complication  of 
force-endowed  materials  produce,  in  the  animal  body,  a 
sum  of  effects  so  interwoven  as  to  become  a  unit,  and 
is  therefore  by  us  called  spirit;"  "  mental  activity  is  the 
function  of  cerebral  substance;  it  is  emitted  by  the 
brain  as  sounds  are  by  the  mouth,  as  music  by  the 


organ 


"  10 


'As  there  is  no  bile  without  liver,  so  there 


5  Cf.  McCosh  Christianity  and  Positivism,  ch.  VII. 

6  Cf.  chapter  IV,  Positivism  and  Agnosticism. 
^  Circular  Course  of  Life,  1852. 

8  Lectures  on  Man,  1854  &  sq. 

9  "  Force  and  Matter,"  i8S4- 

1°  Cf.  Opinion  of  Empedocles  that  the  soul  is  a  harmony, 
St.  Thomas  Contra  Gentes  II,  64. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  53 

is  no  thought  without  brain."  The  analogy  is  false,  as 
we  shall  see;  that  bile  should  come  from  the  liver  it  is 
easy  to  understand;  but  thought  is  of  such  a  nature 
that  it  cannot  come  from  the  brain  alone.  Vogt,  in  Vogt. 
an  uncouth  and  vulgar  style,  holds  that  the  interaction 
of  mechanical  forces  explains  all  things. 

§  7.  Molleschott  contends  that  the  constant  move-  MoUe- 
ment  of  the  material  elements  explains  physical  and 
psychic  life.  ''  The  identification  of  mind  and  body," 
he  says,  "  is  not  an  explanation,  it  is  a  fact,  neither 
more  nor  less  simple,  neither  more  nor  less  mysterious 
than  any  other  fact;  it  is  a  fact  as  weight." 
"  No  one  assuredly  pretends  to  explain  gravi- 
tation by  means  of  distinctions  between  it  and 
matter.  One  states  it  as  an  immanent  property,  as  a 
fact  upon  which  it  is  useless  to  speculate."  ''  It  is  as 
impossible  to  say  why  the  brain  thinks,  as  to  say,  why 
zinc  and  copper  joined  by  a  humid  conductor  generate 
an  electro-motor  force."  ^^  Haeckel,  the  exponent  of  Haeckei. 
Monism,  expresses  the  same  doctrine  in  the  words: 
"  The  real  materialistic  philosophy  asserts  that  the  vital 
phenomena  of  motion,  like  all  other  phenomena  of 
motion,  are  effects  or  products  of  matter."  ^^  Hence 
he  denies  the  distinction  between  animate  and  inani- 
mate bodies.^^  To  him  organic  and  inorganic  forces 
are  the  same  in  kind;  in  their  real  nature  they  are  one 
and  indivisible. 

§  8.  This  materialism  is  crude  and  coarse.     It  could  o^^|[a?^ 
not  withstand  the  vigor  and  fire  of  criticism.     In  its  ^^^If^  ^^^ 
native  land  it  has  been  superseded  by  a  more  refined  glJmany 
kind,  though  the  purpose  and  teaching  are  essentially 

n  Life  &  Light  Disc,  at  Zurich,  1865. 
12  Evol.  of  Man,  vol.  II,  p.  456. 
^  Hist,  of  Creation,  vol.  I,  p.  23. 


54 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


the  same.  Thus  Lange  admits  that  there  is  no  longer 
a  Hterary  outcry  of  indignation  when  a  new  edition  of 
"  Force  and  Matter "  appears ;  that  Molleschott  is 
almost  forgotten  by  the  great  public;  and  that  Karl 
Vogt  is  now  seldom  mentioned  except  in  reference  to 
some  special  question  in  anthropology  or  some  isolated 
and  immortal  utterance  of  his  drastic  humor.^^ 


Scientific 
Material- 


Its  advo- 
cates. 


III. 

Scientific  Materialism. 

§  9.  Hence  the  attempt  to  formulate  a  scientific 
Materialism.  This  is  a  characteristic  product  of  our 
own  times.  It  affects  a  scientific  tone;  it  appeals  to 
positive  experience  in  verification  of  its  assertions;  it 
manifests  an  exclusive  leaning  to  the  physical  sciences, 
especially  physics  and  chemistry;  its  explanations  of 
certain  phenomena,  e.  g.,  the  phenomena  of  hfe  are 
arbitrary  but  somewhat  plausible;  when  pushed  to  a 
crucial  point,  it  seeks  refuge  in  vague  generalities  or 
in  a  wise  confession  of  man's  limitations  and  ignor- 
ance; it  enters  the  arena  with  a  definite  bias  carefully 
concealed  under  ample  protestations  of  fairness,  but 
shows  its  true  colors  in  the  course  of  the  argument  by 
skillfully  arranging  facts,  conjectures,  hypotheses  and 
figures  of  Rhetoric  so  that  the  passage  to  a  wide  and 
unwarranted  conclusion  is  almost  imperceptible. 

§  10.  The  most  prominent  advocates  of  this  form  of 
Materialism  are  Mr.  Tyndall  and  Mr.  Huxley.  They 
do  not  believe  that  matter,  as  is  commonly  meant  by 
the  term,  can  account  for  the  phenomena  of  physical 
or  psychic  life.  Their  views  of  matter  are  higher  ^nd 
purer.     To  them  matter  is  different  from  what  is  gen- 


14  Cf.  Lange  History  of  Materialism,  vol.  Ill,  p.  27. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  55 

erally  believed,  and  its  capabilities  are  very  great.  As  Lotze. 
Lotze  expresses  it:  "  Matter  is  actually  something 
much  better  than  the  name  tells  and  that  what  it 
appears  to  be  from  the  outside."  ^^  Hence  they  infer 
that  if  we  knew  the  nature  and  potencies  of  matter,  we 
could  explain  the  formation  of  ideas,  and  the  opera- 
tions of  psychic  life.  Mr.  Tyndall  admits  ''A  tendency  Tyndaii. 
on  the  part  of  matter  to  organize  itself  and  sees  incipi- 
ent life,  as  it  were,  manifesting  itself  throughout  the 
whole  of  what  we  call  inorganic  nature."  ^^ 

§11.  No    one    denies    potencies    to    matter,     ^^t  gj^^jj^' 
material  potencies  alone  do  not  tend  to  organization,  u^e^^jj^n- 
There  is   a   great   difference   between   crystallization,  jjf  LiJy??*^ 
which  he  adduces  in  confirmation  of  his  view,  and 
organization  as  found  in  living  beings.^^     *'  Incipient  ^SSpient 
life,  as  it  were,"  is  a  phrase  very  ambiguous.     Taken 
as  a  figure  of  speech,  which  the  words  *'  as  it  were," 
would  justify,  the  meaning  is  clear  and  no  fault  ca# 
be  found.     But  when  interpreted  in  a  literal  sense,  the 
phrase  is  erroneous.     It  is  true  that  many  vital  phe- 
nomena can  be  explained  by  the  laws  of  Physics  and 
Chemistry.     The     process      of     digestion      can     be 
explained  by  Chemistry;  the  heart-action,  the  nervous 
s)istem  by  Physics ;  and  the  transformation  of  heat  into 
motion  can,  they  hold,  account  for  life.     But  it  must 
not  be  forgotten  that  these  forces  are  only  instruments, 
and  behind  their  normal  action  is  a  vital  power  which 
causes  them  to  act  and  to  act  harmoniously. 

§  12.  It  is  thus  false,  or  at  least  ambiguous,  to  speak  l^^^^^jf. 
of  growth  as  "  The  cycle  of  molecular  action."    There  ^^^^^^^^ 

1^  Cf.  Lotze  Outlines  of  Psychology  by  Prof.  Ladd,  p.  93. 
^^  Cf.  "  Scientific  Materialism  "  in    Fragments    of    Science, 
vol.  II,  p  81. 

17  Cf.  Mivart  Truth,  304,  323,  327,  444,  158,  sq. 


56  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

is  only  a  partial  statement  of  the  truth;  the  nature  of 
growth  is  far  different  from  the  interaction  of  physical 
forces.  It  is  false  to  assert  that  "  The  animal  body  is 
just  as  much  the  product  of  molecular  force,  as  chalk 
or  sugar,"  that  "  The  formation  of  a  crystal,  a  plant  or 
an  animal,  is  a  purely  mechanical  problem."  Unor- 
ganized matter  in  any  shape"  or  form  is  inadequate  as 
the  cause  of  the  various  forms  of  organized  existence; 
and  organized  matter,  as  such,  can  only  be  explained 
by  postulating  a  directive  and  unifying  agency  presid- 
ing over  the  action  of  the  material  forces.  In  his 
Belfast  address,  Mr.  Tyndall  admits  that  matter,  "  as 
defined  for  generations  in  our  scientific  test-books," 
is  unable  to  account  for  Hfe.  Hence  he  urges  us  to 
change  our  notions  of  matter.  Having  done  so,  he 
traces  "  The  Hne  of  life  backward,"  until  ''  the  vision  of 
the  mind  authoritatively  supplements  the  vision  of  the 
eye,"  and  "  by  an  intellectual  necessity  crosses  the 
boundary  of  experimental  evidence  and  discerns  in 
vulgar  matter  the  promise  and  potency  of  all  terres- 
trial hfe." 
Mr  Tya-  §  13.  This  is  an  illustration  of  Mr.  Tyndall's  reason- 

method  of  ino;.  He  destroys  the  ordinary  meaning  attached  to  the 
word  "  matter,"  makes  it  vague  and  shadowy,  so  that 
it  might  be  apphed  to  anything  and  everything,  and 
draws  the  conclusion  he  already  had  in  mind.  An 
apt  illustration  is  had  in  the  cray-fish  which  muddles 
the  water  in  order  to  escape.  Following  out  this  line 
of  thought  Mr.  Tyndall  could  safely  say,  in  the  same 
address  that  ''  the  Human  Understanding  is  itself  a 
result  of  the  play  between  organism  and  environment 
through  cosmic  ranges  of  time."  ^^ 

1^  When  Prof.   Barker  declared  that  "  Life  is  now  univer- 
sally regarded  as  a  phenomenon  of  matter,"  he  meant  either 


reasoning. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  57 

§  14.  Mr.  Huxley,  in  the  "  Physical  Basis  of  Life,"  ^  ^^'^f-"^"^- 
sets  forth  the  same  views.     But  where  Mr.  Tyndall  Theo^^of 
uses  the  word  "  Matter,"  he  uses  ''  Protoplasm."     His  ^i^e-" 
theory  may  be  termed  the  ''  Chemical "  or  "  Mechan- 
ico-Chemical,"     in     contradistinction    to    the    purely 
"  Mechanical  "  of  his  friend. 

§  15.  Mr.  Huxley  holds  that  vital  action  results 
from  *'  the  molecular  forces  of  the  protoplasm." 
Hence  he  infers  that  "  the  thoughts  to  which  I  am  giv- 
ing utterance  and  your  thoughts  regarding  them,  are 
the  expression  of  molecular  changes  in  that  matter  of 
life,  which  is  the  source  of  our  other  vital  phenom- 
ena." ^^     A  few  pag-es  back  he  tells  us  that  "  even  those  Mr.  Hux. 

ley's 

manifestations  of  intellect,  of  feeling  and  of  will,  which  teaching, 
we  rightly  name  the  high'er  faculties,"  are  known  *'  to 
everyone  but  the  subject  of  them  "  as  "  transitory 
changes  in  the  relative  positions  of  the  part  of  the 
body."  ^^  Yet  he  repudiates  the  accusation  of  being 
a  Materialist:  on  the  contrary  believes  MateriaHsm 
"  to  involve  grave  philosophic  error."  His  reasons 
are  truly  ingenuous.  "  For,  after  all,"  he  adds,  in  a 
burst  of  confidence,  "  what  do  we  know  of  this  '  ter- 
rible '  matter,  except  as  the  name  for  the  unknown  and 
hypothetical  cause  of  states  of  our  own  consciousness? 
And  what  do  wx  know  of  that  '  spirit '  over  whose 
threatened  extinction  by  matter  a  great  lamentation  is 

that  life  was  always  seen  manifested  in  matter,  and  then  he 
enunciated  a  truth  as  old  as  mankind;  or  that, life  was  a  prop- 
erty or  an  effect  of  matter,  and  then  his  words  are  without 
foundation. 

Cf.  Some  Modern  Aspects  of  the  Life-Question,  Add.  by 
Prof.  Geo.  F.  Barker,  Pres.  of  American  Association  for 
Advancement  of  Science,  Boston,  1880. 

20  Cf.  Lay  Sermons  &  Addresses. 

21  Phys.  Basis  of  Life,  p.  138. 

22  lb.,  p.  123. 

8 


58  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

m 

arising,  like  that  which  was  heard  at  the  death  of  Pan. 
except  that  it  is  also  a  name  for  an  unknown  and  hypo- 
thetical cause  or  condition  of  the  states  of  conscious- 
ness? In  other  words,  matter  and  spirit  are  but  names 
for  the  imaginary  substrata  of  groups  of  natural  phe- 
nomena." ^ 

§  i6.  In  this  Huxley  shows  himself  a  legitimate  dis- 
ciple of  Hume.  The  logical  position  is  Agnosticism. 
He  further  assures  us  that  molecular  cerebral  changes 
cause  states  of  consciousness,  but  sees  no  evidence 
that  conscious  states  cause  muscular  motions.^ 
Hence  he  infers  that  '*  mental  conditions  are  simply 
the  symbols  in  consciousness  of  the  changes  which 
take  place  automatically  in  the  organism,"  that  "  the 
feehng  we  call  volition  is  not  the  cause  of  a  voluntary 
act,  but  the  symbol  of  that  state  of  the  brain  which  is 
the  immediate  cause  of  the  act."  His  premise  is  false. 
Consciousness  testifies  that  mental  changes  produce 
bodily  changes,  e.  g.,  fear  causes  pallor  of  the  counte- 
nance. Thus  Carpenter  holds  that  we  have  the  same 
evidence  for  the  action  of  nerve-force  on  mental 
states,  and  for  mental  states  calling  forth  physical  con- 
sequences. He  concludes  that  "  the  correlation  be- 
tween mind-force  and  nerve-force  is  shown  to  be  com- 
plete both  ways,  each  being  able  to  excite  the  other."  ^ 
real  value        §  17.  Scientific  Materiahsm  in  the  hands  of  these,  its 

ofSclen-       ,  !   . 

tificMate-   latest  defenders,  is  therefore  only  an  attempt  to  spirit- 
rialism.  '  ,  ,  •         , 

ualize  matter.     Yet  matter  can  never  be  anything  but 

matter.  It  will  always  retain  the  characteristic  prop- 
erties which  mark  it  out  as  distinct  from  mind.  Dia- 
lectic sophistry  cannot  obliterate  the  barrier  between 

23  lb.,   p.    143.  ^ 

2^  Cf.  on  the  Hypothesis  that  Animals  are  Automata. 
25  Mental  Physiol.,  §§  11,  12. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  59 

matter  and  mind  by  the  endeavor  to  render  the  defini- 
tion of  matter  vague  and  obscure.  The  effort  fails 
and  is  remembered  only  as  a  passing  phase  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  great  conflict  itself.^^ 

IV. 

Doctrine. 

§  1 8.  Materialism  teaches  that  the  history  and  devel-  ^|Mjor- 
opment  of  the  universe  is  due  to  the  action  of  natural  world. 
forces,  and  that  these  natural  forces  can  be  reduced  by 
Physics  to  modes  of  motion.     All  forces  are  material 
forces.     The  principle  is  "without   matter    no    force; 
without  force,  no  matter." 

§  19.  Force  is  a  property  of  matter,  matter  is  a  some- 
what undefined,  ponderable  entity  occupying  space. 
To  the  potencies  inherent  in  its  ultimate  particles  can 
be  traced  all  the  phenomena  of  existence.  These 
potencies  or  properties  are  only  different  modes  of 
motion;  and  the  laws  which  govern  their  activity  are 
only  thoise  of  mechanics.  Matter  and  force  are  eternal, 
indestructible  and  inseparable.  Constant  transforma- 
tion takes  place  without  in  the  least  lessening  the 
material  mass  or  diminishing  the  sum  of  the  forces. 
There  is  no  repose;  but  an  unending  cycle  of  causes 
and  of  effects.  The  laws  of  nature  are  invariable ;  they 
are  simply  the  expression  of  the  necessary  relations 
between  the  forces.  Hence,  the  existence  of  God  is  a 
useless  postulate,  since  the  laws  of  nature  are  immut- 
able, and  admit  no  possibility  of  intervention. 

§  20.  The  principle  of  motion  is  inherent  in  matter,  (b)  organic 
Life  is  explained  by  motion;  thought  is  explained  by 

26  Cf."  "Modern  Phil.  Concep.  of  Life,"  Address  of  J.  J. 
Woodward,  Pres.  of  Phil.  Soc.  of  Washington,  in  Bulletin  of 
See,  1882,  vol.  V,  p.  49. 


6o 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


(c)  mind. 


Mr.  Spen- 
cer's at- 
tempt. 


The  two 
schools  of 
Material- 
ism. 


life,  hence  thought  and  life  are  only  forms  of  motion; 
organic  and  inorganic  forms  are  only  the  result  of  acci- 
dental combinations  of  matter. 

§  21.  The  soul  is  only  a  name  for  the  sum  of  mental 
activities,  and  in  its  ultimate  analysis  is  the  product 
of  a  certain  mode  of  material  organization.  It  is  not, 
therefore,  a  real  substance,  but  a  series  of  material 
phenomena.^^  The  mode  of  combination  or  organiza- 
tion necessary  for  the  production  of  thought  is  difficult 
to  detect.  Physiology,  Chemistry,  Physics,  have  tried 
to  discover  the  secret. 

§  22.  Mr.  Spencer  attempts  the  solution  with  the 
principle  of  the  transformation  of  energy,  and  the  law 
of  equivalence.^  His  analysis  reveals  physical  forces, 
vital  forces  and  thoughts.  The  vital  forces  '  are  the 
mean,  indirect  and  exact  correlation  with  physical 
forces  on  the  one  side,  and  on  the  other  they  bear  the 
same  relation  to  the  thoughts  which  they  produce. 
The  activity  of  the  mind  is  in  exact  equivalence  to  the 
activity  of  the  oxidation  of  the  brain.  Thought  is 
reduced  to  a  movement  of  matter.  Its  relation  to  the 
electric  vibrations  of  the  filaments  of  the  brain  is  the 
same  as  that  of  color  to  the  vibrations  of  ether.  In 
like  manner  the  will  is  only  the  mechanical  expression 
of  the  state  of  the  brain  as  determined  by  external 
impressions.^^ 

§  23.  Admitting  these  premises  two  alternatives  are 
presented:   (a)   Either  reject  thought  altogether  and 

27  Cf.  Prof.  Bowne,  Some  Diff.  in  Mod.  Materialism. 

28Cf.  The  Evolution  Philosophy  by  M.  E.  Gazelles,  p.  116. 

29  This  explanation  shows  how  little  Materialism  has 
changed.  "  The  atoms  of  Democritus  are  individually  with- 
out sensation;  they  combine  in  obedience  to  mechanical  laws; 
and  not  only  organic  forms  but  the  phenomena  of  sensation 
and  thought,  are  the  result  of  their  combination."  Tyndall 
Belfast  Add. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  6l 

admit  the  sole  existence  of  matter  and  material  motion, 
this  is  the  logical  and  candid  course,  and  is  the  position 
of  the  consistent  Materialists,  (b)  Or  hesitate  and 
admit  the  existence  of  thought  in  name  only  as  an 
aspect  of  matter.  In  this  theory  the  physical  scries  is 
the  objective  side,  the  psychical  series  is  the  subjective 
shadow  of  the  objective  physical  series.  Sensation, 
they  say,  is  apparently  due  to  a  chemical  change  in  the 
molecule;  but  in  reality  the  sensation  and  the  chemi- 
cal change  are  only  two  manifestations  of  the  same 
motion,  or  ex.  gr..  Mental  activity,  i.  e.,  perception, 
judgment,  etc.,  is  the  subjective  side  of  the  changes 
in  the  nervous  mechanism  of  the  brain.^°  Thus 
argue  the  English  advocates  of  the  Double-Aspect 
theory,  e.  g.,  Spencer,  Clifford,  Bain.^^  Hence  we 
have  no  such  being  as  mind,  or  Soul;  immortality  is  a 
vain  dream;  with  the  dissolution  of  the  organism,  the 
individual  intelligence  and  personality  melt  like  smoke 
or  a  cloud  into  the  elements  of  the  universe. 

V. 
Arguments  for  Materialism. 
§  24.  Materialists  endeavor  to  strengthen  their  posi-  Siy  toown 
tion  with  various  proofs  drawn  especially  from  Physi-  ^°  "^a**®^* 
ology.     (a)  What  is  called  the  soul  is  known  only  by 
its  connection  with  matter.     Its  activities  come  into 
play    in    and    through    a    bodily    structure.     "  It    is 
enough,"  writes  G.  H.  Lewes  ^^  "  that  mind  is  never 
manifested  except  in  a  living  organism  to  make  us 
seek,  in  an  analysis  of  organic  phenomena,  for  the 

30  Cf.  Prof.  Bowne  Christian  Phil.  Quart.,  Oct.,  1881;  Art. 
Some  Difficult,  in  Mod.  Materialism. 

31  Cf.  infra. 

32  Physical  Basis  of  Mind,  p.  3. 


62 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


(b)  from 

mental 

processes. 


(c)  de- 
pendence 
of  mind 
on  body. 


material  conditions  of  every  mental  fact.  Mind  is 
never  found  separate  from  a  material  organization." 
"  Of  mind  apart  from  body  we  have  no  direct  experi- 
ence and  absolutely  no  knowledge."  ^^  But  what  war- 
rant have  we  to  reason  from  concomitance  to  identify? 

§  25.  (b)  In  company  with  all  our  mental  processes 
there  is  an  unbroken  material  succession.  Parallel  to 
mental  circles  of  sensation,  emotion,  thought,  language 
there  is  an  unbroken  physical  circle  of  effects  in  nerve 
extremities,  the  afferent  nerves,  the  centres,  the  cere- 
bral hemispheres,  the  efferent  nerves,  etc.  "  It  would 
be  incompatible  with  everything  we  know  of  the  cere- 
bral action  to  suppose  that  the  physical  chain  ends 
abruptly  in  a  physical  void,  occupied  by  an  immaterial 
substance,  which  imparts  its  results  to  the  other  edge 
of  the  physical  break  and  determines  the  active 
response."  Hence  there  is  no,  rupture  of  nervous  con- 
tinuity. The  mental  and  physical  proceed  together, 
as  undivided  tv/ins.  A  mental  cause  is  always  a  two- 
sided  cause.  When  mind  operates  on  body,  it  is  a  two- 
sided  phenomenon,  one  side  being  body  that  influ- 
ences the  body;  in  other  words  it  is  body  acting  upon 
body.3^ 

§  26.  (c)  The  absolute  dependence  of  mind  on  body, 
as  proved  by  Physiology  and  Pathology.  This  is 
shown  (i)  in  the  growth  and  development  of  the  child. 
The  mental  faculties  develop  parallel  to  the  growth  of 
the  body.     They  come  into  action  in  proportion  as 


33  Cf.  Bain  Mind  and  Body,  p.  130. 

34  Cf.  Bain  Mind  and  Body,  p.  132;  cf.  Tyndall's  words: 
"  You  cannot  satisfy  the  human  mind  in  its  demand,  for  a 
logical  continuity  between  molecular  processes  and  the  phe- 
nomena of  consciousness.  This  is  the  rock  on  which  Mater- 
ialism must  inevitably  split  whenever  it  pretends  to  be  a  com- 
plete philosophy  of  the  human  mind,"    Scientific  Materialism. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  63 

the  capacities  of  the  organism  unfold.  The  lower  fac- 
ulties act  first,  the  higher  are  gradually  matured. 
Hence,  the  organism  has  latent  capacities  for  all  these 
actions,  and  the  soul  exists  only  in  name. 

"  For  nature  crescent  does  not  grow  alone 
In  thews  and  bulk;  but  as  this  temple  waxes, 
The  inward  service  of  the  mind  and  soul 
Grows  wide  withal." 

— [Haml.,   Act   I,   Seen.   3. 

(2)  The  volume  weight,  convolutions  and  chemical 
properties  of  the  brain  have  a  strict  relation  to  the 
intelligence.  Again  disease,  fatigue,  sleep,  stimulants, 
affect  our  mental  operations.  Finally,  the  mind 
acquires  its  knowledge  of  the  world  through  the 
senses,  and  is  stimulated  to  activity  by  the  impres- 
sions.^^ This  objection  has  weight  against  the  exag- 
gerated spiritualism  of  Des  Cartes,  Leibnitz  and  Male- 
branche.  It  cannot  be  answered  by  them.  Scholastic 
Philosophy  proclaims  the  interaction  of  body  and 
mind.  It  stands  for  the  unity  of  the  human  composite. 
Finally  (3)  that  all  mental  phenomena  have  exact 
equivalents  in  the  specific  forms  of  the  nerve-commo- 
tion of  the  brain.  This  is  the  position  of  cerebral  Phys- 
iology.^^ But  the  basis  of  this  theory  is  very  slight, 
and  the  theory,  as  proposed,  is  far  in  advance  of  actual 
facts.  Our  knowledge  of  the  relations  between  mole- 
cular changes  and  mental  changes  is  very  deficient.^^ 
No  sound  argument  for  Materialism  can  be  drawn 
from  the  dependence  of  the  mind  on  the  operations  of 
imagination  and  sense.  The  dependence  is  extrinsic, 
not  intrinsic;  i.  e.,  sense  and  imagination  furnish  the 

^^  Cf.  Bain  Mind  and  Body,  p.  131. 

36  Cf.  Prof.  James  Psychology;  Tyndall  Scientific  Material- 
ism; Bain  Mind  and  Body,  p.  42. 

3''  Cf.  Ladd  Phys.  Psych.,  p.  592,  sq. 


64 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


(d)  from 
evolution. 


material  of  thought;  thought  itself  is  superorganic.^ 
Imagination  and  sense,  however,  require  a  nervous 
system  and  a  nervous  center.  The  brain  is  an  organ 
for  them,  not  for  the  intellect  which  transcends  them.^^ 

§  2^.  (d)  It  is  confirmed  by  the  doctrine  of  evolu- 
tion. The  universe  presents  a  series  of  existences,  one 
rising  gradually  above  the  other,  one  preparing  the 
way  for  another,  until  the  series  terminates  in  man. 
The  lowest  forms  are  brought  together  in  obedience 
to  mechanical  laws ;  higher  forms  are  capable  of  chem- 
ical combinations;  still  higher,  crystals  are  found;  then 
organized  existence  from  the  lowest  types  up  to  man. 
In  the  grades  of  animal  life  w^e  find  that  the  simpler 
the  organization  is,  the  fewer  are  the  instincts  and  the 
more  limited  is  the  intelligence.  The  individual,  too, 
in  his  development,  seems  to  reproduce  the  history  of 
the  development  of  the  species;  he  passes  through  the 
grades  of  vegetation,  animal  and  conscious  existence.^" 
But  this  argument  from  evolution  cannot  be  substan- 
tiated. The  law  of  biogeny  is  the  basis  of  Haeckel's 
Monism;  it  rests  upon  a  false  analogy,  is  disproved  by 
facts,  and  is  rejected  by  scientific  men. 

§  28.  From  this  the  conclusion  is  reached  that  m.at- 
ter  alone  exists;  that  the  soul  is  only  a  name  for  the 
higher  material  activities  or  an  aspect  of  them;  that 
with  the  disintegration  of  the  body  the  soul  vanishes. 


VI. 

Criticism. 
A  detailed  and  minute  examination  of  Materialism 
one-sided.   ^\[\  j^q^-  j^g  given  here.    Its  arguments  will  be  exam- 


(a)  Mate- 
rialism is 


38  Cf.  Spirituality  of  the  Soul. 

39  Cf.  Janet  Materialism  of  the  Present  Day,  p.  130,  sq. 
^  Cf.  Porter  Human  Intellect,  p.  21. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  65 

ined  in  the  proper  place.  They  touch  on  many  points, 
and  require  careful  and  extensive  exposition  of  the 
true  doctrine.  Here  and  there,  in  the  following  pages, 
as  occasion  presents,  they  will  be  taken  up  and  sifted. 
Some  remarks,  however,  of  general  criticism,  are  not 
out  of  place. 

§  29.  (a)  Materialism  is  a  one-sided  and  partial 
view;  hence,  in  its  estimation  of  facts,  it  lays  itself  open 
to  the  charge  of  narrowness  and  exaggeration.  It 
postulates  an  infinite  number  of  eternal,  self-existent 
atoms  in  motion.^^  Epicurus  tried  to  account  for  the 
movement  by  the  continual  descent  of  the  primordial 
atoms  in  space;  but  Cicero  calls  this  "a  childish  fic- 
tion," a  "  vain  invention."  ^^  In  more  modern  times 
La  Place  held  that  matter  was  originally  in  a  diffuse, 
nebulous  state;  that  by  the  action  of  gravitation  it 
broke  up  into  spherical  masses;  that  the  collision  and 
condensation  of  these  produced  heat;  that  thus  the 
masses  were  fused  and  afterwards  slowly  cooled. 

§  30.  But  is  this  motion  original  and  essential,  or  was 
it  imparted?  If  the  former,  how  account  for  the  begin- 
ning of  the  process?  If  the  latter,  then  the  condition 
of  matter  underwent  a  change.  Furthermore,  it 
assumes  that  material  substance  alone  has  a  real  exist- 
ence, and  hence  that  the  soul  has  no  reality.  This  is 
begging  the  whole  question.  Now,  a  system  which  is 
gratuitous,  one-sided  and  partial,  cannot  claim  to  be 
scientific. 

§31.  (b)  Alaterialism  confuses  things  which  are,  by  ^^^l^, 
nature,  distinct.    Life  is  not  coexistent  with  all  motion ;  fion  of 

'  '  things. 

nor  is  mind  coexistent  with  all  life.^^    There  are  physi- 

«  Cf.  Arist.  Met.  Bi.,  ch.  3  and  4. 
^  De   Finibus   i,   n.    19. 

^  Cf.  Present  Day  Tracts,  "  Modern  Materialism,"  by  Rev. 
W.  F.  Wilkinson. 


66  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

cat,  vital  and  mental  forces.  One  is  not  the  other.  It 
is  true  that  Hfe  is  always  found  connected  with  matter, 
and  mind  with  both  Hfe  and  matter,  or  rather,  with 
Uving  matter.  But  we  cannot  reason  inversely,  and 
contend  that  wherever  matter  is  there  is  life  also;  or 
wherever  life  is,  there  mind  is  found.  Life  is  not  due 
to  mere  material  combinations,  nor  is  mind  explained 
by  organization.  Facts  of  consciousness  are  related 
to  the  brain  and  to  bodily  states;  but  the  brain  is  not 
their  cause.  "The  chasm  is  never  bridged  over 
between  the  last  state  of  the  material  elements  within 
our  reach  and  the  first  rise  of  sensation;  and  scarce  any 
one  will  cherish  the  vain  hope  that  at  a  higher  stage 
of  development  science  will  find  a  mysterious  britlge 
in  a  case  where  it  is  the  impossibility  of  any  sure  cross- 
ing over  that  forces  itself  on  us  with  the  most  evident 
distinctness."  ^* 
not  sSen^  §  32.  (c)  Its  methods  are  not  scientific.  It  conies  to 
*^^^-  us  under  the  auspices  of  the  physical  sciences.     The 

true  spirit,  however,  of  the  experimental  method  does 
not  animate  its  work.  Its  teaching  concerning  origins, 
substances,  causes,  finds  no  warrant  in  true  science. 
Materialism  repudiates  Metaphysics  only  to  set  up  a 
new  Aletaphysics  of  its  own.^^  It  is  only  necessary  to 
read  a  few  pages  of  Mill's  Logic  to  comprehend  this, 
and  to  recognize  his  patent  contradictions.  "  Material- 
ism," writes  Virchow,  "  is  a  tendency  to  explain  all 
that  exists  by  the  properties  of  matter;  it  goes  beyond 
experience;  it  is  constituted  in  a  system,  but  systems 
are  rather  the  results  of  speculations  than  the  results 
of  experience;  they  show  in  us  a  certain  need  of  per- 
fection which  speculation  alone  can  satisfy,  for  every 

44  Lotz  Microcosmos  I,  148. 

45  Caro,  Le  Materialisme. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  (>J 

knowledge  which  is  the  result  of  experience  is  incom- 
plete and  has  gaps."  ^^ 

VII. 
Influence. 
%'\\  Materialism    exerted    a   very    g-reat    influence  due  to 

^  ^^  .  .  physical 

over  the  generation  just  passed.    The  physical  sciences  sciences. 
were  thoroughly  imbued  with  its  spirit.     Under  their 
auspices  it  flourished  and    spread.     The    impression 
was  in  some  manner  made  upon  the  student  that  its 
teaching  alone  fostered  independence  of  mind.    Atten- 
tion was  called  to  the  eminence  occupied  by  its  scien- 
tific defenders.    Their  great  achievements  and  success  to  empiric 
were  magnified  and  attributed  to  honesty  of  mind  and  of  English 
candid  love  of  truth.     The  empiric  tone    of    English 
philosophy,  with  its  strong  undercurrent  to  Material- 
ism, made  its  progress  easier. 

§  34.  But  strong  opponents  were  never  wanting.  lafiuence 
The  insufficiency  and  inconsistency  of  the  Materialis-  ®^^®^''^'^^- 
tic  position  were  pointed  out.  The  false  pretension 
and  unscientific  methods  of  its  advocates  were 
unmasked.  A  reaction  set  in.^^  We  have  just  heard 
Lange's  lament  of  the  untimely  fate  of  its  apostles. 
Janet's  "  Materialism  of  the  Present  Day  "  was  the 
death  blow  to  Buchner's  "  Force  and  Matter." 
Ulrici  laid  bare  the  sophistry  of  Strauss;  ''Old  and 
New  Faith,"  1873.*^  The  scope  and  limit  of  true  sci- 
ence were  set  forth  by  Caro  in  ''  Le  Materialisme  et  la 
Science." 

§35.  In  France  the  spiritualistic  school  of  Maine  i^  France, 
de  Biran;  the  influence  of  Scotch  philosophy  cham- 
pioned by  Royer-Collard,  Saisset;  the  revival  of  the 

*^  Rev.  des  Cours  Scient.,  1864,  p.  308. 
*''  Cf.  Carus  the  Soul  of  Man,  p.  380. 
^^  Eng,  trans,  by  Dr.  Krauth, 


68  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

Study  of  Aristotle  led  by  Barthol.  de  S.  Hilare;  the 
Academie  des  sciences  Morales  et  Politiques,  e.  g., 
Leveque,  Caro,  Bouillier  et  Janet,  broke  the  wave  of 
]\Iaterialism  which  threatened  to  submerge  every- 
^^^^siand  thing.^^  Like  influences  were  at  work  in  England  and 
America.  America.  We  see  it  in  the  Catholic  Revival  led  by 
Cardinal  Newman,  Cardinal  Manning  and  Dr.  Ward,^° 
and  in  our  country  by  Dr.  Brownson,  Fathers  Hecker 
and  Hewitt  ;^^  in  the  modern  Idealistic  school,  i.  e., 
Neo.  HegeHan  or  Neo.  Kantian  represented  by  Pro- 
fessors Green  and  Wallace  of  Oxford;  Dr.  Lotze  and 
Wundt,  Prin.  Caird  and  Prof.  Caird,  of  Glasgow ;  Prof. 
Ferrier,  of  St.  Andrews;  Dr.  H.  S.  Sterling;  Prof.  Her- 
bart.  Dr.  Martineau;  in  the  adherents  of  the  Scotch 
school  Prof.  Frazer,  of  Edinburgh;  Prof.  Calderwood, 
Prof.  FHnt;  in  the  writings  and  influence  of  Cardinal 
Gibbons,  of  Dr.  McCosh,  of  Princeton;  Dr.  Porter 
and  Prof.  Ladd,  of  Yale;  Prof.  Seth,  Prof.  Bowne  in 
the  strong  commendation  bestowed  on  Scholastic  Phil- 
osophy by  Pope  Leo  as  the  only  remedy  for  the  evils 
of  the  times,  and  in  the  Scholastic  writings  of  Fr.  Har- 
per and  the  Stonyhurst  Professors  ;^^  in  the  increased 
respect  shown  for  religion,  and  in  the  number  of  men 
who  are  eminent  alike  for  sincere  piety  and  scientific 
attainments;  in  the  production  of  such  works  as  the 
"  Foundations  of  Belief "  by  Rt.  Hon.  Balfour,  and 
"  Thoughts  on  Religion,"  G.  R.  Romanes,  and  "A 
Rebours,"  by  Huysmans,^^ 

49  Cf.    "  Neo-Christian    Movement    in    France,"    in   Amer. 
Jour,  of  Psych.,  1892-93,  p.  496. 

50  Cf.  W.  G.  Ward  and  the  Catholic  revival. 

51  Life  of  Father  Hecker,  by  Father  ElHott. 

52  Cf.  Encyc.  Aeterni  Patris. 

53  The  names  just  cited  are  not  disciples  of  the  same  school 
of  thought;  they  do  not  profess  the  same  religious  faith,  their 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  69 

§  36.  Materialism  is  formulated  in  the  universal  neg- 
ative proposition:  nothing  but  matter  exists.  This 
proposition  is  proved  false  by  establishing  the  truth  of 
its  contradictory,  the  particular  affirmative  proposition, 
viz.,  that  there  is  an  immaterial  entity.  In  the  follow- 
ing chapter  this  is  done  in  proving  the  existence  of  the 
soul  as  an  immaterial  principle. 

works  are  not  of  the  same  value,  nor  should  they  be  read 
without  judicious  discrimination.  They  are  mentioned  with 
the  view  to  show  how  men  differing  in  faith,  in  language,  in 
philosophic  principles,  in  almost  everything,  yet  join  in  call- 
ing attention  to  the  sophistry  and  insufficiency  of  Material- 
ism, and  in  the  effort  to  propose  a  Theistic  Philosophy. 


SIMPLICITY  OF  THE  SOUL, 
meaning  of      §  I.  Bv  the  simolicitv  of  the  Soul  is  understood  a 

the  terms.       . 

simple  immaterial  unity.  Hence  the  phrase  expresses 
three  notions,  viz.,  that  the  soul  is  a  unity;  that  it  is  a 
simple  unity;  that  it  is  a  simple  unity  totally  different 
from  matter.  In  the  following  chapter  the  meaning 
and  nature  of  its  immateriality  will  be  investigated. 
Here  it  is  sufBcient  to  state  and  prove  the  fact. 


Unity. 

a^faS^*^  ^^  ^  ^'  ^^^  unity  of  the  ego  is  an  indisputable  fact.  To 
deny  it  is  to  do  away  altogether  with  internal  experi- 
ence and  to  render  the  facts  actually  perceived  wathin 
us  absurd.  How  can  there  be  a  sensation  without  the 
unity  of  the  subject  perceiving?  How  can  I  explain 
the  fact  that  /  think  many  thoughts  and  suffer  many 
affections,  if  the  /  or  ego  be  not  a  unity?  Conscious- 
ness, therefore,  with  undeniable  force  testifies  to  this 
elementary  fact.^ 

IL 

Simple  Unity. 

different  §  3.  It  is  not  eilough  to  Say  that  the  soul  is  a  unity. 

unity.  The  expression,  as  it  stands,  is  ambiguous.  There 
are  different  kinds  of  unity.  Hence  it  is  necessary  to 
explain  in  what  way  the  soul  is  one.     We  may  distin- 

1  Cf.  Mivart  Truth,  p.  386,  foil. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY,  71 

guish  a  collective  unity,  a  potential  unity  and  a  simple 
unity,  (a)  A  collective  unity  is  an  aggregate  of  ele- 
ments actually  distinct  and  separable  but  united  by 
some  common  bond.  This  bond  may  be  physical,  as, 
e.  g.,  many  links  are  united  to  form  one  chain;  or 
moral,  as,  e.  g.,  many  persons  are  united  by  the  bond 
of  authority,  and  of  obedience  to  form  one  society;  or 
intellectual,  as,  e.  g.,  many  sentences  and  paragraphs 
are  united  to  form  one  definite  treatise. 


1°.  Collective  Unity. 
§  4.  That  the  soul  is  a  collective  unity  is  the  teaching  tioSs' 


Assoeia- 


of  the  Associationist  school,  as  represented  by  Hume,  thesoui&a 
Mill,  Spencer  and  Bain.  Hume  holds  that  impressions  Snit^y.  ^^^ 
give  rise  to  ideas;  now  to  account  for  an  idea  of  Self 
invariably  the  same,  we  should  have  an  impression 
which  continues  invariably  the  same  through  the  whole 
course  of  our  lives.  But,  he  says,  there  is  no  impres- 
sion constant  and  invariable;  hence  ordinary  men, 
except  metaphysicians,  are  "  nothing  but  a  bundle  or 
collection  of  dififerent  perceptions  succeeding  each 
other  rapidly."  Thus  "  all  our  distinct  perceptions  are 
distinct  existences,  and  the  mind  never  perceives  any 
real  connection  among  distinct  existences."  ^  J.  S. 
Mill  resolves  the  mind  into  "  a  series  of  feelings  with 
a  background  of  possibilities  of  feeling;"  but  he  admits 
that  he  cannot  explain  how  this  "  series  is  aware  of 
itself  as  a  series."  ^  This  admission  is  fatal  to  the 
hypothesis.*  Mr.  Spencer  maintains  that  "  the  sub- 
stance of  mind  cannot  be  known;  that  Mind  as  known 
» 

2  Cf.  Hume  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,"  ch.  Personal  Iden- 
tity. 

2  Cf.  Exam,  of  Hamilton,  p.  247, 
4  lb.,  p.  561. 


y2  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

to  the  possessor  of  it,  is  a  circumscribed  aggregate  of 
activities."  ^  To  them  adhere  Beneke  who  teaches  that 
the  soul  is  the  complex  of  acquired  habits;  Hartman, 
.  who  says  that  the  soul  is  like  a  bundle  bound  together 
from  the  activities  of  the  unconscious.  Mr.  Davis 
also  thinks  it  better  to  use  the  word  mind  to  stand 
merely  for  "  a  complement  of  activities."  ^  Dr.  Mands- 
ley  m.aintains  that  the  soul  is  one  by  a  combination 
and  co-operation  of  the  brain-cells  and  in  fact  is  com- 
posed of  essentially  different  elements  which  change 
every  moment;  henee  its  unity  may  be  dissolved  by  the 
dissolution  of  the  brain-cells;  hence  it  is  a  fictitious  and 
delusive  unity.  Prof.  Kulpe  assures  us  by  conscious- 
ness or  mind,  is  meant  the  sum-total  of  all  these  par-- 
ticular  phenomena,  e.  g.,  subjective  processes,  facts  of 
consciousness  and  mental  states;  he  expressly  declares 
that  he  shall  nowhere  discuss  anything  like  transcen- 
dental consciousness,  a  substantial  soul  or  an  imma- 
terial spirit.^ 
o?this^"^  §  5.  This  opinion  is  false.  The  mind  is  not  a  col- 
opinion.  lection  of  units.  The  mistake  of  these  writers  is  'the 
legitimate  consequence  of  a  wrong  conception  of  sub- 
stance. If  the  substance  be  only  a  grouping  together 
of  activities  or  qualities,  it  follows  that  the  mind  is 
such  a  unity. 

§  6.  Now  consciousness  is  aware  of  itself  as  a  unity. 
I  am  conscious  that  I  now  write  and  that  I  began  to 
write  an  hour  ago.  The  various  states  of  the  mind 
during  that  time  do  not  appear  as  separate,  each  one 

5  Prin.  of  Psych.  VI,  pp.   156,   159. 

6  Elem.  of  Psych.,  p.  52;  cf.  p.  2. 

■^  Outl.  of  Psych.,  p.  3,  tr.  from  Germ,  by  E.  B.  Titchener, 
of  Cornell.  On  self  as  a  unity  of  synthesis  cf.  Prof.  Dewey, 
"  Some  Current  Conceptions  of  Self  "  in  Mind.  1890,  vol.  15, 
p.  58;  Prof.  Seth,  "  Hegelianism  and  Personality." 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  73 

aware  Qf  itself  only ;  but  there  is  a  continuity  and  a  per- 
sistence throughout.  The  testimony  of  consciousness 
contains  two  distinct  elements:  (a)  The  existence  of 
ever-changing  states,  (b)  The  unity  of  these  states. 
To  accept  the  former  alone  is  to  mutilate  the  testimony, 
to  propose  a  gratuitous  and  false  explanation.  Even 
while  explicitly  rejecting  the  latter  element  I  should  be 
compelled  to  admit  it  implicitly.  For  how  could  I 
be  aware  of  successive  states  of  consciousness,  unless  I 
admitted  their  unity?  ^ 

2°.  Potential  Unity. 

§  7.  That  the  mind  is  a  potential  unity  is  the  conten-  Ladd's 
tion  of  Prof.  Ladd.  The  word  Potential  is  not  used  opinion, 
in  its  scholastic  meaning.  St.  Thomas  teaches  that 
the  mind  is  a  potential  unity  in  the  sense  that  although 
one  in  essence,  it  exhibits  its  activity  in  many  modes 
or  potencies.  Prof.  Ladd,  however,  by  a  potential 
unity  holds  that  the  mind  is  in  potency  to  become  one 
and  that  its  unity  is  a  matter  of  degrees  or  of  develop- 
ment. Hence  the  infant  is  not  one,  because  it  has  not 
arrived  at  self-consciousness;  we  say  it  is  one,  but  by 
this  we  mean  that  it  will  become  one;  for  the  mind  can 
be  said  really  to  have  unitary  being  only  as  it  acquires 
and  exercises  the  power  to  make  itself  one  to  itself.^ 

§  8.  How  this  takes  place  is  set  forth  farther  on,  his  ex- 
when  he  says  that  the  real  unity  of  mind  depends  upon 
the  firmness  and  comprehensiveness  of  the  grasp  of 
self-consciousness  and  upon  the  conscious  recognition 
and  control  of  the  mental  life  as  under  one  purpose 

8  Cf.  Lotze  cited  by  Mivart  Truth,  p.  387. 

^  Hegel  held  that  the  mind  is  nothing  actually  but  all  things 
potentially,  i.  e.,  "  a  unity  which  has  grown  up.''    cf.  Wallace's 
Hegel  Proleg.,  ch.  VH.    This  explains  Prof.  Lp-^-^''  "Oi^'tion. 
Phil,  of  Mind,  p.  202. 
10 


74 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


criticism. 


or  immanent  iclea.^°  Hence  the  oneness  of  bei^g  con- 
sists in  grasping  together  and  binding  into  a  unity  of 
self-conscious  remembering  and  reflecting  states 
according  to  some  fitting  and  consciously  selected 
plan,  all  the  manifold  movements  in  that  flowing 
stream  of  psychosis  which  is  called  mental  Ufe.^^ 

§  9.  The  potential,  therefore,  developes  into  the  col- 
lective unity.  Ladd  seems  to  confound  the  fact  of 
personal  identity  with  its  conscious  recognition.  That 
I  am  one  is  not  the  same  as  that  I  am  conscious  that  I 
am  one.  The  latter  supposes  the  former,  does  not 
make  it.  The  infant  of  a  week  is  as  real  a  unity  as  the 
fact  with     full-pfrown  man.     The  former  is  not  conscious  of  its 

the  con-  ^ 

sciousness  unity,  the  other  is ;  but  the  act  of  consciousness  has  no 
influence  whatever  on  the  fact,  as  is  shown  also  in 
sleep  and  in  delirium.  The  idea  of  personal  identity  is 
obtained  from  consciousness,  memory  and  judgment; 
the  act  of  consciousness  containing  the  perception  of 
the  present  ego  is  not  erroneous  but  the  absence  or 
perversion  of  memory  can  render  our  judgment  erron- 
eous; the  idea  of  the  ego  is  changed  or  disappears;  but 
the  person  remains  the  same.  I  could  not  be  con- 
scious of  my  unity,  if  I  were  not  already  one.  Hence 
the  fact  explains  the  consciousness,  the  consciousness 
does  not  account  for  the  fact. 


he  con- 
founds the 


of  the  fact. 


Positivist 
view. 


3°.  The  Unity  of  the  Positivists. 
§  10.  Closely  akin  to  the  opinions  that  the  ego  is  a 
collective  or  a  potential  unity  is  the  contention  of  Posi- 
tivists that  the  ego  is  a  result.  They  base  the  proof 
on  scientific  data,  and  throw  it  into  a  scientific  form. 
Not  so  long  ago,  they  assure  us,  white  light,  water,  etc., 


1^  L.  C,  p.  203. 
11  lb.,  p.  205. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  75 

were  believed  to  be  simple  substances,  but  no  one  will 
now  deny  that  they  are  composite.  Hence  what  the 
prism  in  Physics  does  for  light,  what  voltaic  electricity 
in  chemistry  does  for  water,  nervous  disease  and  acci- 
dent, i.  e..  Physiology  and  Pathology  will  do  for  the 
human  ego.^^  The  ego  is  nothing  more  than  an  ex- 
tract from  internal  events  and  derives  from  them  all  its 
being;  detached  and  isolated  it  is  nothing  in  itself, 
hence  a  metaphysical  illusion.  The  ego  is,  therefore, 
a  product.^^. 

§11.  This  opinion  rests  upon  a  fallacy:  they  con- ^ ^^^^^^y* 
found  the  ego  with  the  states  of  the  ego.  The  subject 
ego  is  a  cause  not  a  result;  it  remains  always  identical. 
The  states  of  the  ego,  however,  are  a  result ;  they  con- 
stantly change,  e.  g.,  in  speaking  of  a  mutual  friend  I 
can  say  that  he  is  not  the  same  as  he  used  to  be,  that 
he  has  changed  in  temperament,  in  manners,  in  appear- 
ance, in  almost  everything;  yet  I  do  not  mean  to  say 
that  the  subject,  i.  e.,  the  man  himself  is  not  the  same,  confounds 

•'        '  the  ego 

Therefore,  we  must  distinguish  the  siibject  ego,  i.  e.,  with  the 

stHtss  or 

who  has  undergone  the  changes,  from  the  phenomenal  ^^^  ^so. 
ego,  i.  e.,  the  changes  themselves. 

§  12.  This  distinction  enables  the  reader  to  estimate 
the  value  of  their  argument  based  on  the  distinction 
between  the  normal  and  the  hysterical  ego.  The  same 
confusion  is  here  found.     The  normal  ego  signifies  not 

12  Cf.  Taine  "Intelligence;"  Ribot  "Diseases  of  Person- 
ality; cf.  also  Th.  Brown  Phil,  of  Human  Mind,  chap. 
Mental  Identity.  To  Mr.  Taine  the  ego  is  a  plank  on  which 
geometrical  figures  are  marked  in  chalk.  These  figures  repre- 
sent its  divisions.  By  an  illusion  we  create  an  empty  sub- 
stance the  ego  in  itself.  Just  as  the  plank  is  nothing  more 
than  the  continuous  series  of  its  successive  divisions;  so  the 
ego  is  nothing  more  than  the  continuous  web  of  its  successive 
events.     Intelligence  pi  BIV.,  ch.  III. 

13  B.  P.  II,  B.  3,  ch.  I. 


76  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

the  subject  ego,  but  the  nonnal  state  of  the  subject  ego. 
Nor  does  the  hysterical  ego  refer  to  a  subject  ego,  but 
only  to  a  hysterical  state  of  the  subject  ego.  Therefore 
two  states  of  the  same  ego  succeed  each  other;  there  is 
no  double  ego.^^ 

4°.  Simple  Unity. 
§  13.  By  simple  unity  we  mean  that  the  soul  is  an 
indivisible  one  having  no  parts  and  incapable  of  being 
divided  into  parts.  In  scholastic  phraseology  it  is 
said  to  be  entitative  simplex,  i.  e.,  a  unity  by  reason  of 
its  very  essence.  The  reasons  for  this  embrace  not 
only  the  refutation  of  the  views  just  stated,  but  also 
positive  facts  o^  our  conscious  life. 

unity^o?         §  ^4-  (a)  The  soul  has  various  acts,  but  it  has  no  parts. 

Sess^^°^^  Its  modes  of  activity  are  not  the  same  and  it  is  con- 
scious of  their  difference;  it  distinguishes,  classifies, 
names  them,  e.  g.,  sensation,  thought,  desire,  will;  but 
the  same  one  ego  feels,  thinks,  desires,  walls.  All 
these  activities  have  their  source  and  explanation  in 
this  unity  and  are  modifications  of  the  same  unity. 
The  modifications  are  the  effects,  the  one  same  ego 
is  the  cause.  The  grouping  together  of  the  effects 
alone  will  not  explain  the  unity  of  the  ^go.  It  is  the 
unity  of  the  cause  that  we  seek,  a  unity  which  is 
already  supposed  in  the  attempt  to  group  its  activities 
or  its  thoughts.  The  fact  that  there  is  a  unity  of  con- 
sciousness iij  me  can  only  be  explained  by  admitting 
the  unity  of  the  ego.  Lotze  contends  that  "  the  fact 
of  the  unity  of  consciousness  compels  us,  in  the  explan- 
ation of  the  intellectual  life,  to  suppose  that  there  is  a 
completely  indivisible  unity  in  the  subject  which  exer- 
cises the  comprehending  activities  of  consciousness."  ^' 

14  Cf.  Farges  Le  Cerveau  L'Ame,  p.  114  sq. 

15  Micro.  I,  72;  II,  I,  4. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  77 

§  15.  (b)  To  prove  our  thesis  to  a  demonstration,  let  ^^^g^Jj^ 
us  suppose  that  the  soul  is  not  a  simple  unity,  but  has 
parts,  (i)  The  soul  elicits  many  different  acts,  but  for 
the  sake  of  the  argument,  we  shall  take  the  simplest 
mental  act,  e.  g.,  the  idea.  I  have,  ex.  gr.,  an  idea  of 
honesty  in  my  mind.  Now,  if  this  idea  be  produced 
by  the  activity  of  an  extended  substance,  i.  e.,  the 
thinking  principle;  then  either  different  parts  of  the 
idea  must  pertain  to  different  parts  of  this  substance,, 
or  the  entire  idea  must  belong  to  each  part  of  the  sub- 
stance, or  the  whole  idea  must  be  produced  by  a  single 
part  of  the  substance. 

§  16.  But  the  first  hvpothesis  is  absurd.     The  act  of  Refutation 

'  -^  of  the 

apprehension  is  indivisible.     I    cannot    divide    it;    it  hypothesis 

from  fip'f"^ 

either  is  or  is  not.  Its  very  nature  shows  that  it  can-  of  mind, 
not  be  an  aggregate  of  units  separately  produced  by  an 
aggregate  of  agents.-^^  The  second  hypothesis  is  like- 
wise untenable.  For,  if  the  different  parts  produced 
the  entire  idea,  then  we  should  have  at  the  same  time 
as  many  ideas  as  there  are  parts  in  the  composite  sub- 
stance; but  this  is  opposed  to  the  testimony  of  con- 
sciousness. In  the  supposition  that  the  whole  idea 
belongs  to  a  single  part,  we  have  two  alternatives, 
either  this  part  is  composite  or  it  is  a  unity;  if  it  is  a 
simple  unity,  then  our  thesis  is  proved;  if  it  is  compo- 
site, then  we  shall  have  to  take  up  the  former  alterna- 
tives, and  so  on  until  we  are  compelled  to  accept  the 
same  conclusion.  This  argument  can  be  further  illus- 
trated in  the  act  of  judgment  and  the  act  of  reasoning. 

§  17.  (2)  An  analysis  of  the  acts  of  the  will  leads  to  From  acts 

,  ,      .  A  r    1  M.     ,  .        ^.       of  the  will. 

the  same  conclusion.     An  act  of  the  will  always  imphes 
a  previous  act  of  the  intellect.     Thus  if  I  resolve  to  do 

^^  Cf.  Stonyhurst  Logic,  ch.  Simple  Apprehension. 


78 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


Kant's  ob- 
jection, 
(a)  the 
unity  is 
collective. 


Criticism 
of  this. 


something,  it  is  only  after  I  have  had  a  conception  of 
the  thing  to  be  done,  and  have  weighed  the  motives 
which  prompt  me  to  action.  Then  my  will  tends  to  the 
object.  Now  this  act  of  the  intellect  and  this  tendency 
of  the  will  do  not  pertain  to  different  parts  of  the  ego, 
but  are  concentrated  in  a  unity.  Let  us  suppose  that 
the  subject  ego  is  made  up  of  tw^o  parts;  that  the  cogni- 
tion pertains  to  one,  while  the  inclination  springs  from 
the  other.  In  the  hypothesis  there  would  be  no  act  of 
the  will;  not  in  the  former  supposition,  for  we  should 
have  only  the  act  of  cognition;  not  in  the  latter,  for  by 
hypothesis  there  is  no  act  of  cognition,  and  an  act  of 
the  will  without  a  previous  act  of  cognition  is 
impossible.^'' 

§  1 8.  Kant  admits  that  this  argument  is  very  strong, 
but  attem.pts  to  show  that  it  is  a  paralogism.^^  He 
holds  (a)  that  "  the  unity  of  thought,  consisting  of 
many  representations,  is  collective,"  and,  therefore,  "  it 
would  be  impossible  to  establish  the  necessity  of  the 
presupposition  of  a  simple  substance." 

§  19.  But  this  principle  is  false.  The  Unity  of 
thought  is  not  the  result  of  many  representations. 
We  have  such  mental  acts  as  simple  apprehension; 
we  have  ideas  of  simplest  things,  ex.  gr.,  of  being.^^ 
Again  in  the  act  of  judgment  the  mind  compares  two 
ideas.  There  is  diversity,  i.  e.,  the  two  ideas ;  but  at  the 
bottom  of  the  diversity  there  is  unity,  i.  e.,  the  relation 
between  the  ideas.  Hence  the  act  perceiving  the  rela- 
tion is  one.  The  same  is  also  true  of  reasoning.  The 
essence  of  reasoning  is  the  perception  of  the  relation 
between  judgments.     But  the  act  grasping  this  relation 


17  Cf.  Balmes  Fundamental  Philosophy  BIX,  ch.  XI. 

.18  Crit.  of  Pure  Reason.  Trans.  Dialect  BII  cl,  p.  286  sq. 

1^  Cf.  Stonyhurst  Logic  ''  errors  on  Simple  Apprehension.' 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  79 

is  one  and  indivisible.  Thus  thought  is  not  a  collec- 
tion of  representations  but  a  simple  indivisible  unity 
perceiving  and  expressing  the  relation  between  the 
representations,  e.  g.,  the  thought  in  which  I  know  the 
judgment,  John  is  good,  is  not  expressed  by  the  sum  of 
the  concepts  John  and  good;  it  is  a  something  distinct 
from  both,  yet  expressing  the  relation  existing  between 
both,  a  something  which  contains  a  comparison 
between  diverse  things,  and  yet  unites  their  diversity 
in  the  unity  of  relation.^*^ 

§  20.  (b)  Kant  says,  "  The  reason  we  postulate  abso-  {i^-i^y  f^ 
lute  unity  of  the  subject  is  because  otherwise  we  could  JjJ^y^^ 
not  say  of  it,  I  think.  But  this  proposition  is  a  purely 
subjective  condition,  a  merely  logical  unity,  signifying 
something  in  general,  and  hence  simple  because  unde- 
termined." Hence  he  concludes  "  that  we  cannot  hope 
by  means  of  mere  concepts  (still  less  through  the  mere 
subjective  form  of  all  our  concepts,  that  is,  through  our 
consciousness),  and  without  referring  these  concepts 
to  a  possible  experience,  to  extend  our  knowledge, 
particularly  as  even  the  fundamental  concept  of  a  sim- 
ple nature  is  such  that  it  can  never  be  met  with  in  expe- 
rience, so  that  no  chance  remains  of  arriving  at  it  as  a 
concept  of  objective  validity." 

§21.  It  is  true  the  proposition,  I  think,  is  the  basis  J?  this!^ 
on  which  we  reason  to  the  unity  of  the  subject.  Con- 
sciousness testifies  this  fact,  and  our  argument  is  noth- 
ing more  than  the  application  of  the  idea  of  unity  to 
the  fact.  The  fact  of  consciousness  is  a  universal  fact; 
it  is  true  of  every  thinking  being;  it  alone  explains  the 
very  possibility  of  thought.  The  idea  of  unity  is  a 
universal  idea,  applicable  to  many  particular  objects. 

20  Cf.  Balmes  Fund.  Phil. 


8o 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


Thus  our  conclusion  cannot  be  questioned;  it  is  true 
of  every  thinking  being.  Kant  errs,  therefore,  in  say- 
ing that  the  proposition,  I  think,  is  "  subjective  (i.  e., 
an  ideal  form),  logical,  undetermined."  On  the  con- 
trary it  is  a  fact,  it  is  real,  and  determined.  Our  con- 
clusion is  not  a  transitiis  from  the  ideal  to  the  real.  It 
began  with  the  perception  of  the  true  nature  of  my 
individual  self,  and  because  that  nature  is  common  to 
ail  thinking  beings,  I  am  justified  in  drawing  a  con- 
clusion applicable  to  all.^ 


simple 

material 

forces. 


the 

principle 
of  proof. 


III. 

An  Immaterial  Simple  Unity. 

§  22.  The  science  of  Physics  treats  of  forces,  of  their 
relations,- and  manifestations.  It  distinguishes  forces 
into  compound  and  simple.  These  forces  are  inherent 
in  matter;  they  are  conceived  as  properties  of  matter; 
they  can  be  measured  as  to  velocity  and  intensity ;  their 
relations  can  be  expressed  in  mathematical  formulas. 
They  are,  therefore,  termed  material  forces.  Hence 
we  can  speak  of  simple  forces  which  are  material.  A 
vast  difference  exists  between  these  forces  and  the 
unity  of  thought.    The  latter  is  an  immaterial  unity. 

§  23.  In  proving  this  thesis  we  shall  take  as  a  prin- 
ciple of  demonstration  the  axiom  of  Aristotle  and  St. 
Thomas:  That  the  acts  of  a  being  are  a  manifestation 
of  its  nature.  This  principal  is  constantly  employed 
in  every  day  experience,  e.  g.,  I  obtain  a  knowledge 
of  your  character  by  observing  your  words  and  actions. 
So,  too,  in  the  various  departments  of  physical  science 
knowledge  increases  and  discoveries  are  made  accord- 
ing as  the  properties  of  beings  are  disclosed;  and  this 


21  Cf.  St.  Thomas  Summa  Theologiae  I.  Q.  87,  a. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  8l 

takes  place  by  observation  of  and  experimentation 
upon  their  activities.  In  like  manner  by  observing  and 
examining  the  operations  of  my  mind  and  will,  I  can 
learn  something  of  the  nature  of  that  principle  which 
works  through  them. 

§  24.  The  line  of  arsfument  may  be  briefly  stated :  The 

_,.      7  -1  1  .         i-rr  1      question 

VVe   know   mmd   and   matter   m   different  ways,   the  stated. 
former  by  self-consciousness,  the  latter  by  the  senses; 
we    know   them    as   possessing    different    properties. 
Hence  we  infer  that  the  soul  is  a  simple  immaterial 
unity.^ 

§2^.  (1°)  We  know  mind  and  matter  in  different  (i)  matter 

^     -J     ^     ''  and  mind 

ways.     Matter  is  known  throus^h  the  senses.     These  known  in 

•^  '^  different 

faculties  are  organic.  The  organs  in  and  by  which  ways, 
they  act  are  different  parts  of  the  human  body.  The 
sense-faculties  are  limited  in  the  range  and  the  number 
of  their  objects.  Mind,  however,  is  known  by  self- 
consciousness.  This  faculty  is  totally  different  from 
the  organs  of  sense.  It  is  not  organic;  its  activity  is 
not  bound  up  with  a  certain  part  of  the  body  as,  ex.  gr., 
the  sense  of  sight  is  with  the  eye.  By  self-conscious- 
ness I  am  aware  of  my  thoughts  or  volitions,  and  by 
the  one  and  same  act  I  know  myself  as  the  agent  elicit- 
ing these  thoughts  and  volitions  and  as  the  subject 
modified  by  them.  Hence  I  know,  and  I  know  that  I 
know.  The  senses  on  the  contrary  cannot  attain  to 
this  perfection  of  knowledge.  My  eye,  ex.  gr.,  sees  an 
object  but  it  does  not  see  that  it  sees.  It  cannot  turn 
over  upon  itself  and  contemplate  the  very  act  of  seeing. 
Its  organic  nature  and  material  object  render  such  an 
act  impossible.^ 

22  Cf.  McCosh  chty  and  Posit,  ch.  4;  Stonyhurst  Psych.,  ch. 
XX,  XXI. 

23  Aug.  de  Gen.  ad  lit.  I.  vii,  n.  24,  26. 

II 


82  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

§  26.  The  senses  cannot  reflect.  This  act  is  peculiar 
to  mind  alone.  I  meditate,  dream  day  dreams,  exam- 
ine my  conscience,  bring  up  in  my  own  mind  a  pano- 
rama of  the  past.^^  The  faculty  which  enables  me  to 
elicit  such  acts  is  not  organic,  it  cannot  be  classed  with 
material  forces.  There  is  no  relation  of  identity  or  of 
likeness  between  an  electric  force  and  the  activity  of 
my  mind  reflecting  upon  that  force  and  measuring  its 
properties, 
^aii's"^^  §  27.  It  is  true  that  molecular  action  of  the  brain 

words.  accompanies  the  thought,  but  the  passage  from  one  to 
•  the  other  is  in  Mr.  Tyndall's  words,  unthinkable. 
"  Granted,"  he  writes,  "  that  a  definite  thought  and 
definition  molecular  action  in  the  brain  occur  simul- 
taneously,- we  do  not  possess  the  intellectual  organ, 
nor  apparently  any  rudiment  of  the  organ,  which  would 
enable  us  to  pass  by  a  process  of  reasoning  from  the 
one  phenomenon  to  the  other.  They  appear  together, 
but  we  do  not  know  why.  Were  our  minds  and  senses 
so  expanded,  strengthened  and  illuminated  as  to  enable 
us  to  see  and  feel  the  very  molecules  of  the  brain ;  were 
we  capable  of  following  all  their  motions,  all  their 
groupings,  all  their  electric  discharges,  if  such  there  be, 
and  were  we  intimately  acquainted  with  the  corres- 
ponding states  of  thought  and  feeling,  we  should  prob- 
ably be  as  far  as  ever  from  the  solution  of  the  problem. 
How  are  these  physical  processes  connected  with  the 
facts  of  consciousness?  The  chasm  between  the  two 
classes  of  phenomena  would  still  remain  intellectually 
impassible."  ^^ 
k?ow\imd  §  ^^'  (^°)  ^^  know  mind  and  matter  as  possess- 
aad  matter  jj-,g.    different    properties.      The    science    of    Physics 

as  possess-        &  1       ir  ^ 

ing  differ- 
ent pros-  nA   ^r     T   •■,  '  1 

perity.  24  Cf.  Liberator!,  vol.  2,  p.  274. 

25  Add.  to  British  Assoc,  in  Frag,  of  Science. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  83 

enumerates  and  explains  the  properties  of  matter. 
We  know  that  matter  is  hard,  has  definite  size,  shape 
and  color,  is  ponderable,  occupies  space,  etc.  Not  one 
of  these  can  be  appHed  to  mind.^^  This  is  shown  from 
our  ideas.  We  have  conceptions  of  objects  which  are, 
by  their  very  essence,  immaterial,  e.  g.,  God,  angel, 
soul;  we  have  abstract  and  universal  notions  which 
can  be  applied  to  material  and  immaterial  beings,  e.  g., 
being,  potency,  essence,  existence,  cause,  etc. ;  we  have 
ideas  which  represent  material  objects  but  in  an  imma- 
terial manner,  e.  g.,  the  ideas  of  a  triangle  in  general,  ^^-^^ft^ 
the  concept  of  humanity.  Let  us  take  as  an  illustra-  * 
tion  the  idea  of  virtue.  We  have  the  conception  of 
Virtue;  we  speak  of  it  in  glowing  words,  recount  the 
history  of  the  saints  and  heroes  it  has  made,  set  forth 
its  strength  and  beauty,  strive  to  make  it  the  aim  of 
our  own  lives,  and  dwell  upon  the  lustre  it  will  shed 
about  our  name.  Virtue  is  something  real ;  the  idea  I 
have  of  it  exerts  a  real  influence  upon  the  moulding  of 
my  character  and  life.  Yet  the  idea  has  not  shape,  or 
size,  or  color,  or  weight.  There  is  nothing  material 
about  it.^^ 

§20.  (2)  The  same  is  true  of  the  acts  of  judgment  (2)  from 
and  reasonmg.  An  act  oi  judgment  cannot  be  meas-  andrea- 
ured  or  weighed.  It  is  an  indivisible  unity  as  we  have 
seen.  The  negative  judgment  exhibits  this  more 
strongly  than  the  positive  judgment.  There  is  no  uni- 
formity about  the  ordinary  judgments  of  Hfe;  they 
dififer  and  may  be  changed.  What  material  force  can 
explain  an  intricate  train  of  thought,  the  tracing  of  an 
effect  to  a  hidden  or  remote  cause,  the  solving  of  a 

26  S.  Aug.  de  quan.  An.,  n.  4,  5,  6. 

2^  S.  Thomas  C.  Gentes  LII,  ch.  49,  50;  cf.  Aug.  de  Gen.  ad 
lit.  1.  vii,  n.  27. 


84  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

problem  in  mathematics,  in  philosophy  or  in  history? 
The  perception  of  different  objects,  the  discovery  of 
their  relations,  the  separation  of  cause  from  circum- 
stance and  occasion,  the  just  estimate  of  varying  influ- 
ences, the  careful  application  of  experimental  methods, 
the  comparison  of  the  universal  and  the  particular  with 
the  view  of  drawing  a  conclusion,  have  nothing  what- 
ever in  common  with  material  activities.  "  The  pas- 
sage from  the  physics  of  the  brain,"  writes  Mr.  Tyndall, 
''  to  the  corresponding  facts  of  consciousness  is 
unthinkable."  ^s 

Se  wnT  §  30-  This  conclusion  is  strengthened  by  a  consider- 

ation of  the  acts  of  the  will.  The  will  is  a  tendency  to 
what  is  apprehended  as  good ;  in  actual  exercise  it  may 
be  a  tendency  to  a  good  not  yet  possessed,  or  an 
avoidance  of  what  is  bad,  a  delight  in  the  possession 
of  good,  or  sorrow  at  its  loss.  These  are  so  many 
channels  of  human  activity.  The  love  of  a  mother  for 
her  child;  the  constant  strife  to  lead  a  noble  and  holy 
life;  the  sorrow  for  sin;  the  resolution  to  do  better; 
the  bitter  struggle  with  temptation;  the  resolve  to  die 
for  country;  or  to  sacrifice  life  sooner  than  violate  the 
law  of  God;  or  to  suffer  a  living  martyrdom- — these, 
viewed  only  as  phenomena,  cannot  be  measured,  or 
weighed,  or  converted,  as  Mr.  Bain  contends,  into 
heat,  motion,  or  electricity;  they  belong  to  a  sphere 
far  above  material  forces  or  activity .^^ 

memor?  ^3^*  (4)    Memory    brings    its    testimony    to    give 

greater  strength,  if  possible,  to  our  conclusion.  By 
memory  we  are  made  aware  of  our  abiding  personal 
identity.  Now,  if  the  mind  were  only  a  series  of  suc- 
cessive states,  as  Mr.  Mill  holds,  this  knowledge  would 

28  Q{   Belfast  Address  in  Frag,  of  Science. 
25  Aug.  de  An,  et  ejus  origine,  1.  iv.,  n.  19. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  8$ 

be  impossible;  for  then  there  would  be  a  constant  flow 
without  a  principle  grasping  and  connecting  these 
states  into  a  unity.  But  this  substantial  ^°  principle 
cannot  be  material,  e.  g.,  the  organism.  The  bodily 
elements  constantly  change;  they  have  no  permanency. 
Hence  memory  would  be  impossible;  nor  could  we 
then  account  for  the  conviction  as  to  our  abiding  per- 
sonal identity.  Therefore,  if  we  refuse  to  admit  a  per- 
manent indivisible  principle  which  is  at  the  same  time 
immaterial,  the  fact  of  conscious  memory  remains 
inexplicable.^^ 

§  32.  Finally  we  refer  to  the  phenomena  of  deaf-  (5)  fj.^^ 
blind  mutes.^^  Here  are  creatures  who  cannot  see,  mutes!*^*^' 
speak,  or  hear,  yet  are  capable  of  sublime  thoughts,  of 
deep  and  pure  affections.  It  is  impossible  to  account 
for  the  existence  of  such  phenomena  by  recourse  to 
the  senses  of  touch  and  of  smell,  which  alone  they  pos- 
sess. Much  less  can  we  explain  them  by  material 
agencies.  Hence  we  must  admit  a  principle  which  is 
immaterial  to  account  for  the  unity  of  their  mental  life. 
The  story  of  Laura  Bridgeman  and  of  Helen  Kellar  is 
a  practical  proof  of  our  thesis.^^ 

30  Cf.  ch.  on  Sub.  of  Soul. 

31  For  a  beautiful  description  of  the  power  of  memory  cf. 
S.  Augustine  Confess.  1.  X,  ch.  8-16. 

32  Mr.  Huxley  tells  us  that  "  man  born  dumb  would  be  capa- 
ble of  few  higher  intellectual  manifestations  than  an  orang  or 
chimpanzee."     cf.  Man's  Place  in  Nature,  ch.  H. 

33  Cf.  i6th  Annual  Report  of  Perkins  Institute  for  the  Blind 
for  the  year  ending  Sept.,  1891,  Boston,  Mass.  It  is  difficult 
to  understand,  in  the  face  of  this  conclusion,  what  Prof.  Ladd  ' 
means  when  he  says  that  "  a  philosophy  of  mind  which  has 
its  basis  in  the  actual  facts  of  mental  life,  makes  short  work 
of  despatching  certain  doctrines  once  held  as  to  the  so-called 

*  simplicity  '  and  '  individuality  '  of  mind."  cf.  Phil,  of  Mind, 
p.  205. 


POSITIVISM. 

§  I.  Side  by  side  with  Materialism,  often  viewed  as 
its  cause  or  as  its  off-shoot,  thriving  on  the  same  soil 
and  in  the  same  atmosphere,  is  another  intellectual 
product  of  the  time,  Positivism}  Between  both  there 
are  many  points  of  contact:  They  are  congenial;  they 
are  confined  to  the  world  of  sense  phenomena;  they 
deny  the  existence  of  super-sensible  entities;  there  is 
no  God,  no  angel,  no  soul;  both  lay  claim  to  be  phil- 
osophies. Yet  MateriaHsm  is  wider  in  its  sphere,  is 
more  theoretic,  is  a  philosophy  only.  Positivism,  on 
the  contrary,  lays  special  stress  upon  the  methods  and 
limits  of  the  physical  sciences,  hence  its  name ;  aims  at 
the  amelioration  of  society,  and  is  therefore  a  Sociol- 
ogy; is  not  merely  a  theory  presenting  an  intellectual 
solution  of  the  universe,  but  a  doctrine  holding  out  to 
the  religious  aspirations  of  the  human  heart  the  ab- 
stract idea  of  humanity  in  place  of  God. 

I. 

History. 

§  2.  The  author  of  Positivism  is  A.  Compte.^  His 
principal  works  are  "  Cours  de  Philosophic  Positive  " 
(1842),  which  sets  forth  his  views  on  the  philosophy 
of  knowledge  and  the  theory  of  the  sciences;  and 
"  Systeme  de  Politique  Positive "  (1854),  which  is 
origin  as  a  purely  sociological.    As  k  philosophy  or  special  mode 

philoso- 
phy. 

1 "  The  Positivist  School  is  a  sect  which  arises  from  Mater- 
ialism, and  has  neither  value  nor  power  unless  by  Material- 
ism."    Lefevre,  "  Renaiss.  du  Materialisme,"  p.  411. 

2  Died  1857. 


.      CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  8/ 

of  thought  Positivism  is  a  protest  against  an  artificial 
a  priori  metaphysics  and  is  a  continuation  of  the  em- 
piricism of  the  eighteenth  centry;  as  a  system  of  so-  Jodoiogy. 
ciology  it  claims  kindred  with  the  teaching  of  St. 
Simon,  the  friend  and  guide  of  Compte's  younger  days, 
who  so  vigorously  combatted  the  individualism  of  J.  J. 
Rousseau;^  as  a  religion  it  appears  in  the  borrowed  ^l^f^j^^^^ 
rites  and  external  forms  of  the  CathoHc  church.*  Thus, 
in  philosophy,  Compte  recognizes  as  precursors  Hume 
and  Kant;  in  sociology,  Condorcet  and  DeMaistre;  in 
science,  Gall.  Through  these  he  claimed  direct  rela- 
tion to  Bacon,  Des  Cartes  and  Leibnitz,  the  real 
fathers  of  modern  philosophy.  He  gleans  "  the  grains 
of  truth  "  scattered  throughout  their  writings,  adds 
thereto  the  ritual  of  the  Catholic  church,  which  he  calls 
the  pure  and  true  form  of  Christianity,  and  proclaims 
this  synthesis  to  be  the  great  philosophy  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  and  of  times  to  come.^ 

§  3.  The  system  of  Compte  is  the  true  Positivism. 
His  orthodox  disciples  are  Lafitte  and  Robinet. 
Littre,  his  greatest  disciple,  divided  the  teaching  of  his 
master  into  two  parts  and  laid  great  stress  on  the  first 
part,  i.  e.,  the  philosophy,  rejecting  the  system  of  wor-  itsdiffer- 
ship  and  of  conduct.®  Yet  with  Compte  it  is  one  con- 
nected system  of  philosophy  and  polity.^  By  Positiv- 
ism is  understood  also  the  philosophy  of  J.  S.  Mill  and 
of  Taine,  the  teaching  of  Frederick  Harrison,  of  G.  W. 

3  Cf.  Flint  "  Philosophy  of  History;  "  Watson  "  Compte, 
Mill  &  Spencer,"  p.  23. 

4  Cf.  "  Clothes  of  Religion,"  by  Wilfred  Ward. 

5  Cf.  "  Modern  Theories  in  Phil,  and  Relig.,"  by  Principle 
Tulloch;  "Aspects  of  Positivism  in  Relation  to  Christianity," 
by  Canon  Westcott  in  Contemporary  Rev.,  vol.  VIII,  p.  383. 

^Cf.  Compte  et  la  Philos.  Positive,  by  M.  Littre;  M.  Littre 
et  le  Positivisme,  by  M.  Caro. 
^  Cf.  Dr.  Bridges'  "  Unity  of  Compte's  Life  and  Doctrine." 


88    .  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

Lewes,  George  Eliot,^  and  the  Agnosticism  of  Her- 
bert Spencer,  W.  Huxley,  of  Youmans  and  the  Scien- 
tific Monthly.^  In  Italy,  Ardigo  preaches  his  own 
Positivism,  and  says  its  author  must  be  sought  for  in 
Galilee.^^  In  Germany,  Ernest  Laas  gives  still  another 
version;  he  considers  Compte  a  parent  in  name  only, 
the  genuine  apostle  is  Pythagoras,  not  as  history  usu- 
ally presents  him,  but  the  true  Pythagoras  as  deline- 
ated by  a  judicious  and  enlightened  criticism.^^ 

H. 

Basis. 
Sethod!^^^  §  4.  The  fundamental  points  of  Positivism  are  (a) 
the  positive  method.  This  maintains  that  the  direct 
observation  of  facts  alone  gives  authority  to  the 
sciences  in  general  and  to  philosophy  in  particular;  in 
other  words,  we  can  know  only  phenomena  and  their 
law^s.  The  principle  is  not  new;  it  is  the  inductive 
method  of  Aristotle,  St.  Thomas  and  Bacon.  Compte, 
however,  extended  and  applied  it  with  effect.  His  vital 
mistake  is  in  contending  that  there  is  but  one  order 
of  existence,  namely,  the  material;  and  that  beyond 
the  material  order  there  is  nothing.  He  has  no  war- 
rant for  such  assertions;  they  are  pure  assumptions 
contradicted  by  the  voice  of  individual  consciousness, 
by  the  testimony  of  history  and  of  sound  philosophy. 
Furthermore,  Compte,  by  "  facts,"  understands  "phe- 

8  "  What  Compte  and  Spencer  have  taught  in  the  name  of 
philosophy,  Tyndall  and  Haeckel  in  the  name  of  science,  G. 
Eliot  has  applied  to  life  and  its  problems."  G.  Eliot,  by  G. 
W.  Cooke,  ch.  IX.  This  teaching  is  especially  found  in 
Daniel  Deronda. 

9  Cf.  Life  of  Youmans,  by  John  Fiske. 

JO  Cf.  Falckenberg  Hist,  of  Mod.  Phil.,  p.  552. 

11  Cf.  "  Compte  sa  vie  sa  doctrine,"  by  P.  Gruber,  S.  J. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  89 

nomena."  This  interpretation  springs  from  the  false 
theory  of  "  the  Relativity  of  Knowledge  "  which  denies 
the  universal  and  supposes  that  our  knowledge  con- 
sists in  adding  particular  to  particular.^^ 

§  5.  (b)  As  a  result  of  this  method,  the  supra-  (b)  no 
sensible  and  absolute,  as,  e.  g.,  God,  the  soul,  sub-  sensible 
stance,  essence,  cause,  etc.,  are  once  and  for  all  re- 
moved from  the  field  of  science;  they  are  in  reality  only 
chimaeras,  the  product  of  the  imagination,  or  the 
creations  of  a  disordered  brain.^^  Thus  the  way  is 
prepared  for  his  classification  of  the  sciences.  Now 
we  do  not  find  fault  with  the  positive  method  in  se, 
i.  e.,  considered  as  a  method  of  scientific  investigation. 
We  protest  against  the  exclusiveness,  i.  e.,  that  it  is 
the  sole  method  of  research,  and  against  its  conse- 
quences, viz.,  the  denial  of  other  methods  and  the  limi- 
tation of  knowledge.^^  This  exclusiveness,  this  denial, 
this  limitation,  is  the  very  essence  of  Positive  Philoso- 
phy. We  contend  that  we  have  ideas  "  of  being  in 
general,"  of  ''  law,"  of  "  force,"  of  "  cause;  "  that  these 
ideas  are  not  physical,  but  metaphysical;  that  they  are 
conceptions  of  the  mind  having  a  basis  in  real  things, 
and  are  not  simply  sensitive  phenomena.  The  con- 
ception of  ''  cause  "  arises  from  oiTr  individual  con- 
sciousness. We  are  conscious  that  there  is  something 
within  us  which  exerts  power,  and  has  a  direct  and 
immediate  influence  on  our  thoughts,  volitions,  and 
bodily  movements.    By  an  act  of  will  I  can  move  my 

12  Cf.  Watson  "  Compte,  Mill  and  Spencer,"  p.  38. 

12  "  Look  carefully  about  you,"  is  the  sarcastic  exclamation 
of  Socrates,  "  and  see  that  none  of  the  profane  are  present. 
By  these  I  mean  such  individuals  as  have  faith  in  the  exist- 
ence of  nothing  but  what  they  can  grasp  with  both  their 
hands,  and  deny  the  operations  of  spirit,  and  the  generations 
of  things,  and  whatever  else  is  invisible."    Plato  "  Theatetus." 

^'^  Cf.  Morell  Philosophical  Tendencies  of  the  Age,  p.  26. 
12 


90  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

arm,  I  am  conscious  of  external  objects  affecting  me 
and  producing  a  change  in  me;  so  I  infer  that  external 
objects  act  upon  one  another.^^  Even  G.  W.  Lewes 
admits,  in  open  opposition  to  his  creed,  that  "  the  fun- 
damental ideas  of  modern  science  are  as  transcendental 
as  any  of  the  axioms  in  the  ancient  philosophy."  ^^ 
humaSty!  §  6.  (c)  In  place  of  God,  who  has  been  set  aside  by 
the  positivistic  method,  the  idea  of  humanity  is  held  up 
as  an  object  of  worship,  and  as  a  centre  of  unity  for  the 
followers  of  the  new  philosophy. 

III. 
Doctrine. 
origin.  §  y^  Compte  realized  that  fixed  principles  of  thought 

and  of  conduct  were  necessary  to  the  well  being  of  the 
individual  and  of  society;  that  their  absence  gave  rise 
to  uncertainty  and  confusion,  and  ultimately  led  to 
every  evil  in  the  social  and  political  order.  To  reor- 
ganize society  and  place  it  upon  a  firm  basis,  his  first 
aim  was  to  put  an  end  to  the  intellectual  anarchy  which 
prevailed  about  him.^^  He  thought  society  could  be 
regenerated  and  saved  by  science  alone.  In  the  effort 
to  reconstruct  society  after  the  Hght  and  the  methods 
of  modern  science  Positivism  arose. 
the^Three^  §  8.  Taking  the  law  of  evolution  as  his  first  principle, 
states.  Compte  afBrmed  that  the  fundamental  law  of  history 
is  to  be  found  in  the  development  of  the  human  mind. 
He  claims  tl^at  he  discovered  it  in  the  law  of  historical 
filiation  or  law  of  the  Three  States.  According  to  this 
all  human  theories  passed  through  three  successive 

16  Cf.    Rickaby    "General    Metaphysics,"     ch.     Causation; 
Martineau  "  Essays,"  p.   140.  » 

17  Phil,  of  Aristotle,  ch.  IV,  §§  62,  (>z. 

i^This  also  was  the  aim  of  the  Traditionalist  School,     cf. 
de  Lamennais  Ess.  sur  L'Indifferance. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  9I 

stages,  (a)  the  theological  or  imaginative,  illustrated 
in  *Fetichism,  Polytheism  and  Monotheism ;  (b)  the 
metaphysical  or  abstract,  which  differed  from  the  for- 
mer in  explaining  phenomena,  not  by  divine  beings 
but  by  abstract  powers  or  essences  which  are  behind 
them;  (c)  the  positive  or  scientific,  where  man  enlight- 
ened perceives  that  the  only  reahties  are  not  super- 
natural beings,  as,  ex.  eg.,  God  or  angels,  nor  are  they 
abstractions,  as  ex.  gr.,  substances  or  causes,  but  phe- 
nomena and  their  laws  as  revealed  by  science.  This  ^S^iS^won 
law,  he  maintained,  is  to  Sociology  what  gravitation  is  p^g^^"^" 
to  Astronomy.  It  proves  Sociology  a  natural  science 
whose  phenomena  are  developed  according  to  inva- 
riable natural  laws.  The  different  states  give  rise  to 
and  exhibit  three  different  phases  of  thought  or  phil- 
osophies. The  main  source  of  modern  intellectual 
confusion  and  error  is  to  him  the  simultaneous  use  of 
the  three  philosophies;  whereas  the  scientific,  being 
the  final  evolution  of  intellect,  is  the  most  perfect  and 
alone  ought  to  prevail.^^ 

§  9.  The  positive  is  what  is  real,  useful,  certain,  pre-  Pofitivf  °* 
cise,  organic,  and  relative.^"  Hence  it  makes  no  men- 
tion of  a  higher  will;  it  rejects  first  or  final  causes  and 
abstract  entities  as  ex.  gr.,  principles  and  essences;  it 
strives  only  to  discover  the  invariable  laws  which 
direct  the  action  of  phenomena,  to  trace  out  their  mu- 
tual relations,  and  to  bring  them  into  one  organic 
whole.  Whatever  escapes  experiment  is  vague  and 
undetermined,  and  thus  unworthy  of  consideration. 
He  contends  that  his  teaching  is  only  common  sense 
carefully  gathered,  collated  and  formed  into  a  system. 

1^  Cf.  Lewes  Compte's  Philosophy  of  the  Sciences,  sect.  I. 
20  Sys.  de  Polit.   Posit.   I,  p.  57.     A  Positivist  Primer,  by 
C.  G.  David,  p.  5. 


92  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

tio?of*the       ^  ^^*  '^^^  ^^^^  ^^  historic  filiation  prepares  the  way- 
Sciences,     for  the  classification  of  the  sciences.^^     He  draws  a 
distinction  between  abstract  science  which  deals  with 
the  laws,  e.  g.,  Chemistry,  and  concrete  science  which 
has  for  its  object  phenomena  in  detail,  e.  g.,  Botany. 
The  former  are  sciences  properly  so  called,  with  them 
Positive  Philosophy  deals.     Philosophy  is  the  most 
universal  of  the  sciences ;  it  takes  the  methods  and  re- 
sults of  the  other  sciences  with  a  view  of  co-ordinating 
them  under  a  higher  unity.    To  be  clear  and  exact,  this 
classification  should  be  made  according  to  the  degree 
of  dependence   among   the   dift'erent   orders   of  phe- 
ciSsiflca-^  nomena.    Hence  the  law  which  obtains  in  the  classifi- 
tion.  cation  is  the  decreasing    generality    and    increasing 

complexity;  the  simplest  and  most  general  phenomena 
forming  a  basis  for  the  more  complicated.  Thus  we 
have  Mathematics,  Astronomy,  Physics,  Chemistry, 
Physiology,  (Biology)  and  Social  Physics  or  Sociol- 
ogy. At  first  he  considered  Ethics  to  be  a  part  of 
Physiology,  then  of  Sociology,  and  finally  classed  it  a 
distinct  science.  Logic  and  Psychology  are  not  par- 
ticular sciences;  the  latter  is  only  a  branch  of 
Physiology.^^ 
results  of  §  jj.  This  system  of  sciences  enables  us  to  dispose 
tion.  facts  for  the  social  welfare  and  to  put  social  benevo- 

lence on  a  scientific  foundation.  Thus  the  sciences 
lead  up  to  Sociology,  i.  e.,  the  science  of  man  in 
society.  Compters  final  aim,  his  last  and  greatest  effort. 

.      21  cf.  Lewes  1.  c,  sect.  Ill,  IV. 

22  J.  S.  Mill  separates  from  Compte  on  this  point;  he 
strongly  maintains  that  Psychology  is  a  distinct  science.  _  cf. 
A  Compte  &  Positivism,  pp.  63-67.  For  this  Littre  criticises 
Mill  severely,  maintaining  that  the  acts  of  intellect  and  will 
are  irreducible  phenomena  with  the  same  relation  to  the  ner- 
vous substance  that  weight  has  to  matter,  cf.  Littre  Pref.  to 
Materialism  &  Spiritualism,  by  M.  Leblais,  p.  XX. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  93 

In  relegating  the  phenomena  of  intellect  and  will  to 
the  physical  sciences,  in  the  attempt  to  explain  the 
order  and  progress  of  the  moral  world  by  social 
Physics,  in  denying  to  Psychology  the  character  of  a 
distinct  science,  the  thoughtful  student  readily  per- 
ceives that  the  system  is  a  disguised  form  of 
Materialism.^^ 

§12.  Compte   considers   marl   as   only  the  highest  His 
product  of  nature,  "the  apex  of  the  animal  series."  ^  oilman. 
Hence  all  human  phenomena,  especially  those  of  the 
mind,  are  purely  physiological,  and  can  be  explained 
by  the  action  of  the  environment  upon  the  organism. 
Thus  Physiolog-y  embraces  the  whole  science  of  man.  and  on  the 

-^  ^  -^  science  of 

Consistent  with  his  principles  he  rejected  psychology  °ian. 
as  taught  by  the  Schoolmen;  its  method  as  a  science, 
i.  e.,  introspection  he  considered  vain  and  absurd.  He 
applied  the  term  ''  functions  "  to  intellectual  and  voli- 
tional acts;  and  held  that  these  were  to  be  observed 
only  in  their  effects.  This,  he  says,  can  be  done  in  two 
ways;  either  by  a  most  exact  determination  of  the 
organic  conditions,  on  wdiich  they  depend,  or  by  the 
direct  observation  of  their  succession.  The  former 
method  is  the  more  scientific  and  was  adopted  by  Gall. 
He  praises  the  system  of  Gall  as  illustrating  how  men- 
tal and  moral  phenomena  can  be  treated  on  a  positive 
scientific  basis.  He  admits  that  Gall  failed  by  multi- 
plying functions  and  by  the  attempt  to  locaHze  them; 
yet  he  contends  that  we  cannot  deny  the  principles, 
that  the  fundamental  dispositions  of  mind  and  of  will 
are  innate,  and  that  the  particular  faculties  are  essen- 

23  Cf.  Lewes  1.  c,  sect.  XIV,  for  the  passage  from  the  inor- 
ganic to  the  organic. 

24  Lewes  Hist,  of  Phil.,  vol.  II,  p.  ^2\  Compte's  Philosophy 
of  the  Sciences,  sect.  XXI. 


94  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

tially  distinct  and  independent,  although  many  of  them 
often  concur  in  the  production  of  definite  acts.^^ 
ganic^'  §  13-  He  divided  the  organic  kingdom  into  vegeta- 

Kmgdom.  ^-^^  ^^^  animal  by  reason  of  the  nervous  system. 
There  is  no  essential  difiference  between  man  and  brute. 
Instinct  is  only  fixed  reason;  reason  is  only  variable 
instinct.  The  brain  is  not  an  organ  but  a  system  of 
organs.^^  These  are  found  more  complicated  and  per- 
fect in  proportion  as  the  animal  rises  in  the  gradated 
scale  of  life.  The  organs  are  the  centers  of  functions, 
which  Phrenology,  with  the  assistance  of  Anatomy  and 
Physiology,  locates.  Hence  the  method  of  Gall  aims 
at  showing  the  true  nature  of  man  and  animal. 
ac^/oFttiT  §  14-  He  denies  the  supremacy  of  the  intellect  taught 
inteuect.  ^^  ^^^  ^j^  Psychology  and  maintains  that  the  intel- 
lectual are  subordinated  to  the  affective  functions.^^ 
Unity  of  He  appeals  to  daily  experience  for  proof  that  the  pas- 
sions are  stronger  than  reason  and  that  reason  is  sub- 
ject to  them.  He  denies  the  unity  of  the  Ego  and 
holds  that  the  idea  of  the  Ego  is  nothing  more  than 
the  general  consensus  of  the  whole  organism;  it  is 
produced  by  the  constant  feeling  of  the  animal  func- 
tions acting  in  harmony.  Not  every  animal  can  ex- 
press this  feeling  by  pronouncing  the  word  I;  but 
each  and  every  one  has  the  idea,  in  as  much  as  he 
perceives  that  he  is  himself  and  not  another.  It  may 
even  happen  that  in  some  animal  the  perception  of 
the  I  is  more  vivid  and  the  feeling  more  intense  than 
in  man.^^ 

2^  Cf.  Evolution-Philosophy,  by  M.  E.  Gazelles,  in  Pop. 
Science  Library,  ch.  VI,  VII,  VIII. 

26  In  like  manner  Sully  holds  that  we  have  not  a  memory 
but  a  cluster  of  memories;  hence,  it  is  not  "  a  single  faculty." 
Cf.  Human  mind,  vol.  i,  p.  354. 

27  Cf.  Mill  on  the  Floss,  D.  Deronda;  Life  of  G.  Eliot,  by  G. 
W.  Cooke,  ch.  X. 

28  Cf.  Chapter  on  Personality. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  95 


IV. 

Relation  to  Agnosticism. 
§  15.  Huxley  claims  to  have  invented  the  word  "Ag-  ^Jg^Jw 
nostic."  He  is  its  open  champion  and  sole  authorized 
exponent.  The  creed  of  Agnosticism  drawn  up  by 
Mr.  Laing  in  reply  to  Gladstone,  he  rejects  with 
scorn.^^  He  therefore  seems  best  fitted  to  tell  what 
Agnosticism  is.  He  says  it  is  not  a  creed  but  a  method, 
the  essence  of  which  lies  in  the  rigorous  application  of 
a  single  principle:  in  matters  of  intellect  follow  the 
reason  as  far  as  it  will  guide  you  and  not  pretend 
that  conclusions  are  certain  which  are  not  demon- 
strated or  demonstrable.^"  When  interpreted  ac- 
cording to  the  letter,  this  principle  looks  innocent  and 
harmless.  But  when  understood  after  Mr.  Huxley's 
own  mind,  it  is  very  different.  With  him  it  means 
that  any  reality  beyond  phenomena  and  their  laws  is 
unknowable.  Now  this  is  the  main  principle  of  Posi- 
tivism. Hence  Frederick  Harrison  seems  to  put  the  of  f. 
question  very  clearly  when  he  says  that  "  the  point  h^^^^^^**- 
of  view"  for  the  Agnostic  and  Positivist  as  to  the  so- 
lution of  the  theological  problem  is  the  same;  only 
the  Positivists  repudiate  the  word  Ag-nostic.^^     Her-  of  h. 

,  .  °.  Spencer. 

bert  Spencer  indicates  the  "  point  of  view "  when  he 
tells  us  that  the  word  Agnostic  fitly  expresses  the  con- 
fessed inability  to  know  or  conceive  the  nature  of 
the  power  manifested  through  phenomena.^^ 

§  16.  Littre  acknowledges  that  there  is  a  close  kin-  ^^^^^ 
dred  ("  cousingermain  ")  and,  upon  many  points,  a 

29  Cf.  Essays  upon  some  contrary  questions  IX,  p.  281. 

30  Cf.  ib. 

31  XIX  Cent.,  Man,  1889. 

32  Cf.  Nature  and  Reality  of  Religion. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

perfect  harmony  between  Agnosticism  and  Positivism; 
with  this  difference,  however,  that  the  basis  of  Posi- 
tivism is  in  the  hierarchy  of  the  sciences,  whereas  the 
basis  of  Agnosticism  is  in  Psychology.^^ 

§  17.  The  criticism  of  Littre  is  just  and  throws  Hght 
on  the  sources  of  Positivism.  Its  influence  in  Eng- 
'  land  is  very  great  and  is  due  to  the  power  liume 
wielded  in  the  formation  of  EngUsh  thought.  Compte 
acknowledges  Hume  as  his  principal  precursor.^* 
/lume  denied  all  knowledge  of  substance,  cause,  etc., 
and  held  that  the  human  mind  could  know  only  phe- 
nomena and  their  relations  of  association.-^^  But  this 
is  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  Agnosticism  of  Mr. 
Spencer,  of  the  Positivism  of  M.  Compte  and  of  the 
Associationism  of  Mr.  Mill.  This  enables  us  to 
understand  how  it  is  that  writers  like  Mr.  Huxley  re- 
pudiate Positivism;  complain  that  thinkers,  whose 
philosophy  had  its  legitimate  parent  in  Hume  or  in 
themselves,  were  labeled  "  Compists,"  in  spite  of 
vehement  protestations  to  the  contrary;  revindicate 
Hume's  property  in  the  so-called  "new  Philosophy;" 
yet  at  the  same  time  hold  a  doctrine  which  is  essen- 
tially the  Positivism  of  Compte.^^  Mr.  Spencer  has 
been  often  called  a  Positivist,  because  he  employs 
their  scientific  method  and  holds  many  doctrines  pro- 
posed by  Compte,  as  ex.  gr.,  the  existence  in  nature 
of  invariable  laws,  the  principle  of  the  Relativity  of 
knowledge  and  the  origin  of  intellect  from  sense.  But 
he  contends  that  these  truths  were  proposed  and  de- 

33  Prin.  de  Phil.  Posit,  p.  59;  Compte  and  J.  S.  Mill,  p.  9  sq. 

34  Catech.  Posit.  Pref.,  p.  7. 

35  Cf,  Treatise  on  Human  Nature. 

36  Cf.  Lay  Sermons  VII,  "  Physical  Basis  of  Life,"  and 
VIII,  "  Scientific  Aspects  of  Positivism,"  "  Essays  upon 
Some  Contra.  Questions,"  Essay  IX,  "  Agnosticism." 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  SXJ] 

fended  by  philoisophers  long  before  Compte  set  them 
forth.^''  He  also  rejects  characteristic  doctrines  of  the 
French  philosopher,  especially  the  attempt  at  recon- 
struction.^^ Writing  later  in  the  XIX  Century  in  re- 
ply to  Frederick  Harrison,  he  sums  up  the  difference 
in  fewer  and  more  pointed  words  by  saying  that  the 
Agnosticism  of  Compte  is  negative,  whereas  his  own 
is  positive.^^  Yet  Mr.  Ribot  calls  Spencer's  First 
Principles  the  "  Metaphysics  of  Positivism."  ^° 

§  i8.  Thus  Mr.  Spencer,  Mr.  Huxley  and  Mr.  Leslie 
Stephen  claim  and  with  some  show  of  truth  that 
their  Positivism  or  Agnosticism  is  absolutely  inde- 
pendent of  the  French.  Nevertheless  Mr.  Lewes,*^  M. 
Littre,^^  and  Mr.  Harrison*^  are  positive  and  pre- 
emptory  in  rejecting  their  assertion. 

V. 

Influence, 
§19.  The  influence  exerted  by  Positivism  for  the  i^^  general, 
past  fifty  years  has  been  very  great.  It  has  formed  a 
certain  atmosphere  of  thought  which  has  spread  over 
all  ranks  and  classes  of  society.  Coming  from  the 
hands  of  its  author,  a  system  of  philosophy  and  of 
polity,  it  gradually  dropped  one  characteristic  trait 
after  another  in  the  effort  to  assimilate  itself  to  dif- 
ferent minds  and  different  peoples  whither  it  was 
borne,  until  at  present  it  is  little  more  than  a  mode 

3^  Cf.  Spencer  First  Principles,  p.    137;    Mill's    Exam,    of 
Hamilton,  p.  260. 
^  Cf.  Reasons  for  dissenting  from  Phil,  of  Compte,  1870, 

*  39  XIX  Cent,  July,  1884. 
^^  Cf.  English  Psychology  by  Mr.  Ribot,  p.  129. 

41  Hist,  of  Phil.  V.  II.  conclus. 

42  Phil.  Posit.  XVII,  p.  453. 
«XIX  Cent.,  1884. 

13 


98  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

of  thought,  or  a  tendency  of  mind.  Its  principles  are 
very  few  and  very  vague;  its  forms  are  indefinitely 
variable;  it  cannot  be  distinguished  from  Materialism, 
Agnosticism  and  Naturalism.  Yet  in  spite  of  its  con- 
stant changing  and  its  disposition  to  change  still  more 
if  possible,  it  comes  down  to  us  through  these  years 
with  something  of  its  original  spirit  still  clinging  about 
it.  We  still  discover  the  same  distrust  of  any  claim 
to  absolute  truth,  the  same  antagonism  to  what  is  be- 
yond the  range  of  sense,  the  same  belief  that  the  com- 
plete explanation  of  a  phenomena  consists  in  detect- 
ing the  relations  of  succession  and  of  contiguity.  Its 
influence  is  seen  in  the  tone  of  society  and  the  conduct 
of  life,  in  poetry  and  fiction,  in  science  and  speculation. 
In  conformity  with  the  fundamental  law  of  the  Three 
States  it  seems  to  reveal  a  bias  for  historical  studies, 
especially  those  departments  which  most  easily  ex- 
hibit man  as  a  mere  animal,  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
intellectual  and  moral  nature,  e.  g..  Anthropology, 
Ethnology.*^ 
In  England.  §20.  Dr.  Brewster  was  the  first  man  of  scientific  at- 
tainments to  praise  Compte,  although  he  condemned 
his  anti-religious  tendencies.*^  J.  Stuart  Mill  places 
the  author  in  the  highest  rank  of  European  thinkers; 
he  considers  "  Le  Cours  de  Phil.  Positive,"  the  great- 
est work  which  the  philosophy  of  the  sciences  has 
produced,*^  a  veritable  encyclopedia;  and  declares  him- 
self an  unreserved  partisan  of  Compte's  method.*^  He 
says  that  Compte  attempted  to  build  Positivism  into  a 
system,  and  places  him  above  Leibnitz  and  Des  Cartes 

44  Cf.  Prof.  Flint,  Phil,  of  Hist. 

45  Edin.  Rev.,  Aug.,  1838,  vol.  ^T,  p.  271;  Littre  A.  Compte, 
p.  260. 

46  Letter  Oct.,  '41;  Bain,  J.  S.  Mill  Mind,  1879. 

47  Logic,  pp.  346,  421,  620. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  99 

as  a  pioneer  of  philosophy .^^  In  1853,  Miss  Harriett 
Martineau  published  in  two  volumes  an  abridgment 
of  "  Le  Cours."  Lewes  holds  that  all  other  phil- 
osophies serve  as  a  pedestal  for  Compte's,  and 
hereafter  they  will  only  develop  his  teaching. 
While  Huxley  repudiates  Positivism;  while  Spen- 
cer and  Mill  reject  its  characteristic  teachings,  ex. 
gr.,  the  classification  of  the  sciences  and  maintain  that 
Psychology  is  a  science;  while  Bain  is  silent;  the  ad- 
hesion of  Lewes  and  of  Congreve  and  of  Harrison  is 
entire.^^  Positivism  also  influenced  Dr.  Maudsley's 
J' Physiol,  of  Mind,"  Buckle's  ''History  of  Civi- 
lization;" Leckey's  "Rationalism  in  Europe,"  the  writ- 
ings of  Grote,  and  of  G.  Eliot,  and  more  especially  * 
Mrs.  H.  Ward's  "  Robert  Elsmere." 

§21.  In  France,  Littre  has  done  most  to  spread  ^^  ^'^®'°<^®' 
the  philosophy  of  Compte.^^  Ch.  Robin  and  de  Blain- 
ville  profess  themselves  his  disciples  in  biology.  He 
has  influenced  Renan,  Vacherot,  Taine,  Berthelot,  C. 
Bernard,  Ribot  and  the  reahstic  school  of  Zola.  Two 
reviews  have  as  an  object  the  propagation  of  his  phil- 
osophy, e.  g..  La  Philosophic  Positive,"  and  "  Revue 
Occidentale."  ^^ 

§  22.  In  Germany  it  has    penetrated    indirectly   by  ^^ny^' 
English  influence  rather  than  by  a  study  of  the  phil- 
osophy of    Compte.     It  has  drawn    the    attention  of 
writers  such  as  Bucholz,  Twesten,  E.  Duhring,  Fr.  A. 
Lange,  E.  Bernheim. 

^^  Compte   &  Positivism. 

^°  Cf.  Dr.  Rich  Congreve  "  Catech.  of  Relig.  of  Humanity." 

51  A.  Compte  et  la  Phil.  Posit. 

52  Cf.  Ravaisson  "  La  Philosophic  en  France  au  xix  siecle," 
p.  65  sq.:  "  Philosophy  In  France,"  by  Th.  Ribot  in  Mind,  vol. 
II,  p.  2^6)  Janet  "  La  Philos.  Franc.  Contemp." 


100  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

critfcfsm  ^  ^3-  ^^  ^^^  Other  hand  Compte  and  the  Positive 
Philosoph}^  have  been  severely  criticised  by  able  and 
learned  writers.  Whewell  calls  him  a  shallow  pre- 
tender in  modern  science,  one  whose  discoveries  are 
absurdly  erroneous.^^  J.  Herschell  points  out  glaring 
errors  in  Mathematics.^  Huxley  is  especially  severe. 
He  says  that  Compte  has  no  eminence  as  a  teacher 
in  mathematics;  that  he  had  only  an  amateur's  ac- 
quaintance with  physical,  chemical  and  biological  sci- 
ence; that  his  works  are  repulsive  for  the  dull  diffuse- 
ness  of  style.^^  He  finds  in  Positive  Philosophy  little 
or  nothing  of  scientific  value.^^  He  says  the  veins  of 
ore  are  few  and  far  between  and  the  rock  so  apt  to 
run  to  mud  that  one  incurred  the  risk  of  being  intel- 
lectually smothered  in  the  working.^  He  is  irritated 
to  find  Compte  put  forward  as  a  representative  of  sci- 
entific thought  and  accuses  him  of  superficial  and 
second-hand  knowledge.^^  He  contends  that  a  critical 
examination  of  the  law  of  the  three  states  brings  out 
nothing  but  a  series  of  more  or  less  contradictory 
statements  of  an  imperfectly  apprehended  truth,  and 
his  classification  of  the  sciences  whether  regarded  his- 
torically or  logically  is  absolutely  worthless,  and  cites 
Spencer  as  agreeing  with  him,^^  He  refers  with  ap- 
proval to  Mill's  severe  criticisms  of  Compte's  Socio- 
logy .^°  He  sees  nothing  in  Compte's  philosophy 
worthy  of  attention  from  a  scientific  point  of  view;  it 

53  a.  MacMillan,  Mar.,  i866. 
^  McCosh,  Christianity  and  Positivism,  p.  172. 
5^  Essays  on  some  Controverted  Questions,  p.  291. 
5®  Lay  Sermons,  "  Physical  Basis  of  Life,"  p.  140. 

57  lb.,  "  Scientific  Aspects  of  Posit.,"  p.  147. 

58  lb.,  pp.  150,  164. 

59  lb.,  p.  156,  cf.  Spencer  "  Genesis  of  Science." 

^•^Ib.,  p.  153;  A.  Compte  and  Positivism,  by  J.  S,  Mill,  p. 
67  sq. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  lOI 

is  the  reverse  of  true  science,  a  tissue  of  contradic- 
tions, a  heap  of  absurdities.^^ 

VI. 

Criticism. 
§  24.  (a)  The  fundamental  law  of  Positivism  is  the  (a)  its 

,  .  ,  .         .      ^..     .  .  ,  .  fundamen- 

law  of  historic  riliation ;  it  supposes  the  successive  ex-  tai  law  is 


istence  of  the  three  states:  Theological,  Metaphysical 
and  Positive.  But  this  law  is  a  hasty,  superficial  gen- 
eralization. What  he  calls  states  are  mere  aspects  of 
things;  nor  does  one  give  way  to  the  other  in  gradated 
succession;  they  exist  simultaneously.  His  system 
therefore  rests  upon  a  basis  which  lacks  verification; 
nay  even  which  is  shown  to  be  false. 

§25.  (b)  Positivism  is  not  a  philosophy;  on  the  (b)  not  a 
contrary  it  is  a  strong  attempt  to  destroy  philosophy .^^  phy°^°* 
Philosophy  deals  with  causes;  its  aim  is  to  set  forth 
the  first  principles  of  knowledge,  to  throw  light  upon 
the  problems  of  existence.  These  questions  are  forced 
upon  the  mind  and  demand  an  answer.  Positivism 
resolutely  pushes  them  aside.  To  preserve  a  strained 
neutrality,  it  is  compelled  to  deny  God,  the  soul,  es- 
sence, first  or  final  causes.  The  existence  of  meta- 
physics as  a  science  and  of  necessary  truth  is  a  stand- 
ing refutation  of  Positivism.^^  Thus  we  find  leading 
philosophers  complain  that  Compte  has  neglected  the 
fundamental  problem  of  human  knowledge;  that  his 
system  is  a  philosophic-nihilism. 

61  Cf.  Lay  Sermons  VIII,  p.  147  sq.;  Essay  upon  Some 
Contr,   Quest.,  IX,  "  Agnosticism." 

62  Cf.  Morell  Philosophical  Tenden.  of  the  Age,  p.  27. 

^^  Cf.  Father  Harper  "  Metaphysics  of  the  Schools;  "  \V.  G. 
Ward  "  Philosophy  of  Theism;  "  McCosh  "  Fundamental 
Truth." 


I02 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


(c)his 
doctrine 
of  man  is 
false. 


(d)  his 
proofs  are 
assump- 
tions. 


§  26.  (c)  His  contention  that  man  is  only  the  first  of 
the  animal  series  and  that  Physiology  is  the  complete 
science  of  man,  is  false.  The  only  proof  alleged  is 
the  assumption  itself  with  the  wise  remark  that  they 
who  refuse  to  accept  it  are  immature  in  intelligence. 
As  a  logical  consequence,  some  writers  contend  that 
Psychology  is  only  a  department  of  Physiology.^* 

§  2y.  To  them  thought  and  the  soul  are  functions 
of  the  brain,  and  therefore  a  chapter  in  the  sciences 
which  studies  the  functions  of  organs.  But  there  are 
two  distinct  orders  of  phenomena,  psychical  and  phys- 
iological. The  functions  which  Physiology  studies 
are  organic,  and  can  be  localized;  Psychology  inves- 
tigates inorganic  acts,  e.  g.,  thought.  Again  the 
methods  of  investigation  dififer.  The  facts  of  Physi- 
ology are  known  through  the  senses ;  those  of  Psychol- 
ogy through  introspection  or  self-consciousness.  So 
great  is  the  difference  between  the  two  orders  of  facts 
that  while  some  men  have  denied  the  existence  of 
things  outside  of  our  representations,  e.  g.,  Berkeley; 
the  most  determined  sceptics,  e.  g.,  Hume,  never 
questioned  the  validity  of  our  actual  psychic  experi- 
ence.^^ 

§  28.  (d)  M.  Compte  seems  not  to  lack:  presumption. 
In  this  way  he  supplies  what  is  wanting  from  a  scien- 


^Mr.  Hodgson,  Mr.  James  "  Prin.  of  Psychology"  I,  ch. 
i,  6,  7,  hold  that  there  can  be  no  science  of  Psychology  except 
a  cerebral  Psychology;  Dr.  Maudsley  rejects  the  method  of 
introspection;  he  maintains  that  Psychology  should  be  studied 
objectively,  i.  e.,  physiologically;  that  Physiology  has  done 
away  with  the  old  Psychology,  cf.  McCosh,  Christianity  and 
Positivism,  p.  193. 

65  On  the  validity  of  Introspection  as  the  Psychological 
method,  cf.  Stonyhurst  "Psychology,"  ch.  11;  W.  G.  Ward 
"  Philosophy  of  Theism;  "  Dr.  Martineau  "  Essays,  cerebral 
Psychology." 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  IO3 

tific  point  of  view.  He  takes  immediate  observation  of 
the  senses  as  the  test  of  truth.  But  what  proof  does 
immediate  observation  furnish  for  the  initial  point  of 
his  system,  viz.,  the  law  of  the  Three  States?  Or  for 
the  fundamental  principle  of  his  theory  of  knowledge, 
viz.,  that  the  supra-sensible  order  is  altogether  inacces- 
sible to  our  minds?  Or  for  the  denial  of  the  higher 
faculties  in  man,  and  as  a  consequence  the  rejection  of 
the  spiritual  and  social  development  and  the  relegation 
of  history  and  sociology  to  the  level  of  the  physi- 
cal sciences? 

§  29.  (e)  Finally,  Compte's  philosophy  is  positive  in  {fv^e'^hl- 
name  only.  It  leads  to  uncertainty,  doubt  and  unbe-  misnome*. 
lief.  He  proclaimed  the  fundamental  maxim  of  con- 
temporary infidel  science:  that  exact  observation  by 
the  senses  is  the  only  method  of  knowledge;  what  it 
gives  we  should  accept;  what  it  cannot  verify,  we 
should  reject  as  of  no  value.  He  rigorously  applied 
this  principle  to  all  branches  of  science  and  to  all  de- 
partments of  human  life.  Now  there  are  certain  great 
verities  in  human  life,  ex.  gr.,  God,  soul,  first  prin- 
ciples of  reason,  the  moral  law;  the  capability  of  the 
mind  to  obtain  truth, —  not  grasped  by  sense  which 
stand  out  as  bright  lights,  giving  us  our  bearings  and 
guiding  the  mind  to  the  harbor  of  safety  and  rest.  Posi- 
tivism blots  these  out  of  sight  and  leaves  the  mind,  who 
trusts  in  it  for  guidance,  like  a  vessel  tossed  to  and  fro 
adrift  of  its  moorings.  A  philosophy  that  ignores  the 
higher  questionings  of  the  mind  and  the  higher  aspi- 
rations of  the  heart  cannot  claim  to  be  the  guide  of 
human  life.  Man  is  conscious  that  he  is  more  than  a 
brute.  He  is  made  to  look  upwards,  not  to  grovel  on 
the  earth;  he  is  to  be  uplifted,  not  depressed;  he  seeks 


104  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

more  light,  not  shadows  and  darkness.  To  one,  whose 
faith  has  been  undermined  and  shattered  by  the  poison 
of  false  philosophical  principles,  Positivism  may  seem 
like  a  beacon  in  the  gloom.  Feeling  that  God  and 
things  divine  are  out  of  reach,  by  an  instinctive  nobil- 
ity of  nature  he  reaches  out  to  his  fellow-man.  He  is 
filled  with  the  spirit  of  the  "  Grand  Etre,"  he  longs  to 
devote  himself  to  the  service  of  Humanity.  But  this 
is  only  a  tem.porary  exaltation,  a  passing  feeling,  which 
yields  to  a  deeper  and  more  hopeless  dejection.^^  The 
object  of  our  eager  and  enthusiastic  search  was  not  to 
be  found.  The  shadow  lured,  not  the  substance.  As 
as  a  philosophy  Positivism  could  not  be  lasting.^^  Its 
author  never  seemed  to  have  a  true  conception  of 
man's  nature  and  dignity.  Human  nature  rises  up  in 
protest  against  false  and  partial  views  of  man. 

VH. 
Conclusion. 
§  30.  The  attempt  of  Compte  to  found  a  philosophy 
has  failed.  His  work  is  not  Philosophy;  and  often 
erroneous  and  ridiculous  from  the  scientific  point  of 
view.  Nevertheless  he  is  not  without  merit.  He  has 
left  a  philosophical  theory  of  the  sciences  and  of  their 
methods  which  has  value;  he  had  great  power  of 
thought  and  of  sympathetic  conception;  he  has  shown 
independence  and  impartiality  in  his  judgments  on  the 

66  Cf.  Robert  Elsmere,  by  Mrs.  H.  Ward. 

67  A  reaction  has  set  in  as  shown  by  the  revolt  against  the 
realistic  school  of  fiction,  by  the  publication  of  "  Foundations 
of  Belief,"  and  by  the  signs  of  a  religious  awakening,  e.  g., 
acceptance  of  Christianity  by  Romanes. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  IO5 

Catholic  church,  on  Protestantism,  Liberalism  and  the 
Spiritual  power.^^ 

§31.  Positivism  denies  the  existence  of  any  super- 
sensible entity.  This  is  a  universal  negative  proposi- 
tion. To  prove  that  it  is  false  according  to  Logical 
principles  we  must  show  that  its  contradictory,  i.  e., 
the  particular  affirmative  proposition  is  true.  This  is 
done  in  the  following  chapter  by  establishing  the  exist- 
ence of  the  human  soul  as  a  spiritual  principle. 

^^  Cf.  P.  Gruber  S.  J.  "  Compte,  sa  vie,  sa  doctrine." 
14 


THE  SPIRITUALITY  OF  THE  SOUL. 

Se  titie.^  §  I  •  It  is  not  enough  to  state  and  prove  the  fact  that 
the  human  soul  is  an  immaterial  substance.  Scholastic 
philosophy  teaches  that  the  soul  of  brutes  is  immate- 
rial. Now  an  essential  difference  separates  the  soul  of 
the  brute  from  that  of  man.-^  The  difference  consists 
in  the  element  of  spirituality  which  belongs  to  the 
human  soul  alone,  and  is  expressed  in  the  statement 
that  the  soul  is  a  spirit.  Hence  the  phrase  employed 
in  our  manuals  of  philosophy,  current  in  Catholic 
thought,  which  is  the  title  of  the  present  chapter. 

I. 

Explanation  of  Terms. 
§  2.  To  prevent  any  misconceptions  which  might 
arise  either  from  an  exaggerated  use  of  the  words,  or 
from  false  imputations  respecting  their  meaning,  it  is 
necessary  to  set  forth  the  clear  and  exact  import  of  the 
notions. 

(1)  spirit.  §  2-  (i°)  A  Spirit  is  an  immaterial  substance  which 
is  independent  of  matter  in  being  and  in  act. 
It  is  essential  to  and  characteristic  of  a  spirit  to  exist 
and  to  exert  its  activity  independent  of  matter.  This 
separates  it  from  all  other  existences,  especially  from 

BpSits  simple  immaterial  entities.  Thus,  ex.  gr.,  God  is  a 
spirit.  But  God  is  a  pure  spirit  in  the  highest  signifi- 
cation of  the  word;  hence  it  is  absolutely  repugnant 
that  He  should  ever  be  or  become  a  soul.  With  good 
reason,  therefore,  Christian  Theodicy  rejects  the  con- 
tention of  the  Stoic  philosophers  that  God  is  the  soul 

1  S.  Augustine  De  Lib.  Arb.  II,  n.  i8;  de  Trin.  XV,  n.  i. 


ex.  gr. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  IO7 

of  the  world.     Below  God  there  may  be,  as  philoso-  ^^^• 
phy  infers,  and  are,  as  faith  teaches,  other  spirits,  e.  g., 
angels.    They  are  pure  spirits  created  by  God  to  exist  ^°^®^* 
and  act  independently  of  any  connection  with  matter. 
Thus  it  is  conditionally,  i.  e.,  by  reason  of  their  creation, 
repugnant  that  they  should  ever  be  or  become  souls. 

§  4.  But  the  concepts  of  spirit  and  of  soul,  viewed  in  IJuY.  ^^ 
themselves,  are  not  mutually  exclusive  or  repugnant. 
A  spirit  may  be  at  the  same  time  a  soul.  For  this  it 
is  necessary  and  requisite  that  it  have  an  intrinsic  and 
natural  tendency  to  vivify  and  actuate  a  body.  Under 
one  aspect  it  is  a  spirit;  under  another  aspect  it  is  a 
soul.  In  this  case  we  have  a  spiritual  soul,  such  as,  ex. 
gr.,  the  human  soul.  The  human  soul  is  a  spirit  be- 
cause it  exerts  its  activities  of  thought  and  of  will  inde- 
pendently of  the  body;  it  is  soul,  i.  e.,  anima,  in  as 
much  as  it  vivifies  and  animates  a  body.^ 

§  S-  (2°)  The  question  for  solution  is  not  the  possi-  (2)  the 

.  .  .  ^  question 

mhty  of  such  substances,  but  the  fact;  are  there  such  to  be 

-^  .     .  .  solved. 

actually  existing?  In  answer  we  point  to  our  soul, 
which  is  the  principle  of  vegetative,  sensitive  and  in- 
tellectual life. 

§  6.  (3°)  A  spiritual  soul  is,  therefore,  a  possibility  ^^LSptsof 
and  a  fact.    The  error  of  Des  Cartes  and  of  his  follow-  spirit  and 

of  soul 

ers  is   in   confounding  the   concepts.     They   require  ^T^  ^is- 
dififerent  definitions  and  are  differently  realized  in  dif- 
ferent things,  e.  g.,  an  angel  is  a  spirit  but  not  a  soul; 
man  has  a  soul  which  is  also  a  spirit ;  the  brute  has  a 
soul,  which  is  not  a  spirit. 

§  7.  (4°)  It  is  of  the  essence  of  the  soul  to  vivify  and  ^  ^  ^°"  • 
actuate  a  body,  ex.  gr.,  "anima  "  (soul)  comes  from  the 
verb  animare,  i.  e.,  to  animate.    The  term,  soul,  is  con- 
notative.     It  signifies  a  thing  not  absolutely,  but  as 

2  Cf.  Aug.  de  an.  et  ejus  origine,  1.  VI,  n.  2)7- 


I08  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

having  a  relation  to  something  else,  viz.,  the  body 
animated;  just  as  the  term  father  signifies  a  man  hav- 
ing a  relation  to  another  who  is  his  son.  To  animate 
a  body  it  is  necessary  that  the  soul  be  simple  and  im- 
SSateriai  i^aterial.  A  spiritual  substance  is  immaterial,  but  an 
uaf.^"^^*"  immaterial  substance  is  not  on  that  account  spiritual. 
The  concept  of  immateriality  is  distinct  from  that  of 
spirituality;  the  latter  implies  the  former  with  some 
element  in  addition.  To  be  spiritual  a  substance  must 
be  able  to  perform  some  acts  without  an  intrinsic 
dependence  on  the  body  which  it  animates.  The  co- 
operation of  a  bodily  organ  is  not  required  for  spiritual 
acts;  thus,  ex.  gr.,  we  think  abstract  truths  which  can- 
not be  embodied  in  matter.  Thought  is  a  spiritual  act; 
the  brain  is  not  its  organ  in  the  same  way  as  the  eye  is 
the  organ  of  sight.  Spiritual,  therefore,  is  another 
word  for  super-organic.^ 
^ueSn  ^  ^'  ^5°^  -^^  ^^  ^^^  ^^^  purpose  to  prove  that  all  the 
stated.  acts  of  the  human  soul  are  super-organic.  This  is  not 
true.  The  vegetative  acts  of  digestion,  ex.  gr.,  and  of 
assimilation,  the  sensitive  acts  of  sight,  of  hearing,  etc., 
are  performed  v/ith  the  intrinsic  co-operation  of  the 
bodily  organs,  and  are  strictly  speaking  organic.  The 
aim  is  to  show  that  certain  acts  of  the  soul  are  super- 
organic  ;  that  these  very  acts  are  characteristic  of  man ; 
and  that  as  a  logical  consequence  since  the  nature  of  a 
being  is  revealed  in  and  known  from  its  acts,  the 
human  soul  does  not  depend  for  its  existence  on  the 
intrinsic  co-operation  of  the  body.  It  is  a  fact  that  the 
soul  and  body  united  form  one  human  composite;  it 
is  a  fact  that  certain  acts  of  the  soul  are  performed 
with  the  intrinsic  co-operation  of  the  body  so  that  they 

3  By  spirit  "  proprie  dici  non  universam  animam  sed  aliquid 
.  ipsius."    Aug.  de  an.  et  ejus  orig.  1,  IV,  c.  22,  n.  36  sq. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  IO9 

belong  more  properly  to  the  body  and  are  called  bodily 
acts;  but  it  is  also  a  fact  that  some  acts  of  the  soul  are 
of  a  higher  nature  than  these  latter;  and  are,  therefore, 
termed  acts  of  the  mind  and  of  the  will.  We  admit  all 
this :  At  present,  however,  we  are  concerned  only  with 
the  last  statement,  and  on  this  our  argument  is  based.* 

11. 
The  Argument. 
§  9.  The  reasoning  rests  upon  data  furnished  by  the  j^^Jg^f.^"^ 
individual   consciousness.     The  reader  need  but   ex-  gence. 
amine  his  own  inner  life  to  find  phenomena  which  are 
not  the  outcome  of  sense  and  cannot  be  explained  by 
sense. 

1°.  Let  Us  Analyze  the  Facts  of  Intelligence. 
§  10.  (a)  We  have  notions  in  the  mind  which  are  im-  (a)  from 
material  and  cannot  be  referred  to  any  bodily  organ,  organic 

ri^i  1    •         1  111  notions. 

Ihey  move  on  a  plam  above  sense  and  belong  to  an 
order  of  entities  which  have  nothing  in  common  with 
the  objects  of  sense.  Our  minds  have  the  conception 
of  God;  we  discourse  of  his  infinity,  of  his  mercy  and 
loving  kindness;  with  awe  we  contemplate  his  majesty 
and  spotless  holiness;  our  will  is  strengthened  in  a 
resolution  to  avoid  vice  and  sin,  and  to  practice  virtue; 
we  look  forward  to  the  future  v/ith  courage  and  hope. 
Yet  these  notions  are  the  product  of  a  bodily 
organ.  They  elude  the  grasp  of  sense  and  cannot  be 
confined  within  its  limits.  I  cannot  see  them  with  the 
eye,  nor  hear  them  with  the  ear,  nor  feel  them  with 
the  hand.  I  may  strive  to  picture  them  upon  the  im- 
agination and  confine  them  to  color  and  to  form,  but 

4Cf.  St.  Thomas  I.  Q.  75. 


no 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


like  a  bird  they  are  away  on  the  wings  of  thought  far 
up  into  the  deep  empirion  of  mind  and  I  sink  back  in 
failure.  I  may  speak  of  them,  but  I  do  not  exhaust 
their  meaning;  and  to  those  who  hear,  the  spoken 
word  gives  an  insight  into  the  mind's  possibilities.^ 

§  II.  We  study  Logic  which  treats  of  the  laws  of  the 
mind,  of  the  forms  and  modes  of  thought;  Psychology, 
which  investigates  the  nature  of  the  soul,  of  mind  and 
of  will;  Metaphysics,  which  sets  forth  necessary  truths, 
the  fundamental  notions  and  principles  on  which  the 
whole  universe  is  constructed;  Ethics,  which  contains 
the  notions  of  right  and  wrong,  and  deals  with  the 
laws  and  relations  of  man  in  his  individual,  domestic 
and  social  life;  Mathematics,  which  based  on  a  few  ab- 
stract truths  rises  into  a  structure  of  magnificent  pro- 
portions, the  pride  and  glory  of  intelligence;®  Theodicy, 
which  soars  aloft  to  God  and  discourses  on  the  nature 
of  the  divine  attributes.  We  move  in  worlds  beyond 
sensitive  experience.  The  acts  which  we  elicit  are 
not  the  product  of  an  organ;  they  are  super-organic 
and  spiritual.  We  may  therefore  legitimately  infer 
that  their  principle  is  also  super-organic  and  spiritual.'^ 

§  12.  (b)  It  is  not  true  to  hold  that  the  intellect 
knows  only  abstract  truths  and  immaterial  entities. 
Material  things  and  objects  of  sense  form  part  of  its 
knowledge.  The  manner  in  which  it  apprehends  these 
objects  furnishes  a  strong  proof  of  its  inorganic 
nature.^    The  sense,  e.  g.,  of  sight  perceives  only  the 


^  C.  Gent.  BII,  ch.  49;  Augustine  de  quan.  an.,  n.  7,  8,  9,  22. 

'°  Cf.  S.  Augustine  De  Lib.  Arb.  1.  ii,  n.  22,  23,  24. 

'^  Aug.  de  an.  et  ejus  origine  1.  iv,  n.  31;  C.  Gent.  BII,  ch  (£', 
McCosh  Christianity  and  Positivism,  p.  208  sq.  S.  Augustine 
shows  that  the  brute  has  not  science.  De  quant.  An.,  n.  49, 
50,  54. 

8  Aug.  de  Gen.  ad  Lit  XII,  n.  49,  50. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  Ill 

concrete,  the  particular,  the  object  limited  by  the 
material  determinations  of  color,  size  and  form.  The 
intellect  grasps  the  very  nature,  which  it  conceives  as 
abstracted  from  all  concrete  limitations,  and  as  appli- 
cable to  all  individuals  of  the  same  class.^  This  imma- 
terial abstract  universal  conception  furnishes  the  basis 
for  the  intellectual  process  of  classification.  Hence, 
the  distinction  of  genus,  of  species,  of  properties  and 
of  accidents,  which  are  employed  not  only  in  the 
descriptive  sciences,  ex.  gr.,  the  classifications  of  Bot- 
any, of  Zoology,  but  also  in  the  ordinary  conversation 
of  daily  life,  ex.  gr.,  we  speak  of  a  class  of  honest  men, 
thus  grouping  individuals  under  the  abstract  concep- 
tion of  honesty.  So,  also,  analysis,  synthesis,  com- 
parison, inference,  are  intellectual  processes  which 
reveal  in  material  objects  relations  utterly  impervious 
to  organs  of  sense.  In  fine,  the  masterpieces  of  art, 
the  great  sciences  of  nature  appeal  primarily  to  mind.^° 
§  13.  I  stand  on  the  sea-shore  and  look  out  over  its 
heaving  waves;  my  mind  is  filled  with  the  thought  of 
its  mighty  power  and  its  trackless  wastes.  Or  I  turn 
my  eyes  upwards  to  the  heavens  studded  with  stars;  in 

^  On  difference  between  "  sensation  "  and  "  thought  "  cf.  S. 
Aug.  de  quant.  An.,  n.  56,  57. 

1°  "  One  of  the  most  important  functions  of  physical  science, 
considered  as  a  discipline  of  the  mind,  is  to  enable  us  by- 
means  of  the  tangible  processes  of  Nature  to  apprehend  the 
intangible.  The  tangible  processes  give  direction  to  the  line 
of  thought;  but  this  once  given,  the  length  of  the  line  is  not 
limited  by  the  boundaries  of  the  senses.  Indeed,  the  Domain 
of  the  senses,  in  Nature,  is  almost  infinitely  small  in  compari- 
son with  the  vast  region  accessible  to  thought  which  lies 
beyond  them.  From  a  few  observations  of  a  comet,  when  it 
comes  within  the  range  of  his  telescope,  an  astronomer  can 
calculate  its  path  in  regions  which  no  telescope  can  reach, 
and  in  like  manner,  by  means  of  data  furnished  in  the  narrow 
world  of  the  senses,  we  make  ourselves  at  home  in  other  and 
wider  worlds,  which  can  be  traversed  by  the  intellect  alone." 
Tyndall  "  on  Radiant  Heat,"  in  Fragments  of  Science. 


112  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

thought  I  pass  beyond  the  horizon  into  the  boundless 
reach  of  azure  blue,  and  am  filled  with  the  notion  of 
infinity.  I  listen  with  delight  to  a  symphony  of  Bee- 
thoven, or  to  a  masterpiece  of  Shakespeare;  I  gaze 
with  pleasure  upon  a  Raphael  or  a  Murillo;  I  look 
with  admiration  at  the  grand  and  noble  propor- 
tions of  an  ancient  Cathedral.  In  thought  I  go  out 
with  reverence  to  the  creative  mind  whose  glory  shines 
around  and  through  them;  I  am  conscious  of  strong 
•'  sympathy  for  the  genius  of  the  worker;  and  the  pleas- 
ure I  feel  is  purely  intellectual  —  the  result  of  the 
influence  of  mind  upon  mind.-^^ 

§  14.  Finally  it  is  mind  which  enables  me  to  read 
your  thoughts,  to  divine  your  feelings,  to  pierce  stone 
walls,  to  gather  up  into  a  connected  whole  the  experi- 
ence of  a  lifetime  or  the  labors  of  centuries,  to  pass 
beyond  the  confines  of  the  present  with  a  view  to  pre- 
dict and  plan  for  the  future.  In  the  light  of  this  what 
basis  can  there  be  for  Mr.  Bain's  contention  that 
thought  consists  in  organic  movement?  ^^ 
conscious-  ^  ^^'  ^^)  ^^^  strongest  and  most  convincing  proof 
^®ss.  that  the  mind  is  not  an  organic  faculty  is  drawn  from 

the  phenomena  of  self-consciousness.^^  Conscious- 
ness is  a  sensitive  act,  e.  g.,  a  dog  can  feel  pain.  Self- 
consciousness,  however,  transcends  sense;  it  is  not 

^  St.  Thomas  I  q.  75  a..  2;  I.  Q.  84  A.  I.  "  Natura  animae 
praestantior  est  quam  natura  corporis,  excellit  multum;  res 
spiritualis  est,  res  incorporea  est,  vicina  est  substantiae  Dei. 
Invisibile  quidem  est,  regit  corpus,  novet  membra,  dirigit  sen- 
sus,  praeparat  cogitationes,  exserit  actiones,  capit  rerum  infin- 
itarum  imagines."    Aug.  in  Ps.  145.  n.  4. 

12  Cf.  Present  Day  Tracts,  n.  42,  "  Points  of  Contact  be- 
between  Revelation  and  Natural  Science,"  by  Sir.  J.  W. 
Dawson. 

^  An  interesting  criticism  of  Tyndall's  views  on  conscious- 
ness is  given  by  Mallock  in  "  Is  Life  Worth  Living,"  p.  221 
sq. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  II3 

only  an  act  by  which  I  am  aware  of  the  facts  afifecting 
me,  but  it  is  a  faculty  by  which  I  can  reflect  upon  my 
own  acts  and  know  myself  to  be  their  source  and  their 
subject.  Hence  I  not  only  know,  but  I  know  that  I 
know;  in  some  wonderful  manner  the  subject  know- 
ing and  the  object  known  are  one  and  the  same,  e.  g., 
I  myself  know  myself  to  do  so  and  so.  This  power 
of  reflection  which  is  characteristic  of  self-conscious- 
ness cannot  take  place  by  the  intrinsic  co-operation  of 
a  bodily  organ.^^ 

§  16.  Self-consciousness  may  be  considered  as  an  act  fr^^^f* 
or  as  a  state.  As  an  act  it  is  a  judgment  of  the  intel- 
lect; as  a  state  it  is  a  train  of  reflective  thoughts  upon 
self.-^^  Matter  is  not  capable  of  an  act  of  reflection,  ^ffter? 
nor  can  it  make  itself  the  object  of  its  own  activity. 
The  senses  also,  by  reason  of  their  organic  nature,  are 
immerged  in  matter  and  cannot  have  their  acts  as 
objects.  Thus  the  eye  sees,  but  it  cannot  see  that  it 
sees;  the  ear  hears,  but  cannot  hear  that  it  hears;  and 
so  on  for  the  rest.  The  mind,  on  the  contrary,  knows 
and  knows  that  it  knows.  This  reflection  is  a  certain 
self-penetrating,  self-acting  power;  it  is  a  certain  self- 
possession. 

§  17.  Physiology  and  Biology  teach  that  after  seven 
years  the  atoms  of  the  human  body  undergo  a  com- 
plete change ;  hence  an  old  man  differs  physically  and 
materially  from  what  he  was  when  a  boy.  Self-con- 
sciousness with  memory,  however,  show  his  identity. 
The  optical  reflection  of  Physics,  the  reflection  of 
Acoustics,  e.  g.,  the  echo,  differ  essentially  from  the 
reflection  of  consciousness.  Here  the  ego  is  at  one  matter, 
and  the  same  time  reflecting  and  reflected,  active  and 

i^Cf.  St.  Thomas  I  Q.  14.  a  2.  , 

15  St.  Thomas  I.,  q.  14,  al. 


114  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

passive;  it  is  a  self-penetration  and  a  self-possession, 
whereas  in  physics  there  is  a  real  separation.  In 
Physics  we  have  matter  in  motion,  subject  to  the  laws 
of  mechanics;  the  reflection  of  the  ego  may  be  com- 
pared to  motion,  but  is  by  no  means  mechanical ;  there 
is  an  analogy,  but  no  identity.  Self-consciousness  has 
been  called  a  "  circular  motion,"  a  "  wave."  But  cir- 
cular motion  is  only  a  return  to  the  same  point  in 
space;  it  is  not  a  reflection  upon  itself;  nor  is  a  "  wave  " 
different  in  kind  from  physical  motion.  "  No  body," 
writes  the  Angelic  Doctor,  "  possesses  an  activity 
capable  of  reflecting  upon  the  same  body  acting,"  and 
again,  "  a  material  body  is  set  in  motion  only  by 
parts."  ^^ 

§  1 8.  Furthermore,  a  material  entity  or  a  sense- 
organ  cannot  divide  itself  into  two  parts,  so  that  they 
may  be  identical  with  the  whole;  yet  in  self-conscious- 
ness the  ego  reflecting  is  distinguished  from  the  ego 
reflected  upon,  but  so  that  both  parts  possess  each 
other ;  for  this  reason  St.  Thomas  calls  the  act  "  a 
complete  return  upon  itself,  *  reditio  completa.' "  ^^ 
The  phenomena  of  self-consciousness  are  the  rock 
upon  which  Physics  and  Physiology  have  been  shat- 
.tered  in  the  effort  to  explain  away  the  higher  nature 
of  men.  Mr.  Huxley,  for  example,  has  tried  to 
explain  them  dynamically,  i.  e.,  by  cerebration.  He 
holds  that  cerebral  molecules,  animated  with  energy, 
produce  them.  Tyndall  also  contends  that  atoms, 
individually  without  sensation,  combine  in  obedience 
to  mechanical  laws,  with  the  result  that  organic  forms, 
sensations  and  thought  are  due  to  their  combinations.^^ 

16  C.  Gent.  BIT,  ch.  49. 

17  De.  Ver.  ql. 

18  Cf.  Belfast  Address. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  II5 

How  unfounded  and  arbitrary  is  this  assertion,  is  evi- 
dent from  a  careful  analysis  of  the  nature  of  the  act. 
Leibnitz  long  ago  set  the  attempt  convincingly  aside." 

2°.  The  Phenomena  of  Will. 
§  IQ.  Another  series  of  considerations  tending-  with  (2)  from 

,      .         ,  ,        .  .  ^     ,       the  will. 

cumulative  force  to  prove  the  inorganic  nature  of  the 
soul,  is  drawn  from  the  phenomena  of  the  will.^ 
There  is  in  man  not  only  a  tendency  to  objects  which 
belong  to  the  order  of  sensitive  experience;  there  is 
also  a  higher,  a  rational  tendency  to  good  as  appre- 
hended by  the  intelligence. 

§  20.  The  train  of  reasoning  is,  therefore,  based  from 
Upon  the  existence  of  a  Rational  will.  Consciousness  win. 
testifies  that  every  act  of  rational  will  presupposes  a 
previous  act  of  knowledge.  "  Ignoti  nulla  cupido  "  is 
a  truth  of  individual  experience.  Now  the  will  desires 
and  acquiesces  in  spiritual  goods ;  hence,  the  act  of  the 
intellect  which  antecedes  this  desire  must  be  spiritual. 
Viewed  in  this  aspect  an  additional  argument  is  had 
for  the  spiritual  nature  of  the  mental  act.  The  direct 
and  obvious  proof,  however,  is  drawn  from  the  nature 
of  the  tendency  itself. 

§  21.  (a)  A  tendency  which,  in  its  exercise  is  bound  ^g^^^^to* 
up  with  the  body  or  a  part  of  the  bodv,  is  limited  to  an  abstract 

,  ,  '  classinca- 

what  is  particular  and  concrete.  It  cannot  go  out  to  <^ion. 
the  universal  or  embrace  a  class  of  individual  objects. 
Nevertheless,  I  know  from  my  own  conscious  experi- 
ence, that  I  can  hate  not  only  a  bad  man,  but  also  the 
class  of  bad  men;  that  I  can  love  not  only  a  good  man, 
but  also  the  class  of  good  men;  that  I  can  shun  the 

19  Cf.  Monology,  §  17. 

20  St.  Thomas  i,  2,  q.  22  sq. 


Il6  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.. 

company  of  thieves,  murderers  or  robbers,  and  seek 
the  fellowship  of  the  good,  the  wise,  the  just.  The  ten- 
dency to  an  abstract  classification,  as  proposed  by  the 
intellect,  has  nothing  in  common  with  an  inclination 
whose  exercise  is  bound  up  with  an  organ  of  sense.^^ 
(b)  to  su-^        §  22.  (b)  An  organic  tendency  cannot  be  directed  to 

perorganic         .  . 

objects.  objects  which  transcend  the  bounds  of  sensible  expe- 
rience. It  is  as  evident  that  sense  cannot  grasp  what 
is  beyond  sense,  as  that  my  arm  cannot  reach  out  to 
what  is  beyond  its  reach.  Now,  individual  experience 
shows  that  there  is  in  us  a  tendency  to  objects  which 
are  purely  immaterial.  Thus,  I  love  truth;  I  strive 
after  Christian  virtue;  I  am  inflamed  with  patriotism; 
I  hate  sin;  I  esteem  integrity;  I  prize  honor;  I  prac- 
tice honesty;  I  strive  to  reproduce  in  my  own  life  the 
great  Christian  virtues  of  humility,  charity,  self-denial, 
self-sacrifice,  etc.  This  tendency  cannot  be  organic 
because  of  the  spiritual  nature  of  its  objects.  It  is, 
therefore,  inorganic,  and  we  legitimately  infer  that  the 
principle  from  which  it  springs,  viz.,  the  will,  is  inor- 
ganic also.^2 

(c)from         §2^.  (c)  Another  consideration  is  drawn  from  con- 
conscience      .  . 

science,  which  reveals  the  existence  of  a  moral  law 

binding  upon  the  will.  There  is  in  every  man,  by  vir- 
tue of  his  rational  nature,  a  participation  of  a  certain 
eternal  and  immutable  law,  which  is  none  other  than 
the  light  of  intelligence  implanted  in  us  by  God,  with 
a  view  to  guide  us  in  the  knowledge  of  what  we 
should  do  and  what  we  should  avoid.  By  its  assist- 
ance we  decide  with  certainty  and  without  hesitation 
that  certain  things  are  good,  that  others  are  bad,  that 


21 C.    Gent.    BIX,   ch.   6o;    "  adhuc   intellectus,   etc."     Sum- 
Theol.  I,  q.  8o,  a.  i. 
22  C.  Gent.  BIL  c.  82. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  11/ 

we  should  avoid  all  evil  acts,  and  that  we  should  per- 
form those  good  acts  which  conduce  to  the  mainte- 
nance of  order.  If  I  act  according  to  the  dictates  of 
this  law  within  me,  the  still  small  voice  of  conscience 
praises,  and  I  feel  a  new  accession  of  strength,  whence 
I  know  not  But  if  I  act  in  opposition  to  its  behests, 
I  am  conscious  of  shame,  of  blame,  of  sorrow,  of 
remxorse. 

§  24.  Its  sanction  is  clear,  definite  and  unfailing. 
Though  in  the  silence  of  my  room,  secure  from  the 
sight  of  another,  I  should  commit  an  act  which  is 
wrong,  I  carry  within  me  a  witness,  a  judge,  an  aven- 
ger, who  exacts  the  last  farthing  of  punishment. 
Again  confident  and  strong  in  the  approbation  of  con- 
science I  strive  for  what  is  right  and  just,  holding  as 
of  little  value  the  idle  comments  of  those  around  me. 
Conscience  has  made  heroes  in  the  past  and  conscience 
enlightened  by  Christian  faith  has  made  saints  and  can 
make  saints  of  us  all.^^  Now  the  basis  and  law  of  this 
binding  force  cannot  be  sought  for  in  an  organic  fac- 
ulty; it  is  absolute,  universal  and  transcends  all  sensi- 
tive experience.  We  must  conclude,  therefore,  that  it 
is  inorganic  and  spiritual.^* 

§  24.  (d)  Finally  we  appeal  to  the  phenomena  of  ^^ijif^®®" 
free-will.  That  we  are  free  is  here  an  assumed  fact; 
it  is  proved  at  length  elsewhere.^^  Liberty  of  will  is 
the  crowning  perfection  of  man's  volitional  nature,  just 
as  self-consciousness  is  the  climax  of  intellectual  devel- 
opment.    It  means  the  power  of  self-determination. 

23  Cf.  The  Great  Enigma  by  W.  S.  Lilly,  p.  21. 

24  St.  Thomas  I2,  q.  21,  al;  q.  91,  a2  ad  2;  Rickaby,  ch.  IV; 
Newman  Gram,  of  Assent,  p.  106. 

25  Cf.  Rickaby;  Fonsgreave  "  Le  Libre  Arbitre;  "  Dr.  Ward 
"  Philosophy  of  Theism." 


Il8  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

fjje*^^"^*  §25.  Matter  has  no  such  power,  ex.  gr.,  physical 
activity  can  be  considered  as  (a)  velocity,  which 
depends  on  intensity  of  impulse  and  the  mass  (b) 
direction,  hence  the  law  of  the  parallelogram  of  the 
forces  (c)  mechanical  work,  hence  the  law  of  the  con- 
servation of  energy  and  the  value  of  living  force. 
Underlying  and  ruling  these  forms  of  activity  there 
is  the  law  of  inertia.  Now  inertia  implies  complete 
passive  indifiference,  but  liberty  means  activity  in  the 
highest  sense  —  the  power  of  self-determination;  iner- 
tia contains  the  element  of  necessitation  in  its  very 
concept,  liberty  excludes  external  compulsion  and 
internal  determination.  Thus  inertia  as  an  essential 
property  of  manner  and  liberty  as  an  essential  prop- 
erty of  will  are  contradictory.^^ 
miuer^  §  26.  An  Organic  act  is  under  the  control  of  physical 

not  free,  forces  and  of  external  agents.  The  senses  necessarily 
receive  impressions;  ex.  gr.,  I  cannot  help  seeing  with 
my  open  eye,  or  hearing  with  my  ear.  On  the  con- 
trary the  will  can  select  some  motives  presented  by 
the  intellect  and  set  aside  others,  can  choose  some 
objects  and  reject  others,  it  can  despise  a  motive, 
abstain  from  acting,  or  deliberately  choose  the  oppo- 
site.    Moreover  modern  Physiology  teaches  the  law  of 

26  Cf.  Janet  "  Traite  Elementaire  de  Philosophic,"  vol.  i, 
p.  SS7.  "  After  having  admitted  first,  the  notion  of  ponder- 
able matter,  then  that  of  ether,  later  the  notion  of  actual 
movement,  and  then  that  of  potential  movement,  contempor- 
ary science  is  compelled  to  recognize  still  another  force,  a 
soul-power,  in  order  to  satisfactorily  understand  the  observed 
and  observable  facts.  Experimental  Physics  demonstrates 
that  morality  is  possible,  that  duty  and  free-will  can  be 
affirmed,  and  consequently,  that  men  can  escape  from  the 
mechanical  determinism  without  upsetting  the  order  of  the 
universe."  Conclusion  of  a  lecture  delivered  at  Paris,  1893, 
by  M.  Pictet,  now  Prof,  of  Physics  in  Berlin;  cit.  in  Amer. 
Jour,  of  Psych.,  1892-93,  p.  511. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  IIQ 

the  specific  energy  of  the  senses,  i.  e.,  the  organs  of 
sense  each  in  its  own  specific  way  respond  to  an  exter- 
nal stimulus,  e.  g.,  an  electric  current  to  the  eye  is  a 
spark,  to  the  ear  a  sound,  to  the  taste  something  bitter. 
Finally  the  existence  of  Psycho-Physics,  which  is  the 
result  of  efforts  made  to  formulate  a  law  between  the 
stimulus  and  the  sensation,  show  the  dependence  of 
the  organs  on  material  impulses,  and  prove  that  they 
are  not  free. 

§  2^.  Not  so  the  acts  of  the  will.  I  have  the  power 
to  resist  a  strong  inclination,  and  to  chose  a  weaker 
one;  a  short  message  announcing  a  death  may  cause 
in  my  will  emotions  altogether  out  of  proportion  to 
the  stimulus;  I  feel  no  necessity,  nor  do  the  same 
things  always  afifect  my  will  in  the  same  manner.  I 
may  chose  to-day  what  I  despised  yesterday;  and  from 
many  diverse  objects  I  am  at  liberty  to  select  here  and 
now  w^hatsoever  I  please.  It  follows  that  the  will  can- 
not be  an  organic  force,  else  we  should  be  necessitated 
to  act  according  to  impressions,  and  these  impressions 
would  be  the  determining  cause  of  human  action. 
Consciousness  and  common  sense  testify  to  the  con- 
trary. Hence,  we  speak  of  a  person  who  is  apt  to  be 
guided  by  impressions  as  a  man  who  lacks  discrimina- 
tion and  good  judgment.^^ 

3°.  Human  Speech. 

§  28.  Besides  the  endowment  of  spiritual  faculties 
man  possesses  the  gift  of  human  speech.  This  is  the 
instrument  and  expression  of  thought  and  volition. 
By  language  I  hold  converse  with  the  greatest  minds 
in  all  ages;  I  know  their  thoughts,  aims  and  desires; 

27  St.  Thomas  Sum.  Theol.  i,  q.  115,  a.  4. 


120  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

or  I  comniiinlcate  with  those  about  me  in  the  various 
occupations  of  daily  Hfe,  in  school,  at  business,  in  the 
professions,  in  the  family,  in  discharging  the  obliga- 
tions of  friendship.  The  power  of  speech  is  character- 
istic of  the  human  race.^^  It  is  an  insurmountable  bar- 
rier between  man  and  beast.  Some  scholars,  forgetful 
of  the  higher  nature  of  man,  go  to  excess  in  holding 
that  language  is  the  only  difference  which  marks  man- 
kind distinct  from  the  animal  kingdom.^ 
of  ian-°°  ^  §  29.  During  the  present  century  the  science  of  Com- 
guage.  parative  Philology  has  sprung  into  existence.  It  is 
based  upon  the  analysis  of  language.  In  every  lan- 
guage are  found  certain  roots  or  phonetic  types  which 
are  regarded  as  ultimate  elements.  From  these  roots 
language  has  developed.  The  laws  of  the  growth  are 
phonetic  decay  and  dialectic  regeneration.^^  Now^  an 
examination  of  the  roots  or  the  ultimate  elements  of 
speech  shows  that  their  formation  requires  a  mind  cap- 
able of  abstraction,  and  of  forming  universal  con- 
cepts.^^  The  roots  signify  something  proper,  peculiar 
and  characteristic  of  an  object,  and  are,  therefore, 
always  abstract  and  universal.^^  From  the  very  struc- 
ture of  language,  therefore,  we  infer  the  existence  of  a 
mind  which  is  super-organic  and  spiritual.^ 

28  Cf.  Mivart  Truth,  p.  351  sq.,  224  sq.,  279. 

29  Muller  Science  of  Language  II,  p.  372. 
2°  Muller  Science  of  Language,  vol.  I. 

^^  Cf.  Mivart  Truth,  p.  232;  Tyler  Primitive  Culture  vol.  i, 
p.  216;  Muller  Science  of  Thought,  ch.  IV. 

22  Cf.  Whitney  Language  and  Study  of  Language,  ch.  VIL 
^  The  power  of  expressing  his  thoughts  by  articulate 
sounds  has  ever  been  considered  as  the  distinctive  character 
of  man;  the  absence  of  articulate  language  in  animals  is  not 
explained  on  merely  anatomical  grounds;  again  some  animals, 
ex.  gr.,  parrot,  are  capable  of  uttering  articulate  sounds,  cf. 
Dr.  Th.  Bischoft'  on  Difference  Between  ]\Ian  and  Brutes  in 
Anthrop.  Rev.  of  London  Society,  vol.  I,  p.  54. 


SPIRITUALITY  OF  THE  SOUL  AND  MODERN 
SCIENCE. 

§  I.  The  spirituality  of  the  soul  has  been  bitterly 
assailed.  The  modern  school  of  Materiahsm  and  of 
cerebral  Physiology  have  made  this  thesis  a  point  of 
attack.  They  have  employed  every  means  to  show 
that  the  soul  is  material  or  at  least  organic.  The  rea- 
sons alleged  in  support  of  their  contention  are  so  spe- 
cious that  they  deserve  a  special  consideration. 


Correlation  of  Thought  to  the  Structure  of 
THE  Brain. 

§  2.  Our  adversaries  contend  that  there  is  a  strict  The 
mathematical  proportion  and  correlation  between  the  °^J®^^^^^- 
perfection  of  the  brain  and  the  degrees  of  intelligence. 
As  a  consequence  they  infer  that  the  knowledge  of  the  - 
one  is  an  infallible  indication  of  the  other.     This  con- 
tention is  a  logical  consequence    of    their    principles. 
Their  whole  argument  is  based  upon  a  fallacy.     From  general 
the  tmion  of  thought  and  of  brain  they  infer  the  iden-  ^"  ^^^^^' 
tity.     We  hold  that  there  is  a  union  of  thought  and 
brain,  as  there  is  a  union  of  soul  and  body,  neverthe- 
less that  they  are  essentially  distinct. 

§  3.  The  proofs  they  present    are    insufficient    and  rj-j^^j^. 
fallacious.  p^'^^^^- 

1°.  From  Quantity  of  Brain-Matter.  From 

(a)  They  appeal  to  the  quantity  of  brain  matter;  hence  of  brain- 

1  .       ,  .  ,  ,       ,  ,  matter. 

the  greater  is  the  quantity  of  cerebral  matter,  the  more 
intelligent  is  the  being.  To  ascertain  the  quantity, 
they  employ  various  criteria;  either  directly,  by  tak- 


122  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

ing  the  volume  of  the  cerebral  mass;  or  indirectly  by 
measuring  the  capacity  of  the  empty  skull.  In  the 
former  case  the  brain  is  weighed  immediately  after 
death.  In  the  latter  case  the  skulls  of  all  peoples,  both 
ancient  and  modern,  contribute  to  the  questionings  of 
science.  The  tombs  of  ancient  Egypt,  the  ruins  of 
excavated  cities  furnish  materials  for  study.  Topinard 
and  Broca  have  adopted  this  method,  because  more 
universal  and  apparently  more  scientific.  By  appeal- 
ing to  archaeolog}^,  ethnology,  etc.,  they  hoped  to 
prove  that  in  proportion  as  peoples  advanced  in  civili- 
zation, the  volume  of  the  brain  likewise  increased. 
weigS"^  §  4.  (a)  If  the  criterion  of  weight  were  valid  it  should 
apply  to  all  living  creatures.  But  facts  prove  conclus- 
ively that  it  is  not  of  any  value.  Thus,  ex.  gr.,  the 
brain  of  an 
(1)  abso-  Elephant  weighs  3,000  grammes, 
weight.  Dolphin  weighs  1,800  gr. 

Whale  weighs  1,500  gr. 

Man  weighs  1,300-1,400  gr. 

Horse  weighs  600  gr. 

Ox  weighs  500  gr. 

Monkey  weighs  400-600  gr.  * 

Donkey  weighs  360  gr. 

Dog  weighs  80  gr. 

Cat  weighs  30  gr. 

Now,  in  the  hypothesis  the  elephant  and  whale 
should  be  more  intelligent  than  man;  the  ox  more 
intelligent  than  a  monkey;  while  the  dog  and  cat 
should  show  signs  of  the  least  intelligence.  Experi- 
ence shows  that  this  is  not  true.  Hence  the  hypothesis 
must  be  abandoned. 
ulr^^'  §  5-  (2)  Recourse  was  then  had  to   the   method   of 

weight.       relative  weight,  i.  e.,  the  weight  of  the  brain  should  be 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  I23 

considered  not  absolutely  but  in  proportion  to  the 
weight  of  the  individual  body.  But  the  results  have 
been  just  as  unsatisfactory.  In  this  case  the  infant 
should  be  four  times  superior  in  intelligence  to  the  fully 
developed  man ;  the  monkey  would  be  superior  to  man ; 
while  the  dog  would  be  inferior  to  the  bat,  the  horse  to 
the  donkey  and  man  to  the  canary.^ 

§  6.  (i)  Driven    from    this    position     thev     sous^ht  (3)  to  the 

-  .  '  .  .        .  . ' .  ,       enceph- 

refuge  in  proposmg  as  a  criterion  the  weight  of  the  aion. 
brain  compared  to  the  encephalon,  i.  e.,  rest  of  the 
head,  e.  g.,  the  medulla  oblogata  and  cerebellum.     In 
this  case  man  would  be  placed  almost  on  a  level  with 
the  duck  or  the  crow. 

§  7.  (4)  Finally,  an  attempt  was  made  to  weigh  the  ntrvSus^ 
nervous  system  as  a  whole.  But  this  is  impossible;  the  '^y^^®"^- 
nerves  and  fibres  are  too  delicate  and  complex  to  per- 
mit its  successful  accomplishment.  As  a  fact  many 
men  of  great  intelligence  possessed  a  small,  or  frail 
and  sickly  body,  ex  gr.,  Alexander  Pope.  Moreover, 
even  if  successful,  we  could  not  admit  that  the  process 
is  scientific,  because  the  organs  and  nerves  of  the  body 
have  not  all  the  same  functions,  or  importance  or 
dignity.^ 

1  Tiedeman  says  that  at  birth  the  proportion  of  brain  to 
body  is  i  to  5.85  in  the  male;  but  this  diminishes  with  years, 
e.  g.,  at  10  years,  i  to  14;  at  20  years,  i  to  30,  and  later  on.  i 
to  36.  Bischoff  says  that  in  man  the  relative  weight  of  Brain 
to  the  body  is  1:35;  in  whale,  1:3300;  in  elephant,  1:500;  in  ox, 
1:900;  in  horse,  1:550;  in  dog,  1:250.  Yet  he  tells  us  that  the 
law  is  not  general,  ex.  gr.,  in  canary  and  greenfinch,  1:14;  in 
some  apes,  1:13,  i.  e.,  sajou,  and  in  the  Sanniri,  1:24.  cf. 
Dr.  Th.  Bischoff  on  Difference  Between  Man  and  Brutes  in 
Anthrop.  Rev.  of  London,  vol.  I,  p.  54. 

2  Among  the  Magyars  short  individuals  had  heaviest,  and 
middle-sized,  the  lightest  brain,  cf.  Weight  Proport.  of  Brains 
of  Austrian  Peoples  by  Dr.  Weisbach  in  Anthropol.  Rev.,  vol. 
VII,  p.  92. 


124 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


(5)  restrict- 
ed to 
human 
species. 


brain  of 
woman. 


brains 

different 

races. 


§  8.  (5)  The  failure  of  these  attempts  was  attributed 
to  the  fact  that  the  appHcation  was  extended  to  all 
species,  w^hereas,  it  should  be  confined  within  the  limits 
of  one  only.  Let  us  admit  the  truth  of  the  complaint, 
and  continue  the  experiment.  We  take  the  human 
species  because  the  objection  is  aimed  at  destroying 
the  higher  nature  of  man. 

§  9.  Now,  it  is  a  fact  that  the  brain  of  woman  weighs 
less  than  man.  Broca  and  Topinard  show  that 
between  the  ages  of  twenty  and  sixty  years  the  weight 
of  a  woman's  brain  is  from  125  to  164  grams  less  than 
that  of  man.  Nevertheless,  woman  is  not  inferior  to 
man  in  intelligence.  She  is  capable  of  thoughts  as 
sublime,  of  deeds  as  heroic,  of  efforts  as  admirable.  In 
history-,  in  science,  in  philosophy,  in  letters,  she  has 
left  productions  not  inferior  to  man's ;  even  in  theology 
we  have  St.  Catherine  of  Alexandria  and  St.  Teresa. 

§  10.  It  is  false  to  maintain  a  natural  mental  infer- 
iority in  w^omen.  She  differs  from  man  anatomically 
and  physiologically;  the  nervous  system  is  more  deli- 
cate and  sensitive;  the  whole  organization  conspires 
to  make  her  fit  for  her  duties  of  motherhood.  This 
has  an  influence  upon  the  mxoulding  of  character,  and 
hence,  indirectly  upon  the  mental  qualities;  but  it  by 
no  means  makes  her  inferior. 

§  II.  If  we  pass  to  a  comparison  of  the  brains  of  dif- 
ferent races,  the  facts  we  meet  cannot  be  reconciled 
with  their  hypothesis.  Mr.  David  gives,  as  a  result 
of  careful  study,  the  following  table  :^ 

Ancient  Britains 52.54  ounces 

English 50.28  ounces 


^  Cf.  Contributions  towards  determining  weight  of  brain  in 
different  races  of  man,  by  J.  B.  David,  in  Phil.  Transact,  of 
Royal  Soc.  of  London,  1868,  vol.  158,  p.  505  sq. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  I25 

Irish 49.62  ounces 

Merovingians 50.28  ounces 

French 47-21  ounces 

Italians 48.24  ounces 

Lapps 47-65  ounces 

Finns 48.31  ounces 

Hindus 44.22  ounces 

Dahomans 46.63  ounces 

Kafirs '  49.04  ounces 

Esquimaux 49-^5  ounces 

Malays 50-13  ounces 

Dayaks 44.80  ounces 

New  Caledonians 47-14  ounces 

New  Hebrides 44.66  ounces 

Maoris 45-19  ounces 

Kanakas 47-^9  ounces 

According  to  Dr.  Hunt  the  American  negroes  in 
slavery  had  the  same  brain  capacity  with  the  Hindus, 
who  are  a  metaphysical  race,  ex.  gr.,  weight  of  male 
Hindu  44.22  ounces,  average  weight  of  negro  46.96, 
or,  according  to  Dr.  Peacock,  44.34.  Hence  we  find 
a  high  intellectual  development  in  a  nation  remarkable 
for  small  brain.^ 

§  12.  Finally,  let  us  examine  the  individual.     That  fodw?!-''®''* 
the  weight  is  by  no  means  proportionate  to  the  intel-  "*^^' 
ligence  is  evident  from  the  following  table  :^ 

Cuvier 64.5  ounces 

Abercrombie 63.  ounces 

Schiller 63.  ounces 

Goodsir 57.5  ounces 

4Cf.  Anthrop.  Rev.,  vol.  VII,  p.  190;  cf.  also  "  Elements  d' 
Anthropologic,"  par  Topinard,  ch,  XVI. 
5  Cf.  Bastian  Brain  as  Organ  of  Mind,  p.  369. 


1^6  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

Spurzeim 55.06  ounces 

Jas.  Simpson 54.       ounces 

Dirichlet 53.6     ounces 

De  Morny 53.5    ounces 

D.  Webster 53.5     ounces 

Campbell,  Lord  Chancellor 53.5     ounces 

-^§"^ssiz 53.3     ounces 

Dr.  Chalmers 53.       ounces 

Fuchs 52.9     ounces 

De  Morgan 52.75  ounces 

Gauss 52.6     ounces 

Judge  Jeffry 51.8     ounces 

Dupuytreu 50.7     ounces 

Grote 49-75  ounces 

Whewell 49.       ounces 

Herman  (Philol.) 47.9     ounces 

Hughes  Bennett 47.       ounces 

Tiedman 44.2     ounces 

Hausmann 43.2     ounces 

Thus  Cuvier's  brain  weighed  1,830  grams,  Broca's 
1,484,  Hausmann's  1,226,  Gambetta's  1,160,  whereas 
the  average  weight  of  the  European  brain  varies 
between  1,350  and  1,360  grains.  The  heaviest  brain 
measured,  according  to  Bastian,  is  that  of  an  illiterate 
Sussex  bricklayer,  which  weighed  67  ounces,  14J 
ounces  heavier  than  that  of  Dan.  Webster.  Turner 
cites  women  with  brains  of  50  ounces,  and  no  evidence 
of  high  mental  power.^  The  weight  of  the  brain  of 
Laura  Bridgeman  was  about  1,200  gr.,  its  volume 
about  1,160  c.  c;  but  the  mean  weight  of  the  European 
female  brain  is,  according  to  Bischoff,  1,244.5  gr., 
to  Tiedman   1,275,  to  Huschke   1272,    to    Schwalbe 

^  Cf.  Turner  Anatomy,  vol.  I,  p.  297. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  \2'J 

1,245/  Hence,  Bastlan  concludes  that  there  is  "no 
necessary  or  invariable  relation  between  degree  of 
intelligence  of  human  beings  and  mere  size  or  weight 
of  the  brain.  Demented  persons  may  have  large 
brains;  ordinary  people  have  large  brains;  men  of  abil- 
ity have  average  or  small  brains."^ 

§  13.  If  the  degree  of  intelligence  corresponds  to  the  from  the 
weight  of  the  brain,  the  growth  of  the  organ  should  be  brain, 
proportionate  to  the  development  of  the  mental  facul- 
ties. But  the  facts  are  contrary.^  In  childhood  the 
growth  of  the  organ  is  very  great,  whereas  the  develop- 
ment of  intelligence  is  very  small,  e.  g.,  six  months 
after  birth  the  weight  has  doubled,  at  three  years  it 
has  trebled,  at  seven  years  the  growth  becomes  much 
retarded;  nevertheless,  the  intelligence  then  only 
begins  to  develop.  Again  the  maximum  of  cerebral 
development  is  had  between  the  ages  of  fourteen  and 
twenty;  from  twenty-five  to  forty  the  weight  increases 
still  more  slowly;  then  diminishes.  But  reason  and 
wisdom  do  not  follow  the  same  law  in  their  develop- 
ment. Hence,  we  have  the  remarkable  fact  proved  be- 
yond question  that  reason,  judgment  and  wisdom  in- 
crease, whilst  the  weight  diminishes.-^" 

§  14.  Pathology  of  the  brain  presents  facts  which 
cannot  be  explained  by  the  criterion  of  weight;  ex.  gr., 

'^  Cf.  Brain  of  Laura  Bridgeman  by  H.  Donaldson,  in  Amer. 
Jour,  of  Psych.,  vol  III,  Sept.,   1890. 

^  Bastian  Brain  as  Organ  of  Mind,  p.  369;  cf.  Quartrefages 
The  Human  Species,  p.  410;  Calderwood  Brain  and  Mind, 
pp.  20,  503. 

9  S.  Augustine  considers  this  objection,  and  shows  that  the 
soul  develops  without  any  corresponding  development  of  the 
body.     cf.  de.  quant  An.,  n.  27,  28,  29. 

10  Cf.  Dr.  Body's  Table  of  Weight  of  Human  Body  in  Phil. 
Trans,  of  Royal  Soc.  of  London,  vol.  CLI,  year  1861,  p.  241; 
Weight  Proportions  of  Austrian  Peoples  by  Dr.  Weisbach, 
in  Anthr.  Rev.,  vol.  VII,  p.  92;  Gray's  Anatomy,  p.  707. 


128  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

the  human  brain  is  composed  of  two  hemispheres; 
nevertheless,  we  know  instances  where  intelHgent  men, 
e.  g.,  Broca,  who  possessed  an  average  brain,  and  have 
carried  on  their  mental  labors  with  only  one  hemis- 
phere, and  gave  no  sign  of  lack  of  intellect.^^  ''  It  is 
impossible,"  writes  Mr.  Donaldson,  "  to  judge  by  the 
scales  alone  about  the  intellectual  capacity  of  a  given 
person,  or  even  whether  he  was  healthy,  criminal  or 
insane."  ^^ 

§  15.  (b)  Measurement:  This  method  is  considered 
more  scientific  than^that  of  weight;  it  can  be  applied 
to  the  skulls  of  past  ages.  Therefore,  more  stress  is 
laid  upon  it.    The  facts  are  as  follows  :^^ 

6  in  the  age  of  polished  stone 1606  c.  c. 

24  Gauls 1592  c.  c. 

21   Egyptians  of  4th  dynasty 1532  c.  c. 

12  Egyptians  of  iith  dynasty 1443  c.  c. 

9  Egyptians  of  i8th  dynasty 1464  c.  c. 

84  Merovingians 1 504  c.  c. 

67  Parisians  of  12th  cent 1531  c.  c. 

■  77  Parisians  of  19th  cent 1559  c.  c. 

74  Italians  of  19th  cent 1467  c.  c. 

7  Maoris 1446  c.  c. 

85  Negroes  of  W.  Africa 1430  c.  c. 

146  Ancient  Britons 1524  c.  c. 

1 16  Kanakas 1470  c.  c. 

9  Esquimaux.  .  . 1535  c.  c. 

36  Anglo-Saxons 1412  c.  c. 

9  Lapps ^ 1440  c.  c. 

12  Dahoman  Negroes 1452  c.  c. 

^1  Cf.  Calderwood  Brain  and  Mind,  p.  317;  Ferrier  Func- 
tions of  the  Brain,  §  89. 
^2  Cf.  Growth  of  the  Brain. 

13  Cf.   Elements  D'anthropologie  by  Topinard,  ch.  XVII; 
Anthropology  of  Topinard  tr.  by  R.  Bartley. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  I29 

These  facts  show  that  savages  and  ancient  races 
have  a  skull  capacity  equal  and  even  superior  to  mod- 
ern and  civilized  peoples.  If  this  criterion  were  our 
guide,  we  should  then  be  compelled  to  conclude  that 
the  Esquimaux  are  equal  to  the  Parisians  of  the  pres- 
ent day,  and  superior  to  the  Europeans;  that  the 
Anglo-Saxon  is  inferior  to  the  Dahomen  Negro,  and 
is  almost  at  the  lowest  scale  of  humanity. 

§  16.  2°.  From  quality  of  brain '}^  An  examination  of  ^"^fff^ 
the  quality  of  brain-m.atter  leads  to  the  same  irrefut- 
able conclusion.  We  may  distinguish  chemical  and 
physical  qualities.  Neither  one  nor  the  other,  nor  both 
combined,  can  explain  the  fact  or  the  degree  of 
intelligence. 

§  17.  (a)  The  chemical  theory  of  life  and  of  thought  (a)  chem- 
is  based  upon  the  chemical  discoveries  of  digestion,  of  life  and 
etc.  These  discoveries  are  good;  they  mark  an 
advance,  and  contribute  much  to  the  maintenance  of 
the  health  of  the  individual.  The  mistake  is  made  in 
extending  their  influence  beyond  just  limits.  Because 
chemical  elements  are  found  in  the  organism,  it  does 
not  follow^  that  they  can  explain  life  and  thought. 

§  18.  As  a  result  of  the  introduction  of  the  synthetic 
method,  chemists  have  produced  in  the  laboratory 
organic  substances  or  certain  compound  substances 
which  are  found  only  in  living  beings,  e.  g.,  urine, 
formic  acid,  lactic  acid.  Hence  they  infer  that  life  is 
due  to  ordinary  chemical  forces  alone.  They  maintain 
that  all  living  powers  are  cognate;  that  all  living  forms 
are  fundamentally  of  one  character;  and  that  protop- 

15  Physiologists  of  to-day  have  been  compelled  to  abandon 
the  hypothesis  of  quantity.  The  present  position  is  that 
thought  is  explained  by  quality  of  the  brain,  i.  e.,  by  the  con- 
volutions and  the  grey  matter.  Cf.  Gray's  Anatomy,  p.  707; 
McClellan's  Regional  Anatomy,  vol.  I,  p.  25. 

17 


130  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

lasm  is  the  formal  basis  of  all  life.  This  protoplasm 
contains  the  four  elements,  carbon,  hydrogen,  oxygen 
and  nitrogen ;  these,  when  brought,  together  under  cer- 
tain conditions,  give  rise  to  protoplasm,  which  exhibits 
the  phenomena  of  life.  The  inference  is  obvious  that 
"  all  vital'  action  may  be  said  to  be  the  result  of  the 
molecular  forces  of  the  protoplasm  which  displays  it. 
And  if  so,  it  must  be  true,  in  the  same  sense  and  to  the 
same  extent,  that  the  thoughts  to  which  I  am  now 
giving  utterance  and  your  thoughts  regarding  them, 
are  the  expression  of  molecular  changes  in  that  matter 
of  life  which  is  the  source  of  our  other  vital  phe- 
nomena.^^ 

§  19.  The  animal  or  plant  is  an  organism.  It  takes 
in  certain  materials  from  the  outside  w^orld,  and  by  a 
organic  certain  process  forms  therefrom  organic  substances 
tances.  which  are  immediately  assimilated  into  tissue,  etc.,  for 
its  own  nourishment.  Again  certain  material  in  the 
organism  which  has  been  used  and  no  longer  con- 
tributes to  its  nourishment,  is  insensibly  detached  and 
gradually  expelled  into  the  outside  world.  Some  of 
these  waste  substances  are  inorganic  and  others  are 
organic,  e.  g.,  urine,  formic  acid.  The  mineral  sub- 
stances which  enter  the  organism  and  the  inorganic 
matter  which  has  been  expelled,  belongs  to  inorganic 
chemistry  and  are  under  the  sway  of  its  laws.  The 
organic  waste  substances,  however,  pertain  to  organic 
chemistry.  Now  chemists  have  succeeded  in  produc- 
ing organic  waste  substances.  But  can  chemistry  arti- 
ficially produce  true  organic  substances  —  substances 
fit  to  be  immediately  assimilated  by  the  organism? 

§  20.  Pasteur  has  proved  by  experiments  that  these 
organic  substances  in  the  organism  possess  properties 

^^  Huxley,  Lay  Serm.  "  Physical  Basis  of  Life." 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  I3I 

which  the  artificially  produced  substances  lack.  More- 
over, chemistry  is  unable  to  produce  an  organ.  Much  organ, 
less  can  it  hope  to  produce  an  organism.  It  is  power- 
less to  explain  why  the  materials  so  combine  that  life 
results.  The  products  of  chemistry  always  want  the 
properties  and  characteristic  of  life,  e.  g.,  growth,  organism, 
nutrition,  propagation.  The  persistence  of  these  acts, 
their  concentrated  action,  the  fixity  of  the  specific  type, 
the  permanence  of  the  individual  throughout  the 
stages  of  its  growth,  the  transmission  of  life  by  gener- 
ation are  characteristics  of  the  living  organism  which 
science  is  utterly  unable  to  imitated  The  chemists 
may  analyze  and  combine,  but  cannot  produce  the  liv- 
ing being.     The  germ  of  life  is  wanting. 

§21.  Mr.  Tyndall  admits  that  the  chemist  can  pro- 
duce organic  substances,  but  says  that  life  can  come  " 
only  from  demonstrable  antecedent  Hfe.^^  What 
makes,  asks  Mr.  Preyer,  the  materials  of  a  seed  or  of 
an  egg  so  combine  that  life  results  from  their  activity? 
In  vain  does  chemistry  grope  for  an  answer.^^  Mr. 
Haeckel  bids  us  look  to  carbon  for  the  cause,  but  does 
not  tell  how  it  is.^° 

§  22.  Ap-ain  the  methods  of  chemistry  and  the  meth-  inetii9dsof 

°  -^  chemistry 

ods  of  life  are  totally  different.     Chemistry  employs  and  of  life, 
electric  currents  and  excessive  heat  to  obtain  certain 
results.     Life  employs  gentle  means  and  an  ordinary 
temperature;  nothing  seems  forced  and  the  activities 
maintain  a  normal  mode. 

§  23.  If  chemical  qualities  cannot  explain  life,  with  conclusion, 
greater  reason  they  are  powerless  to  solve  the  problem 

1^  D'Hulst  Melang.    Philos.,  p.    170  sq. 

18  Belfast  Add.   Prof.   Tulloch  Modern    Theories    in    Phil- 
osophy and  Religion,  p.  157. 

1^  Cf.  Lange  History  of  Materialism,  vol.  Ill,  p.  61,  note. 
20  lb.,  p.  56. 


132  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

of  mind.  The  attempt,  however,  has  been  made. 
Molleschott,  ex.  gr.,  held  that  "  without  phosphorus, 
there  is  no  thought."  Feuerbach  adopted  this;  and 
Tyndall  cites  it  in  Fragments  of  Science.^^  But  why- 
phosphorus?  No  reason  is  given.  It  is  an  arbitrary 
assumption.  Furthermore,  the  brains  of  the  two  ani- 
mals proverbially  stupid,  ex.  gr.,  sheep  and  goose,  show 
the  most  phosphorus. 

sjcai  quaii-  §  24.  (b)  But  may  not  physical  qualities  of  the  brain 
supply  the  explanation  we  seek?  By  physical  quali- 
ties are  understood  the  number,  depth  and  variety  of 
the  convolutions.  Of  this  theory  M.  Topinard  is  the 
most  eloquent  exponent.  The  convolutions  contain 
the  grey  substances,  on  the  amount  of  which  intelli- 
gence depends,  hence  he  says  the  more  numerous  are 
the  convolutions,  the  more  grey  matter  is  had. 

§  25.  If  intelligence  depend    on    the    convolutions, 
experiments    would    be    in    its    favor.     Nevertheless 

criticism,  some  animals  possess  remarkable  instinct  who  have 
smooth  skulls,  e.  g.,  squirrel,  rat,  mouse,  beaver.  On 
the  other  hand  the  ox  and  cow  have  many  convolu- 
tions in  the  skull,  yet  are  by  no  means  remarkable  for 
intelligence.  According  to  this  criterion  the  elephant 
should  be  more  highly  gifted  than  man;  the  ass  and 
sheep  should  be  the  equal  of  the  elephant  and  superior 
to  the  dog;  and  the  woman  should  be  the  inferior  of 
man.  Again  the  brain  of  man  and  of  the  chimpanzee 
are  very  much  alike  in  structure;  yet  there  is  a  vast 
difference  in  intelligence.^  Moreover,  there  are  ex- 
amples of  men  who  were  highly  gifted  in  mental  pow- 
ers, yet  whose  brains  were  not  more  complex  than 
the  ordinary  brain,  and,  on  the  contrary,  instances  of 

21  Cf.  Scient.  Materialism. 

22  Cf.  Quatrefazes  "  Human  Species." 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  133 

brains  remarkable  for  convolutions  without  any  sign  of 
great  endowments.^^ 

§  26.  Finally  regularity  is  by  no  means  a  necessary 
condition.  Bichet,  who  held  this  opinion,  is  said  to 
have  had  one  hemisphere  smaller  than  the  other. 
Experience  shows  that  intelligence  is  compatible  with 
small,  unsymmetrical  and  badly  formed  skulls.  There 
may  be  exceptions  to  our  reasoning.  Let  us  grant 
that  there  are.  We  contend  that  Materialism  should 
not  base  a  theory  upon  exceptions.  It  is  not  scientific. 
Furthermore,  their  conclusion  should  have  the  force  of 
a  physical  universality.  If  not,  it  falls  to  the  ground; 
for  they  contend  to  establish  a  physical  law.^* 

§  27.  Science,  therefore,  is  powerless  to  prove  the 
strict  correlation  of  intelligence  to  the  size  or  structure 
of  the  brain.  As  a  final  resource  they  appeal  to  occult 
qualities.  Thus  Ferrier  writes  "There  is  in  the  head 
an  Unknown  which  science  has  not  yet  been  able  to 
determine."  But  how  bitterly  have  they  ridiculed 
such  a  position  in  endeavoring  to  explain  the  source  of 
life!^^  They  are  compelled  to  make  the  admission 
because  there  is  in  the  human  brain  something  which 
IS  not  matter,  but  is  independent  of  matter  in  exist- 
ence and  action,  viz.,  a  spiritual  soul  or  mind.^ 

-  23  Cf.  Calderwood  Relations  of  Brain  and  Mind,  pp.  24,  503. 
24  Cf.  P.  Janet  "  Le  Cerveau  et  la  Pense." 

26  Cf.  Huxley  "  Physical  Basis  of  Life"  in  Lay  Sermons, 
p.  137. 

27  "  The  alleged  scientific  principle,"  writes  Prof.  Ladd,  "  of 
psycho-physical  parallelism,  is  far  from  being  the  self-evident 
conclusion  of  modern  psycho-physical  research  which  it  is  so 
often  and  so  rashly  assumed  to  be.  Even  the  simplest  rela- 
tions between  the  phenomena  of  the  lowest  order  of  con- 
sciousness and  the  concomitant  cerebral  activities,  are  far  too 
fluctuating, complicated  and  changeable  to  be  subsumed  under 
this  principle.  Of  parallelism  in  space  we  cannot  speak  ap- 
propriately in  this  connection.     Of  parallelism  in  time  there 


134  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

II. 

stated!^^  ^^^  Localization  of  Function. 

§  28.  A  strong  objection  to  the  Spirituality  of  the 
soul  is  drawn  from  the  attempt  to  fix  the  basis  of  our 
activities  in  different  parts  of  the  brain,  i.  e.,  from  local- 
ization of  function.  The  aim  is  to  show  that  the  soul 
is  not  one  principle,  but  a  collection  of  many  princi- 
ples ;  and  that  in  its  existence  and  action  it  is  bound  up 
completely  with  the  organs,  and  hence  organic,  not  in- 
organic. The  contention  appears  the  stronger  and  the 
more  specious  because  it  contains  an  element  of  truth. 
A  careful  analysis  will  unfold  its  full  meaning  and 
enable  us  to  estimate  its  true  force. 

con^ctiwi.  §  29.  The  conviction  that  certain  activities  of  the 
soul  are  organic  or  connected  in  some  special  manner 
with  particular  parts  of  the  human  body  is  no  discovery 
of  recent  times,  but  is  as  old  and  widespread  as  human 
nature,  and  is  revealed  in  the  phrases  of  every  lan- 
guage. Thus  we  say  that  the  eye  sees,  that  the  brain 
thinks,  that  the  heart  feels.  In  the  present  century, 
however,  the  attempt  was  made  to  investigate  this  line 
of  thought  and  to  throw  the  conclusions  into  scientific 
form. 

§  30.  Gall  based  his  protests  against  the  ultra  spir- 
itualistic school  of  Des  Cartes  on  physiological 
grounds.  He  set  forth  his  system  in  a  work  of  four 
volumes.^''^     In  it  are  contained    the    two    principles 

is  only  an  incomplete  and  broken  analogy.  And  when  one 
tries  to  think  out  clearly  the  conception  of  a  complete  quali- 
tative parallelism,  one  finds  the  principle  soon  ending  in  in- 
adequacy, and  finally  becoming  unintelligible  and  absurd." 
Ladd  Phil,  of  Mind,  p.  344. 

27a  "  Anatomy  and  Physiology  of  the  Nervous  System  and 
of  the  Brain,"  1810-1817. 


GaU. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  135 

characteristic  of  his  system,  (a)  The  human  brain  is 
the  instrument  of  all  the  higher  powers  in  man,  and 
each  faculty  is  located  in  a  very  circumscribed  portion, 
(b)  The  outer  form  and  shape  of  the  skull  exactly  cor- 
responds to  the  inner  form  and  shape  of  the  brain,  so 
that  by  an  examination  of  the  protuberances  we  may 
infer  the  inclinations  and  degrees  of  the  faculties. 
Gall  marked  out  twenty-six  and  Spurzeim  thirty-five 
portions  of  the  skull  which  were  considered  the  organs 
of  distinct  propensities,  as,  ex.  gr.,  murder,  theft,  wit, 
secretiveness,  etc.^ 

§  31.  This  theory  is  unscientific,  is  based  on  arbitrary  criticised. 
assumptions  and  has  been  completely  discredited  by 
Physiology  and  Anatomy.^^  His  classification  of  the 
faculties  is  of  no  value  whatever;  the  method  is  unsci- 
entific and  he  confounds  sense  with  intellect.  The 
assignment  of  the  faculties  to  so  many  different  areas 
of  the  skull  is  purely  imaginary,  is  false  and  is  held 
up  to  ridicule  by  contemporary  science.  The  second 
principle  has  been  likewise  discarded.  Experiment 
has  shown  that  the  badger,  the  fox  and  dog  have  brains 
almost  identical,  yet  how  unlike  are  their  skulls !  Again 
in  man  the  skull  varies  in  thickness,  and  a  membrane 
may  be  found  between  skull  and  brain,  thus  destroy- 
ing the  similarity  of  conformation,^® 

§  32.  The  theory  of  Gall  has  failed,  but  interest  in  brain 
the  study  of  the  human  brain  has  steadily  increased.  ^  ^  ^* 
The  peculiar  shape  of  the  head,  its  complexity,  the  dif- 
ferent lobes,  etc.,  naturally  excite  the  curiosity  of  the 
student  and  lead  to  experiments  as  to  the  functions 
of  the  parts  and  their  mutual  relations.     The  methods 

^  Cf.  Dr.  Bastian  "  the  Brain  as  an  organ  of  mind,"  ch.  X. 
29  Cf.  Sully  The  Human  Mind  I,  p.  50. 
^  Cf.  Surbled  Le  Cerveau. 


13^  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY, 

pursued  in  the  investigation  are  more  scientific  and  the 
conclusions  are  carefully  tested.  Hence  the  depart- 
ment of  cerebral  Physiology,  which  is  the  product  of 
our  own  times.^^  The  results  obtained  by  these  inves- 
tigations are  very  interesting,  and  at  first  sight  may 
seem  to  be  a  strong  objection  to  the  doctrine  set  forth 
in  the  preceding  chapter.  To  make  the  criticism  more 
exact,  it  is  necessary  to  classify  the  facts.'*^ 
(n  sensa-  §  ^^^  (jos^  Sensation:  M.  Broca,  in  1861,  obtained  the 
first  scientific  result  by  localizing  the  centre  of  articu- 
late speech  in  the  third  frontal  convolution  near  the 
fissure  of  Silvius  and  the  island  of  Reil.^^  The  way  was 
opened  to  some  important  discoveries.^^  Thus,  ex,  gr., 
(a)  The  phenomena  of  Aphasia  have  been  connected 
with  an  injury  to  this  convolution.  These  pathologi- 
cal facts  are  complex  and  are  Hke  the  phenomena  ob- 
served in  acquiring  a  language.^^  Sometimes  com- 
plete aphasia  is  found,  as  in  fever;  after  recovery 
speech  may  return,  ex.  gr..  Card.  Messofanti,  or  it  must 
be  again  learned.^^     More  frequently,  however,  it  is 

21  Cf.   Encyc.   Brittan.  art.  Physiology. 

22  Cf.  Six  Lectures  on  Cerebral  Localization  delivered  by 
Prof.  Donaldson  before  the  Boston  Medico-Psychological 
Society  Feb.  and  March,  1891,  and  found  in  Amer.  Jour,  of 
Psych.,  vol.  4,  1891-92,  p.  113  sq. 

33  Cf.  Broca's  Convolution  as  told  by  himself  in  Bulletin  de 
la  Soc.  Anthrop.  de  Paris,  1861,  p.  326;  La  circonvolution  de 
Broca,  par  G.  Herve,  Paris,  1888. 

34  Cf.  Sully  The  Human  Mind,  vol.  1, 312,  354;  James  Psych., 
vol.  I,  p.  30  sq. 

35  Cf.  Ribot  Diseases  of  the  Memory. 

36  "  A  case  is  recorded  by  Dr.  Hun,  of  Albany,  the  sufferer 
being  a  blacksmith,  thirty-five  years  of  age,  who,  after  a  long 
walk  under  a  burning  sun,  was  seized  with  symptoms  of 
congestion  of  the  brain,  and  for  several  days  lay  in  a  state 
of  stupor.  V/hen  he  recovered  from  this  state  he  understood 
what  was  said  to  him,  but  had  great  difficulty  in  expressing 
his  desires  in  words,  on  account  of  which  he  resorted  to 
signs  to  convey  his  meaning.  If  the  name  of  a  thing  he 
wished  was  uttered  in  his  hearing,  he  would  say  "  Yes,  that 


»  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  I37 

partial;  at  times  some  words  are  retained,  e.  g.,  "no 
doubt,"  an  oath,  etc.;  again  certain  letters  or  figures 
are  lost;  or  technical  words  only  are  remembered;  or 
a  class  of  words  cannot  be  recalled,  e.  g.,  nouns;  or 
the  person  affected  cannot  speak,  but  can  sing,  and 
vice  versa.^^ 

§  34.  (b)  Writing  memory,  i.  e.,  agraphy,  has  been  ^V!^"^*" 
localized  at  the  basis  of  the  second  frontal  convolution 
of  the  left  hemisphere.  A  lesion  here  causes  the  loss 
of  writing  movements.  The  phenomena  are  varied 
also  and  very  strange,  e.  g.,  the  person  affected  can 
write  music  only,  or  can  write  his  name,  or  a  few 
words  only,  (c)  Auditory  Aphasia  or  Verbal  Deaf-  ^2J^S=^ 
ness  is  located  in  the  first  and  second  temporal  convo- 
lution of  the  left  hemisphere  along  the  fissure  of  Sil- 
vius.  In  this  case  the  word  is  heard  as  a  noise  or 
sound,  not  as  a  sign  of  language.^^  Verbal  deafness  is 
complete  or  partial,  e.  g.,  a  student  cannot  understand 
French,  or  a  certain  number  of  words  or  musical 
sounds.^^ 

is  it,"  but  he  still  continued  unable  to  name  it.  After  fruit- 
less attempts  to  repeat  a  word,  Dr.  Hun  wrote  it  for  him,  and 
then  he  w^ould  begin  to  spell  it  letter  by  letter,  and  after  a 
few  trials  was  able  to  pronounce  it.  If  the  writing  were  now 
taken  from  him  he  could  no  longer  pronounce  it,  but  after 
long  study  of  the  written  word  and  frequent  repetitions,  he 
would  learn  it  so  as  to  retain  it,  and  afterwards  use  it.  He 
kept  a  slate  on  which  the  words  he  required  most  were  writ- 
ten, and  to  this  he  referred  when  he  wished  to  express  him- 
self. He  gradually  learned  these  words,  and  extended  his 
vocabulary  so  that  after  a  time  he  was  able  to  dispense  with 
his  slate."  In  Dublin  Quart.  Journal,  p.  53,  Feb.,  1891,  cit. 
by  Calderwood  Mind  and  Brain,  p.  392. 

27  Cf.  Ferrier  "  The  Functions  of  the  Brain,"  §  99;  cf.  W.  A. 
Hammond  Treatise  on  the  Diseases  of  the  Nervous  System, 
ch.  VII;  Dr.   Bateman  "Aphasia." 

2^  Cf,  Carpenter  Mental  Physiology,  p.  437  sq. 

39  Cf.  Mind  III,  p.  157;  Sully  The  Human  Mind,  vol.  I,  p. 
Ill;  Dr.  Allen  Starr  "The  Pathology  of  Sensory  Aphasia" 
Brain,  July,  1889. 

18 


138  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

{Jmdne^s!  ^35*  (^)  Finally  verbal  blindness  has  been  traced  to 
a  lesion  of  the  second  parietal  convolution  in  the  left 
hemisphere  a  little  above  the  organ  of  verbal  memory. 
In  this  case  the  person  sees  the  writing,  but  cannot 
read  it,  like  a  child  who  has  not  yet  learned  the  letters ; 
it  is  a  foreign  language  to  him ;  there  is  no  connection 
between  the  sign  and  the  idea  signified.  Instances  of 
partial  verbal  blindness  are  very  singular,  e.  g.,  for 
words,  but  not  for  syllables;  or  for  syllables,  not  for 
letters;  or  for  letters,  not  for  figures;  or  for  Arabic, 
not  for  Roman  figures.  The  localization  of  these  sen- 
sitive activities  is  placed  beyond  doubt.  Contempo- 
rary science  admits  their  truth.^^ 

mo^vemeSt  §  3^'  (^°)  ^^^"^oiis  Movement:  The  localization  of 
motor  centres  Avas  proposed  in  1861  by  Mr.  HughUngs 
Jackson.  In  1870  Fritsch  and  Hitzig  found  that  by 
touching  certain  parts  of  the  brain  with  an  electric  cur- 
rent, muscular  action  in  the  body  was  the  result.  Fer- 
rier,  Duret,  de  Carville  continued  the  experiments  on 
the    same    line.*^     It    was    found    that    the    principal 

40  Cf.  Diet,  of  Psych.  Medecine  by  H.  Tuke  under  "  Mem- 
ory; "  Annales  de  Phil.  Cretienne  Avril,  '87;  Farges  "  Le 
Cerveau  L'ame,"  p.  181  foil. ;  Transactions  of  Congress  of 
American  Physicians  and  Surgeons,  1888,  vol.  i,  p.  278.  Fer- 
rier  and  Munk  attempted  to  localize  the  sense  of  sight,  touch, 
smell  and  hearing,  but  they  do  not  agree  in  the  results 
obtained.  Goltz  says  that  the  hypothesis  which  teaches  that 
circumscribed  centers  subserve  special  functions  in  the  cere- 
bral cortex  is  untenable,  cf.  Mind,  April,  1882.  And  G. 
Croom  Robertson,  influenced  by  the  data  presented,  inclines 
to  Goltz's  opinion  in  preference  to  Ferriers'.  lb.  cf.  also, 
James  Prin.  of  Psychology  i,  p.  31;  Mind,  vol.  V,  p.  89;  vol. 
VII,  p.  299. 

41  Hitzig's  and  Ferrier's  results  were  confirmed  by  the  N.  Y. 
Society  of  Neurology,  cf.  N.  Y.  Med.  Jour.,  March,  1875; 
also  Localization  of  Function  in  Jour,  of  Anat.  and  Physiol. 
V.  XII;  Boston  Med.  and  Surgical  Jour.  V,  91;  Calderwood 
Brain  and  Mind,  ch.  IV;  Psychological  Review,  1895,  vol.  2, 
p.  2>Z- 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  I39 

groups  of  voluntary  muscles  could  be  put  into  action 
by  exciting  the  parietal  or  the  posterior  half  of  the 
frontal  lobe,  hence  the  so-called  '"*  motor  zone,"  i.  e., 
the  convolutions  about  the  fissure  of  Rolando.  Again 
a  paralysis  of  these  muscles  was  superinduced 
by  removing  the  corticle  coating  of  the  same 
lobes.  Yet  functions,  impeded  by  an  operation  on  the 
cerebral  cortex,  are  found  to  be  restored  by  the  vicar- 
ious action  on  the  part  of  the  centres  surrounding  the 
lost  part.^^  These  discoveries  have  been  utilized  in 
surgery.  Thus  successful  operations,  e.  g.,  for  epi- 
lepsy, contractures,  paralysis  have  been  performed.*^ 

§  37.  (3°)  Reason:  Made  confident  by  the  success  in  3°  Reason. 
locaHzing  the  centres  of  sensation  and  of  nervous 
activity.  Physiologists  claim  that  certain  parts  of  the 
brain  are  the  areas  of  the  rational  faculties.  Adopting 
the  same  method  as  in  the  preceding  cases,  they  have 
exerted  all  their  ingenuity  to  locate  these  centres. 
That  a  faculty  be  localized  it  is  necessary,  that  (a)  it 
should  be  isolated  from  all  other  activities;  (b)  that  an 
organic  lesion  suppresses  the  activity  connected  with 
it;  (c)  that  by  the  cure  of  the  lesion  the  act  is  restored. 
Can  these  conditions  be  verified  for  the  higher  acts  of 
the  soul,  e.  g.,  the  abstract  idea,  the  judgment,  reason- 
ing, free  choice,  hatred,  love,  etc.? 

§  38.  Science  in  vain  seeks  a  favorable  answer.  The 
very  nature  of  these  activities  so  opposite  to  sense  and 
motor  acts  show  the  futility  of  the  attempt.  The  con- 
fessed inability  of  experimentators  to  map  out  the 
areas  of  thought  shows  that  they  are  dealing  with  a 
problem  which  eludes  the  blade  of  the  scalpel  and  lies 

42  Cf.  Ravisson  Rapport  sur  la  Philos.  du  XIX  Siecle,  p.  189. 

43  Cf.  Dr.  Ferrier  "  The  Functions  of  the  Brain,"  ch.  IX, 
§  72;  Mr.  Hersley  in  Phil.  Trans.  V.  179,  p.  205. 


I40  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

beyond  the  reach  of  the  electric  current.  There  is  no 
ground  to  assign  the  intellectual  powers  to  the  "  silent 
parts  of  the  brain."  These  parts  may  be  the  seat  of 
inhibitory  powers  controlling  the  nervous  system. 
Hence  we  conclude  that  intelligence  has  its  seat  no- 
where in  particular  but  has  relation  to  all  parts  of  the 
brain.^* 

conclusion.  §  -^9.  The  examination  and  classification  of  the  ef- 
forts ma.de  by  scientists  to  localize  the  activities  of  the 
soul  in  certain  portions  of  the  cerebral  cortex  places 
the  objection  in  its  full  and  true  light.  Far  from 
weakening,  it  only  strengthens  our  Hne  of  reasoning. 
To  prove  the  spirituality  of  the  soul  it  is  not  necessary 
nor  is  it  the  aim  to  show  that  all  its  activities  are  inde- 

strengfh-^  pendent  of  the  bodily  organs.*^  The  purpose  is  to  show 

ened  by :  ^-^^^  ^^iq  higher  faculties  —  those  distinctive  and  char- 
acteristic of  man,  are  inorganic.  The  arguments  pre- 
sented to  substantiate  this  position  were  strong,  and 
when  taken  together  have    an    overwhelming    force. 

failure  to    'phg  failure  to  localize  the  hig-her  faculties  must  be  con- 

locahze  ... 

Y^viti        sidered  as  an  additional  argument  in  favor  of  the  thesis. 

§  40.  In  like  manner  the  success  obtained  in  local- 
by  success         '^  ^ 

iniocaiiz-    izing"  nervous  and  sense-activity  only  strengthens  our 

Ing  sense  ^  j  j  g 

*^d  motor-  position.  In  proving  the  spirituality  of  the  soul  a  dis- 
tinction was  drawn  between  the  organic  and  the  inor- 
ganic faculties.  The  organic  activities  are  not  inde- 
pendent of  the  body;  on  the  contrary,  they  require  the 
intrinsic  co-operation  of  parts  of  the  body.  If  I  see 
with  my  eye,  hear  with  my  ear,  speak  with  my  mouth, 
it  is  only  natural  that  Physiologists  should  attempt  to 
trace  the  optic  and  auditory  nerves    and    the    vocal 

^*  Cf.  Ferrier,  ch.  VII;  James  Psych,  i,  p.  64,  n;  Dr.  Surbled 
Le  Cerveau,  p.  165;  Caldervvood  Brain  and  Mind,  p.  316; 
Farges  Le  Cerveau  L'ame. 

45  Cf.  chapter  on  Spirituality  of  the  Soul. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  I4I 

chords  to  certain  parts  of  the  brain  and  that  they 
should  do  it  successfully.  All  this  is  within  their  legiti- 
mate sphere.  In  localizing  motor-centres  and  sensi- 
tive acts,  they  have  done  no  more  than  what  was  from 
the  beginning  admitted  they  might  do.  Thus  their 
very  success  as  well  as  their  failure  prove  the  spiritu- 
ality of  the  human  soul.^^ 


III. 

Psycho-Physics. 

§41.  The  efforts  made  especially  in  German>  ||^^^°g^ 
during  late  years  to  bring  the  methods  of  the 
physical  sciences  to  bear  upon  the  investigations 
in  psychology  have  given  rise  to  the  department  of 
Psycho-Physics.  By  an  abundant  use  of  mathematical 
formulas  this  new  branch  of  study  lays  claim  to  the 
name  of  a  science.  Its  object  is  the  measurement  of 
Psychic  acts;  its  real  aim  and  influence  are  materialis- 

^^  The  distinction  of  intellect  from  sense  and  nerve-move- 
ments; the  impossibility  of  localizing  the  former;  the  localiza- 
tion of  the  two  latter,  is  held  by  Lotze.  Cf.  Outlines  of  Psy- 
chology, ed.  by  Prof.  Ladd,  pp.  138-142.  "  One  clear  result 
is,"  writes  Mr.  Calderwood,  "  in  all  known  living  organisms 
Brain  is  the  chief  organ  of  Sensori-motor  activity.  *  *  * 
Accordingly,  the  leading  demands  upon  the  organ  are  these: 
To  supply  nerve  energy  adequate  to  keep  the  whole  sensori- 
motor apparatus  in  condition  for  functional  activit)'-;  to  pro- 
vide for  transmission  of  impulse,  whether  occasioned  by  ex- 
ternal impact,  or  by  visceral  or  other  internal  excitation;  and 
to  secure  co-ordination  of  all  sensory  and  muscular  activity 
according  to  the  requirements  of  animal  life.  These  are  the 
functions  common  to  the  brain,  as  a  grand  centre  of  a 
nervous  system.  The  marvellously  complex  forms  of  sensi- 
bility and  activity  natural  to  the  higher  orders  of  animals  are 
all  dependent  on  the  nerve-system,  and  all  the  multifarious 
combinations  requisite  within  the  unity  of  animal  life  are  pro- 
vided for  by  action  within  the  great  central  body  —  the 
Brain,"  L.  c,  p.  196.  Yet  he  shows  that  sensori-motor  activ- 
ity is  the  antithesis  of  intelligent  action.    lb.,  p.  203. 


142  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

tic;  and  its  existence  as  a  science  is  to  Materialists  the 
one  direct  proof  of  their  position. 

its  basis  §  42.  It  is  a  fact  that  sensations  differ  in  quality, 

thus,  ex.  gr.,  sound  differs  from  sight.  It  is  a  fact  also 
that  they  differ  in  quantity,  i.  e.,  in  intensity,  in  dura- 
tion, in  extension.  By  intensity  is  meant  the  vividness 
or  strength;  by  duration  is  understood  the  time  taken 
up  in  the  production ;  by  extension  reference  is  made  to 
the  bodily  surface  affected. 

Weber  and      §  4-2.  To  explain  the  fact  that  sensations   differ  in 

Fechner.       .         ^^.  ^         . 

intensity  and  duration,  Weber,  of  Leipsic  (1840),  spent 
twenty  years  of  experiment.  He  inferred  a  law  that 
sensation  grows  with  equal  increments,  when  the  ex- 
citation grows  with  relatively  equal  increments.  This 
furnished  a  basis  for  the  studies  of  Fechner.  In  i860 
he  published  in  two  volumes  the  "  Elements  of 
Psycho-Physics."  By  psycho-physics  he  understood 
an  exact  theory  of  the  relations  of  soul  and  body,  of 
the  physical  and  psychical  world.  In  this  work  he  at- 
tempted to  formulate  a  law  ruling  the  exact  quantita- 
tive measurement  of  all  mental  acts.  He  hoped  to 
obtain  indirectly  what  Herbert  failed  to  get  directly.^^ 
Thus  a  new  department  of  study  was  opened,  which 
was  eagerly  taken  up  and  developed  by  Helmholtz, 
Bonders,  Delboeuf,  Wundt,  Markel  and  Hall.^ 

47  Cf.  Fakkenburg  Hist,  of  Phil.,  p.  603. 

4^  Prof.  Jastrow  makes  a  distinction  between  Weber  and 
Fechner;  he  says  that  the  Psycho-physical  methods  are  appli- 
cable only  to  such  experiments  as  can  be  utilized  for  estab- 
lishing Weber's  law,  that  Fechner's  law  can  be  deduced  from 
Weber's  experiments  only  by  the  use  of  a  series  of  assump- 
tions hardly  one  of  which  is  even  probably  justifiable;  that 
the  function  and  value  of  Weber's  law  depends  on  "  its  fur- 
nishing (it  may  be  within  limits)  a  means  of  comparing  the 
sensibility  of  different  incommensurate  senses."  He  makes 
this  distinction  with  the  object  "  to  clear  the  way  for  a  more 
rational  system  of  Psycho-physics,  by  directing  future  experi- 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  143 

§44.  (a)  Intensity:  Fechner  thought  that  he  could  (^^)  i^*®'^- 
explain  the  intensity  of  the  sensation  by  discovering 
the  relation  which  existed  between  it  and  the  external 
stimulus.  His  aim  was  to  estimate  the  intensity  of  the 
effect  from  the  -intensity  of  the  cause.  He  found  that 
the  intensity  of  the  sensation  was  not  proportionate 
to  the  intensity  of  the  stimulus ;  but  was  augmented  as 
the  logarithm  of  the  stimulus.  He  took  as  the  unit  of 
measurement  the  smallest  perceptible  difference  in  sen- 
sations. Thus  he  found  that  a  constant  ratio,  different 
however  for  the  kind  of  sensation,  prevails  between 
the  production  of  a  sensation  consciously  distinguish- 
able from  a  previous  mental  state  and  the  quantity  of 
the  stimulus  required.  Hence  the  famous  law  of 
Fechner:  "To  increase  the  intensity  in  arithmetical 
progression  the  stimulus  must  be  increased  in  geome- 
trical progression;"  thus,  ex.  gr.,  that  the  sensation 
be  one,  two  or  three  times  stronger,  the  stimulus  must 
be  increased  from  ten  to  loo  to  i,ooo.^^ 

§  45.  (i)   It  is  not  a  universal  or  a  rigorous  law.  criticism 

Wundt  admits,  "  For  sound  the  concordance  is  most  universal 

or  rigor- 
precise;  for  sight,  pressure  and  motion,  it  has  a  more  ous. 

restricted  value;  for  temperature  and  taste  it  is  abso- 
lutely uncertain ;  for  smell  and  general  sensibility  there 
are  no  experiments."  Hence,  he  concludes,  that  "  the 
law  of  Weber  has  not  a  universal  value;  it  is  applied 
only  to  certain  sensorial  domains,  and  agrees  approxi- 
mately with  most  of  them  only  within  certain  limits."  ^° 

mentation  into  that  path  in  which  it  is  most  promising  of 
results,  and  thus  preventing  the  employment  of  the  many  un- 
critical and  unanahjzed  processes  now  current."  Cf.  A  Critic 
of  Psycho- Physic  Methods  in  Amer.  Jour,  of  Psych.,  vol.  I, 
Feb.,  1888. 
^^  Cf.  Ladd  Elements  of  Physiological  Psychology. 
_^°  Cf.  James  "  Psychology,  vol.  I,  p.  533  sq.,  where  he  criti- 
cises the  practical  importance  and  the  theoretic  interpretation 


144  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

Hering,  of  Prague,  holds  that  the  law  is  of  value  when 
applied  to  normal  stimulation  and  to  a  very  narrow 
range  above  and  below,  which  he  calls  the  "  range  of 
sensibility."  ^^  Thus,  when  the  stimulus  has  been  in- 
creased to  a  certain  strength,  the  sensation  shows  no 
appreciable  gain,  ex.  gr.,  a  very  powerful  sound;  the 
difference  between  the  central  and  peripheral  portions 
of  the  sun's  disk  is  not  noticeable;  a  prolonged  stimu- 
lation produces  dullness,  fatigue,  monotony. 

(2)  limited  §  46.  (2)  It  is  not  applicable  to  the  whole  range  of 
in  range,  j^^j^^^j  jjfg^  Thought  cannot  be  reduced  to  the  cate- 
gory of  material  quantity.  When  we  say  that  one  de- 
sire is  stronger  than  another,  or  that  one  spiritual 
being  is  greater  than  another,  we  mean  not  material 
but  virtual  quantity,  which  in  Scholastic  phraseology 
is  another  term  for  the  greater  or  less  perfection  of  a 
being.  Furthermore,  the  process  of  measurement  is 
based  on  the  unit  of  sensation.  This  unit  is  found  to 
vary  for  different  sensations.  But  how  may  we  hope 
to  obtain  units  for  the  higher  powers?  Hence  the 
higher  spiritual  life  of  thought  and  of  voHtion  cannot 
be  subjected  to  quantitative  measurement. 

(3)  even  §  47-  (s)  Even  when  restricted  within  the  sphere  of 
tiSH^!^^^'  sensation,  its  statements  are  questioned,  (a)  Sensa- 
(a")sensa-  tion  is  not  simply  an  external  impulse;  its  total  and 
mere^^**  adequate  cause  includes  a  subjective  element,  i.  e.,  the 
impulse,     excitability  of  the  sensitive  organ;  in  other  words,  the 

actual  power  of  reaction  possessed  by  the  organ  and  de- 
rived from  the  soul  which  informs  it.  In  overlooking 
the  subjective  element,  they  have  neglected  the  prin- 

of  Weber's  law.     cf.  also,  vol.  I,  p.  616;  Sully  Human  Mind, 
vol.  I,  pp.  88,  89;  "A  New  Instrument  for  Weber's  Law,"  by 
J.  Leuba,  in  Amer.  Jour,  of  Psych.,  1892-93,  vol.  5,  p.  370. 
5^  Cf.  German  Psychology,  Ribot,  ch.  V. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  I45 

cipal  cause  of  the  sensitive  act.  The  subjective  con- 
ditions of  age,  of  temperament,  of  present  attention, 
etc.,  cause  variations  in  sensation.  This  explains  how 
it  is  that  two  equal  impulses  can  produce  different  sen- 
sations and  vice  versa. 

§  48.  (b)  Again  thev  seem  to  assume  that  the  quality  (b)  quality 

.  '  .  .  varies. 

of  the  sensation  does  not  vary.  Consciousness  testifies 
that  the  quality  of  sensations  is  not  always  preserved 
intact.  Thus,  ex.  gr.,  a  notable  increase  in  intensity 
of  the  sensations  of  hght,  of  sound,  etc.,  causes  change 
also  in  the  quality,  ex.  gr.,  the  beautiful  and  the  sub- 
lime.^^  Fechner  supposes  that  sensations  are  multiples. 
He  says  the  unit  of  intensity  is  the  least  perceptible 
difference  between  two  sensations,  and  thus  by  consid- 
ering sensations  as  multiples  of  this  unit  he  could  quan- 
tify them.  But  a  sensation  as  such  is  indivisible.  And 
the  character  of  the  unit  is  very  questionable.^^  (c)  Most 
recent  writer.s  contend  that  the  law  is  not  psychologi- 
cal, but  only  physiological,  i.  e.,  they  attribute  to  prop- 
erties of  the  nerve-structures  the  necessity  of  greater 
stimulus  in  order  to  efifect  an  appreciable  change  in 
the  sensation.^^  Prof.  Tichener,  of  Cornell,  gives  to 
Weber's  law  a  purely  physiological  interpretation;  on 
the  nature  of  mind  he  is  content  with  psycho-physical 
parallelism  and  leaves  the  question  to  metaphysics, 
holding  that  it  does  not  pertain  to  Psychology .^^ 

§  49.  (b)  In  duration:  To  this  study  the  title  Psycho-  (]>)  dura- 
metry  has   been  given.     Its   leaders   are   Helmholtz, 
Bonders,  Exner,  Hermann,  Wundt,  etc.     A  mental 

52  Ladd  Phys.  Psych.,  p.  II  C5. 

53  Cf.  Sully  Human  Mind,  vol.  I,  p.  89;  Davis  Elements  of 
Psych.,  p.  435. 

54  Cf.  James  Psychology  I,  p.  548;  Sully  "Human  Mind" 
I,  p.  89. 

55  Cf.  Outlines  of  Psychology  by  E.  B.  Tichener. 

19  .  ! 


146  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

Operation  can  be  measured  in  time,  (i)  if  it  is  composed 
of  many  successive  acts,  e.  g.,  syllogistic  reasoning, 
etc.,  the  estimation  of  motives  preparatory  to  a  delib- 
erate choice;  (2)  or  if  the  same  act  be  prolonged,  e.  g., 
the  contemplation  of  beautiful  landscape,  the  study  of 
the  work  of  art ;  (3)  or  if  the  act  be  produced  gradually 
so  that  a  certain  time  elapse  in  the  production. 

§  50.  A  spiritual  operation,  e.  g.,  an  act  of  thought 
or  of  will,  may  have  duration  in  the  first  two  cases  and 
can  therefore  be  measured;  but  not  in  the  third  way. 
By  virtue  of  its  very  nature  it  passes  from  potency  to 
act,  i,  e.,  is  produced  instantaneously.  Consciousness 
assures  us  of  this  fact.  On  the  contrary,  a  sensation 
or  organic  act  may  have  duration  in  all  three  ways, 
e.  g.,  we  may  have  a  train  of  sensations,  or  the  same 
sensation  may  be  prolonged,  or  it  may  be  produced 
successively,  e.  g.,  from  thumb,  to  hand,  to  whole  arm. 

§  51.  Thus,  ex.  gr.,  the  time  of  the  transmission  of  a 
neural  action  through  a  definite  nerve  length  has  been 
ascertained  by  experiments^  to  be  about  iii  feet  a  sec- 
ond. The  interval  between  a  shock  on  one  hand  and 
the  response  with  the  other  has  been  found  to  be  0.15 
of  a  second ;  this  is  called  reaction  time.  The  reaction 
time  varies  according  to  the  expectation  of  the  patient, 
the  degree  of  his  attention,  the  intensity  of  the  stimulus, 
and  the  "  personal  equation,"  i.  e.,  the  natural  quick- 
ness and  habits  of  the  person.  In  like  manner,  by  the 
automatic  registration  of  a  galvanic  chronoscope  the 
time  taken  to  distinguish  one  of  two  sensations,  e.  g., 
colors,  called  discernment  time,  varies  from  o.i  to  0.03 

^^  The  mechanical  instruments  employed  to  measure  the  re- 
action time  are  Ludwig's  Kyniograph,  Marcy's  Chronograph 
and  Exner's  Psychodometer.  Cf.  James  Psychology,  vol.  I, 
p.  87. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  147 

of  a  second.^^  These  results  present  no  difficulty.  The 
data  for  calculation  are  too  inaccurate  for  use,  as 
Wundt  admits,^^  and  Mr.  James  expresses  "  doubts  as 
to  the  strict  psychologic  worth  of  any  of  these  meas- 
urements," (vol.  I,  p.  524,  n.).  Our  thesis  concerns  only 
inorganic  acts.  The  higher  powers  of  mind  are  be- 
yond the  reach  of  these  experiments ;  ^^  and  again, 
*'  The  proper  psychological  outcome  of  the  new  de- 
partment of  Psycho- Physics  is  just  nothing."  ^° 

§  52.  (c)  That  sensations  are  extended  is  a  fact  of  j^ngatFon*" 
individual  experience,  e.  g.,  in  the  sense  of  touch,  a  gl^fgation 
scald  on  the  arm  is  greater  in  extension  than  the  prick 
of  a  needle.    The  efforts  made  to  find  the  discrimina- 
tive sensibility  of  different  parfs  of  the  body,  lie  within 
the  limits  of  Physiology .^^ 

§  53.  The  objection  drawn  from  Psycho-Physics  is 
not  so  formidable  when  closely  examined.  It  does  not 
even  touch  the  position  we  hold.  Its  leading  defend- 
ers candidly  confess  its  limitations.  The  conclusion, 
therefore,  is  obvious.  Each  objection  analyzed  and 
explained  is  in  reality  an  indirect  argument  for  the 
higher  nature  of  our  soul.  Science,  sifted  of  all  imagi- 
nations and  assumptions,  vindicates  the  contention  of 
sound  philosophy  and  proclaims  the  true  dignity  of 
man. 

57  Cf.  Science,  Sept.  10,  1886;  Mind  XI,  p.  2>^7. 
5^  Cf.  James  L.  c,  p.  89. 

5^  Cf.  James  L.  c,  p.  94;  Ribot  German  Psychology,  ch. 
VIII. 

60  Mr.  James  Psychology  V.  I,  p.  534. 

61  Cf.  Ladd  Elements  of  Phys.  Psych.,  p.  405;  Sully  Human 
Mind,  vol.  I,  p.  106. 


PANTHEISM. 

§  I.  The  objections  against  the  spirituality  of  the 
soul,  which  were  examined  in  the  preceding  chapter, 
have  been  proposed  in  the  name  of  science.  They  are 
of  recent  origin  and  carry  to  the  mind  of  the  reader  a 
conviction  which  ordinarily  accompanies  the  carefully 
selected  data,  the  exact  methods,  the  rigid  reasonings 
of  modern  science.  In  this  case,  however,  the  strength 
was  in  appearance  only;  under  the  severe  test  of  logic 
and  of  fact  the  idle  boastings  have  been  shattered. 
of^hiE  §  ^-  Philosophy  also  has  its  difficulties.  They  call 
P^y-  for  a  solution  as  clear  and  as  convincing.    Under  new 

forms  they  constantly  reappear  in  the  history  of  the 
human  mind.  The  words,  the  phrases,  the  considera- 
tions in  their  favor,  the  principles  from  which  they 
spring,  may  clothe  them  in  the  vigor  of  youth;  yet 
when  freed  from  the  circumstances  of  time  and  place, 
they  stand  forth  as  passing  phases  of  errors  as  ancient 
as  the  records  of  human  speculation, 
theism^s.^  §  3-  A  false  system  of  philosophy  which  seems  to 
have  a  fascination  for  the  speculative  mind  is  Panthe- 
ism. As  has  been  shown.  Materialism  and  Positivism 
attack  the  very  existence  of  the  soul;  Pantheism  de- 
nies its  true  nature.  The  former  contend  that  matter 
only  exists ;  that  everything  can  be  ultimately  resolved 
into  material  elements;  that  a  super-organic  or  spirit- 
ual world  is  a  non-entity;  that  God,  the  soul,  etc.,  are 
illusions.  The  latter  holds  that  every  existing  being 
is  a  manifestation  of  or  an  evolution  from  some  pri- 
mordial essence,  which  pervades  creation;  that  par- 
ticular things  have  the  same  common  nature ;  that  as  a 
consequence  one  being  alone  exists,  which  is  all  in  all. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  >  I49 

I. 

Modern  Pantheism. 
§  4.  We  pass  by  the  Pantheism  of  the  Eleatic  school  modern 

^  -^  .       pantheism. 

represented  by  Xenophanes,  Parmenides  and  Melis- 
sus;  that  of  the  Neo-Platonists,  Plotinus  and  Proclus; 
or  its  phases  as  proposed  by  Erigena  and  Avicennes 
in  the  middle  ages.  These  forms  have  an  interest  to 
the  student  of  history.  Modern  Pantheism  requires 
careful  examination;  its  influence  has  been  wide  and 
profound;  its  teachers  have  held  a  leading  place  as 
thinkers  and  as  men  of  letters;  it  has  been  boldy  and 
persistently  proposed  as  a  system  of  thought,  which 
alone  answers  the  problems  of  existence,  and  satisfies 
the  highest,  noblest  aspirations  of  the  heart. 

1°.  Spinoza  (1632- 1677). 

§  '5.  Spinoza  may  be  considered  the  father  of  modern  Spinoza. 
Pantheism.  An  ardent  disciple  of  Des  Cartes,  he 
found  himself  in  full  sympathy  with  the  reactionary 
movement  against  the  philosophy  of  Aristotle  and  the 
Schoolmen.  Unfortunately  he  pushed  the  principles 
of  his  master  to  an  extreme. 

§  6.  Des  Cartes  defined  substance  to  be  that  which  teaching, 
exists  of  itself  so  that  it  needs  no  other  thing  for  its  ex- 
istence. From  this  Spinoza  inferred  that  one  substance 
alone  existed ;  that  it  was  infinite  and  was  what  is  called 
God.  He  taught  that  this  substance  by  a  power  of  self- 
determination  expresses  itself  in  matter  and  in  thought. 
The  world  of  matter  and  of  thought  are,  therefore, 
revelations  of  the  absolute  truth.  They  are  both  real, 
but  independent  of  each  other;  hence  we  cannot  con- 
ceive of  body  acting  on  mind  or  of  mind  acting  on 
body.     But  matter  and  thought  exist  as  two  parallel 


150 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


influence. 


series;  the  more  perfect  is  the  body,  the  more  perfect 
is  the  mind.  Thus  my  mind  is  only  a  part  of  God's 
mind;  my  body  is  part  of  His  embodied  substance.  '*  I 
declare,"  he  writes,  "  the  human  mind  to  be  a  part  of 
nature,  namely,  because  I  hold  that  in  nature  there 
exists  an  infinite  power  of  thinking,  which  power,  so 
far  as  it  is  infinite,  contains  ideally  the  whole  of  nature, 
in  such  wise  that  its  thoughts  proceed  in  the  same 
fashion  as  nature  herself,  being,  in  fact,  the  ideal  mirror 
thereof.  Hence  follows  that  I  hold  the  human  mind 
to  be  simply  the  same  power,  not  so  far  as  it  is  infinite 
and  perceives  the  whole  of  nature,  but  so  far  as  it  per- 
ceives alone  the  human  body;  and  thus  I  hold  our 
human  mind  to  be  part  of  this  infinite  intellect.^ 

§  7.  The  influence  of  Spinoza  upon  modern  thought 
has  been  very  great.  His  fundamental  principle,  e.  g., 
that  the  one  substance  has  two  attributes,  matter  and 
thought,  especially  underHes  the  attempt  of  contempo- 
rary English  Psychologists  to  explain  the  union  of 
soul  and  of  body,  i.  e.,  the  Double-Aspect  Theory.  His 
ethics  was  the  constant  companion  of  Goethe ;  his  Pan- 
theism was  by  SheUing  harmonized  with  Idealism;  the 
*'  Absolute  "  of  the  latter  was  the  "  natura  naturans  '* 
of  Spinoza.^  But  he  had  no  great  disciple  to  propose 
his  theory  in  whole  or  in  part;  nor  can  he  be  said  to 
have  formed  a  school,  whose  position  and  number  are 
clearly  and  sharply  defined.^ 


teaching 
of  Kant. 


2°.  German  Pantheism. 
§  8.  Kant   cannot  be   accused  of   Pantheism.     His 
principle,  however,  as  developed  by  his  followers,  led 


1  Spinoza  Ep.  XXXII. 

2  Cf.  Essays  by  E.  Caird,  vol.  I,  "  Goethe." 

3  Cf.  Essays  in  Literat.  and  Philos.,  by  E.  Caird,  vol.  II,  p. 
3Z2. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  I5I 

immediately   and   directly   to   a   Pantheistic    doctrine 

which  in  one  form  or  another  has  profoundly  moved 

the  German  mind  for  the  past  hundred  years.     Kant  reJsom"''^ 

held  that  the  mind  perceives  not  objects  as  they  really 

exist  independent  of  us,  but  the  appearances  only  as 

they  are  in  the  mind ;  hence  the  word  phenomenon  with 

him  is  something  ideal  not  real.     The  object  itself  is 

unknown.     The   speculative   reason,   therefore,    gave 

subjective  truth,  i.  e.,  the  truth  of  its  ideal  appearance, 

as  covered  over  with  the  forms  of  thought,  not  objective 

truth,  i.  e.,  the  truth  of  the  object  itself  as  independent 

of  the  mind.* 

§  9.  He  recognized,  however,  that  we  need  objective  feasorfa^ 
truth ;  hence  he  invented  the  practical  reason  in  order  ™^s°  rom 
to  pass  from  the  subjective  to  the  objective.     This  tSofeec^^ 
method  w^as  critically  examined  by  his  successors  and  ^^^®- 
rejected  as  insufficient  and  imaginary.^ 

§  10.  Another  method  was  sought  and  believed  to  be  fication^of 
found  in  identifying  the  subject  thinking  and  the  object  lnd''object. 
thought.  The  absolute  unity  of  substance,  which  is  at 
the  same  time  the  ego  and  non-ego,  the  subject  and 
object,  the  ideal  and  the  real,  seemed  to  be  a  legitimate 
solution  of  the  difficulty.  It  follows  from  this  that  one 
substance  alone  exists.  In  proposing  this  explanation, 
however,  and  in  setting  forth  its  true  nature  its  defend- 
ers separate  into  widely  diverging  camps. 

Fichte  (1762- 1 81 4). 
§11.  Fichte  maintained  that  things  unknow^n  are  to  j^Js  teach- 
us  as  nothing ;  the  only  real  thing,  therefore,  is  the  Ego.  concerning 


the  ego. 


^  Cf.  Critic  of  Pure  Reason  Transc.  Aesth.,  p.  34,  Muller's 
trans. 

^  Cf.  Essaj^s  in  Literature  and  Pliilos.,  by  E.  Caird,  vol.  II, 
p.  431. 


152  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

(a)  The  external  world  is  the  projection  of  the  Ego, 
the  product  of  my  unconscious  act;  hence  the  world 
about  me  has  existence  only  as  a  manifestation  of 
spirit.  Inasmuch  as  the  Ego  by  its  activity  produces 
external  things,  they  have  a  reality  only  in  the  mind 
which  by  thinking-  creates  them;  thus  when  the  mind 
ceases  to  think,  they  cease  to  exist. 

"  We  are  no  other  than  a  moving  row 

Of  magic  shadow-shapes  that  come  and  go."  ^ 

S?at?onof  §  i^-  (b)  He  then  attempted  to  explain  the  relation 
the  deeper  ^^  ^J  conscious  self  to  the  deeper  Self.  The  solution 
^®^*-  he  proposes  is  that  there  is  only  one  Spirit  —  the  spirit 

of  nature;  that  the  conscious  self  is  the  transient  ex- 
pression of  the  one  Spirit  or  the  deeper  Self;  that  the 
private  thought  is  the  passing  shadow^  of  the  divine 
universal  thought.  With  Fichte,  therefore,  the  ego  is 
the  only  reality.  His  system,  as  justly  been  termed, 
Transcendental  Egoism. 

Schclling. 

teaching.  §  13.  Schelling  (1775-1854),  at  first  the  disciple,  be- 
came afterwards  the  critic  of  Fichte.  His  teaching 
is  the  exact  reverse  of  his  early  master.  Schelling  held 
that  one  being  alone  has  real  existence;  this  being  he 
called  the  Absolute.  By  its  own  essential  activity  the 
Absolute  evolves  and  manifests  itself;  the  manifesta- 
tion results  in  the  world  of  nature  and  of  man.  Hence 
his  great  division  of,  Nature  Philosophy  and  of  Trans- 
cendental Philosophy.  The  world  around  us  shows 
the  struggle  of  this  one  divine  spirit  to  m.anifest  itself 
in  countless  varying  forms  until  in  man  it  attains  the 

^  Omar  Khayyam  in  Rubaiya. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  153 

consciousness  of  itself;  this  is  the  end  and  the  crown 
of  the  whole  evolution.  The  double  manifestation  of 
nature  and  of  spirit  reaches  unity  in  the  Ego,  wdiich 
embraces  both  subject  and  object  in  its  concept. 

§  14.  With  Fichte  the  ego  was  real;  was  the  creator;  eXfr^JS^^' 
the  subject.  With  SchelHng,  on  the  contrary,  the  Ah-  ^i^hte. 
solute  was  real;  it  was  the  universal  mind,  in  which 
subject  and  object  were  identified;  the  finite  mind  be- 
ing only  a  phase  in  the  manifestation  of  the  infinite 
mind.  To  Schelling  reason  is  a  faculty  transcending 
all  finite  experience,  hence,  he  says,  it  is  not  personal; 
it  is  the  all-seeing  eye  confronting  itself,  gazing  upon 
eternal  realities;  my  own  deeper,  truer  self  is  nature, 
the  one  great  life  permeating  and  vivifying  all,  the  one, 
divine,  absolute  spirit.  The  system  of  Schelling  has 
been  rightly  called  "  Objective  Idealism "  or  the 
"  Philosophy  of  the  Absolute." 

§15.  Schoppenhauer  is  considered  an  off-shoot  of  influence 
Schelling;  he  puts  the  ''  will  "  in  place  of  the  ''  Abso-  ing. 
lute."  His  Pessimism  is  drawn  from  a  study  of  Budd- 
hism.'' Hartman  endeavored  to  reconcile  Schoppen- 
hauer and  Hegel.  He  retains  the  Pessimism  of  the 
former,  and  the  evolution  of  the  latter.  His  "  Uncon- 
scious "  is  another  term  for  the  "  will  "  and  the  ''  Idea." 
In  literature  Schelling  is  considered  as  having  given 
rise  to  the  Romantic  School,  ex.  gr.,  the  Schlegels, 
Novalis,  etc.  Through  Coleridge,  Schelling  exerted 
great  influence  on  the  English  and  the  American  mind 
during  the  first  half  of  the  present  century.  Thus  we 
account  for  its  traces  in  Emerson,  Parker  and  Alcott.^ 

^  Cf.  Caro  "  Le  Pessimisme." 

^  In   1850  a   French  translation  of  Schelling  appeared;  the 
main  source  was  Coldridge. 

20 


154  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

Hegel. 

the^cor?"  ^  ^^*  ^^^^  Culmination  in  the  development  of  Kant 
^ure being  ^^  reached  in  Hegel.^  His  system  seems  to  be  kind  of 
compromise  between  Fichte  and  Schelhng.  (a)  Hegel 
starts  with  the  concept  of  pure  and  undetermined 
being.  He  says  that  the  mind  conceives  of  being  as 
necessary  or  contingent,  as  eternal  or  temporal,  as 
spiritual  or  material,  as  finite  or  infinite;  that  these 
are  limitations  of  being  and  mutually  exclusive  of  each 
other,  e.  g.,  the  necessary  excludes  the  contingent; 
hence  an  analysis  of  these  reveals  another  concept 
which  is  outside  of  these  limitations  and  yet  contains 
them,  i.  e.,  the  concept  of  pure  being  or  of  being  viewed 
without  determination  or  modes. 
(b)not  §  17.  (b)  He  contends  that  the  idea  of  pure  being 

supposes  the  idea  of  not-being,  for  the  mind  cannot 
conceive  the  one  without  conceiving  the  other  at  the 
same  time;  and  that  the  idea  of  pure  being  does  not 
dififer  from  the  idea  of  not-being;  hence  he  derives  the 
tofieri^        concept  of  no-being,     (c)  This    last    concept    he    dis- 
tinguishes from  the  concept  of  absolute  nothing,  for  it 
is    a   medium   between   existing   being  and   absolute 
nothing.     Hegel  calls  this  concept  To  -fieri,  i.  e.,  what 
is  to  be  or  the  becoming}^ 
Sonof^he       §  ^^'  ^^^   existing  things   are   a   manifestation   and 
Idea.  evolution  of  the  To  fieri.     This  evolution  is  seen  (a)  in 

abstract  and  metaphysical  notions,  hence  the  depart- 
ment of  Logic;  (b)  in  real  existences  and  material 
phenomena,  hence  nature;  (c)  finally  the  idea  rises  to 
consciousness  and  manifests  itself  in  the  phenomena 

9  Cf.  Wallace's  Hegel  Proleg.,  ch.  VI. 

10  Cf.  Introd.  to  Hegel's  Phil.,  by  W.  T.  Harris;   Hegel's 
Logic,  by  W.  Harris. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  155 

of  human  thought,  hence  the  world  of  man  —  the  high- 
est and  most  perfect  of  its  manifestations.^^ 

§  19.  Criticism:    (a)  The  Idea  of  Hegel  is  nothing  an'^a^sump- 
more  than  possible  being;  it  is,  therefore,  abstract  not  *^°^- 
real  in  itself;  its  evolution  is  an  abstract  evolution.  Yet 
he  assumes  it  to  be  real;  just  as  he  assumes  thought 
and  reality  to  be  identical.    The  very  basis,  therefore, 
of  his  system  is  an  assumption,     (b)  He  denies  the  (b^  con- 
fundamental  principles  of  reason,  e.  o;.,  the  principle  of  principles 

^  ^  '        ^  '  ^  ^  of  reason. 

contradiction;  ex.  gr.,  according  to  him  the  to  fieri  is 
and  is  not  at  the  same  time.  In  fact,  he  holds  that  his 
theory  cannot  stand  without  assuming  the  falsity  of  this 
principle.-^^     (c)  From  its  consequences.     His  system  (c)conse- 

i:^  tr  \   /  ^  J  quence. 

was  at  first  favored  by  the  German  government  and 
thus  became  the  philosophy  of  the  state.  Soon,  how- 
ever, its  assumptions  and  errors  w^ere  discovered  and 
exposed;  his  disciples  thereupon  separated  into  three 
schools.  Strauss'  "  Life  of  Jesus  "  caused  a  division; 
hence  the  old  and  young  Hegelians.  With  Strauss 
stand  Fuerbach  and  Schmidt.  Between  is  a  third 
party,  ex.  gr.,  Rosenkrantz  and  Michelet.  With 
Strauss,  Philosophy  of  religion  becomes  a  histori- 
cal criticism  of  the  Bible  and  Theology,  hence  the 
Mythical  school  of  Biblical  interpretation.^^  Strauss 
developed  into  Materialism  and  Atheism  in  "  Old 
and  New  Faith,"  1872,  where  he  holds  that  cul- 
ture is  incompatible  with  Christianity,  which  is 
a  religion  of  poverty;  that  the  process  of  life 
is  'eternal,  hence  no  need  of  a  Creator;  that  the  new 
religion  is  a  cult  of  genius,  which  consists  in  sympathy 

^1  Cf.  Liberatore,  vol.  II,  pp.  19,  20. 

12  Cf.  Fr.   Hecker,  Aspirations  of  Nature,  ch.   X, 

13  Cf.   Strauss'  "  Life  of  Jesus,"  in  which  the   Son  of  God 
is  ideal  Humanity,  and  "  Christian  Dogmatics." 


156  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

with  the  highest  efforts  of  humanity,  hence  his  Positiv-  , 
ism.  Feuerbach  ran  more  directly  into  Materiahsm. 
He  holds  that  man  is  the  sole  subject  of  Philosophy; 
that  Philosophy  is  opposed  to  religion  as  health  is  to 
disease;  that  religion  arises  from  man  objectifying  his 
own  essence;  hence  in  opposition  to  Hegel  he  taught 
that  self-consciousness  is  the  absolute  and  in  his  God 
man  knows  himself.-^*  The  teaching  of  Strauss  and 
Feuerbach  reaches  Sensuahstic  Egoism  in  Schmidt 
"  Individual  and  his  Property."  ^^ 
influence.  g  20.  The  influence  of  Hegel  was,  however,  greater 
than  that  of  Fichte  or  of  Schelling.  His  philosophy 
spread  into  other  countries  and  was  modified  by  them. 
At  present  he  divides  with  Kant  the  Pre-eminence  in 
Idealistic  philosophy.  The  leading  Idealistic  trend  of 
thought  in  England  and  in  America  is  either  Neo- 
Kantian  or  Neo-Hegelian.^^ 

3°.  Hie  Vedanta. 

s^dYJ^^^^'  §  21.  Another  source  of  modern  Pantheism  must  be 
sought  for  in  a  land  which  in  manner  of  life  and  in 
habits  of  thought  is  the  direct  antithesis  of  our  West- 
ern civilization.  The  Hindus  are  a  nation  of  philoso- 
phers. From  the  earUest  times  they  have  set  the  mind 
to  solve  the  great  problems  of  existence.  Their  at- 
tempts are  found  in  the  Upanishads,  a  collection  of 
philosophical  writings  dating  back  to  the  sixth  cen- 
tury, B.  C,  and  in  the  various  commentaries  upon 
them,  especially  that  of  Sankara. 

^'^Ci.  Fr.  Hecker,  Aspirations  of  Nature,  ch.  X;  Life  of  G. 
Eliot,  by  G.  W.  Cooke,  ch.  IX. 

15  Cf.  Falckenberg  Hist,  of  Mod.  Phil.,  ch.  XVI;  Philos.  in 
Germany,  by  W.  Wundt,  in  Mind,  vol.  II,  p.  493- 

16  Cf.  Phil,  of  Relig.  Caird,  pp.  229-241:  Present  Day  Tracts 
No.  38  "  F.  Bauer,"  by  Rev.  A.  B.  Bruce. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  157 

^22.  Schoppenhauer  says  that  the  study  of  these  ^^e^^''^^!"®- 
works  has  been  the  solace  of  his  Hfe;^^  Sir  Wilham 
Jones  thinks  that  "  Pythagoras  and  Plato  derived  their 
sublime  theories  from  the  same  fountain  as  the  sages 
of  India;"  Cousin  sees  ''in  this  cradle  of  the  human 
race  the  native  land  of  the  highest  philosophy;"  and 
Fred.  Schelegel  holds  that  "  the  loftiest  philosophy  of 
Europeans  or  the  IdeaHsm  of  the  Greeks,  in  compari- 
son with  Oriental  Idealism,  is  a  feeble  spark."  ^° 

§  23.  The  problem  of  the  Upanishads,  is  to  explain  p^^Q^jj^^ 
the  true  nature  of  the  soul  and  its  relation  to  Brahma. 
The  soul  is  called  Atman,  i.  e.,  self;  Givatman,  i.  e.,  liv- 
ing self;  and  after  its  substantial  unity  with  Brahma  had 
been  discovered  Parama- Atman,  i.  e.,  the  highest  self.^^ 
To  Sankara  the  self,  i.  e.,  the  Atman,  is  not  what  is 
commonly  meant  by  the  Ego,  but  lies  far  beyond.  The 
Ego  is  our  character  and  is  made  up  of  nationality, 
prejudices,  language,  body,  senses,  etc.  These  form 
only  the  involucra  of  the  self. 

§  24.  The  higher  knowledge  is  to  know  one's  self  as  ?^*^^®  5^' 
identical  with  the  Highest  Self;  this  is  called  Atman- 
Vidya,  i.  e.,  the  knowledge  of  one's  self.^"  The  true 
nature  of  the  soul  is  the  one's  self;  individuality  is  only 
a  fiction,  or  rather  an  illusion ;  ^^  what  is  real  and  true 
in  the  individual  is  the  Self  .within  and  invisible,  infinite 
divine,  all-pervading.^^  Hence  external  things  are  only 
appearances;   my  own   spirit   is  the  one   spirit;  that 

17  Cf.  S.  B.  E.,  vol.  I,  p.  LVII. 

18  Cf.  Vedanta  Philosophy,  p.  8,  by  Max  Muller. 

19  Atman  in  the  Vedas,  is  a  pronoun,  e.  g.,  ^pse,  /;  afterwards 
it  was  used  to  express  the  ipseitas,  i.  e.,  the  self.  cf.  Muller 
1.  c.  p.  21. 

20  S.  B.  E.,  vol.  I.  p.  XXV. 

21  S.  B.  E.,  vol.  XV,  p.  XXXVI. 

22  Cf.  Katha  Upanished. 


158  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

which  alone  exists,  is  the  unive^^sally  present  imper- 
sonal Self.^^ 

Brahman.  g  25.  The  great  principle  of  the  Vedanta  is  that  there 
can  be  onl)-  one  Brahman.  The  soul  is  not  a  part  of  the 
divine  Self;  not  a  modification  of  the  Divine  Self;  not 
different  from  the  Divine  Self;  hence  the  Divine  Self 
and  the  Human  Self  are  one  and  the  same  substance. 
The  fetters  of  Upadhis,  i.  e.,  the  senses,  cause  the 
Highest  Self  to  appear  as  conditioned  and  blinds  us  as 
to  the  substantial  oneness  of  both.  When  this 
nescience  of  illusion  is  destroyed  by  Vidya,  i.  e.,  true 
knowledge,  we  can  perceive  that  the  soul  is  God :  Tat 
Tvam  Asi,  i.  e..  Thou  art  It.  "  Thou  canst  not  see  the 
seer  of  the  sight;  thou  canst  not  hear  that,  that  hears 
the  sound;  thou  canst  not  think  the  thinker  of  the 
thought;  thou  canst  not  know  the  knower  of  all  knowl- 
edge.   This  is  thy  Self  that  is  in  all  things  that  are."  ^* 

Its  influ-  §  26.  This  teaching  is  pure  Pantheism.     It  has  ex- 

erted wide  influence  in  Europe  and  America.  Schop- 
penhauer,  especially,  is  indebted  to  its  doctrine.  His 
Will  corresponds  to  Brahman  the  subject  of  the  world, 
the  only  true  reality,  the  highest  Self;  his  Vorstellimg 
to  the  phenomenal  world  seen  by  us  objectively,  and 
recognized  as  unreal.^^ 

II. 
Influence. 

Influence         §  2^.  From  these  three  sources  modern  Pantheism 
ng  an  .  ^^^  ^^kcn  rise  and  has  spread.    We  shall  now  briefly 

23  Williams'  Buddhism,  p.  105. 

24  Brih.  Upan.  Ill,  4.2;  Mund.  Upan.  Ill,  i.  8;  cf.  especially 
the  Katha  Upanishad. 

25  Cf.  Colebrooke  Essays;  Prof.  Gough,  Phil,  of  the  Upani- 
shads;  A  Rational  Refutation  of  Indian  Phil.  Systems  by  Dr. 
Hall. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  1 59 

trace  its  influence  upon  contemporary  thought.    From 
Germany  the  new  teaching  passed  into  England.    Ger- 
man Hterature,  e.  g.,  Goethe,   Richter,  NovaHs,  was 
even  more  powerful  than  philosophy  in  spreading  its 
tenets.    Coleridge  was  a  student  and  admirer  of  Schel- 
ling.     He  explained  his  master  and  thus  introduced 
his  system  to  English  and  American  thinkers.    Carlyle, 
by  his  translations  of  Goethe,  e.  g.,  Wilhelm  Meister 
made  thousands  of  readers  familiar  with  that  gifted 
mind.     Coleridge  was  the  theologian  and  philosopher,  Coleridge. 
Carlyle  the  preacher  and  man  of  letters  in  the  new  ^ariyie. 
intellectual  awakening.     The  Ethical  IdeaHsm  of  Mr.  Arnold. 
Arnold  can  be  traced  to  the  same  source.^®     Words-  Words- 
worth,  the  Poet  of  Nature,  also  came  under  the  influ- 
ence.    We  find  traces  of  its  mystic  thought,  of  the  one 
spirit  that  speaks  in  man  and  in  nature,  breathing  out 
of  his  poetry.^'' 

"  For  I  have  learned 
To  look  on  Nature,  not  as  in  the  hour 
Of  thoughtless  youth,  but  hearing  oftentimes 
The  still  sad  music  of  humanity. 
Nor  harsh  nor  grating,  though  of  ample  power 
To  chasten  and  subdue.    And  I  have  felt 
A  presence  that  disturbs  me  with  a  joy 
Of  elevated  thoughts;   a   sense   sublime 
Of  something  far  more  deeply  interfused, 
Whose  dwelling  is  the  light  of  setting  suns. 
And  the  sound  ocean  and  the  living  air, 
And  the  blue  sky,  and  in  the  mind  of  man; 
A  motion  and  a  spirit  that  impels 
All   thinking  things,   all   objects   of  all  thought, 
And  rolls  through  all  things."  ^8 

But  Coleridge  gave  way  to  the  theological  reac- 
tion of  the  Oxford  School  and  became  eventually  the 
parent  of  the  Broad  Church  party,  e.  g.,   Maurice; 

26  Cf.  Pfleiderer  Devel  of  Theol.,  p.  330. 

27  Cf.  E.  Caird  Essays,  vol.  I,  Wordsworth. 
^  Cf.  Excursion. 


l60  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

Wordsworth  made  room  for  Tennyson,  who  became 
the  poet  of  skepticism  of  his  age;  and  the  spirit  of 
idealism  was  replaced  by  the  empiricism  of  J.  S.  Mill. 
The  English  mind  is  too  practical  to  remain  long 
under  the  sway  of  Transcendental  thought. 

In  America.  §  28.  The  influence  of  these  writers,  however,  spread 
to  their  American  contemporaries.  Transcendental 
philosophy  found  a  foothold  in  New  England.  While 
its  main  source  was  German,  through  Coleridge  and 
CarMe,  in  reality  it  was  eclectic.  Cousin  w^as  widely 
read,^^  and  traces  of  the  Vedanta  philosophy  are  found 
in  Emerson.  In  New  England,  TranscendentaHsm 
spread  through  every  sphere  of  life.  Theology  was 
platonic  and  mystic;  it  found  its  source  in  Fichte  and 
Jacobi,  in  Herder  and  Schleiermacher.  The  attempt 
at  the  reform  of  society  is  illustrated  in  Brook  Farm.^° 
Leading  men  as  Theo.  Parker,  Prof.  Walker,  W.  H. 
Channing,  Mr.  Ripley,  Mr.  Brownson,  in  Boston 
Quarterly,  Bronson  Alcott  became  its  propagators. 
Emerson,  however,  was  the  highest  product  and 
master-mind  of  the  movement.^^ 

Emerson.  §  29.  To  Emerson  the  soul  was  supreme.  By  the 
soul  he  understood  "  the  background  of  our  being,  an 
immensity  not  possessed  and  that  cannot  be  pos- 
sessed." The  soul  or  mind  is  eternal,  one,  immanent 
and  Self  manifesting.  It  is  within  man  so  that  the 
"Act  of  seeing  and  the  thing  seen,  the  seer  and  the  spec- 
tacle, the  subject  and  the  object  are  one."     He  writes 

29  Cf.  Specimens  of  For.  Stand.  Literature,  ed.  by  Geo. 
Ripley,  1838:  Brownson's  Quarterly,  vol.  I,  p.  6;  F.  Hecker's 
The  Church  and  the  Age,  ch.  XlT. 

20  Cf.  Transcendentalism  in  New  England,  by  Frothing- 
ham,  p.  158; Brownson's  Quart.  Rev.,  vol.  Ill,  p.  409  sq. 

31  Cf.  Brownson's  Quarterly,  vol.  Ill,  p.  273;  vol.  IV,  p. 
421  sq. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  l6l 

that  "  the  currents  of  the  Universal  Being  circulate 
through  me ;  that  I  am  part  and  parcel  of  God ;  "  or 
that  "  man  and  the  world  are  incarnations,  projections 
of  God."  To  him  man  is  an  infinite  soul;  and  every- 
thing real  is  self-existant.  "  We  see  the  world  piece  by 
piece,"  he  tells  us,  "  as  the  sun,  the  moon,  the  animal, 
the  tree;  but  the  whole,  of  which  these  are  the  shining 
parts,  is  the  soul,"  or  "  the  web  of  events  is  the  flowing 
robe  in  which  the  soul  is  clothed ;  "  and  *'  through  all 
persons  appears  this  identical  impersonal  nature,  which 
is  God."  ^^  The  same  trend  of  thought  is  shown  in 
his  poetry. 

"  Onward  and  on  the  eternal  Pan, 
Who  layeth  the  world's   incessant  plan, 
Halteth  never  in  one  shape, 
But  forever  doth  escape, 
Like  wave  or  flame,  into  new  forms 
Of  germ  and  air,  of  plants  and  worms. 
I  that  to-day  am  a  pine. 
Yesterday  was  a  bundle  of  grass." 

In  the  hymn  to  Brahma,  Mr.  Emerson  puts  into 
verse  thoughts  found  in  the  Katha  Upanishad. 

If  the  red  slayer  thinks  he  slays, 
Or  if  the  slain  thinks  he  is  slain 
They  know  not  well  the  subtle  ways 
I  keep,  and  pass  and  turn  again. 

Far  or  forget  to   me  Is  near; 
Shadow  and  sunlight  are  the  same; 
The  vanished  gods  to  me  appear; 
And  one  to  me  are  shame  and  fame. 

They  reckon  ill  who  leave  me  out; 
When  me  they  fly,  I  am  the  wings; 
I  am  the  doubter  and  the  doubt, 
And  I  the  hymn  the  Brahmin  sings. 

32  Cf.   Nature:   Over  Soul;  Spirit;  Add.  to  Div.   Students, 
July  15,  1838;  the  Transcendentalist. 
21 


l62  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

Sei^u^'  ^  3^-  Emerson  does  not  defend  himself  against  the 

charge  of  Pantheism.  That  such  is  the  trend  of  his 
teaching  cannot  be  gainsaid.  That  a  character  of  such 
singular  sweetness,  a  mind  of  such  delicacy  and  rich- 
ness, should  be  brought  under  the  sway  of  this  teach- 
ing is  in  part  due  to  the  intellectual  atmosphere  of  the 
time;  for  Transcendentalism  was  in  its  earliest  stages, 
a  reaction  of  the  whole  man  from  the  narrow  and  Puri- 
tanical sensism  which  prevailed  in  New^  England.  A 
deeper  and  more  cogent  reason  is  found  in  the  man's 
mind.  Emerson  was  not  a  consecutive  thinker.  He 
saw  beautiful  things  and  he  saw  deeply;  but  what  he 
presented  were  only  fragments.  He  never  showed  the 
least  desire  to  connect  these  parts  into  a  consecutive 
whole.  Hence  the  strange  disconnectedness  which  is 
seen  in  the  sequence  of  his  sentences.^^ 

Dr.  Royce.  §31.  Transcendental  philosophy  in  America  has 
passed  its  meridian.  It  has  died  a  natural  death.  Yet 
Emerson  has  left  an  influence  behind  him  in  his  writ- 
ings. Its  best  modern  representative  is  Dr.  Royce.^^ 
Dr.  Royce  proclaims  himself  an  idealist,  and  holds  that 
"  the  whole  choir  of  heaven  and  earth  "  is  nothing  for 
any  of  us  but  a  system  of  ideas  which  governs  our  be- 
lief and  conduct;  hence  we  never  get  beyond  our  own 
ideas,  because  all  minds  are  in  essence  one;  thus 
the  whole  world  of  ideas  is  essentially  one  world  and 
so  it  is  essentially  the  world  of  one's  self  and  That  art 
Thou. 

§  32.  Dr.  Royce  has  the  spirit  of  Fichte,  but  not 
his  teaching;  he  is  an  improvement  on  Fichte;  he 
starts    from    an    experimental    basis  and  appeals  for 

34  Cf.  Azarias  Phases  of  Thought  and  Criticism,  ch.  3. 

35  Cf.  Spirit  of  Modern  Philosophy,  ch.  XI. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  163 

proof  to  Berkeley.  But  Ficlite  and  Berkeley  are  fund- 
amentally opposed.  Fichte  is  a  pantheist,  Berkeley  a 
Christian;  to  Fichte  all  things  are  projections  of  the 
Ego;  to  Berkeley  external  objects  have  a  reality  in 
the  mind  of  God.  Hence  he  is  an  idealist  with  Berke- 
ley, yet  not  a  true  disciple;  he  avoids  the  vagaries  of 
Fichte,  yet  retains  his  Pantheism.  The  teaching  of  Dr. 
Royce  is  most  properly  term.ed  a  syncretism  of  the  best 
elements  of  Idealistic  Pantheism  put  into  the  most 
natural  and  strongest  form.  He  admits  a  universal 
mind  with  Schelling;  in  setting  forth  the  relation  of 
our  minds  to  the  universal  mind,  he  is  a  Vedantist  and 
a  disciple  of  Sankara,  without  however  the  spectre  of 
transmigration.  Unlike  Hegel,  he  contends  that  the 
higher  self  is  personal  and  conscious;  nor  does  he  fall 
into  the  strange  contradictions  of  that  philosopher.  In 
the  definition  of  matter  as  a  "  permanent  possibiHty  of 
sensation,"  he  is  a  phenomenal  Idealist  with  J.  S.  Mill. 

§  33.  Such  is  a  .brief  sketch  of  Transcendentahsm  in  "ents.^*'' 
our  own  country.  The  influence  and  trend  of  thought 
was  pantheistic;  although  not  all  those  wdio  came  un- 
der its  sway  can  be  charged  with  Pantheism.  Its 
antagonists  were  strong  and  powerful.  Dr.  Porter,  of 
Yale,  set  forth  the  best  of  Trendelenberg,  who  in  Ger- 
many led  a  reaction  to  Aristotle  in  the  effort  to  recon- 
struct German  philosophy  demoralized  by  the  failure 
of  Hegel.  Prof.  Ladd  is  the  disciple  of  Lotze,  the  last 
of  the  German  metaphysicians;  Prof.  James  is  of  the 
materiaHstic  school;  and  Dr.  McCosh,  of  Princeton, 
was  the  last  and  most  consistent  thinker  of  the  Scottish 
School  which  for  a  century  in  England,  in  France  and 
in  America,  withstood  the  philosophy  of  Sensism. 


164  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


III. 

The  Neo-Hbgelian  School. 
Origin.  g  24.  A  sketch  of  modern  Pantheism  would  not  be 

complete  without  a  reference  to  the  Neo-Kantian  or 
Neo-Hegelian  school.  The  cry,  "  Back  to  Kant," 
raised  by  Beneke,  Zeller  and  Fisher  in  Germany,  was 
taken  up  in  England  and  America.^^  The  aim  was  to 
stem  the  tide  of  scientific  materialism  and  agnosticism. 
In  England,  J.  H.  Sterling  was  the  pioneer  in  his  ''Se- 
cret of  Hegel,"  1865.  He  was  foUov/ed  by  J.  Caird, 
"  Introd.  to  Philosophy  of  ReHgion,"  1880;  Ed.  Caird, 
"  Crit.  Philosophy  of  Kant,"  2  vols.,  1889;  "  Evolution 
of  Religion,"  1893;  Green,"Prolegom.  to  Ethics,"  1887; 
"  Outlines  of  a  Philosophy  of  Religion,"  by  A.  Saba- 
tier,  1897;  by  Wallace,  Bradley  and  Adamson.^^  In 
America  the  movement  is  carried  on  by  W.  T.  Harris, 
U.  S.  Com.  of  Education;  C.  Everett,  G.  Morris,  G. 
Howison,  Stanley  Hall,  J.  Watson.^^  In  Germany  the 
Neo-Kantian  influence  is  seen  in  the  Ritschlin  school; 
the  Neo-Hegelian  in  Pfleiderer.  The  distinctive  mark 
of  the  latter  is  the  theory  of  development,  the  To  iieri  of 
Hegel.  In  England  and  America  the  line  of  demark- 
ation  is  not  drawn;  hence  we  have  a  school  which  is 
by  different  writers  called  now  by  one,  again  by  the 
other  title.2^ 
g'^^enits  §  2iS'  The  Neo-Hegelian  school  is  called  an  Idealistic 
representa-  reaction.     It  has  been  charged,  and  with  good  reason, 

"^  Cf.  F.  E.  Beneke,  by  Francis  Brandt. 

37  Cf.  Courtney  Studies  in  Phil.,  ch.  IX. 

38  Cf.  Phil,  in  United  States,  by  S.  Hall,  in  Mind,  vol.  IV, 
p.  89. 

39  Ed.  Caird's  "Crit.  Phil,  of  Kant,"  is  considered  "a 
transliteration  of  Kant,  as  seen  in  the  light  of  Hegelianism," 
cf.  Scottish  Review,  1890,  vol.  XVI,  pp.  68,  91. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  "  165 

with  Pantheism.  The  leader  of  the  movement  is  Mr. 
T.  H.  Green.  A  criticism  of  his  teaching  will  furnish 
a  conception  of  the  new  doctrine  and  of  its  tendency. 
Prof.  Green  draws  from  both  Kant  and  Hegel.  His 
fundamental  position  and  claim  on  his  followers  is  his 
transformation  of  Kant's  theory  of  knowledge  into  a 
metaphysic  of  existence.^*^  Green  identifies  the  self 
which  the  theory  of  knowledge  reveals  —  the  single, 
active,  self-conscious  principle  —  with  the  universal  or 
divine  self-consciousness,  the  one,  eternal,  divine  sub- 
ject to  which  the  universe  is  relative.  Hence  con- 
sciousness has  a  double  character,  unity  and  manifold; 
as  a  unity  it  is  eternal,  all-conditioning,  an  end  realiz- 
ing itself  in  and  through  the  manifold;  as  manifold  it 
is  subject  to  change,  conditioned  and  is  a  means  to  an 
end.  The  eternal  consciousness  is  manifested  in  the 
individual  as'  a  "  forecasting  idea."  ^^ 

§36.  Criticism:  The  teaching  of  Mr.  Green  is  an  Panthe- 
idealistic  Pantheism  based  on  Kant  and  Hegel.  He 
takes  the  notion  of  knowledge  for  the  real  Knower. 
Since  the  form  of  knowledge  is  one,  he  infers  that  one 
subject  alone  sustains  the  w^orld  and  is  the  real  Knower. 
This  knower  is  manifested  in  human  consciousness. 
Hence  consciousness,  human  and  divine,  is  unified  in 
one  self.  With  justice,  therefore,  Prof.  Seth  and  Mr. 
A.  Balfour  contend  that  Prof.  Green's  teaching  is  a 
thorough-going  Pantheism.^^  Prof.  Seth  holds  that 
the  reaction  to  Hegel  is  only  transitory,  that  it  is  not 

40  Cf.   Philos.   of  T.  Green,  by  W.   Fairbrother,  p.   157. 

41  Cf.  Green  Proleg.  182,  Burt  Hist,  of  Mod.  Phil.,  vol. 
II,  S.  166. 

42  Cf.  Prof.  Seth  Hegelianism  and  Personality,  p.  215;  A. 
Balfour  in  Mind,  Jan.,  1884,  Oct.,  1893;  nevertheless  Prof. 
Seth  is  not  free  from  criticism;  for  his  peculiar  Panthei-sm 
cf.  Some  Current  Conceptions  of  Self,  by  Prof.  John  Dewey, 
in  Mind,  1890,  vol.  XV. 


l66  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

satisfying.*^  Mr.  Balfour  says  the  English  mind  can 
never  be  the  home  of  such  a  philosophy.**  Hence  we 
have  an  explanation  of  the  efforts,  also  unsatisfactory, 
at  a  speculative  Theism,  as  illustrated  by  Mr.  Balfour 
in  '*  Foundations  of  Belief,"  by  Martineau  in  ''  Study 
of  Religion."  '^ 

IV. 
Criticism. 
§  34.  It  is  not  necessary  to  take  up  and  refute  one 
after  another  the  different  forms  of  Pantheism.     In  all 
forms  it  is  essentially  the  same  whether  it  be  Spinoza's 
Substance,  or  Fichte's    Ego,  or    Schelling's    Absolute, 
Hegel's  Idea,  Schoppenhauer's  Will,  Hartmann's  Un- 
conscious,    They  have  one  element  in  common  —  the 
denial  of  the  true  nature  of  the  soul.     In  this  point  they 
are  a  standing  objection  to  our  hue  of  thought. 
c?sm"rom        §  35-  W  ^^  Pantheism  human  individuality  is  de- 
sonaut/.^^"  stroyed.     But  the  testimony  of  consciousness    is    ex- 
plicit and  irrefutable.     It  tells  me  that  I  am  myself  and 
not  another.     There  is  an  abyss  between  you  and  me; 
no  fiction  of  the  imagination  can  make  us  one  and  the 
same.     Again  consciousness  bears  witness  to  our  per- 
sonality.    This  incontrovertible  and  elementary  fact  of 
human  experience  lies  at  the  basis  of  our  individual 
and  social  life.     I  am  not  only  an  individual,  but  I  am 
sid  juris:  the  responsible  agent  of  my  actions. 
thlmS^  §  36.  (b)  Pantheism  controverts  the  first  principles 

of  reascm.   o^  reason.     The  Principle  of  contradiction  affirms  that 

43  Cf.  ib.,  p.  349. 

44  Cf.   Foundations  of  Belief,  p.   2,  ch.  2. 

45  Falckenberg  concludes  his  History  of  Phil,  with  these 
words:  "The  revival  of  Fichto-Hegelian  Idealism  by  means 
of  a  method  which  shall  do  justice  to  the  demands  of  the 
time  by  a  closer  adherence  to  experience,  by  making  gen- 
eral use  of  both  the  material  and  the  mental  sciences,  and 
by  an  exact  and  cautious  mode  of  argument  seems  to  us  to 
be  the  task  of  the  future,"  p.  632. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  !  167 

the  same  thing  cannot  be  and  not  be  at  the  same  time. 
With  Pantheists,  however,  we  must  hold  that  being  is 
one  and  absolute,  yet  constantly  changing;  that  it  is 
and  yet  not  is.  It  is  one  so  long  as  it  is  a  potency  to 
become  all  things ;  in  becoming  all  things  its  unity  dis- 
appears. It  is  one  while  it  remains  vague  and  indefi- 
nite; in  becoming  definite  and  concrete,  it  is  no  longer 
one,  but  many. 

§  ^7.  (c)  This    one    being:    of    Pantheists    is    either  (c)  ad 

"  ^'      ^   ''  o  hommem. 

material  or  immaterial,  not  the  former,  for  my 
soul  is  immaterial,  otherwise  Psychology  would  not 
be  a  distinct  science;  not  the  latter,  for  my  body  is 
material,  otherwise  I  should  be  compelled  to  deny 
Physiology  and  the  Physical  sciences:  it  cannot  be 
both,  because  the  properties  of  the  material  and  of 
the  immaterial  are  contradictory. 

§  38.  (d)  Pantheism  saps  the  foundations  of  (d^  its 
morality.  The  principles  of  morality  suppose  a 
subordination  of  persons  for  the  existence  and 
efficacy  of  a  law.  Hence  the  superior  commanding; 
the  inferior  obeying;  the  bonds  of  intelligence  and  of 
free-will,  the  sanction  upon  its  proper  fulfillment  —  all 
conducive  to  the  formation  of  a  sound  social  organism, 
whether  it  be  of  the  family,  of  the  state,  or  of  the 
church.  But  Pantheism  makes  subordination  a  fic- 
tion, denies  liberty  of  will  and  responsibility.  Again 
according  to  Pantheism,  every  thought  and  action 
springs  from  and  is  a  manifestation  of  the  eternal 
Divine  energy;  in  this  case,  how  make  a  distinction 
between  good  and  evil?  The  acts  of  the  thief  and  mur- 
derer, as  well  as  those  of  the  wise  and  good,  are  divine. 

§  39.  Finally  it  is  repugnant  to  common  sense  to  sup-  ^l^nJ^^o"^" 
pose  that  I  am  one  and  the  same  being  with  the  brute,  f°?£ 
the  tree,  the  stone. 


SOUL  AND  BODY. 

existence         §  I.  The  existence  of  the  soul  was  proved  to  a  cer- 
fact.  tamty  by  the  voice  of  consciousness.    The  method  fol- 

lowed was  experimental.  We  dealt  with  a  fact, 
through  the  medium  of  testimony.  Then  by  a  process 
of  reasoning  from  data  the  nature  of  the  soul  as  a 
spiritual  being  was  set  forth.  In  its  essence  and  in  its 
activities  the  soul  of  man  is  totally  dif¥erent  from 
matter.^ 
existence  §  2.  It  is  a  fact  also,  the  knowledge  of  which  conies 
fact?  ^^  through  consciousness,  that  we  have  a  material  body. 
Science  has  shown  that  the  material  elements  of  our 
body  are  of  the  same  nature  as  the  elements  found  in 
the  world  about  us.  These  elements  enter  into  our 
intimate  constitution  and  form  a  part  of  our  human 


em. 


the  prob-  §  3.  The  problem  that  now  faces  us  is  a  most  difH- 
cult  one.  How  explain  the  existence  in  man  of  soul 
and  body  so  diverse  and  apparently  antagonistic,  and 
at  the  same  time  account  for  the  harmony  of  action 
and  the  unity  of  the  organism?  This  unity  in  diver- 
sity lies  at  the  basis  of  our  conscious  existence.  It 
antecedes  all  experience.  It  is  evident  to  the  un- 
learned; the  young  child  not  yet  attained  the  use  of 
reason,  supposes  it;  the  thoughtful  student  pauses  be- 
fore it  as  one  of  the  deepest  questions  of  human  life. 

§4.  The  greatest  philosophers  of  histor}^  have  at- 
tempted to  elucidate  this  question,     ^"arious    are   the 

1  S.  Aug.  de  quant,  an.  n.  2. 

2  August  serni.  150,  n.  5. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  169 

solutions  proposed.  We  shall  now  classify  and  sub- 
ject them  to  a  brief  criticism.  That  hypothesis  or  ex- 
planation shall  be  considered  the  best  which  shall  best 
account  for  the  following  facts:  (i)  the  real  existence 
of  the  soul;  (2)  the  real  existence  of  the  body;  (3)  their 
opposition  and  mutual  dependence. 

I. 

Theory  op  Exaggerated  Spiritualism. 

§  5.  Led  on  by  a  mistaken  zeal  to  render  the  spirit-  J/^ted^ 
uality  of  the  soul  secure  against  the  assaults  of  Mater- 
iaHsm,  some  philosophers  denied  the  possibility  of 
body  acting  on  spirit  or  of  spirit  acting  on  body,  and, 
therefore,  there  is  no  real  but  only  an  apparent  union 
of  soul  and  body.  The  reasons  alleged  in  support  of 
this  theory  are  purely  a  priori.  From  the  known  prop- 
erties of  spirit  and  matter  so  antagonistic  to  each  other, 
they  infer  that  there  is  no  possible  union  between 
them. 

1°.  Des  Cartes. 

§6.  (1°)  The  opinion  was  first  proposed  by  Des  Des  Cartes. 
Cartes.  He  taught  that  body  and  soul  are  both  com- 
plete and  perfect  substances.  This  is  the  basis  of  his 
reasoning,  and  is  drawn  from  Plato.^  Des  Cartes,  how- 
ever, goes  much  farther.  He  maintained  that  the 
essence  of  the  entire  man  was  the  soul  alone  ;^  that  the 
soul  was  by  its  nature  spiritual,  and  as  such  completely 
independent  of  the  body.  But  how  account  for  the 
belief  that  the  soul  exerts  an  influence  upon  the  body 
and  vice  versa?  This  influence,  he  says,  of  one  upon 
the  other,  is  not  real;  it  appears  so  to  us;  therefore, 

^  Cf.  Alcibiades  and  Phaedo. 

^  Man  is  a  unit,  formed  of  both  body  and  soul;  cf.  Augus- 
tine de  Immort.  An.  c.  15;  de  Mor.  Ecc.  I,  c.  4. 
22 


170 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


Sstancef"  <^eceived  by  appearance,  we  believe  in  its  reality.  The 
true  explanation  he  finds  in  God.  Thus,  when  I  have 
an  idea  in  my  mind,  e.  g.,  to  move  my  arm,  God  inter- 
feres and  directly  moves  the  arm.  The  act  of  the  will, 
i.  e.,  to  move  the  arm,  is,  therefore,  not  the  real  cause 
of  the  bodily  movement,  but  only  the  occasion.  God 
is  the  sole,  immediate,  and  direct  cause  of  all  my  bodily 
movements.  His  activity  is  exerted  upon  the  occasion 
of  ideas  or  of  resolves  in  my  mind.  The  same  is  true 
of  the  influence  of  body  upon  the  soul.  The  influence 
is  only  apparent.  The  act  of  the  body  is  the  occasion, 
not  the  cause.  God  alone  is  the  cause.  This  theory  is 
called  the  theory  of  *' Divine  Assistance,"  or  of  ''Occas- 
ional Causes,"  and  is  proposed  by  Des  Cartes  in  his 
Medit.,  VI,  §  8. 


occasional 
cause. 


Pre-estab- 
lished. 
Harmony. 


2°.  Malehranche. 

§  7.  Malebranche  developed  more  fully  the  doctrine 
of  Des  Cartes.  He  denies  that  the  will  can  move  a 
member  of  the  body,  because  there  is  no  relation  be- 
tw^een  things  so  different.  The  will  is  powerless  of 
itself  to  influence  any  bodily  movements;  but  it  can 
determine  the  will  of  God,  who  thereupon  produces  the 
effect.  He  denies  that  we  can  have  a  clear  concep- 
tion of  a  causal  influence  of  soul  and  body  or  vice 
versa.  Thus,  therefore,  reason  and  reflection  show 
that  the  belief  cannot  be  held.^  To  this  opinion  Mr. 
Reid  seems  to  incline.  Mr.  Stewart  expressly  pro- 
poses it.^ 

3°.  Leibnitz. 

Leibnitz  started  from  the  principle  of  Des  Cartes 
that  no  interaction  can  take  place  between  matter  and 


5  Cf.  Malebranche     Recherche  de  la  Verite,  1.  6,  p.  2,  c. 

6  Cf.  Hamilton  Metaphys.,  L.  XVI. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  I7I 

Spirit.  To  account  for  what  was  called  the  apparent 
union  of  body  and  soul,  he  developed  a  theory  which 
has  become  famous  under  the  title  of  "  Pre-established 
Harmony."  He  reproached  Des  Cartes  for  degrading 
God  by  comparing  Him  to  a  watchmaker  who,  having 
made  a  clock,  is  still  obHged  to  turn  the  hands.  A 
skillful  workman,  he  says,  would  make  it  so  that  it 
could  work  itself  without  assistance.  He  holds  that  the 
soul  and  the  body  are  entirely  separated;  that  the 
soul's  acts  succeed  one  another  and  form  a  series;  that 
the  acts  of  the  body  form  another  series ;  that  between 
these  two  series  there  is  no  interaction.  But  God  in 
the  beginning  foresaw  what  the  actions  would  be,  and 
established  a  harmony  between  the  one  and  the  other. 
Thus  the  soul  and  body  can  be  compared  to  two 
watches,  which  were  regulated  and  wound  up.  In 
both  the  minute  and  the  hour  hands  point  to  the  same 
identical  place;  but  one  watch  goes  entirely  independ- 
ent of  the  other;  the  spring  w^hich  gives  motion  to  one 
is  not  the  same  as  that  which  gives  motion  to  the 
other.^ 

§  8.  The  fundamental  error  on  which  these  various  Criticism 

^  ^  ^  (1)  from 

expositions  have  been  raised  is  the  doctrine  of  occas-  nature  of 

^  ^       cause. 

ional  causes.  That  we  have  a  true  and  real  causal  in- 
fluence on  limbs  of  our  body  and  on  external  objects 
is  evident  from  consciousness  and  from  daily  expe- 
rience. I  am  conscious  of  the  influence  of  will  on  my 
body,  e.  g.,  that  I  walk,  speak,  write,  etc.  So,  too,  I 
am  conscious  that  external  agents  afifect  me  as  causes, 
ex.  gr.,  a  blow  from  another,  etc.  The  notion  of  cause 
is  real.  If  I  deny  the  true  conception  of  causality,  I 
should  do  violence  to  the  voice  of  consciousness.   This 

^Cf.  Leibnitz  Monadol,  s.  50,  Theod.,  s.  62;  Wolff  Psych. 
Rationalis  s.  3,  s.  13. 


172  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

conception  of  cause  is  at  the  basis  of  all  experimenta- 
tion in  the  physical  sciences.  I  reason  from  effect  to 
cause,  from  properties  to  substance,  with  a  view  to 
obtain  and  formulate  the  laws  which  rule  the  inter- 
action of  physical  agents.^  If,  therefore,  there  is  a  real 
causal  efficiency  in  created  things,  I  have  no  basis  for 
the  theory  of  Occasional  Causes.  It,  therefore,  be- 
comes a  gratuitous  hypothesis, 
basis^isan  .  §9*  Again,  Des  Cartes  argues  a  priori.  Because 
Son^,^^'  spirit  and  matter  have  contradictory  properties  he  in- 
fers that  there  can  be  no  union  between  them.  But 
this  position  is  contrar}^  to  fact.  The  union  of  body 
and  of  soul  is  a  fact.  Thus,  his  starting  point  was  an 
ideal  difficulty, 
conse-"^^*^  §  10.  Finally,  the  attempt"  to  save  the  spirituality  of 
qiiences.  ^^  g^^j  j^y  exaggerating  the  concept  of  spirit  met 
with  disastrous  failure.  The  very  opposite  was  the 
result.  The  explanation  was  artificial  and  mechanical; 
it  was  adverse  to  the  testimony  of  consciousness,  to  the 
dictates  of  common  sense.  Therefore,  time  only  was 
needed  for  its  downfall.  The  protest  came  in  the  form 
of  a  Materialistic  philosophy  which  spread  and  pre- 
vailed in  France  during  the  eighteenth  century.^  It 
was  in  aim  a  vindication  of  our  bodily  existence  and 
activities,  but  erred  by  reacting  to  an  extreme. 

II: 

Theory  of  Accidental  Union. 
§  II.  Plato  is  considered  the  parent  of  this  theory. 
He  maintained  that  the  soul  was  in  the  body  after  the 
same  manner  as  a  pilot  was  in  a  ship  or  a  man  was  on 

8Cf.  St.  Thomas  C.  Gent.  L.  Ill,  c.  6g;  Rickaby  General 
Metaphysics,  chap.  Causation. 
9  E.  g.  D'Holbach,  De  la  Mettrie. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  I73 

a  horse.^°  Thus,  the  soul,  by  using  the  body,  was 
united  to  it.  The  union,  therefore,  consisted  in  the 
mutual  action  of  body  upon  soul*  and  of  soul  upon 
body.  To  him  the  body  is  a  prison  in  which  the  soul 
is  confined  for  some  crime  committed  in  a  state  of 
existence  prior  to  the  present.  Thus,  his  theory  of  the 
union  of  body  and  soul  supposes  the  false  and  aban- 
doned doctrine  of  the  pre-existence  of  souls.^^ 

2°.  Locke. 
§  12.  The  opinion  of  Plato  was  proposed  by  Locke  Locke. 
in  his  essay  on  the  Human  Understanding.^^  With 
Plato  he  held  that  the  body  and  the  soul  were  two 
complete  and  perfect  substances;  that  they  were  united 
into  one  human  composite  by  the  mutual  influence  of 
one  upon  the  other.  The  soul  possesses  the  power  of 
thinking  and  of  motion,  and  by  acting  upon  the  body 
determines  the  movements  of  the  body.  So,  likewise, 
body,  by  acting  upon  the  soul,  determines  it  to  per- 
ceive external  objects.  Hence,  a  physical  efficiency  of 
one  upon  the  other  whence  resulted  their  union.  In 
our  own  time  this  opinion  prevails  among  those  who 
champion  a  spiritualistic  philosophy  against  the  per- 
nicious doctrines  of  a  materialistic  science. 

3°.  Lotze. 
§  13.  Lotze  rejects  the  contention  that  a  bond  is  nee-  ^otze. 
essary  to  explain  the  reciprocal .  action  of  body  and 

1"  Dr.  E.  Hamilton,  professor  of  Mental  Philosophy  in 
Hamilton  College,  says  that  "  the  soul  is  in  the  bodv  lil<;e  a 
diver  incased  in  strange  armor."  Cf.  his  Mental  Science, 
p.  48. 

11  Cf.  Alcibiades  and  Phaedo;  St.  Thomas  C.  Gentes,  1.  2, 
c.  57;  Summa  Theol.,  i  q.  76,  a.  3.  c. 

12  BH.  ch.  23,  n.  28,  29. 


174 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


soul.  Bonds,  he  says,  are  needed  to  unite  things  which 
do  not  of  themselves  act  on  each  other.  The  bond  has 
its  binding  power  because  its  parts  are  attached 
to  each  other.  We  cannot  be  always  explaining 
this  fact  by  postulating  new  bonds,  but  in  the 
last  analysis  must  admit  an  immediate  reciprocal 
action  of  the  elements.  Hence  "the  definite  forms. in 
which  the  body  would  act  on  the  soul,  and  the  soul  on 
it,  would  by  no  m.eans  proceed  from  the  bare  concep- 
tion of  the  aforesaid  bond,  but  only  from  the  specific 
natures  of  the  two  elements  bound  together,  and  of 
their  obligation  to  reciprocal  action."  He  concludes 
as  follows:  "  Instead  of  one  such  vain  bond,  we  assert 
that  the  two  are  connected  by  very  many  peculiarly 
conistituted  bonds;  each  reciprocal  action  to  which 
they  are  by  their  natures  necessitated,  is  such  a  bond 
which  holds  them  tOR-ether.''^^ 


Ladd. 


'  4°.  Ladd. 
§  14.  Prof.  Ladd  also  holds  that  the  relations  of  mind 
and  body  are  those  of  causation.  It  is  true,  as  he  pro- 
ceeds to  explain,  that  our  first  perception  of  the  true 
nature  of  causation  springs  from  the  inner  experience 
of  mind  acting  upon  body.  Nevertheless,  we  hold  that 
their  union  does  not  consist  in  causation;  rather  causa- 
tion is  the  result  of  their  union.-^^ 


Rosmini . 


5°.  Rosmini. 
§  15.  Closely  akin  to  the  doctrine  of  physical  inter- 
action is  that  proposed   by   Rosmini.     He   maintains 
that  body  and  soul  are  united  by  the  mutual  action  of 


13  Cf.   Lotze  Elements  of  Psychology,  ed.  by  Prof,   Ladd, 
pp.  loi,  102;  Microcos,  vol.  I,  b.  3,  c.  4. 

14  Cf.  Ladd  Philosophy  of  Mind,  p.  258. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  I75 

one  upon  the  other,  but  explains  the  nature  of  the  ac- 
tion after  a  different  manner.  The  soul,  he  says,  is 
both  sensitive  and  rational.  The  sensitive  soul  is 
united  to  the  body  by  the  fact  that  it  feels  the  body 
through  a  certain  fundamental  sense.  Thus  the  union 
consists  in  this  fundamental  feeling,  which  is  consid- 
ered as  a  subjective  modification.  The  rational  soul  is 
united  to  the  body  because  it  has  an  intellectual  per- 
ception of  this  feeling.  This  perception  is  innate  and 
enduring  and  thus  forms  the  medium  by  which  body 
and  soul  are  united. 

§  16.  The  theory  of  mutual  interaction  is  much  more  Criticism, 
plausible  than  that    of    exaggerated    spirituaHsm.     It 
admits  the  distinction  of  the  two  substances  and  main- 
tains the  action  of  one  upon  the  other.     But  it  is  not 
a  satisfactory  explanation.     It  states  a  fact  simply,  but  ^e  state- 
makes  no  attempt  to  account  for  the  fact.     The  fact  fact,  not 

^  _  its  explan- 

that  soul  acts  on  body  is  not  the  cause  of  their  union,  ation. 
It  is  rather  the  effect.  How  can  reciprocal  action  ex- 
plain the  growth  and  development  of  the  organism,  the 
gradual  putting  forth  of  mental  powers?  Why,  in  this 
hypothesis,  should  not  the  inteUigence  be  keen  and 
alert  in  infancy?  Why  should  the  powers  of  the  soul 
gradually  manifest  themselves  as  the  body  becomes 
stronger?  Mere  reciprocal  action  cannot  explain 
these  patent  facts.  Furthermore  reciprocal  action 
cannot  explain  the  close  intimate  union  of  soul  and 
body.  There  is,  so  to  say,  a  certain  result  in  one  sub- 
stantial composite.  The  fact  that  the  one  acts  upon 
the  other  is  not  an  explanation  of  that  intimate  union. 
Reciprocal  action  cannot  hold  them  together.  It  is  a 
fact,  evident  from  individual  experience  that  the  soul 
striveth  against  the  body  and  the  body  against  the 
soul.     Why  in  that  case  should  they  not  separate?     If 


176 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


reciprocal  action  be  the  only  bond  of  union,  they  would 
certainly  part  company.  Hence  we  must  admit  a 
closer  and  more  intimate  union  than  reciprocal  action, 
a  union  by  which  one  substantial  composite  is  found, 
and  which  makes  reciprocal  action  possible. 


Dualism 
and  mon- 
ism. 


materialis- 
tic and 
Idealistic 
monism. 


Scientific 
monism. 


its  history 
and  de- 
fenders. 


III. 

The  Monistic  Theory. 

§  17.  The  theories  proposed  considered  the  soul  and 
body  as  two  distinct  substances.  They  differed  only 
in  the  attempt  to  explain  their  union.  Hence  we  may 
call  them  different  presentations  of  DuaHsm.  Others, 
however,  deny  the  duality  of  substances.  Among 
these  some  contend  that  the  physical  series  can  account 
for  the  mental;  to  them  mind  is  but  a  function  of  the 
brain,  ex.  gr.,  Materialists  with  Huxley.  Others  hold 
that  mind  is  the  only  substance;  thus  to  Berkeley  ex- 
ternal things  are  the  product  of  the  imagination;  to 
Schoppenhauer  the  w^orld  is  a  representation. 

§  18.  Finally  others  deny  these  suppositions.  To 
them  the  mental  and  physical  are  manifestations  or 
different  "  aspects,"  or  "  phases,"  or  "  sides,"  or 
''  faces "  of  the  same  reality.  This  is  called  the 
Double-Aspect  theory.  Its  influence  to-day  is  very 
great,  its  defenders  are  learned  and  powerful,  and 
therefore  calls  for  special  consideration. 

§  19.  The  Double-Aspect  theory  can  be  traced  to 
Spinoza.  It  is  the  logical  consequence  of  his  doctrine. 
Spinoza  held  that  there  was  only  one  Substance,  which 
was  infinite  and  self-determined.  This  one  substance 
manifests  itself  in  two  known  ways :  the  world  of  mat- 
ter and  the  world  of  thought.  Thus  two  parallel  or- 
ders exist,  mutually  independent,  yet  expressions  of 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  177 

the  one  substance  which  is  God}^  Now  if,  in  place  of 
God,  we  put  the  "  unknowable  "  of  Mr.  Spencer,  or 
the  ''  InexpHcable  "  of  Mr.  Romanes,  we  have  the  mod- 
ern form  of  Spinoza's  Pantheism  which  has  pervaded 
current  English  thought.  Its  teachers  are  Mr.  Spen- 
cer,i6  Bain,!^  G.  Lewes,i«  Prof.  Clifford,i^  Ferrier,^** 
Hofifding,^^  Fechner,^^  Huxley.^^ 

§  20.  The  reason  given  for  this  theory  is  the  sup-  its  reasons 
posed  impossibility  of  mind  acting  on  body  or  of  body 
acting  on  mind.     Mr.  Romanes  dismisses  with  con-  interaction 
tempt  the  hypothesis  of  causality  acting  from  nervous  andbody. 
structure  to  mental  processes.     He  says  that  it  does 
violence  to  our  faculty  of  reason  and  to  our  very  idea 
of  causation ;  that  in  this  case  there  is  no  perceived 
equivalency  between  causes  and  effect.     To  him  also 
mental  changes  cannot  cause  physical  changes;  such 
a  hypothesis  is  contrary  to  the  law  of  the  conservation 
of  energy.     Therefore  there  is  no  interaction.^* 

§  21.  At  the  same  time  they  were  forced  to  explain  (2)  J^^ 
the  testimony  of   consciousness   that   there    are   two  there  are '  ■ 

•^  two  classes 

classes  of  facts,  viz.,  mental  and  physical.^    The  solu-  o«  v^^-    ^ 

'  '  -^    •'  nomena. 

15  Cf.  Spinoza,  p.  XXXII. 

16  Cf.  First  Principles,  Psychology. 

17  Cf.  Mind  and  Body. 

1^  Cf.  Physical  Basis  of  Life,  p.  341;  Problems  of  Life  and 
Mind. 
1^  Cf.  Seeing  and  Thinking. 

20  Functions  of  the  brain,  §  88. 

21  Cf.  Outlines  of  Psychology. 

22  Cf.  Ladd,  Philosophy  of  Mind,  p.  262. 

23  "  On  Hypothesis  that  animals  are  automata." 

24  Cf.  Romanes  "  Fallacies  of  Materialism,"  Contemp.  Rev., 
vol.  XII;  cf.  Hoffding  Outlines  of  Psychology,  p.  64;  Bain, 
Mind  and  Body,  p.  160;  for  opposite  view  cf.  Ladd  in  Physiol. 
Psychology.  In  the  following  chapter  the  objection  drawn 
from  the  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy  will  be  answered. 

25  For  distinction  of  the  two  orders,  physical  and  mental, 
cf.  Clifford  "  Seeing  and  Thinking,"  p.  87;  "  Lectures  and 
Essays,"  II,  p.  35;  Huxley  "  Science  and  Culture,"  p.  260. 

23 


178 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


tempt  at 

reconcilia 

tion. 


tion  adopted  was  an  attempt  at  conciliation.  They 
admitted  the  distinction  of  the  mental  and  physical 
S^an*at^-°^^  Only  as  aspects  of  one  unknown  substance.  Hence 
there  are  two  corresponding  sets  of  phenomena  which 
are  simultaneously  unfolded  each  according  to  its  own 
laws.  Hence  there  is  a  parallelism  and  a  proportionality 
between  mind  and  the  cerebral  motions  of  the  brain. 
But  this  supposes  an  identity  at  the  bottom.  The  dif- 
ferences, we  are  conscious  of,  show  that  this  one  prin- 
ciple has  found  expression  in  a  double  form.  Thus 
what  inner  experience  reveals  as  thought  or  feeling, 
is  represented  in  the  material  world  by  certain  cerebral 
activities.  It  is  the  expression  of  the  same  thing  in 
two  languages.  In  this  explanation  they  hold  that 
the  law  of  conservation  of  energy  would  remain  intact; 
for  it  would  be  applied  to  and  would  rule  the  cerebral 
processes.^ 

Different  Forms. 
§  22.  This  theory  has  been  proposed  in  different 
forms.  We  shall  briefly  present  the  most  important. 
(i°)  Prof.  Clifford  is  an  authoritative  exponent  of  the 
''Mind  Dust"  theory .^^  Prof.  Clififord  holds  that 
what  we  perceive  as  matter  is  in  reality  mind-stufif. 
Every  molecule  of  inorganic  matter  possesses  an  atom 
of  mind-stuff.  In  its  separated  elementary  condition 
there  is  no  mind  or  consciousness.  The  combination 
of  molecules  causes  a  combination  in  the  elements  of 
mind-stufif,  which  first  appears  in  the  faint  beginnings 
of  sentience.  When  this  combination  results  in  the 
complex  structure  of  the  brain  and  nervous-system, 


Its  differ- 
ent forms, 
(1°)  Prof. 
Clifford. 


"  mind 
stuff." 


26  Cf.  Hoflfding  Outlines  of  Psychol.,  p.  66. 

27  This  theory  was  proposed  by  Fick,  1862,  is  held  by  Taine 
"  IntelHgence  "  Bill;  cf.  Clifford  Lectures  and  Essays  II,  71; 
Prince,  Nature  of  Mind  and  Human  Antomatism. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  1/9 

the  elements  of  mind-stuff  combine  into  conscious 
thought  and  volition.  Prof.  Clifford,  therefore,  is  an 
evolutionist.  He  postulates  "  mind-dust  "  as  a  certain 
property  of  matter,  and  explains  the  evolution  of  intel- 
ligence from  lower  to  higher  forms  by  the  increasing 
complexity  in  which  the  material  elements  are 
combined.^ 

§  23.  (i)  What  is  this  "  mind-stuff?"  It  is  not  con-  gy^f^^^X 
scious  in  its  ultimate  analysis,  as  Prof.  Clifford  admits.  ^inJ4tuff. 
Then  it  must  be  unconscious.  Lewes  holds  that  the 
nerve-process  considered  in  its  most  general  form  of 
".rritability,  is  everywhere  conscious.  This  is  the  posi- 
tion of  Bain/^  and  in  a  modified  form,  of  Wundt. 
Others  contend  that  a  given  degree  of  development 
is  necessary  before  consciousness  is  found  at  all;  this 
is  the  theory  of  Maudsley,  James  and  Ferrier,  and  is 
generally  accepted.  "  Those  nervous  actions,"  writes 
Mr.  Bastian,^"  "  attended  by  conscious  states,  consti- 
tute in  reality  only  a  very  small  fraction  of  the  sum 
total  of  nerv'ous  states  or  actions."^^  Mr.  Morgan  con- 
siders man  as  "  the  self-conscious  outcome  of  an  activ- 
ity, selective  and  synthetic,  which  is  neither  energy  nor 
consciousness;  which  has  not  been  evolved,  but 
through  the  action  of  which  evolution  has  been  ren- 

^  "  Consciousness  is  only  the  flowering  of  mind,  and  be- 
low consciousness  there  is  an  unconscious  mind-substance 
out  of  which  consciousness  is  evolved.  In  its  higher  forms 
this  unconscious  mind-substance  is  correlative  with  nerve- 
force,  and  below  nerve-force  it  still  exists  correlated  with 
other  forms  of  force.  Hence  matter  is  everywhere  corre- 
lated with  atoms  of  mind-substance,  having  laws  exactly 
parallel  to  and  the  counterparts  of  material  laws.  Mind  and 
Matter,  a  double-faced  unity,"  Thomson  Psychology,  vol.  II, 
p.  186  sq. 

29  Cf.  Emotions  and  Will  appendix  A. 

30  In  Brain  as  Organ  of  Mind,  p.  145. 

31  Cf.  Baldwin  Handbook  of  Psychology  PHI,  ch.  II,  §  i. 


l80  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

dered  possible,  which  is  neither  subject  nor  object,  but 
underlies  and  is  common  to  both."  ^^  But  conscious 
mental  life  cannot  evolve  out  of  unconscious  elements. 
The  mistake  of  Prof.  Clifford  is  to  assume  that  our 
mental  states  are  compounds.  This  is  unwarranted 
and  controverted  by  conscious  experience.  Impres- 
sions should  not  be  confounded  with  sensations.  There 
may  be  a  combination  of  impressions  or  "  shocks/'  but 
there  is  no  compound  in  the  sensation  produced.  It 
may  have  different  sensations,  but  we  cannot  say  that 
one  sensation  as  such  is  made  up  of  different  elements. 
In  like  manner  the  "notion"  or  the  "judgment"  are 
indivisible;  they  are  not  compounds  of  elementary 
units.^^ 

absurdo.  §^4-  (^)  ^^  ^^^  "  mind-dust "  be  conscious,  why  is 
not  intelligence  manifested  in  all  material  objects?  In 
this  case  stone,  grass,  tree,  etc.,  all  should  show  signs 
of  mind.^* 

Tm"?'         §25.  (3)  M.  Romanes  rejects  this  explanation.    He 

Romanes,  considers  it  inadequate  to  explain  the  fundamental 
antithesis  between  subject  and  object.  If  by  "  subject," 
he  means  mind  in  one  sense  of  the  term,  and  by 
"object"  he  understands  matter;  we  can  readily  per- 
ceive that  the  "mind-dust"  theory  would  obliterate 
the  fundamental  antithesis  of  matter  and  mind.^^ 

2°  Bain.  §  26.  (2°)  Mr.  Bain  says  that  "  a  sentient  animal  has 

two  sides  or  aspects  of  its  being  —  the  one  all  matter, 
the  other  all  mind ;  that  the  doctrine  of  two  substances, 
one  material  the  other  immaterial,  is  now  in  course  of 

32  Cf.  Introd.  to  Comp.  Psych.,  p.  332. 

33  Cf.  Calderwood  "  Relations  of  Mind  and  Brain,"  p.  294, 
foil.;  Guthrie  Spencer's  Unification  of  Knowledge,  p.  231. 

3*  On  Double-Aspect  Theory  as  Hylozoic  Materialism,  cf. 
Prof.  Bowne  Introduction  to  Psychological  Theory,  p.  21  sq. 
35  Cf.  Contem.  Rev.,  vol.  XII. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  l8l 

being  modified  at  the  instance  of  modern  physiology; 
that,  in  company  with  all  our  mental  processes,  there  is 
an  unbroken  material  succession;  hence  no  rupture  of 
nervous  continuity.  He  infers  that  the  only  tenable 
supposition  is  that  mental  and  physical  proceed  to- 
gether as  "undivided  twins."  Thus  he  speaks  of  a 
** two-sided  cause,"  a  "two-sided  phenomenon,"  of 
"not  mind  causing  body  and  body  causing  mind,  but 
mind-body  giving  birth  to  mind-body,"  of  "  the  proper 
physical  fact  being  a  single,  one-sided  objective  fact;'* 
of  "  the  mental  fact  being  a  two-sided  fact."^^ 

§  27.  We  deny  that  matter  and  mind  are  two  "  sides  "  Criticism. 
or  "  aspects  "  of  the  same  one  thing,  if  by  this  is  meant 
the  denial  of  the  distinct  substances.  The  reasons  for 
the  distinction  of  the  substances  are  too  strong  to  be 
obliterated  after  this  fashion.^''  Modern  Physiology  has  . 
given  no  proofs,  as  Mr.  Bain  and  Lewes  contend, 
which  have  modified  the  doctrine  held  from  "  the  time 
of  Thomas  Aquinas  to  the  present  day."  If  by  an 
"  unbroken  material  succession  "  he  understands  the 
physical  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy,  the  reader 
is  referred  to  the  following  chapter  where  proof  is 
given  that  the  law  remains  intact.  The  phrases  "  un- 
divided turns ''  and  "  two-sided  cause  "  denote  strange 
confusion  of  thought.  Or  rather,  they  are  terms  in- 
vented to  cover,  under  an  apparently  scientific  form, 
the  difficulties  which  cannot  honestly  be  met.  It  seems 
strange  that  intelligent  men  would  go  to  such  lengths 
rather  than  admit  the  real  existence  of  a  soul,  which 
"seems  to  me,"  writes  Mr.  James,^^  "the  line  of  least 
logical  resistance,  so  far  as  we  have  yet  attained.'^ 

36  Cf.  Bain  Mind  and  Body,  ch.  VI. 

37  Cf.  Prof.  Bowne  Introduction  to  Psychological  Theory, 
p.  36. 

38  Psych.,  vol.  I,  p.   182. 


l82  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

8*  Spencer.  §  28.  (3°)  Mr.  Spencer  speaks  of  nervous  changes 
which  have  "subjective  aspects"  and  "objective  as- 
pects," of  "  feeUngs  as  the  subjective  sides  of  nervous 
changes/'^^  of  "  mind  and  nervous  action  as  the  sub- 
jective and  objective  faces  of  the  same  thing."  ^°  His 
inference  is :  "  This  brings  us  to  the  true  conclusion 
implied  throughout  the  foregoing  pages  —  the  conclu- 
sion that  it  is  the  one  and  the  same  ultimate  Reality 
which  is  manifested  to  us  subjectively  and  object- 
ively."^! 

Criticism.  ^29.  Mr.  Spencer  champions  the  evolutionary 
theory  of  mind^  He  explains  mind  by  the  correlation 
of  mechanical  forces.  Elsewhere  this  theory  is  put  to 
the  test  of  criticism.  At  present  his  views  on  the  rela- 
tions of  mind  and  of  matter  demand  our  attention. 

consStent.  §  3^-  ^i".  Spencer  speaks  of  "  feelings  as  subjective 
sides  of  nervous  changes ;  "  nevertheless,  a  little  farther 
on  he  says  that  "  the  distinction  of  subject  and  object  is 
itself  the  consciousness  of  a  difference  transcending  all 
other  dififerences/'  that  "a  unit  of  feeling  has  nothing  in 
common  with  a  unit  of  motion  becomes  more  than  ever 
manifest  when  we  bring  the  two  into  juxtaposition."^ 
§31.  Again,  why  should  we  not  hold  that  all  phe- 
nomena have  these  subjective  and  objective  sides. 
Finally,  there  "two  faces''  are  phenomena ;  as  such  they 
are  two  facts  or  two  things;  they  cannot,  therefore,  be 
merged  into  one.  Thus,  the  difficulty  is  not  solved  by 
calling  the  material  and  mental  "  two  faces ; "  it  is  only 
hidden  under  an  obscure  phraseology.*^ 

39  Prin.  of  Psych.,  vol.  I,  ch.  VI. 

40  lb.,  ch.  VII,  §  56. 

41  Vol.  I,  §  273.  Sully  speaks  of  the  "  subjective  "  and  "  ob- 
jective "  sides  of  attention,  cf.  Human  mind,  vol.  I,  pp.  I47r 
151. 

42  lb.,    vol.    I,    §   62. 

43  Cf.    Herbert    Modern    Realism    Examined,    §   12;   Mn 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  183 

Its  Arguments. 

§  32.  The  principal  arguments  which  are  advanced  ^^y^X 
in  support  of  the  "  Double- Aspect "  theory,  are:  ^^y- 
(a)  Physiology  shows  that  physical  and  mental  facts 
are  parallel.  It  is  assumed  that  there  is  a  recipro- 
cal correspondence  between  a  mental  state  and  a  neu- 
ral process.  But  this  is  not  and  cannot  be  proved. 
Even  if  we  grant  that  it  is  so,  we  would  have  no  ground 
to  infer  that  the  mental  state  is  merely  a  concomitant 
or  appendage  of  the  neural  changes. 

§  33.  (b)  Physics  shows,  through  the  law  of  the  con-  (b)  from 
servation  of  energy,  that  there  is  no  reciprocal  action  ^^^^^' 
of  mind  upon  body;  therefore,  this  hypothesis  seems 
better  fitted  to  answer  the  facts.  But,  we  answer  that 
the  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy  remains  intact. 
Reciprocal  action  of  body  upon  mind  does  not  inter- 
fere with  this  law,  as  we  shall  see.  Moreover,  indi- 
vidual experience  testifies  that  body  acts  upon  mind 
and  mind  upon  body. 

§  34.  (c)  The  hypothesis  of  evolution  necessitates  Jg^ory^^f 
this  explanation.  The  answer  is  made  that  the  theory  evolution, 
of  evolution  cannot  be  sustained.  Evolution  supposes 
a  gradual  passage  from  inorganic  nature  to  living  be- 
ings who  feel  and  think.  But  science  is  powerless  to 
solve  the  origin  of  life.  "  The  influence  of  animal  or 
vegetable  life  on  matter  is  infinitely  beyond  the  range 
of  any  scientific  inquiry  hitherto  entered  on.  Its  power 
of  directing  the  motions  of  moving  particles,  in  the 
demonstrated  daily  miracle  of  our  human  free-will,  and 
in  the  growth  of  generation  after  generation  of  plants 
frorh  a  single  seed,  are  infinitely  different  from  any 
possible  results  of  the  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms. 

Tyndall's  vacillating  position  is  stated  by  Mallock,  Is  Life 
Worth  Living,  p.  228. 


184  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

The  real  phenomena  of  Hfe  infinitely  transcend  human 
science.^*  If,  therefore,  evolution  is  powerless  to  solve 
the  problem  of  life,  how  can  it  expect  to  account  for 
thought? 

Consequences. 
structiveof  §  35-  W  According  to  this  theory  bodily  changes  and 
nowe  ge  j^gj^^g^j  States  go  on  in  parallel  series;  there  is  no  inter- 
action. The  result  is  that  I  am  unable  to  learn  your 
state  of  mind  from  your  actions.  The  flush  of  shame, 
the  heat  of  anger,  the  tears  of  sorrow  give  me  no  clue 
to  your  feelings.  Moreover  I  do  not  know  that  you 
have  a  mind,  for  how  can  I  infer  its  existence  from 
your  acts,  if  there  be  no  reciprocal  influence?  But 
this  is  against  consciousness  and  common  sense. 

lers 
absurd. 


hiito?^^'''      §36.  (b)  What  can  be 'said  of  the  achievements  of 


mind  in  the  past?  Mind  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
progress  of  civilization,  of  the  fine  arts,  or  of  literature. 
Man's  activity  consists  in  physical  or  neural  changes. 
Therefore,  if  the  original  elements  were  given,  the 
course  of  history  could  be  antecedently  determined. 
The  mind  is  only  the  subjective  aspect  of  these  changes, 
not  anything  distinct  in  itself.^^ 

IV. 

Scholastic  Theory. 

o?matt?r        §  37*  """^  ^^  ^  truth  of  physical  science  that  there  is  no 
and  force     matter  without  force,  and  no    force   without    matter. 

attested  by  '  _ 

observa^      This  is  a  simple  fact  attested  by  ordinary  observation, 
tion.  ^j^(j  confirmed  by  scientific  experiment.     It  is  a  truth 

^  Lord  Kelvin,  Fort.  Review,  Mar.,  1892. 

45  Cf.  St.  Thomas  S.  Th.  I,  q.  85,  a;;  3-  q.  69,  a.  8,  ad.  3;  i;  q. 
50,  a.  4,  ad.  2;  Prof.  Bowne  "  Metaphysics,  a  Study  of  First 
Principles,"  pp.  358,  376  sq.  Herbert,  Modern  Realism  Ex- 
amined, §  18.  ; 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  185 

which  obtains  throughout  the  visible  universe  from  the 
smallest  particle  of  inorganic  matter  to  the  highest 
forms  of  organized  existence.  Materialism  is  based  on 
this  truth ;  but  it  errs  in  giving  to  the  formula  "  no 
matter  without  force  "  universal  and  necessary  value, 
and  affirming  that  all  forces  are  of  a  material  nature. 
As  a  logical  consequence  it  denies  a  higher  world  of 
beings  than  the  material,  and  destroys  the  difiference 
in  nature  of  the  forces  which  enter  into  play  in  the  vis- 
ible world  about  us.  Scholastic  philosophy  avoids 
either  extreme.  It  takes  the  existence  of  matter  and 
of  force  as  facts,  but  draws  no  necessary  law  therefrom; 
it  affirms  that  all  forces  are  not  of  the  same  nature,  that 
we  must  make  a  distinction  between  physical,  vital, 
mental  forces. 

§  38.  The  fact  that  there  is  no  matter  without  force  t>yscien-  ^ 

^       ^   ^  tificexperi; 

in  the  visible  universe  is  not  a  truth  known  only  from  ment. 
ordinary  observation.  Approved  results  in  all  the  de- 
partments of  descriptive  science  affirm  it.  Physics 
formulates  the  law  of  inertia  and  of  the  conservation 
of  matter.  At  the  same  time  it  teaches  as  a  fact,  veri- 
fied by  experimental  investigation,  that  forces  are 
transformed,  ex.  gr.,  mechanical  work  into  heat,  etc., 
and  enunciates  the  law  of  the  conservation  and  dissipa- 
tion of  energy.  Every  day  progress  is  made  in  the  ac- 
quisition of  facts  which  illustrate  the  working  of  these 
laws.  The  same  duality  is  revealed  in  Chemistry.  This 
is  seen  in  the  decomposition  of  chemical  compounds. 
Thus  by  voltaic  electricity  water  is  separated  into  its 
component  parts  of  oxygen  and  hydrogen,  e.  g.,  the 
weight  is  the  same  whether  the  elements  be  consid- 
ered as  decomposed    or   in    their    compound    state.^ 

^  New  Chemistry,  by  Cooke,  Lect.  V. 
24 


l86  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

Nevertheless  the  specific  properties  are  different.  In 
the  words  of  Mr.  Cooke  "  water  and  the  two  gases,  hy- 
drogen and  oxygen,  are  the  same  matter  under  differ- 
ent forms."  This  fact  is  the  basis  of  the  laws  of  chemi- 
cal affinities  and  of  multiple  proportions.  In  crystalli- 
zation we  must  admit  a  force  which  arranges  the  ma- 
terial atoms  in  various  forms. 
a  duality  in      §  -20.  In  every  material    substance,    therefore,    are 

every  sub-  ^  ^>'  j 

stance.        found  two  series  of  properties  which  are  antagonistic 
in  nature  and  point  to  a  duality  in  the  composition  of 
the  substance  itself.     Thus  ex.  gr.,  we  find  quantity  and 
quality,  permanence  and  change,  inertia  and  energy.    The 
inference,  therefore,  is, made  that  a  substance  is  a  com- 
pound whole,  constituted  by  the  intimate  union  of  first 
this  duality  matter  and  of  form.     The  first  matter  is  the  source  of 
of  the         quantity,  of  permanence  and  of  inertia;  the  form  is  the 
Matter  and  source  of  quality,  of  change  and  of  energy.     The  first 
matter  is  the  same  throughout  the  visible  universe ;  the 
form  is  specifically  different  and  by  its  union  with  first 
matter  constitutes  a  specific  type  of  existence  with  its 
specific  qualities  or  energies.*^ 
Theory  ii-        §  40.  We  here  speak  of  the  ultimate  constitution  of 

lustrated      .       .7  ^  .      ^        .  ^         , 

from  bodies.     Experimentation,  therefore,  cannot  give  any 

direct  evidence.  The  theory  of  first  matter  and  form 
is  based  on  ordinary  and  scientific  inference.  Illustra- 
tions, however,  can  be  drawn  from  analogy.  Thus,  ex. 
gr.,  a  rough  block  of  marble  may  be  compared  to  first 

*^  Cf.Fr.  Harper  S.  J.  Metaphysics  of  the  Schools,  vol.  II, 
b.  5,  c.  2,  §  4;  Abbe  Farges  "  Matiere  et  Forme  "  "  L'acte  et 
Potencie."  "  No  one,"  writes  Mr.  Cooke,  "  who  has  followed 
modern  physical  discussions  can  doubt  that  the  tendency  of 
physical  thought  is  to  refer  the  differences  of  substances  to 
a  dynamical  cause,"  and  confesses  himself  rather  drawn  to  that 
view  of  nature  which  refers  the  qualities  of  substances  to  the 
affections  of  the  one  substractum  modified  by  the  varying 
play  of  forces."     New  Chemistry,  pp.  118,  117. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  187 

matter;  the  chisel  of  the  sculptor  may  form  it 
into  a  statue  of  Washington.  The  statue  in  its  com- 
pleted state  may  be  considered  as  composed  of  marble 
and  of  the  specific  form  which  constitutes  it  in  the  like- 
ness of  our  country's  hero.  So,  too,  wood  may  be 
likened  to  first-matter,  the  form  of  a  table  to  form.  But 
in  the  examples  of  the  statue  and  of  the  table  the  forms 
are  only  accidental.  In  these  cases  the  word  ''  shape  " 
would  be  more  exact.  Nevertheless  we  never  perceive 
a  material  object  which  has  not  some  definite  shape. 
What  these  shapes  are  to  material  objects,  the  sub- 
stantial form  is  to  substance  itself;  it  constitutes  the 
substance  in  a  concrete  existence.*^ 

§41.  The  concepts  of  "first-matter"  and  of  "  sub- of^ma?ter 
stantial  form  "  are  abstractions.    But  that  is  not  to  say  areab^^ 
that  they  are  figments  of  the  mind.    The  warrant  we  but  have  a 
have  for  making  these  abstractions  is  had  in  the  de-  reality, 
scriptive  sciences  and  in  daily  observation.    First-mat- 
ter does  not  exist  as  a  concrete  entity;  in  combination 
with  form  only  it  exists  in  the  concrete.    The  union  of 
both  is  physical.     We  say  substance  is  composed  of 
first-matter  and  form.    Hence,  the  union  is  a  composi- 
tion.   It  is  not  a  mixture  as,  ex.  gr.,  water  is  a  mixture 
of  hydrogen  and  oxygen.     But  it  can  be  compared  to 
the  union  of  potency  and  act;  the  first-matter  is  a  pure 
potency,  receptive  of  any  form;  the  substantial  form 
actuates,  determines  and  perfects  it  into  a  complete 
concrete  existence.    The  result  is  one  substance  essen- 
tially composed.*^ 

*8  The  term  "  first-matter "  is  used  in  contradistinction 
to  *'  second-matter,"  or  matter  as  it  comes  under  the  activ- 
ity of  our  senses,  i.  e.,  concrete  matter  or  matter  simply. 

*^  Cf.  Aug.  Confess.,  L.  12,  c.  6;  L.  13,  c.  29;  de  Gen  ad  Lit. 
LI,  c.  15;  Aristotle's  Psychology,  by  E.  Wallace,  BII,  ch.  I; 
St.  Thomas  C.  Gentes  L.  2,  c.  56,  57,  71;  L.  4,  c.  81;  Summa 
Theologiae  I.  q.  44,  a.  2;  I.  q.  66,  a.  i;  I.  q.  76. 


i88 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


hierarchy 
of  beings 
and  of 
forms. 


based  on 
fact. 


§  42.  But  all  beings  are  not  of  the  same  nature.  A 
gradated  series  of  existences  in  the  world  about  us 
meets  the  eye.  There  are  entities  purely  material,  then 
living  beings,  ex.  gr.,  the  vegetable  world,  then  ani- 
mals, and  finally  man,  the  crown  of  God's  work,  the 
apex  of  creation.^"  The  same  law  of  duality  persists 
throughout.  Each  substance  has  its  material  and  its 
formal  element.  With  this  difference,  that  the  material 
element  is  the  same.  The  laws  of  quantity,  of  inertia 
and  of  the  conservation  of  matter,  are  as  true  of  the 
material  particles  which  go  to  make  up  the  human 
body  as  of  those  which  enter  into  the  formation  of  a 
crystal  or  a  stone.  A  remarkable  fact,  however,  is  that 
the  forces  are  dififerent  in  nature.  The  laws  which  gov- 
ern the  material  and  chemical  forces  are  not  the  same 
as  those  which  prevail  in  the  living  world.  Again,  the 
laws  of  vegetative  growth  differ  in  kind  from  the  laws 
of  sensation,  just  as  these  in  turn  differ  from  the  laws 
of  mental  life.  These  facts  point  to  a  difference  in  na- 
ture of  the  formal  element.  Thus,  we  have  material, 
living,  sensitive,  intellectual  energies;  and  as  a  natural 
inference  material,  living,  sensitive  and  intellectual 
forms.  These  forms,  therefore,  so  different  in  nature, 
joined  in  intimate  substantial  union  with  first-matter, 
constitute  the  hierarchy  of  beings  we  see  about  us. 

§  43.  The  inference  is  logical,  and  is  based  on  facts. 
Thus,  we  have  the  sciences  of  Chemistry  and  Physics 
which  deal  with  material  forces.  Biology  and  Physi- 
ology, which  explain  the  phenomena  of  life,  Psychol- 
ogy, which  investigates  the  nature  and  processes  of 
sensation  and  of  thought.  Chemistry  and  Physics  dif- 
fer from  Biology  and  Psychology  because  the  former 
deal  with  forces  which  differ  from  the  latter.    From  the 


5°  S.  Thomas  C.  Gentes,  liv,  cap.  11. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  I89 

difference  of  these  forces  we  infer  a  difference  in  the 
nature  of  the  beings.  This  difference  is  caused  by  a 
difference  in  the  formal  element. 

§44.  Let  us  now  apply  this  line  of  thought  to  man.  ^an!*^^'^ 
Each  of  us  has  in  his  own  organism  two  series  of  prop- 
erties which  are  antagonistic  to  each  other.  Thus,  ex. 
gr.,  my  organism  is  a  certain  quantity  possessing  dif- 
ferent qualities;  it  is  composed  of  matter  and  of  certain 
activities  or  forces;  the  law  of  the  conservation  of 
matter  remains  intact  at  the  dissolution  of  the  body, 
and  the  materal  elements  preserve  their  inertia.  There- 
fore, I  infer  the  forces  in  my  body  spring  from  a  for- 
mal element,  and  the  material  properties  have  their 
source  in  first-matter.  But  the  forces  in  my  organism 
differ  specifically  from  the  forces  which  have  play  in 
the  lower  existences.  Therefore,  I  infer  a  specific  dif- 
ference in  the  form.  The  invesigation  of  the  specific 
nature  of  the  form  which  actuates  the  body  is  the  sub- 
ject-matter of  this  essay.  The  activities  Avhich  are 
manifested  as  thought  and  will  are  in  nature  super- 
organic  and  spiritual.^^  Hence,  their  principle,  i.  e., 
the  form  of  the  body,  is  superorganic  and  spiritual. 
This  principle  or  form  is  called  the  soul,  because  it  is  a 
principle  of  life,  and  by  its  union  with  the  body  con- 
stitutes a  living  organism.  This  union,  is  intrinsic, 
natural  and  substantial.^^ 

§  45.  There  is  no  more  difficulty  in  explaining  the  Hence 

.        .  r     1        ,  .  ....      union  of 

constitution  of  the  human  organism  than  there  is  mt)odyandof 

.  .    ,      .  .  .      soul, 

accounting  for  the  constitution  of  the  inorganic  mole- 
cule. In  both  cases  we  have  a  union  of  first-matter 
and  of  substantial  form.     With  this  difference,  how- 

51  S.  Thomas  C.  Gentes,  1.  ii,  cap.  69. 

52  S.  Thomas  C  Gentes,  1.  ii,  cap.  71 ;  Sum.  Theol.  i  q.  76, 
a.  I,  ad.  4. 


IQO  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

ever,  that  the  substantial  form  of  the  human  organism 
is  of  a  spiritual  nature,  and  can  subsist  by  itself  after 
its  dissolution  from  the  body.  Thus,  the  acts  of  growth 
and  of  sensation  are  acts  of  the  animated  organism.^^ 
The  animated  organism  is  the  "Adequate  principle" 
of  these  acts.  Therefore,  the  soul,  the  one  source  of  all 
our  activities,  is  essentially  and  immediately  the  sub- 
stantial form  of  the  human  body,  and  by  its  intrinsic 
union  with  the  body  constitutes  man  in  the  human 
species.^^ 

§  46.  The  principles  set  forth  furnish  a  ready  an- 
swer to  the  question  as  to  the  place  of  the  soul  in  the 
hum.an  body.  The  soul  is  the  substantial  form  of  the 
body;  it  constitutes  the  body  an  organism;  it  commun- 
icates life  and  movement.^^  Therefore,  it  is  whole  and 
entire  in  every  part.  It  is  in  every  part  of  the  living 
body,  because  it  is  the  form  of  the  body,  and  as  such, 
the  source  and  principle  of  bodily  life;  it  is  whole  and 
entire  in  every  part,  because  of  its  simple  nature.^^  An 
illustration  can  be  drawn  from  the  magnet.  Every  part 
of  the  iron  possesses  the  power  of  attraction.  I  may 
crush  it  into  powder  without  detecting  with  the  eye  the 
force  whence  springs  its  peculiar  power.  In  like  man- 
ner the  body  may  be  dissected,  yet  the  scalpel  cannot 
dissect  or  touch  the  soul.    In  both  the  energy  is  known 

^  Cf.  Following  Chapter. 

54  Cf.  St.  Thomas  C.  Gentes,  BIT,  ch.  49,  68;  Summa  Theol. 
I.  q.  ']6\  q.  90,  a.  4.  That  the  soul  is  the  substantial  form  of 
the  body  is  an  article  of  faith  defined  in  the  councils  of  Vienne 
and  V.  Lateran,  cf.  Denziger's  Enchiridion. 

55  S.  Theolog.  I  q.  "/d,  a.  Z-J- 

56  "  Tota  igitur  in  singulis  partibus  simul  adest,  quae  tota 
simul  sentit  in  singulis,"  Aug.  de  Immort.  an.  n.  25;  S. 
Thomas  S.  Theolog.   i  q.  '/d,  a.  8. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  IQI 

to  exist  by  reason  of  its  manifestations.^''  That  the 
force  in  material  bodies  is  essentially  different  from  the 
soul  has  been  shown.^^  The  marvellous  structure  of 
the  body  explains  the  difference  in  the  functions  of  our 
organic  life.  The  functions  are  all  related  one  to  an- 
other, and  in  their  action  reveal  a  no  less  marvellous 
unity  and  harmony.  One  principle  and  controlling 
power  is  over  all.^^ 

5^  S.  Augustine  illustrates  this  by  comparing  the  body  to  a 
"  word,"  the  soul  to  the  "  meaning  "  of  the  word.  De  quant. 
An.  nn.  65,  69. 

5^  Spirituality  of  the  soul. 

^^  Per  totum  corpus  quod  animat  non  locali  dififusione,  sed 
quadam  vitali  intentione  porrigitur  (anima) ;  nam  per  omnes 
ejus  particulas  tota  simul  adest,  nee  minor  in  minoribus,  et  in 
majoribus  major;  sed  alicubi  intentius,  alicubi  remissius,  et  in 
omnibus  tota  et  in  singulis  tota  est."  Aug.  Ep.  166,  n.  4; 
cent.  Epist.  Manich.,  n.  20;  S.  Thomas  S.  Theol.  I,  q.  "jd. 


THE  BRAIN  AND  THOUGHT. 


question 
stated. 


solved  by 
scientific 
methods 


§  I.  In  the  preceding  pages  the  nature  of  the  human 
soul  has  been  set  forth  and  the  special  difficulties 
drawn  from  the  Physiology  of  the  brain  examined  and 
solved.  A  complete  and  satisfactory  study,  however, 
requires  an  explanation  of  the  real  positive  relation 
which  subsists  between  the  brain  and  those  activities 
of  the  soul  embraced  under  the  term  thought.  This 
question  is  proposed  here  as  a  complement  to  the  chap- 
ter on  the  Union  of  Body  and  Soul,  and  serves  as  an 
illustration,  deriving  therefrom  in  return  solid  prin- 
ciples and  a  sound  basis.  But  it  is  more  than  a  sub- 
sidiary problem;  at  the  present  time  the  brain  is  the 
real  battle  ground  between  Materialism  and  a  spiritual- 
istic philosophy;  on  this  the  issue  depends. 

§  2.  It  is  a  fact  that  we  think  with  the  brain,  that 
the  brain  in  some  way  concurs  in  the  production  of 
thought.  MateriaHsts  maintain  that  it  is  the  organ  of 
thought,  e.  g.,  as  the  eye  is  the  organ  of  sight.  This 
statement  is  simple  and  has  a  scientific  appearance,  and 
therefore  seems  to  be  strong.  They  hold  that  cere- 
bral functions  can  explain  the  phenomena  which  we 
regard  as  spiritual,  and  that  as  a  consequence  the  soul 
is  an  unnecessary  postulate.  The  question  is  a  scien- 
tific one  and  can  be  solved  according  to  the  methods 
of  science,  i.  e.,  by  reasoning  from  data  furnished  by 
observation  and  experiment.^ 


1  Cf.  Dr.  Surbled  Le  Cerveau,  ch.  XXIII. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  I93 


I. 

Explanation  op  Terms. 

§  3.  First  of  all  definition  of  terms  is  necessary;  am-  produced 
biguity  leads  to  mental  confusion  and  erroneous  con-  ^^  ^^^^^• 
elusions;  the  candid  reader  will  be  convinced  that 
Materialism  thrives  in  such  conditions;  statements  in 
appearance  very  simple  are  in  reality  very  complex. 
Thus  in  the  phrase:  Thought  is  produced  by  the  brain, 
we  must  understand  (a)  what  is  meant  by  thought. 

§4.  With  modern  writers    from   the    time    of    Des  j^^^^^^^' 
Cartes,  the  term  is  used  to  designate  two  orders  of  ^^^ught. 
phenomena  essentially  different,  viz.,  sense  and  intel- 
lect.    This  is  especially  true  of  English  Philosophy.  pj^SkJophy 
From  Locke  to  Mill  and  Spencer,   the   confusion    of 
these  two  orders  has  been  a  fundamental  error  of  the 
English  mind.     Too  much  stress  cannot  be  laid  upon 
this  fact. 

§  5.  Scholastic  philosophy,  on  the  contrary,  has  ever  inScho- 
taught  that  the  phenomena  of  sense  are  essentially  dif-  philosophy 
ferent  from  the  phenomena  of  thought.  For  proof  it 
appeals  to  the  testimony  of  consciousness.  It  is  evi- 
dent to  any  one  who  carefully  scrutinizes  the  facts  of 
the  inner  life  that  the  act  of  sense  is  totally  different 
irom  the  act  of  thought.  The  object  of  sense  is  con- 
crete, material,  extended;  the  object  of  thought  is 
abstract,  immaterial  and  unextended.  Thus,  for  ex- 
ample I  put  my  hand  in  the  fire ;  the  sensation  of  burn- 
ing is  not  the  same  as  the  idea,  they  are  different  in 
nature,  and  altogether  opposed.^ 

2Arist.  de  an  L2  c2,  §  10;  Balmes  Fund.  Phil.,  vol.  II,  ch. . 
II;  S.  Thomas  C.  Gent.  Lib.  2c,  66;  Mivart  Truth,  ch.  XV. 

25 


194 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


inffS^^^  §  6.  (b)  It  is  necessary  to  have  a  clear  notion  of  the 
duced  "  word  ''  produced."  It  is  true  that  the  brain  concurs 
in  the  production  of  thought,  and  can  therefore  in  a 
certain  sense  be  termed  the  cause.  The  real  issue  at 
stake  is  the  manner  of  the  concurrence,  the  reason  why 
the  brain  is  said  to  produce  thought,  the  meaning  of 
the  word  cause.  In  ordinary  language  the  term,  cause, 
has  a  very  wide  signification;  it  may  mean  the  prin- 
ciple, or  the  instrumental,  or  the  efficient  or  the  final 
cause,  or  it  may  designate  the  circumstances  or  the 
occasion.  Thus,  ex.  gr.,  in  the  statement:  I  chop  trees 
for  my  health,  I  am  the  principle  and  efficient  cause, 
the  axe  is  the  instrumental  and  health  is  the  final 
cause,  since  the  axe  is  the  instrument  I  use,  and  my 
health  is  the  reason  why  I  perform  the  act.  In  like 
manner  I  often  allege,  as  the  cause  of  a  conflagration, 
the  existence  of  combustible  material;  whereas  in  pre- 
cise language  such  material  is  the  occasion  or  condi- 
tion of  the  fire.^ 
the  pur-  §  7.  These  explanations  put  the  question  in  clear 

chapter.  ^  light,  and  we  can  now  proceed  in  the  effort  to  discover 
the  true  relation  between  the  brain  on  the  one  hand 
and  the  acts  of  sensation  and  of  thought  on  the  other. 
The  thesis,  therefore,  is  directed  against  the  school  of 
cerebral  physiologists,  represented  by  Mr.  James.^ 


11. 
The  Brain  and  Sensation. 
P'^ssibie  §  8,  On  inquiring  into  the  cause  or  the  subject  of 

material-     sensation,  three  hypotheses  are  possible :  either  the  sub- 


^  For  clear  examples  of  the  distinction  between  cause  and 
occasion  read  Balmes  Europ.  Civiliz.,  ch.  II. 

4  James  "  Prin.  of  Psychology;"  J.  Luys  "Brain  and  Its 
Functions." 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  195 

ject  is  the  body,  or  it  is  the  soul,  or  it  is  both  united,  i. 
e.,  the  animated  body.  MateriaHsts  hold  that  the  body 
can  account  for  sensation.  Scholastic  philosophy  con-  Scholastic, 
tends  that  the  subject  of  sensation  is  in  general  the 
animated  organism,  or  in  particular  the  animated  or- 
gan, as,  ex.  gr.,  the  living  eye,  ear,  etc. 

§  9.  (a)  The  opinion  of  St.  Thomas  rests  upon  in-  ^}^\)\^gJ"P^® 
controvertible  facts  of  consciousness,  is  sustained  by  iJ^<J|s^^^y- 

common  sense  and  finds  verification  in  the  ordinary  proved 

•^  (a)  by  con- 
language  of  daily  hfe.     Consciousness  testifies  to  the  sciousness. 

sensations  which  I  experience.  I  come  in  contact  with 
the  external  world  through  the  senses  of  sight,  of 
smell,  of  hearing,  of  taste,  of  touch  with  its  particular 
sensations  of  temperature  and  of  pressure.  The  gen-  fact  of  gen- 
eral sensibiHty  diiTused  over  the  nervous  system  makes 
me  aware  of  internal  bodily  feelings.  All  these  senses 
can  be  in  operation  at  one  and  the  same  time;  in  my 
waking  state  some  always  are,  busy  conveying  their 
own  specific  message.  Even  when  wearied  by  con- 
stant exertion  I  seek  rest  and  refreshment  in  sleep,  my 
senses  are  watchful.  A  loving  hand  laid  upon  my 
forehead  disturbs  my  slumber;  a  noise,  maybe  a  foot- 
fall, arouses  me;  a  bright  light  penetrates  the  closed, 
heavy  lids  and  my  eyes  open ;  or  the  strange  feeling  of 
an  unseen  presence  near  awakens  me  noiselessly  from 
the  soundest  sleep  and  I  am  conscious  of  every  nerve 
alert  to  catch  the  slightest  sound.  Thus,  through  the 
swiftly  running  moments  of  the  hour  and  of  the  day,  a 
thousand  impressions  excite  a  thousand  varying 
sensations. 

§  10.  Yet  these  sensations  so  different  in  kind  and     ^^"^^y* 
in  the  power  of  affecting  me  or  in  the  length  of  time 
they  last,  do  not  hasten  past  into  oblivion  Hke  the 
quickly  moving  figures  of  a  panorama.     In  some  won- 


196  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

derful  manner  they  coalesce  into  a  unity.  It  is  /  who 
see,  and  hear  and  feel.  It  is  /  who  am  the  one  indivis- 
ible subject  which  experience  all  and  suffer  all.  From 
early  morn  until  late  at  night  I  have  been  the  same 
constant  subject  and  agent  of  all  the  manifold  impres- 
sions which  go  to  make  up  the  life  of  a  day.  It  is  not 
the  organ  of  sight  that  sees,  it  is  /  who  see;  it  is  not  the 
ear  that  hears,  it  is  /  who  hear ;  and  so  it  is  /  who  taste, 
or  smell,  or  touch,  or  feel  a  shock  from  without  or  a 
bodily  p^in  within.  This  unity  ot  consciousness  in  the 
acts  of  sensation  is  an  elementary  fact  of  individual 
experience.  It  is  something  intangible,  inexplicable, 
indivisible.  I  accept  it  as  such  because  it  is  part  of 
my  very  nature.  I  can  only  explain  its  existence  by 
postulating  a  simple  principle  which  vivifies  my  body 
throughout  and  thus  becomes  the  one  agent  of  my 
bodily  activities  and  with  my  body  constitutes  the  one 
subject  of  sensation, 
common  §11-  (t>)  Common  sense  and  ordinary  speech  reflect 
speech.^^  the  undivided  voice  of  consciousness.  Thus  I  tell 
what  /  saw,  not  what  my  eyes  saw,  etc.  The  same 
unity  of  sense-consciousness  is  observed  in  the  animal, 
conclusion,  rj.^^^^  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^  whatever  part  of  the  body  I  may 

touch  a  dog,  he  is  immediately  aware  of  the  impres- 
sion.    We,  therefore,  conclude  that  a  simple  subject 
is  necessary  for  the  act  of  sensation,  in  as  much  as  a 
simple  subject  alone  can  explain  the  unity  of  con- 
sciousness in  the  sensitive  life. 
<2)^8ensa-        §  12.  It  is  a  fact  of  consciousness,  evident  upon  care- 
tat!?e^'       ^^^  observation,  that  sensation  itself    is    quantitative. 
tJ^is^P^oved  xhe  properties  of  quantity  are :  that  it  occupies  space, 
sciousness.  j^  q^  extension:  that  it  can  be  measured,  i.  e.,  intensity: 
that  it  is  produced  gradually,  i.  e.,  protensive  magni- 
tude.    All  these  properties  are  verified  of  the  sensation. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  197 

(a)  Consciousness  testifies  that  sensation  has  an  ex-  ^|5;en^on, 
tended  form.  Not  only  the  object  felt  is  something 
extended,  but  the  very  feeling  is  extended  also.  Thus, 
ex.  gr.,  in  the  sensation  of  sight,  the  organ  is  a  certain 
extended  part  of  the  body,  the  impression  made  upon 
the  eye  is  extended,  as  experiment  shows,  the  sensa- 
tion is  also  extended,  and  its  representation  pictured 
upon  the  imagination  has  the  form,  color  and  appear- 
ance of  the  external  extended  object. 

§  13.  In  like  manner  the  sam.e  can  be  said  of  the 
other  senses.  The  sense  of.  touch,  however,  presents 
the  most  striking  illustrations  of  this  truth.  The  pain, 
ex.  gr.,  which  is  caused  by  the  needle  piercing  the 
flesh,  is  definitely  localized  and  circumscribed;  again, 
I  hold  a  coin  in  my  fingers,  a  Hmited  surface  of  the 
skin  feels  the  impression;  or  I  Hft  my  hand  to  ease  the 
racking  headache  which  may  be  now  in  the  temples, 
now  on  the  side,  or  on  the  back  of  the  head;  or  I  can 
indicate  the  definite  tooth  that  is  to  be  extracted. 
Now  only  can  the  pain  in  the  periphral  organ  be  local- 
ized, but  Physiology  has  traced  the  nerves  which  com- 
municate the  stimulus  and  have  located  the  nerve 
centres  in  the  brain.  Therefore,  in  the  act  of  sensation 
the  subject  feeling,  the  manner  of  feeling,  and  the  ob- 
ject felt  are  all  extended. 

§  14.  (b)  Sensation    can    be    gradually    produced;  (m  proten- 
-  ..  ,  .,,.         sive  mag- 

hence  a  certam  tune  may  elapse    m   the   production,  mtude. 

which  has  been  called  protensive  magnitude.  Con- 
sciousness testifies  that  the  sensation  may  be  'gradu- 
ally produced,  e.  g.,  from  the  thumb,  to  the  hand,  to 
the  whole  arm.  (c)  Individual  experience  testifies  (9)  inten- 
tliat  sensations  differ  in  intensity.  Thus,  ex.  gr.,  we 
distinguish  a  difference  of  intensity  between  the  can- 
dle and  the  electric  light.     Now  an  attempt  has  been 


tion. 


198  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

made  to  measure  these  differences.  Hence  the  depart- 
ment of  Psycho-Physics.  The  term  is  a  misnomer. 
It  is  not  a  branch  of  Psychology;  but  rather  pertains 
to  Physiology.  While  Psycho-Physics  has  failed  to 
establish  a  law  which  is  universal  or  exact  even  within 
the  sphere  of  sensation,  nevertheless  it  can  furnish 
some  data  which  help  our  position.  The  law  of  Weber 
holds  good  within  certain  limits;  hence  the  difference 
in  intensity  of,  ex.  gr.,  two  definite  sensations,  can  be 
measured.  This  is  all  we  contend  for  in  this  place. 
We  do  not  speak  of  the  law;  we  question  only  the  fact; 
can  the  intensity  be  computed?  One  sole  instance 
sufifices.® 
fOT?lS£°  §  15-  Now  if  we  take  these  two  facts  of  conscious- 
ness as  the  data  of  our  reasoning,  the  inference  is  in- 
controvertible. The  unity  of  consciousness  can  only 
be  explained  by  the  existence  of  a  simple,  immaterial 
principle:  the  quantitative  form  of  sensation  requires 
that  the  feeling-subject  be  likewise  quantitative. 
These  two  facts  do  not  mutually  exclude  each  other; 
they  are  found  side  by  side  as  the  two  essential  ele- 
ments in  every  act  of  sensation. 

§  16.  Thus  sensation  is  simple  and  quantitative: 
simple  because  it  is  the  act  of  a  simple  principle  as  is 
shown  from  the  unity  of  consciousness:  quantitative 
because  the  form  of  the  actual  present  sensation  is 
quantitative  as  consciousness  also  shows.  The  ele- 
ments mutually  complete  each  other  in  the  production 
of  one  perfect  organic  act.  Thus  we  may  say  that 
the  soul,  i.  e.,  the  simple  principle  and  the  body,  i.  e., 
the  organ  when  considered  separately,  are  the  partial 
causes  of  sensation,  but  when  united  in  one  compos- 

5  Cf.  Sully  The  Human  Mind,  pp.  81-99. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  199 

ite  principle  form  the  one  adequate  cause;  in  other 
words,  that  the  subject  of  sensation  is  the  animated  or- 
ganism in  general,  or  the  animated  organ  in  particular. 
Now  as  the  nervous  system  is  the  organ  of  sensation, 
and-  as  this  is  centred  in  the  cerebral  ganglia  at  the  base 
of  the  brain,  so  that  if  the  communication  from  the 
periphral  organs  to  the  cerebrum  be  broken,  I  should 
no  longer  feel  the  impression  and  sensation  would  be 
impossible,  it  follows  that  the  brain  is  the  central  and 
fundamental  organ  of  sensation. 

§  17.  In  the  name,  therefore,  of  sound  philosophy  Thecon- 
and  of  true  science  Scholastics  protest  against  the  ex-  in  accord 
aggerated  teaching  of  those  who  would  either  refer 
sensation  to  the  activity  of  the  soul  alone,  or  would 
seek  its  cause  in  the  cerebral  activities  independently 
of  the  soul. 

III. 
Brain  and  Thought. 
§  18.  We  pass  to  the  consideration  of  the  second  question 

.  .  ,  stated » 

part  of  the  thesis;  the  relation  between  the  brain  and 
the  phenomena  of  mind.  The  same  method  is  fol- 
lowed, viz.,  from  an  analysis  of  thought,  and  as  a  logi- 
cal consequence  its  comparison  with  sensation.  The 
relation  between  the  brain  and  sensation  has  been 
shown  to  be  organic,  i.  e.,  the  brain  is  the  organ  of 
sensation.  Now,  if  thought  can  be  shown  to  be  dififer- 
ent  in  kind  from  sensation,  it  follows  of  necessity  that 
the  relation  between  the  brain  and  thought  is  not  the 
same  as  prevails  between  the  brain  and  sensation. 

§  19.  The  phenomena  of  mind  are  essentially  differ-  Sntfatiy 
ent   from   the   functions   of  bodily   organs :     (a)  An  from  sen- 
analysis  of  thought  shows  that  there  is  no  extended  s^^'^^- 
element;  hence  the  thinking  subject  does  not  possess 


200  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

inlfysffof  ^xtension.^     Thus,  ex.  gr.,  abstract  thought  has  the 

thought,     immaterial  and  unextended  for  its  object,  and  in  act 

not  ex-       it  does  not  appear  under  an  extended  form.     It  has 

focaiizedor  been  shown  also  that  all  efiforts  to  localize  or  measure 

measuie  .  ^i-^Q^^g]^!-  j^g^yg  failed;  whereas,  on  the  contrary,  I  can 

localize  or  measure  sensations,  in  some  cases  at  least, 

approximately;  and  that  it  is  of  the  essence  of  sensation 

that  it  affect  a  definite  part  of  the  body.^ 

§  20.  Now  if  we  compare  sensation  and  thought,  we 
find  that  sensation  has  two  elements,  the  simple  and  the 
quantitative;  that  thought  has  but  one,  the  simple. 
Again  we  know  that  the  quantitative  element  in  sensa- 
tion comiCS  from  the  intrinsic  co-operation  of  the  organ 
with  the  simple  principle  to  form  one  adequate  cause. 
Hence  from  the  absence  of  this  extended  element  in 
the  act  of  thought,  we  infer  that  there  is  no  intrinsic 
co-operation  of  the  bodily  organ  in  the  production  of 
thought;  that  the  simple  principle  alone  is  the  sole 
adequate  cause;  and  by  this  very  fact  that  the  simple 
principle  is  in  its  nature  spiritual. 

§21.  (b)  The  acts  of  mind  and  body  are  essentially 
of  mtod^^^  different,   e.    g.,   the   acts   of   the   mind   are   abstract 
body.  *  ^   thought,    conceptions    of   spiritual    objects,    self-con- 
sciousness.   The  acts  of  the  bodily  organs  belong  to  a 
different  sphere,  e.  g.,  sensation,  imagination, 
(c)  from         §  22.  (c)  The  laws  of  matter,  of   organized   matter, 
mind  and    and  of  mind  are  different.     Thus  the  laws  of  matter 
are  set  forth  in  the  physical  sciences  of  Physics,  Chem- 
istry, etc.,  as  ex.  gr.,  the  laws  of  attraction,  of  gravita- 

6  Cf.  Bain  Logic  BV,  ch.  V,  p.  505. 

^  "  Pars  intellectiva  animae  secundum  se  est  supra  tempus, 
sed  pars  sensitiva  subjacet  tempori,  et  ideo  per  temporis  cur- 
sum  transmutatur  quantum  ad  passiones  appetitivae  partis 
et  etiam  quantum  ad  vires  apprehensivas."  St.  Thomas  Sum. 
Theol.  I2,  q.  53,  a3  ad.  3. 


(b)  from 
compari- 


of  body. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  201 

tion,  of  chemical  affinity,  of  multiple  proportions.  The 
laws  of  organized  matter  are  explained  in  Biology, 
Physiology,  etc.,  as,  ex.  gr.,  the  law  of  growth,  of  as- 
similation, etc.  Whereas  Logic  is  a  special  science 
dealing  with  the  laws  of  mind,  and  Ethics  is  a  special 
science  which  examines  the  laws  of  right  and  wrong. 
Now  the  laws  of  mind  and  of  will  are  different  in  kind 
from  those  which  rule  the  growth  and  preservation  of 
the  body;  just  as  they  are  different  from  the  laws  of 
Chemistry  or  Physics. 

§  27,.  (d)  Finally,  the  organs  of  some  animals  are  ^Sifiar°^ 
very  much  Hke  those  of  man;  ex.  gr.,  the  nervous- ^|n an? 
system  and  the  brain  ganglia  show  marvellous  similar!-  ^^^'^^^• 
ties.     Nevertheless  the  mental  operations  are  essen- 
tially different.    In  organic  powers  the  ape  is  very  Hke 
man;    there    appears   to    be    but    a    slight    difference 
between  them.    As  an  actual  fact  the  difference  is  in- 
surmountable ;  therefore,  it  is  more  than  organic. 

§  24.  Therefore,  we  can  conclude  that  the  thinking  conclusion, 
subject  is  not  the  animated  organism  in  general,  i.  e., 
the  body;  nor  the  animated  organ  in  particular,  i.  e., 
the  brain.  The  spiritual  soul  alone  is  the  agent  and  the 
subject  of  thought.  There  is  no  intrinsic  dependence 
of  thought  on  the  brain  as  is  had  in  the  act  of  sensa- 
tion. The  brain  is  not  the  total  nor  even  the  partial 
cause  of  thought.^ 

§  25.  It  is  not  true,  however,  to  say  that  the  mind  ^Jom'teiy 
is  absolutely  independent  of  the  brain.     The  depend-  ent^fThe 
ence  denied  is  that  of  causation.    To  deny  any  relation  ^^^'^y- 
between  them  would  be  to  contravert  the  fundamental 
thesis  which  affirms  the  union  of  soul  and  of  body  in 
one  composite.     Hence  Scholastic  philosophy  affirms 

^  Cf.  Calderwood  "  Relation  of  Mind  and  Brain,  p.  313  foil.; 
S.  Thomas  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  yj,  a.  5;  q.  118,  a.  2. 
26 


202 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


This  con- 
clusion in 
harmony 
with  latest 
ascer- 
tained 
facts  of 


question 
stated. 


Its  im- 
portance. 


that  the  mind  depends  upon  the  brain  as  upon  a  con- 
ditio sine  qua  non  of  its  own  activity. 

§  26.  Thus  cerebral  activity  is  from  man's  very  con- 
stitution a  condition  of  thought.  The  teaching  of  St. 
Thomas  is  in  harmony  with  the  latest  discoveries  in 
Anatomy  and  Physiology.  But  cerebral  activity  does 
not  produce  nor  can  it  explain  the  phenomena  of  in- 
telligence ;  it  is  limited  "to  sensation  and  nervous  action ; 
it  is  common  to  man  and  brute.  Intellect  is  the  pos- 
session of  man  alone;  it  has  no  organ  of 
sense;  but  in  its  action  it  depends  upon  sense 
because  all  our  knowledge  comes  from  sense,  and  a 
sensitive  faculty,  i.  e.,  the  imagination  furnishes  the 
images  from  which  intellect  draws  its  store  of  thought. 
Thus  the  mind  depends  upon  the  brain  indirectly  or 
extrinsically,  as  Scholastic  Philosophy  phrases  it,  i.  e., 
as  on  a  condition,  inasmuch  as  the  brain  is  the  organ 
of  sensation.  Hence  St.  Thomas  says  that  the  imagi- 
nation is  the  point  of  contact  between  the  brain  and 
the  intelligence.^ 

IV. 
Thought  is  Not  Cerebral  Motion. 

§  2y.  A  logical  and  inevitable  inference  from  these 
principles  in  that  thought  cannot  be  considered  as  a 
movement  of  brain  matter.  At  first  sight  it  does  not 
call  for  special  treatment.  But  in  late  years  some 
writers,  who  have  a  reputation  with  a  certain  class, 
have  seriously  proposed  this  as  a  hypothesis  able  to 
account  for  the  phenomena  of  thought. 

§  28.  The  scientific  form  in  which  it  is  proposed,  the 
claim  that  it  is  in  conformity  with  the  latest  discoveries 


9  St.  Thomas  I,  q.  75,  a6;  I,  q.  84  a  7,  c;  I,  q.  85;  al;  c.  Gent. 
1.  2,  C76,  77;  Aristotle's  Psychology  by  E.  Wallace,  Bill, 
ch.  IV. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  203 

of  Physics,  the  fact  that  representative  writers  cham- 
pion it  in  the  name  of  science,  has  given  to  it  an  ap- 
pearance of  strength  and  conclusiveness.  Thus  Mr. 
Spencer  says :  "  It  is  fast  becoming  a  common-place 
of  science  that  no  idea  or  feeling  arises  save  as  a  result 
of  some  physical  force  expanded  in  producing  it.^" 
Given  the  state  of  the  brain,  the  corresponding  thought 
or  feeling  might  be  inferred;  or,  given  the  thought  or 
feeling,  the  corresponding  state  of  the  brain  might  be 
inferred.  But  how  inferred?  It  would  be  at  bottom 
not  a  case  of  logical  inference  at  all,  but  of  empirical 
association."  ^^  Prof.  Clifford  advances  the  same 
proposition ;  ^^  and,  in  our  own  country.  Prof.  James  is 
its  recognized  defender.^^ 

§  29.  It  is  true  that  in  language  I  speak  of  the  mo-  ^aii^d^* 
tions  of  the  soul;  thus,  ex.  gr.,  **  I  was  strongly  moved  fl™°a-°^' 
by  your  exhortations,"  or  "  I  was  moved  to  do  so,"  lively. 
etc. ;  but  the  word  ''  moved  "  is  used  in  a  figurative 
sense;  it  does  not  indicate  real  motion,  i.  e.,  a  quantita- 
tive or  qualitative  change.     In  this  sense  Aristotle  says 
that  joy  and  grief  and  reasoning  are  motions.^*    The 
figure  of  speech  is  based  on  the  fact  that  thought  can 
be  compared  to  motion;  but  we  should  not  on  that 
account  identify  the  one  with  the  other.^^ 

1°  First  Principles,  p.  280.  "  Mind  is  a  force,  the  result  of 
nervous  action."  Dr.  Hammond  in  "  Physics  and  Physiol- 
ogy of  Spiritualism." 

11  Cf.  Tyndall  Scientific  Materialism  in  Fragments  of 
Science. 

^^Cf.  Seeing  and  Thinking,  III. 

i^Princ.  of  Psych. 

1*  De  an.  li.  C4,  §  11;  S.  Thomas  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  81,  a  i; 
"  movetur  anima  non  pedibus  sed  affectibus."  Aug.  de  Joan 
tr.  48,  n.  3. 

15  S.  Augustine  shows  that  the  soul  "  grows  "  and  "  de- 
creases "  in  a  figurative  sense.    De  quant.  An.,  n.  ss,  36-40. 


204  CHRISTIAN    PHILGiSOPHY. 


From^th?'*       §  3^-  ^i^d  is  not  a  physical  force ;  nor  as  Mr.  James 
tkm  of^^     contends,  can  appetition  and  feeling  of  efifort  be  traced 
energy.       ^q  simple  muscular  sensations,  the  reflects  of  motions 
already  effected.     This  is  proved  from  the  law  of  the 
cannoTbe^*  Conservation  of  energy,     (i)  According  to  this  law  the 
forcl^^^^^   sum  of  the  physical  forces  in  the  universe  is  ever  the 
same,  e.  g.,  the  mechanical  equivalent  of  heat  is  772 
foot-pounds.     Now   this    law   cannot   be   applied    to 
thought.     Heat,  electricity,  etc.,  can  be  measured  and 
transformed  one  into  the  other;  not  so  thought  or  will. 
They  are  beyond  the  range  of  mechanical  instruments 
and  cannot  be  computed  by  physical  processes.^^ 
noVa?eflex      §31-  (2)  Again  the  thought  is  not  as  Mr.  Spencer 
action.        ^j^^  -^j.^  James  maintain  a  reflex  action  following  on 
an  impulse  from  without.    Very  often  there  is  no  ex- 
ternal impulse,  e.  g.,  the  thoughts  and  feelings  which 
arise  during  meditation  or  examination  of  conscience 
or  recollection  of  the  past;  often  the  impulse  is  had 
without  however  producing  an  effect,  e.  g.,  I  try  to 
rouse  a  lazy  man  to  labor,  or  some  one  insults  me  and 
I  repress  my  temper  from  a  motive  of  Christian  virtue; 
often  there  is  no  proportion  between  the  impulse  and 
the  effect  produced,  e.  g.,  a  few  words  announcing  the 
death  of  a  relative  move  me  deeply.    The  law  of  Weber 
is  based  on  the  fact  that  sensations  are  not  equal  to 
the  excitation.     Hence  there  is  "no  necessary  correla- 
tion or  rigorous  proportion, 
conse-**^^       §  32.  (3)  But  they  maintain  that  there  must  be  a  cor- 
conserva^    relation  between  impulse  and  thought,  although  we 
cannot  detect  it,  because  the  law  of  the  conservation 
of  energy  suffers  no  exception;  hence  if  thought  were 
not  equal  to  impulse  or  vice  versa,  some  force  would 

16  Cf.  McCosh  Christianity  and  Positivism,  p.  210  sq. 


tion  of 
energy 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  205 

be  lost  contrary  to  the  great  law  of  Physics.^^  This  is 
their  great  argument.  It  seems  peremptory.  Never- 
theless the  answer  is  as  simple  as  it  is  complete.  We 
do  not  here  question  the  law  of  conservation;  there  is 
no  necessity  to  do  so.  An  impulse  is  received  in  the 
sensitive  organ,  e.  g.,  of  touch,  with  w^hat  result? 
Thought  follows  as  a  natural  physical  effect,  they 
plainly  affirm.  That  thought  may  follbw  on  an  im- 
pulse we  do  not  gainsay,  that  thought  is  the  only  result, 
or  that  thought  follows  as  a  physical  effect,  we  posi- 
tively deny. 

§  33.  It  has  been  shown  by  careful  experimentation  of^^n*^*^*^ 
that  an  impulse  upon  a  sensitive  organ  produces  im-  impulse, 
mediately  two  physical  effects;  it  quickens  the  molecu- 
lar movements  of  the  nervous  substance,  and  as  a 
consequence  causes  an  increase  of  temperature.  These 
molecular  movements  and  caloric  vibrations  are  always 
proportionate  to  the  intensity  of  the  external  impulse. 
Hence  the  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy  remains 
intact.  The  movement  coming  from  the  outer  world 
and  striking  the  organ  is  exactly  transformed  into 
molecular  changes  and  increase  of  temperature  and 
thus  restored  to  the  external  world  in  combustion  and 
heat.  The  process  has  nothing  to  do  with  thought. 
Thought  is  outside  the  phenomena  and  the  process  of 
transformation.^^ 

§  34.  (b)  The  transformation  of  the  external  impulse  opin£n 
into  combustion  and  heat  shows  how  baseless  is  the  Barker* 
contention  of  Prof.  Geo.  Barker  that  "  the  heat  evolved  ^^"^^^®®^' 
during  the  reception  of  an  idea  is  energy  that  has  es- 

I'This  is  an  illustration  of  the  materialistic  theory  that  all 
phenomena  can  be  explained  by  molecular  Physics,  cf.  Mi- 
vart  Truth,  p.  391  foil.;  Bain  Soul  and  Body,  ch.  VI. 

18  Cf.  Farges  Le  Cerveau  I'ame. 


206  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

caped  conversion  into  motion."  ^^  We  have  seen  that 
the  energy  of  the  impulse  is  exactly  converted  into 
combustion  and  heat;  this  may  be  expressed  in  the 
formula:  E=c-|-h;  there  is  no  loss,  no  spent  energy; 
both  terms  of  the  equation  are  equivalent. 

§  35-  (c)  We  do  deny  that  the  law  of  the  transforma- 
tion of  forces  embraces  the  organic  world;  thus,  ex. 
gr.,  there  is  an  equivalence  between  the  heat  expended 
by  the  muscles  in  performing  mechanical  work  and  the 
work  done.  Helmholtz  has  verified  this  by  experi- 
menting on  the  muscles  of  a  frog.  Let  us  grant  that 
brain  heat  is  transformed  into  thought;  hence  the  more 
profoundly  I  think,  the  more  heat  I  should  lose,  and 
the  cooler  the  brain  should  become.  As  Prof.  Barker 
admits,  "  In  addition  to  the  production  of  thought,  a 
portion  of  the  energy  appears  as  nerve  and  muscle 
power;  less,  therefore,  should  appear  as  heat,  accord- 
ing to  our  law  of  correlation."  ^"  But  the  very  con- 
trary is  the  fact,  as  individual  observation  and  scientific 
experimentation  has  proved.  The  argument  he  ad- 
duces from  Prof.  Lombard,  that  "  the  amount  of  heat 
developed  by  the  recitation  to  one's  self  of  emotional 
poetry  was  in  every  case  less  when  that  recitation  was 
oral,"  tells  decisively  against  his  hypothesis.  The  in- 
crease of  heat  in  the  latter  case  is  due  to  nervous 
actions. 

increase  of      §  36.  Thus  it  is  a  fact  of  experience  that  the  increase 

po?ti?nate  of  heat  is  in  proportion  to  the  intensity  of  thought. 

tensitv^f    The  mind  does  not  add  to  the  sum  of  physical  energy. 

thought,     'pj^gj-g   ^j-g  potential  as  well  as   actual  forces  in  the 

19  Cf.  The  Correlation  of  Vital  and  Physical  Forces  by  Prof. 
Geo.  Barker  in  Half  Hour  with  Modern  Scientists,  vol.  i;  cf. 
also,  Ch.  Bray  Force  and  its  Mental  Equivalents;  Spencer 
Chap.  Materialism,  p.   13. 

20  lb. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  20/ 

human  system.  The  mind  simply  excites  the  potential 
forces  to  act.  Thus  it  quickens  the  movements  of  the 
organs,  e.  g.,  the  glance  of  the  eye,  the  animated  ap- 
pearance of  the  body;  and  consequently  causes  the 
blood  to  flow  more  rapidly.  Hence  I  can  account  for 
fatigue  felt  after  severe  mental  labor,  for  the  perspira- 
tion which  gathers  in  drops  upon  my  forehead. 

§  37.  It  is  true  also  that  spent  condition  of  the  body 
is  proportionate  to  the  severity  of  my  mental  labor, 
thus,  ex.  gr.,  the  harder  I  study  the  more  fatigued  I 
become.  But  there  is  no  mathematical  or  scientific 
equivalence.  Daily  experience  proves  that  brain  effort 
or  organic  waste  is  not  index  of  the  powers  of  mind, 
ex.  gr.,  a  dull  child  might  distill  perspiration  like  rain 
in  the  effort  to  solve  a  problem  which  a  brighter  child 
could  easily  work  out.  Fatigue  of  body  only  shows 
the  power  of  will  over  the  bodily  frame,  but  that  power 
is  often  exerted  without  much  show  of  intelligence, 
ex.  gr.,  in  the  effort  to  keep  awake,  or  to  concentrate 
mind  when  exhausted.^^ 

§  38.  (c)  Finally  eminent  scientists  admit  that  the  (c^  from 
problem  is  insoluble  to  physical  science.     "  When  we  of  eminent 
shall  possess  the  intimate  knowledge  of  the  brain," 
says  Du  Bois.  Reymond,  ''  The  intellectual  phenomena  guBois 
will   be   to    us    entirely     as     incomprehensible.     The 
most   intimate    knowledge    of   the    brain   will    reveal 
only   matter   in  .motion.     But    no    arrangement    nor 
any    movement    of    material    parts    can    serve    as    a 
bridge  to  pass  into  the  field  of  intelHgence.    Movement 
can  only  produce  movement  or  re-enter  the  state  of 
potential  energy.    Potential  energy  in  its  turn  can  do 

21  Cf.  Abbe'  Farges  Le  Cervean  L'Ame,  ch.  ill.  IV;  "  Dar- 
winism and  Other  Essays,"  b}'-  J.  Fiske,  p.  72;  "  Present  Day- 
Tracts,"  No.  29;  "  Philosophy  of  H.  Spencer,"  examined  by 
Rev.  J.  Iverach. 


208  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

nothing  save  to  produce  motion,  to  maintain  equili- 
brium, exercise  pression  or  traction."  A  little  farther 
on  he  adds :  "  What  conceivable  connection  subsists 
between  definite  movements  of  definite  atoms  in  my 
brain  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  such 
primordial,  indefinable,  undeniable  facts  as  these:  I 
feel  pain  or  pleasure;  I  experience  a  sweet  taste,  or 
smell  a  rose,  or  hear  an  organ,  or  see  something  red. 
It  is  absolutely  and  forever  inconceivable  that  a  num- 
ber of  carbon,  hydrogen,  nitrogen  and  oxygen 
atoms  should  be  otherwise  than  indifferent  as  to 
their  own  position  and  motion,  past,  present  or  future. 
It  is  utterly  inconceivable  how  consciousness  should 
result  from  their  joint  action."  ^ 

Terrier .  §  39.  "  How  happens  it,"  asks  Mr.  Ferrier,  "  that  the 

molecular  modifications  in  the  cerebral  cells  coincide 
with  the  modifications  of  consciousness?  How,  for 
instance,  do  the  light  waves  falling  upon  the  retina 
excite  the  modifications  of  consciousness  called  sight- 
sensation?  They  are  problems  we  can  never  solve. 
We  can  succeed  in  determining  the  exact  nature  of 
the  molecular  changes  which  are  produced  in  the  cere- 
bral cells  w^hen  a  sensation  is  experienced,  but  that 
does  not  bring  us  an  inch  nearer  the  explanation  of  the 
fundamental  nature  of  that  which  constitutes  sen- 
sation." 23 

TyndaU.  §  40.  Mr.  Tyndall  is  even  more  emphatic.     "  The 

passage  from  the  physics  of  the  brain  to  the  corres- 
ponding facts  of  consciousness  is  unthinkable. 
Granted  that  a  definite  thought  and  a  definite  molecu- 
lar action  in  the  brain  occur  simultaneously;  we  do  not 
possess    the  intellectual   organ,    nor   apparently    any 

22  upon  the  Limits  of  Natur.  Phil.,  Sept.,  1875. 

23  Funct.  of  Brain,  §§  88,  89. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  209 

rudiment  of  an  organ,  which  would  enable  us  to  pass, 
by  a  process  of  reasoning,  from  the  one  to  the  other. 
They  appear  together,  but  we  do  not  know  why.  Were 
our  minds  and  senses  so  expanded,  strengthened  and 
illuminated  as  to  enable  us  to  see  and  feel  the  very 
molecules  of  the  brain,  were  we  capable  of  following 
all  their  motions,  all  their  groupings,  all  their  electric 
discharges,  if  such  there  be,  and  were  we  intimately 
acquainted  with  the  corresponding  states  of  thought 
and  feeling,  we  should  be  as  far  as  ever  from  the  solu- 
tion of  the  problem,  how  are  these  physical  pro- 
cesses connected  with  the  facts  of  consciousness?  The 
chasm  between  the  two  classes  of  phenomena  would 
still  remain  intellectually  impassible.  Let  the  con- 
sciousness of  love,  for  example,  be  associated  with  a 
right-handed  spiral  motion  of  the  molecules  of  the 
brain,  and  the  consciousness  of  hate  with  a  left-handed 
spiral  motion.  We  should  then  know,  when  we  love, 
that  the  motion  is  in  one  direction,  and,  when  we  hate, 
that  the  motion  is  in  the  other;  but  the  '  why?  '  would 
remain  as  unanswerable  as  before."  ^*  Again,  "  The 
utmost  he  (the  materialist)  can  affirm  is  the  association 
of  two  classes  of  phenomena  of  whose  real  bond  of 
union  he  is  in  absolute  ignorance."  ^  In  the  Belfast 
Address  we  find:  "You  cannot  satisfy  the  human 
understanding  in  its  demand  for  logical  continuity  be- 
tween molecular  processes  and  the  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness. This  is  a  rock  on  which  MateriaHsm  must 
inevitably  split  whenever  it  pretends  to  be  a  complete 
philosophy  of  life." 

24  Cf.  Scientific  Materialism  in  Fragments  of  Science. 

25  lb.  ]  I 

27 


.210  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

Prof.  Ladd.  §  ^j^  Finally,  Prof.  Ladd  sums  up  the  discussion 
of  the  subject  with  these  words:  *'  The  phenomena  of 
human  consciousness  must  be  regarded  as  activities 
of  some  other  form  of  Real  Being  than  the  living  mole- 
cules of  the  brain.  They  require  a  subject  or  ground 
which  is  in  nature  unlike  the  phospherized  fats  of  the 
central  masses,  the  aggregate  nerve-fibres  and  nerve 
cells  of  the  cerebral  cortex;  that  the  Subject  of  the 
states  of  consciousness  is  a  real  being,  standing  in  cer- 
tain relation  to  the  material  beings  which  compose  the 
substance  of  the  brain,  is  a  conclusion  warranted  by 
all  the  facts."  ^s 

26  Cf.  Ladd  Physiological  Psychology,  p.  606. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  SOUL. 

§  I.  Philosophy  is  an  examination  of  the  funda-  ^t^ted?^ 
mental  causes  which  determine  the  existence  of  things. 
It  embraces  the  first  beginnings,  as  well  as  the  actual 
condition  and  development.  A  philosophy  of  soul, 
therefore,  would  not  be  complete  without  an  effort  to 
explain  its  origin ;  the  more  so  because  attempts  have 
been  made  which  are  not  in  accord  with  sound 
reasoning. 

I. 
Theory  op  Emanation. 

§  2.  According  to  this  view,  the  soul  is  an  emanation  its  advo- 
of  the  Divine  Substance;  in  its  essence,  therefore,  it  is  a 
part  of  God.  We  find  this  opinion  in  the  writings  of 
the  Stoics  and  Neo-Platonists.  Pantheists  of  ancient 
and  modern  times  have  proposed  it,  if  we  except  the 
ideal  or  phenomenal  Pantheists,  who  hold  that  there 
is  only  one  reality  and  that  the  world  is  an  illusion. 
Nevertheless,  even  they  resort  to  the  theory  of  emana- 
tion to  explain  the  illusion,  e.  g.,  the  Vedanta.^ 

§  3.  But  this  explanation  is  opposed  to  known  criticism, 
facts.  The  reasons  advanced  by  St.  Thomas  hold  good 
to-day.  He  takes  his  stand  on  facts.  It  is  a  fact  that 
the  soul  is  finite  or  limited  in  its  being  and  its  powers; 
that  it  is  changeable  in  as  much  as  it  is  subject  to  modi- 
fications and  is  the  subject  of  action  and  of  passion, 
which  vary  with  every  passing  moment;  that  it  does 
not  possess  all  its  activity  at  one  and  the  same  time, 
nor  is  it  always  in  act,  but  passes  from  potency  to  act.^ 

1  Ci.  Gough  Phil,  of  the  Upanishads;  S.  Augustine  de  Gen. 
ad  Lit.  1.  VII. 

2  Cf.  S.  Augustine  Ep.  166,  n.  3. 


212  '  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

Hence  he  infers  that  such  a  being  is  not  infinite,  all- 
perfect,  immutable;  but  is  a  distinct  entity  finite, 
imperfect  and  subject  to  change.^ 

II.  I 

Theory  of  Traducianism. 

exposition.        o         o  1  1-1  r 

.  §4.  Some  have  sought  m  the  parents  a  reason  for 
the  origin  of  the  soul.  They  contend  that  the  soul  is 
propagated  to  the  offspring  in  the  act  of  generation. 
The  manner  of  propagation  is  explained  in  different 
ways.  With  some  it  is  by  means  of  a  material  force, 
e.  g.,  Tertullian;*  with  others  the  transmission  is 
effected  by  a  spiritual  agency,  e.  g.,  Apollonius  as 
Gregory  of  Nyssa  relates.^  An  illustration  of  this 
theory  is  seen  in  the  way  a  taper  is  lighted  from  a 
candle.  Or,  from  a  materialistic  point  of  view,  the 
soul  is  considered  as  a  germ  or  cell  which  was  already 
precontained  in  the  parent. 

§  5.  St.  Thomas  subjects  this  theory  to  a  severe  and 
judicious  criticism.  He  holds  that  the  soul  is  a 
spiritual  and  intellectual  entity,  as  has  been  shown. 
But  the  act  of  generation  is  organic;  whereas  the 
activity  of  the  soul  is  inorganic.  Now  no  effect  can 
transcend  its  cause,  nor  can  a  cause  produce  an  effect 
of  a  higher  order.  Hence  he  concluded  that  the  act 
of  generation  cannot  be  the  sole  cause  which  accounts 
for  the  origin  of  the  soul,  else  we  should  have  an 
effect  of  a  nature  transcending  the  cause. 

§  6.  It  is  not  denied  that  the  act  of  generation  con- 
spires to  the  origin  of  the  soul.  The  real  point  at 
issue  is  the  nature  of  that  relation.     Scholastic  phil- 

3  Contra  Gentes.  Ill,  085;  St.  Thomas  I,  q.  90,  a  I. 

4  Cf.  S.  Augustine  de  Gen.  ad  Lit,  lib.  X. 

5  Cf.  also  Augustine  Epist,  165.  ; 


criticism. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  21^ 

osophy  maintains  that  it  is  not  a  casual  relation.  It 
teaches,  as  we  shall  see,  that  the  act  of  generation  is 
an  occasion,  but  that  the  soul  as  an  intellectual  and 
spiritual  entity  is  due  to  the  creative  act.^ 

III. 
Theory  of  Manifestation. 

§  7.  This  seems  to  be  the  proper  appellation  of  the  Eadd's. 
view  proposed  by  Prof.  Ladd  to  account  for  the  origin 
of  mind  or  soul.  He  denies  the  theory  of  Creationism  reasons. 
on  the  ground  that  it  is  without  warrant  and  is  unin- 
telligible. He  says  that  we  "  cannot  be  consistent  and 
yet  accept  an  unknowable  entity  .  in  the  form  of  a 
soul  that  has  really  not  yet  begun"  to  be  a  soul,  as  the 
cause  of  no-phenomena."  He  speaks  of  the  absurdity 
in  the  conception  of  a  "  ready-made  soul,"  and  at  the 
manner  of  its  being  "posited  in  the  tenement  of  a 
body." 

§  8.  So  much  for  his  negative  criticism.  His  posi-  positive 
tive  and  constructive  teaching,  however,  is  peculiar 
and  deserving  of  passing  notice.  "The  origin  of  every 
mind,"  he  writes,  "  must  be  put  at  the  exact  point  of 
time  when  that  mind  begins  to  act;  its  origin  is  in 
and  of  these  its  first  conscious  activities.  Before  this 
first  activity  the  mind  is  not."  But  he  adds:  "It  can 
not  be  admitted  that,  properly  speaking,  any  mind 
springs  into  full  being  at  a  leap,  as  it  were."  "  It 
springs  constantly  into  a  fuller  being  originating  in 
a  higher  meaning  of  the  word  in  a  perpetual  process, 
as  the  development  of  these  activities.''^ 

^Cf.  C.  Gent.  BII,  ch.  86,  89;  Summa  Theologiae  I,  q.  90, 
&2;  q.  100,  a  i;  I.  Q.  118,  a  2;  I.  2,  q.  81,  a  i. 
7  Phil,  of  Mind,  p.  364. 


214  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

§  9.  Conscious,  however,  that  this  position  was  open 
to  criticism,  he  proceeds  to  strengthen  it  by  the  state- 
ment that  '*  in  a  modified  way  the  theory  of  creation 
affords  the  only  inteUigible  explanation  of  the  first 
origin  and  of  the  perpetual  process  of  originating 
which  belongs  to  the  individual  human  mind."  His 
confusion  and  uncertainty  becomes  more  apparent  by 
the  strange  statement  that  "  a  vague  reference  to  the 
order  of  nature  as  conditioning  the  rise  and  develop- 
ment of  every  stream  of  human  consciousness  would 
seem  to  be  the  last  w^ord  that  can  be  said."  He  then 
continues:  "Out  of  this  Universal  Being,  without 
seeming  wholly  to  be  accounted  for  by  it,  does  every 
stream  of  consciousness  rise."  He  concludes  by 
quoting  approvingly  from  Lotze :  "  At  the  place  where 
and  at  the  moment  when  the  germ  of  an  organic  being 
is  formed  amid  the  coherent  system  of  the  physical 
course  of  nature,  this  fact  furnishes  the  incitement  or 
moving  reason  which  induces  the  all-comprehending 
One  Being  to  beget  from  Himself,  besides,  as  a  con- 
sistent supplement  to  such  physical  fact,  the  soul 
belonging  to  this  organism.^ 
by^hfsdoc-  §  ^^'  ^he  explanation  of  this  theory  is  found  in  the 
soul!  ^^  ^^^  strange  view  Prof.  Ladd  holds  concerning  the  unity  of 
the  soul.  To  him  the  soul  is  a  potential  unity;  it 
has  the  potency  to  become  a  unit  and  does  so  by  a 
process  of  development.  Therefore  the  origin  of  this 
unity  is  explained  by  the  concurrence  of  the  activities 
which  go  to  form  it  into  a  specific  entity.  The  same 
criticism  which  showed  how  unfounded  and  contra- 
dictory this  assumption  was  can  be  applied  to  his 
explanation  of  the  origin  of  the  soul.     The  act  of 

8  Outl.  of  Psych.,  third  edition,  §  81 ;  cf.  Lotze  Outlines  of 
Psychology,  ed.  by  Prof.  Ladd,  p.   117. 


criticism. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  2X5 

consciousness  by  which  I  recognize  myself  as  a  think- 
ing being  does  not  make  me  so  in  fact.  I  was  a 
rational  creature  before,  and  consciousness  only 
testifies  to  the  fact. 

§  II.  He  seems  to  recognize  that  the  explanation  as 
such  is  insufficient  and  has  recourse  to  a  modified  view 
of  creation.  What  that  modified  view  is  and  how  it 
differs  from  the  Scholastic  theory,  he  fails  to  explain. 
What  his  purpose  is  in  recurring  to  the  "  order  of 
nature"  is  difficult  to  perceive.  If  he  means  that 
bodily  conditions  influence  the  manifestation  of  mind,  - 
he  is  undoubtedly  correct.  But  it  is  strange  that  he 
should  appeal  to  bodily  influence  or  the  development 
of  mind  in  a  question  which  wholly  concerns  its 
origin.  Such  an  appeal  in  the  present  case  betrays 
either  vagueness  and  incorrectness  of  thought,  or  a 
fallacy  of  reasoning.  Compelled  to  have  recourse  to 
God  for  the  rise  of  consciousness,  he  does  so  grudg- 
ingly by  a  modified  statement.  Yet  he  has  given  no 
reason  for  the  modification.  And  at  last,  to  add  to  his 
confusion,  he  seeks  refuge  in  an  opinion  of  Lotze, 
expressed  in  words  whose  plain  meaning  is  a  kind  of 
Divine  generationism. 

§  12.  The  manifestations  of  consciousness  or  of 
thought  are  the  efifect  of  the  mind  or  soul.  The  ques- 
tion at  issue  is  not  the  explanation  of  these  manifes- 
tations. The  aim  is  to  explain  the  origin  of  that 
being  which  produces  these  manifestations.  We  seek 
not  the  reason  of  the  efifect,  but  the  reason  of  the 
cause.  An  illustration  can  be  drawn  from  the  plant- 
world.  We  do  not  explain  the  origin  of  the  life  in  a 
plant  by  pointing  to  the  first  buds  or  blossoms.  It  is 
necessary  to  go  farther  back,  to  seek  in  the  seed,  which 
for  days  lay  in  the  ground,  dead  to  all  appearances, 


2l6  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

for  the  reason  of  that  activity  of  which  the  bud  and 
tendrils  are  only  the  manifestations.  So  likewise  for 
the  soul. 

•  IV. 
Theory  of  Evolution. 
§  13.  No  philosophical  theory  has  ever  made  the 
deep  and  widespread  impression  on  the  minds  of  men 
as  the  theory  of  Evolution.  Set  forth  by  Mr.  Darvvin 
in  1853,  it  immediately  acquires  a  wide  popularity.  It 
was  hailed  by  men  as  the  universal  solvent  of  all  the 
riddles  in  the  universe.  Broached  originally  as  a 
scientific  theor}^,  it  soon  assumed  a  philosophical 
aspect  by  an  attempt  to  solve  the  origin  of  things.  It 
was  supposed  to  explain  the  beginnings  of  life. 
And  in  the  hands  of  Mr.  Romanes  and  Mr.  Spencer  it 
was  elaborated  into  a  theory  which  was  considered 
capable  of  accounting  for  the  origin  of  thought.^ 
aim  of  Mr.  §14.  In  his  First  Principles,  Mr.  Spencer  aims  at 
shomng  that  all  phenomena,  even  those  of  life  and 
thought,  are  convertible,  and  thus  explain  all  things 
in  terms  of  matter  and  of  force.  In  the  Principles  of 
Psychology  he  applies  these  Principles  to  the  phe- 
nomena of  mind,  and  by  an  elaborate  process  attempts 
to  verify  them.^°  His  task  is  to  show  that  the 
phenomena  of  intelligence  came  from  instinct,  that 
instinct  is  developed  by  molecular  movements,  and 
thus  to  establish  a  unity  in  all  these  phenomena,  and 
a  continuity  in  their  development.^^ 

9  Cf.  S.  Augustine  de  Gen.  ad  Lit.  1.  VII,  n.  12,  13;  X,  n.  7. 

^^  P.  Tannery,  in  an  article  published  in  Rev.  Phil.,  March, 
1882,  p.  522,  contends  that  the  system  of  Spencer,  the  law  of 
rythme,  of  successive  integration  and  disintegration  is  noth- 
ing more  than  the  hypothesis  of  Anaximandre  on  a  little 
wider  basis,    cf.  de  Roberty  "La  Philosophie  du  siecle,"  p.  37. 

11  Cf.  Ribot  English  Psychology,  p.  124  sq.;  Spencer  Prin- 


Spencer. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  21*J 

§15.  He  thus  explains  the  process.  The  funda-^^^^^®^^- 
mental  trend  of  thought  with  Spencer  is  the  denial 
of  any  precise  line  of  demarkation  between  physio- 
logical and  psychological  facts,  between  the  physical 
and  the  mental.^^  Hence  there  is  a  continuous  series 
in  the  progression  of  life.  The  problem  of  Psychology 
is  to  determine  the  order  in  which  one  change  follows 
another;  i.  e.,  to  enunciate  and  explain  the  law  of 
intelligence.-^^ 

§  16.  The    law    of    intelligence    follows    successive  JUj^gnJ" 
phases  of  development,  e.  g.,  reflex  action,  instinct,  ^^^^^ 
thought  and  will.     Reflex  action  is  simply  molecular  action, 
motion ;   it   supposes   an   afferent   nerve,    an   efferent  sensation, 
fibre  and  a  centre.     Sensation  is  composite  because 
made    up   of   nervous    shocks.     The   combination    of 
nervous  shocks  into  a  unity  of  sensation  is  the  first 
integration  in  the  evolution  of  mind.     Instinct  is  reflex 
action   of  a   certain   complexity.     The   simple   reflex 
action   is   not  accompanied  by   consciousness.      This 
arises  from  the   complexity,   and  is   accordingly  ex- 
plained in  terms  of  mechanical  motion.^* 

§  17.  From  instinct  he  derives  reason.    The  process  ^®ason, 
is   explained    by   an    increase   in    the    complexity    of 
mental   states.     These   states   correspond   to   external 
relations,  and  as  they  increase  the  automatism  of  their 
movements  is  established  with  more  difficulty,  hence 

ciples  of  Psychology,  p.  349;  Guthrie  "Mr.  Spencer's  For- 
mula of  Evolution,"  1879,  and  "  Mr.  Spencer's  Unification  of 
Knowledge,"  1882. 

12  Prin.  of  Psych.,  p.  510. 

12  The  evolutionary  theory  of  soul  is  not  new.  S.  Augustine 
refers  to  it:  "  omne  quippe  corpus  in  omne  corpus  mutari 
posse,  credible  est;  quodlibet  antem  corpus  mutari  posse  in 
animam,  credere  absurdum  est."    de  Gen.  ad  lit.  1.  VII,  n.  26. 

1^  Cf.  C.  Morgan  Introd.  to  Comp.  Psychology,  ch.  XVIII, 
where  the  same  teaching  is  found. 
28 


2l8  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

the  action  no  longer  possesses  the  mechanical  infalli- 
bility of  instinct,  and  reason  is  the  result.  The  differ- 
ence between  instinct  and  reason  consists  in  this,  that 
the  acts  of  instinct  are  decisive  and  rapid,  whereas 
those  of  reason  are  slow  and  apparently  hesitating. 
But  he  adds  that  reason  can  be  transformed  into 
instinct  when  by  frequent  experience  groups  of  ex- 
ternal impressions  are  allied  to  groups  of  mental  states 
and  habits  result,  and  habits  are  acquired  instincts.  He 
thus  infers  that  higher  animals  possess  the  faculty  of 
special  reasoning,  that  man  possesses  the  faculty  of 
general  reasoning,  and  that  between  them  there  is  no 
distinction. 
iSredfty.  §  ^^-  ■'^^^  ^'^^^^^  explain  the  existence  of  the  necessary 
laws  and  forms  of  thought,  e.  g.,  first  principles  of 
reason,  which  exist  in  the  individual  mind  and  are  not 
acquired  by  experience?  Mr.  Spencer  attempts  the 
solution  of  this  difficulty,  and  proposes  a  theory  which 
is  peculiarly  his  ow^n.  He  sees  the  insufficiency  of 
evolution  and  supplements  it  by  the  law  of  heredity,-^^ 
He  holds  that  these  laws  and  forms  of  thought  are  the 
experiences  of  past  ages  accumulated  and  transmitted 
from  generation  to  generation.^^ 
i^iJii^*^  §  19-  Criticism:  (a)  Mr.  Spencer  speaks  of  a  unity 
the  unity.  ^^  shocks  to  make  a  sensation,  and  calls  instinct  a 
complex  group  of  shocks,  etc.  But  how  does  he 
explain  this  unity?  There  is  a  marvelous  harmony 
in  his  theory;  probably  this  is  its  most  attractive 
feature;    but  with   him  it  is  a  pure  and  gratuitous 

15  Cf.  Present  Day  Tracts,  No.  29,  "  Philosophy  of  H.  Spen- 
cer Examined,"  by  Rev.  J.  Iverach. 

1^  By  considering  what  is  «  prio7'i  in  the  individual  to  be  a 
posteriori  in  the  human  race,  Spencer  and  Lewes  depart  from 
J.  S.  Mill,  and  form  a  new  development  in  English  Psychol- 
ogy,    cf.  Courtney  Studies  in  Philosophy,  ch.  V. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  2ig 

assumption.  He  utterly  fails  to  tell  us  how  and  why 
it  is  so.  Is  it  due  to  an  innate  tendency  in  the  mole- 
cular motions?  He  cannot  admit  this,  because  he 
denies  every  vestige  of  finalty.^''  Is  it  due  to  a  co-ordi- 
nating principle?  He  is  silent  because  that  would 
constrain  him  to  admit  the  existence  of  a  soul.  Mr. 
Spencer  is  an  Associationist;  therefore  he  proposes 
a  Phenomenal  Psychology,  i.  e.,  mind  to  him  is  a 
series  of  states.  He  dififers  from  other  Phenomenalists 
only  in  the  systematic  effort  to  explain  this  series  by 
the  correlation  of  physical  forces.  The  strange  feature 
is  that  he  does  not  explain  the  unity  of  consciousness 
which  gives  harmony  to  the  mental  life.  Now  a  theory 
which  rests  upon  and  is  pervaded  throughout  by  an 
assumption  is  not  philosophical. 

§  20.  (b)  Instinct  is  not  the  outcome  of  reflex  action,  (b)  instinct 

•^  ^    ^  has  not  its 

At  most  we  admit  an  analogy  between  them.  How  ^ource  in 
can  reflex  action  explain  the  fact  that  chickens,  two  action, 
minutes  after  leaving  the  tgg,  will  watch  the  crawling 
worm  or  answer  the  hen's  call;  or  the  dread  in  some 
birds  of  the  hawk;  or  the  fact  that  birds  fly;  or  the 
devices  of  insects  to  protect  their  young  and  avoid 
danger  to  themselves.  Reflex  action  is  restricted  to 
the  present  act;  instinct  is  a  definite  plan  of  action 
which  embraces  the  present  and  the  future. 

§  21.  (c)  He  does  not  explain  the  origin  of  con-  (c)  origin 
sciousness.  He  admits  that  the  simplest  reflex  action  sciousness. 
is  not  accompanied  by  consciousness.  Where,  then 
and  how,  does  consciousness  arise?  If  the  develop- 
ment from  reflex  action  to  instinct  and  to  reason  is 
carried  on  in  the  same  plan,  then  consciousness  should 
also  be  found  in  the  nervous  action  contrary  to  Mr. 

^^  Mr.     Morgan    admits    a    "  selective    synthesis "    in  the 
grouping.    Cf.  Intr.  to  Comp.  Psych.,  p.  351. 


220  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

Spencer's  express  statement.  As  it  is  not,  it  must  have 
arisen  at  some  stage  of  the  evolution.^^ 

of  con-^^^        W  Nor  does  he  explain  the  unity  of  consciousness. 

sciousness.  ^q^q  indivisible  unit-element  is  necessary  to  focus,  as 
it  were,  all  these  impressions.  But  in  the  hypothesis 
of  Mr.  Spencer  there  is  no  such  unifying  force.  The 
attempt  to  explain  this  unity,  after  the  analogy  of  the 
composition  of  Physical  forces  is  a  failure.^^  The  unity 
of  many  elements  explains  the  quantity  of  the  sensa- 
tion, but  consciousness  is  something  differing  in  quality 
from  a  nervous  shock.  He  says  consciousness  implies 
a  change  in  the  subject; 'but  he  does  not  tell  what  the 
change  is,  and  forgets  that  a  subject  cannot  undergo  a 
change  unless  we  admit  in  it  a  permanent  element.^ 

notion°o?  ^22  (e)  To  Spencer  mind  is  passive;  it  is  a  group- 
ing of  impressions.^  But  this  is  not  true.  The  mind 
is  an  active  agency.  Consciousness  testifies  to  this 
truth.  How  can  a  passive  group  of  impressions  under 
the  action  of  physical  force  explain  the  boundless  range 
of  the  intellect  or  the  existence  of  a  moral  law  binding 
on  all.  The  imperative  command  of  duty  in  face  of 
opposition  and  contrary   to    utility   is   not   a   passive 

18  "  The  history  of  speculation  has  sufficiently  shown  that 
all  theories  which  make  consciousness  ultimately  dependent 
upon  the  evolution  of  unconscious  forms  of  existence,  succeed 
only  by  smuggling  into  their  explanations  something  which 
the  very  essentials  of  the  theories  require  them  to  leave  out." 
G.  Ladd  "  Consciousness  and  Evolution"  in  Psych.  Rev., 
1896,  p.  298. 

19  Cf.  Lotze  Psychology,  ed.  by  Prof.  Ladd,  p.  94.  Mr. 
Huxley  is  more  modest  than  Mr.  Spencer.  In  contending 
that  the  organic  is  the  development  of  the  inorganic  he  bids 
us  "  recollect  that  science  has  put  her  foot  upon  the  bottom 
round  of  the  ladder."     cf.  Huxley  Origin  of  Species  HI. 

20  Cf.  Guthrie  Spencer's  Unification  of  Knowledge,  p.  155. 

21  Prin.  of  Psych.,  vol.  I,  p.  626. 


mind. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  221 

state  of  physical  forces.  Nor  is  there  any  exact 
equivalence  between  the  impression  and  the  thought 
as  he  maintains.^^  He  seems  never  to  have  perceived 
the  real  nature  of  substance  and  thus  fails  to  grasp  the 
true  meaning  of  mind. 

§  23  (f)  The  theory  of  heredity  puts  back  the  prob-  ^9,*^®^^.? 
lem,  but  does  not  solve  it.  Even  granting  that  hered-  does  not 
ity  may  explain  the  fact  that  I  have  necessary  forms 
of  thought  prior  to  experiences,  how  will  it  account  for 
the  first  possession  of  these  principles?  How  can 
heredity  explain  the  commencement  of  the  difference 
between  man  and  ape?  The  meaning  of  the  word 
"  heredity  "  is  "  transmission,"  not  "  acquisition." 

§  24.  Again  his  theory  of  heredity  as  applied  to  mind 
is  gratuitous.  It  implies  that  there  is  no  distinction 
between  sensation  and  thought,  between  mind  and 
matter.  This  is  absolutely  false.  It  is  a  refined  form 
of  Materialism,  and  Materialism  as  a  theory  is  in  oppo- 
sition to  known  facts.  Again,  how,  according  to  the 
theory  of  heredity,  can  we  explain  the  great  difference 
between  children  of  the  same  parents?  Or  how  account 
for  the  fact  that  men  of  great  ability  fail  to  transmit 
their  accumulated  experiences  to  their  children?  Mind 
is  not  the  product  of  individual  or  of  race  experience. 
How  explain  the  creations  of  poet,  artist,  musician? 
Experience  gives  the  stimulus  of  mental  activity;  but 
in  the  mind  itself  there  is  a  creative  and  masterful 
power  which  moulds  and  fashions  experience  to  finer 
forms  and  vaster  issues.^^ 

22  Cf.  Chapter  on  Brain  and  Thought. 

23  Cf.  Welch  "Faith  and  Modern  Thought,"  p.  41  sq.;  T. 
Green  in  Contem.  Rev.  beginning  Dec,  1877;  J.  Caird  Introd. 
to  Phil,  of  ReHg.,  p.  10  sq.;  Bowne  Phil,  of  H.  Spencer,  1874. 


222 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


(a)  from 
nature  of 
the  soul. 


Soul  is 
subsistent. 


(b)  soul  is 
spiritual. 


c)  from 
refutation 
of  other 
theories. 


V. 

Theory  of  Creation. 

§  25.  This  is  the  theory  of  Scholastic  Philosophy. 
St.  Thomas  sums  up  the  arguments  for  it.^  The  rea- 
sons are  drawn  from  the  nature  of  the  soul,  (a)  The 
soul  cannot  owe  its  existence  to  pre-existing  matter. 
It  is  a  spiritual  entity  capable  of  existing  independent 
of  matter.  Hence  no  necessary  intrinsic  dependence 
on  matter.  This  consideration  has  the  more  force 
when  we  bear  in  mind  that  St.  Thomas  proposes  the 
subsistence  of  the  human  soul  as  a  distinctive  charac- 
teristic, marking  it  off  from  the  souls  of  brutes.  They, 
he  contends,  are  transmitted  by  generation,  because 
they  depend  on  matter  and  are  involved  in  matter.  Not 
so,  however,  the  human  soul. 

§  26.  (b)  Again  he  maintains  that  it  is  impossible 
for  a  material  force  to  extend  its  activity  so  far  as  to 
produce  an  spiritual  effect.  The  intellective  principles 
in  man,  i.  e.,  the  soul,  entirely  transcend  matter. 
Hence  the  mind  or  soul  must  come  from  another 
source,  i.  e.,  creation.^  (c)  Finally  the  theory  of  Crea- 
tion receives  strength  from  the  refutation  of  the  other 
explanations  advanced  for  the  origin  of  the  soul.  They 
cannot  be  held.  Known  facts  and  sound  reasoning 
are  against  them.  Hence  their  rejection  can  be  con- 
sidered as  a  negative  argument  in  favor  of  Creation.^ 


2^  C.  Gent.  Ill,  ch.  83-87;  Summa  Theol.  I,  q.  90,  a  2;  q.  118, 
a  2. 

25  Cf.  Aristotle  De  Gener.  Anim.  12  03;  Cicero  Tuscul.  Dis- 
put.  1.  I,  27. 

26  Aug.  Contra  Fortum,  n.  12,  13;  de  actis  cum  Felice,  1.  2, 
n.  XX;  De  An.  et  ejus  Origine  1.  I,  n.  24;  Ep.  166,  n.  8;  Ep. 
190,  al.  157  ad  Optatum;  de  quant,  an.,  n.  2;  de  Gen.  ad  Lit. 
L.  VII,  X. 


IMMORTALITY. 

§  I.  The  Immortality  of  the  soul  is  a  theme  which 
possesses  a  singular  and  fascinating-  power.  It  has 
inspired  some  of  the  most  beautiful  passages  in  litera- 
ture; it  awakens  great  and  noble  thoughts,  and  rouses 
to  a  consciousness  of  our  dignity;  it  has  strengthened 
the  soul  to  attempt  sublime  deeds  of  heroism.  The 
hope  that  somehow  after  death  man  shall  yet  live  on 
lies  deep  in  the  breast  of  the  savage,  brings  comfort 
and  strength  to  the  heavy  labors  of  lowly  life,  or  shines 
like  a  beacon  of  Hght  and  cheer  on  the  solitary  medi- 
tations of  the  student.  Belief  in  Immortality  is  indis- 
solubly  connected  with  our  notions  of  God,  of  morality, 
with  our  convictions  of  moral  freedom,  of  the  sacred- 
ness  of  Right,  of  the  majesty  of  Truth.  We  shall  here 
investigate  the  nature  and  the  grounds  of  this  beHef. 

I. 

Method. 
§  2.  The  belief  in  Immortality  finds  expression  in 
many  forms.  Various  also  are  the  considerations  pro- 
posed by  different  thinkers  as  reasons  for  the  faith 
that  is  in  them.  The  method  to  be  followed,  therefore, 
considers  the  question  under  all  aspects  and  draws 
from  all  sources  of  knowledge.  Literature,  the  mirror 
of  thought,  reflects  the  varied  forms  in  which  the 
human  mind  clothed  its  belief  that  the  soul  was  immor- 
tal. History,  Philosophy,  Psychology,  Ethics,  the 
Physical  sciences,  each  has  its  own  considerations 
which  serve  as  proofs  or  as  analogies  to  substantiate 
this  conviction. 


224  CHRISTIAN    PHILdSOPHY. 

11. 

Theories. 

of.Mate^^^       §  3-  (i°)  Materialism  assumes  that  matter  and  force 
nahsm.      ^lone  exist,  that  at  most  the  soul  is  only  an  organic 
function  of  the  brain.     Hence  it  concludes  that  this 
life  is  all;  that  beyond  the    grave    there    is    nothing. 
Many  reasons  can  be  given  to  account  for  the  fact  that 
some  have  denied  the  life  after  death, 
rtlson  of        §  4-  (a)  There  is  the  reason  alleged  by  the   free- 
ThinkerT    thinker.     His  consists  in  a  protest  against  false,  exag- 
gerated or  superstitious  views  of  revealed    religion. 
The  result  is  a  revolt  from  revealed  truth  and  a  fall  to 
the  other  extreme  of  hostility  and  total  unbelief.    The 
notion  of  a  future  life,  therefore,  becomes  a  myth  or 
fiction  of  the  mind.     To  maintain  that  we  shall  live 
after  death  would  be  to  hold  some  element  of  religious 
behef.i 
(b)  worldly      §  5-  (b)  The   reason   of   the  worldly-minded  comes 
also  as  a  protest.    To  them  the  future  life  is  clouded 
with  dread  and  gloom.     Its  belief  means  a  restraint 
upon  the  pleasures  and  joys  of  life.    Happiness  is  thus 
destroyed  and  life  is  not  worth  living.    Hence  life  after 
death  is  rejected  as  something  visionary;  the  present 
alone  is  real;  and  the  aim  should  be  to  catch  the  pleas- 
ures of  the  fleeting  day.     This  is  the  position  of  the 
Epicure  in  ancient  as  in  modern  times.    It  appears  in 
the  poetry  of  Horace  as  well  as  that  of  Heine. 
Cc)  ^^^^  a       §  6.  (c)  There  are  those  whose  low  degraded  life  has 
i^6"  quenched   the   hope   of  immortality.     This   happens 

either  because  a  life  given  over  to  sensual  pleasures 

1  Cf.  Bowen  Materialism  and  Eth.  Science,  p.  2,  chapter  9; 
Courtney  Future  States. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  225 

carries  its  own  curse;  the  body  becomes  surfeited  and 
falls  a  prey  to  disease;  the  misery  of  existence  itself 
becomes  unbearable;  death  is  looked  to  as  the  end  of 
all  and  as  such  is  hailed  a  blessing.  Or  the  mind  and 
heart  made  beastly  by  sensualism  give  no  intimation, 
emit  not  the  faintest  beam  of  another  life.  Their 
higher,  nobler  nature  has  been  deadened  by  inter- 
course with  what  is  lowest  and  most  vile. 

§  7.  (d)  Scientific      Materiahsm,      however,      seeks  (d)  scien- 
^ '     ^  ^  '  '  tific  Mate- 

stronger  and  more  cogent  arguments.    Thus  they  con-  riaiism. 

tend  that  the  soul  is  not  a  separate  entity;  that  what  we 

call  the  soul  is  only  the  result  of  the  combination  of 

brain-cells   and   cerebral  activities.     Hence  with  the 

death  of  the  body,  these  elements  or  parts  separate, 

and  in  consequence  the  soul  vanishes.^    This  reasoning 

has  been  shown  to  be  false.^     Consciousness  testifies 

that  the  soul  is  a  substantial  entity.    Its  unity  is  not  a 

collection  of  parts.^ 

§  8.  (e)  Finally  resort  is  had  to  the  fact  that  death  (e)  death 
is  to  all  appearances  the  end  of  individual  existence,  aif.^'^ 
We  admit  that  with  death  the  body  dissolves  into  dust. 
The  problem,  however,  concerns  not  the  body  but  the 
soul.  To  assume  the  death  of  the  soul,  from  the  actual 
dissolution  of  the  body  is  a  fallacy,  which  in  Logic  is 
termed  ''  begging  the  question." 

§  9.  The  theory  of  materialism  has  been  called  the  ^J^JjJ^^"^ 
theory  of  Annihilation.     It  is  to  be  rejected  because  theory. 
the  principles  from  which  it  springs  are  false.    Mater- 
ialism, as  has  been  shown,  is  not  a  rational  or  satisfac- 
tory theory  of  life.    It  is  a  partial  and  one-sided  view. 
In  attempting  to  solve  the  problems  of  human  life,  it 

2  Cf.  Dr.  Mandsley  Physiology  and  Pathology  of  Mind. 
2  Cf.  Substantiality  of  Soul. 
*  Cf.  Simplicity  of  Soul. 

29  ;1 


226 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


S°  Theory 
of  Panthe- 
ism. 


criticism 
of  this 
Theory. 


8°  Scepti- 
cism. 


destroys  the  highest,  nobl.st  attribtites  of  man,  and 
presents  as  the  result  a  mutilated  humanity. 

2°.  Pantheism. 

§  10.  Pantheism  denies  the  existence  of  the  indi- 
vidual soul.  It  admits  that  there  is  in  us  a  divine 
something.  This  divine  self  is  an  emanation  from  or  a 
transient  phase  of  the  one  great  Soul  which  envelops 
all  and  is  all.  Just  as  the  ripples  sink  into  the  calm 
surface  of  the  lake;  just  as  my  breath  is  part  of  and 
mingles  with  the  atmosphere  which  envelops  me,  so 
my  soul  melts  into  or  fades  into  the  all-pervading 
Spirit.^ 

§  II.  This  theory  keeps  the  shadow  of  the  soul  and 
the  vesture  of  immortality.  But  if  death  brings  a  loss 
of  consciousness;  if  I  am  no  longer  a  person  with  the 
capacity  to  enjoy  a  rational  existence;  then  there  is  no 
future  life  for  me.  Death  means  the  end  for  me;  what- 
ever survives,  it  is  not  /.  This  differs  from  annihila- 
tion only  in  name.  Again  this  theory  is  a  false  presen- 
tation of  what  is  true.  We  come  from  God,  but  not  as 
parts  of  His  substance  nor  as  manifestations  or  modes 
of  His  essense.  The  soul  is  destined  to  return  to  God 
and  reach  the  fullness  of  happiness  by  union  with  Him, 
but  this  union  is  not  an  absorption  into  God's  essence, 
nor  does  it  infer  a  loss  of  consciousness.  Christian 
Theodicy  sets  forth  the  true  nature  of  our  dependence 
on  God.  The  theory  of  Pantheism  has  been  called  the 
theory  of  Absorption.  It  differs  in  name  only  from  the 
Materialistic  hypothesis. 

3°.  Scepticism. 
§  12.  Another  theory,  or  rather  aspect  of  Immortal- 
ity is  presented  by  Scepticism.     It  maintains  that  we 

5  Cf.  Emerson,  Schleiermacher. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  227 

cannot  prove  a  future  life,  therefore,  that  the  proper 
and  rational  state  of  mind  on  such  a  question  is  one 
of  doubt  and  suspense.  Allusion  is  made  to  the  modern 
spirit  of  scepticism.  The  generation  which  is  now 
passing  has  been  deeply  imbued  with  its  fatal  poison. 
It  has  blighted  minds  of  great  gifts  and  promises;  it 
has  lowered  the  standard  of  life;  it  has  brought  unhap- 
piness  and  gloom  to  many  a  heart. 

§  13.  Thus  J.  S.  Mill  in  summing  up  his  criticism  of  ^^^  headers, 
the  proofs  for  immortahty  calmly  declares  that  there  J  s.  Mm. 
is  no  clear  evidence  for  or  against.^    Mr.  Emerson  tells  Mr.Emer- 

^  son. 

US  that  man  fails  in  attempting  to  teach  separately  the 
doctrine  of  Immortality;  that  from  the  very  nature  of 
man  a  veil  shuts  down  on  the  facts  of  to-morrow.''  Mr. 
Matthew  Arnold  holds  that  belief  in  Immortality  is  in 
excess  of  the  evidence.    To  him  death  is 

The  stern  law  of  every  mortal  lot 
Which  man,  proud  man,  finds  hard  to  bear, 
And  builds  himself,  I  know  not  what 
Of  second  life,  I  know  not  where.^ 

The  poems  of  Tennyson  show  that  its  influence  had  Tennyson, 
hold  on  his  mind.^ 

But  what  am  I? 
An  infant  crying  in  the  night; 
An  infant  crying  for  the  light; 
And  with  no  language  but  a  cry. 

Here  and  there,  however,  signs  of  a  returning  hope 
are  seen.  The  gloom  of  doubt  hangs  over  the  writings 
of  Carlyle  and  Froude,^^  of  Morley  and  Renan.     The 

^  Cf.  Mill  Three  Essays  on  Religion,  p.  197  sq. 
^  Cf.  Emerson  Essays,  "  the  Over-Soul." 
^  Cf.  Hutton  Modern  Guides  of  English  Thought  in  Mat- 
ters of  Faith,  p.  125. 
9  Cf.  In  Mem.  54. 
i"^  Cf.  Essay  on  Progress;  the  Nemesis  of  Faith. 


228  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

French  novel  of  Zola,  of  Manpassant;  of  Daudet,"  of 
Bourget,  ex.  gr.,  *'Mensonges;"  have  helped  to  spread 
its  influence.^2  It  is  revealed  in  the  work  of  Thomas 
Hardy,  of  Mrs.  H.  Ward's  ''  Robert  Elsmere,"  and  of 
G.  Eliot's  "  Middlemarch."  ^^ 

HI. 

Substitutes  for  Immortality. 

§  14.  The  hope  of  a  life  beyond  the  grave  is  too 
deeply  imbedded  in  the  soul  of  man  to  be  totally  eradi- 
cated.    The  voice  of  human  nature  will  make  itself 
heard.     Immortality  is   only  the   expression   of  that 
longing  and  hope  for  better  things  than  what  this  life 
affords.     If  the  true  conception  of  Immortality  is  de- 
nied, man  is  constrained  to  invent  some  artificial  sub- 
stitute, 
(a)  immor-      §  15.  Thus  (a)  some  base  Immortality  on  the  scien- 
themate-    tific  truth  of  the  Conservation  and  indestructibility  of 
ments  of     matter.    They  maintain  that  all  things  possess  immor- 
al Cf.  "The  Ave  Maria,"  Jan.  29,  1898,  p.  150. 
^  Cf.  "  Neo-Christian  Movement  in  France,"  in  Amer.  Jour, 
of  Psych.,  1892-93,  p.  496. 

12 "  I  remember,"  writes  Mr.  Myers  in  an  essay  on  G. 
Eliot,  "  how  at  Cambridge  I  walked  with  her  once 
in  the  Fellows'  Garden  of  Trinity,  on  an  evening  of  rainy 
May,  and  she,  stirred  somewhat  beyond  her  wont,  and  taking 
as  her  text  the  three  words  which  have  been  used  so  often  as 
the  inspiring  trumpet-calls  of  men  —  the  words  God,  Immor- 
tality, Duty  —  pronounced,  with  terrible  earnestness,  how  in- 
conceivable was  the  first,  how  unbelieveable  was  the  second^ 
and  yet  how  peremptory  and  absolute  the  third.  Never,  per- 
haps, had  sterner  accents  affirmed  the  sovereignty  of  imper- 
sonal and  unrecompensing  law.  I  listened,  and  night  fell; 
her  grave,  majestic  countenance  turned  towards  me  like  a 
Sybil's  in  the  gloom;  it  was  as  though  she  withdrew  from  my 
grasp,  one  by  one,  the  two  scrolls  of  promise,  and  left  me  the 
third  scroll  only,  awful  with  inevitable  fate."  cf.  Hutton 
Modern  Guides  of  English  Thought  in  Matters  of  Faith, 
p.  271. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  229 

tality,  in  this  sense  that  the  elements  are  never  de- 
stroyed, but  constantly  combine  into  new  forms. 
Hence  the  individual  disintegrates,  but  the  elements 
of  his  being  enter  into  other  combinations.  Nature 
presents  the  constant  and  unending  process  of  redinte- 
grations and  recreations.  Man  himself  comes  under 
the  sway  of  the  universal  law.  He  is  part  of  the 
totality  of  being.-^^ 

§  1 6.  (b)  Others    confound    Immortalitv    with    the  Cb)  of  the 

'^  \    y  ^  conserva- 

scientific  truth  of  the  conservation  of  Energy.     To  tion  of 

.     enei-gy. 

them  man  is  a  certain  force;  this  force  is  the  sum  of  his 
character  and  his  life ;  it  is  manifested  in  every  thought 
and  action.  His  activity  shall  never  die,  but  shall  go 
on  exerting  its  influence  on  the  course  of  subsequent 
history.  Thus  a  good  or  bad  act,  a  good  or  bad  Hfe 
have  physical  effects  in  uplifting  or  lowering  the  lives 
of  those  who  are  my  contemporaries  and  through 
them  influence  those  who  shall  come  after  me.  The 
influence  of  my  life  shall  ever  go  on  and  shall  never 
cease.  In  this  sense,  therefore,  they  contend  that  man 
is  immortal. 

§  17.  (c)  Closely  akin  to  this  view  is  the  teaching  of  ^^^tfdhism. 
Buddhism.  Orthodox  Buddhism  maintains  that  man 
has  no  soul  in  our  sense  of  the  word.^^  Nevertheless  it 
must  offer  some  sanction  for  a  good  Hfe,  and  on  the 
other  hand  would  do  violence  to  human  nature  if  it  did 
not  preserve  some  shadow  of  a  future  existence. 
Hence  the  doctrine  of  Karma. 

§  18.  Karma  is  not  a  separate  entity.     It  is  another  Karma, 
word  for  moral  character ;  it  is  the  sum  of  all  the  moral 
activities  and  influences  which  have  shaped  my  Hfe. 
Death  causes  the  dissolution  of  the  body.     My  body 

14  Cf.  Lucretius  De  Nat.  Rerum  III,  No.  78. 
1^  Cf.  Chapter  on  Substantiality  of  the  Soul. 


230  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

no  longer  exists,  but  on  this  account  I  do  not  cease  to 
live.  My  character,  the  influences  which  have  formed 
and  moulded  me  into  an  individual  distinct  from  other 
men  —  in  a  word,  my  Karma  yet  lives  on.  The  mo- 
ment it  is  freed  from  this  present  existence  by  the  dis- 
solution of  the  body,  it  enters  in  all  its  totality  into 
another  corporal  existence  lower  or  higher  in  the  scale 
of  being  according  as  my  hfe  has  been  bad  or  good. 
In  the  former  view,  my  character  or  moral  influence 
was  scattered  with  death  and  mingled  with  the  totality 
of  force  in  its  perpetual  motion.  According  to  the 
teaching  of  Buddhism,  however,  my  character  whole 
and  entire  enters  into  and  determines  some  new  indi- 
vidual form  of  being.  This  teaching  can  be  well 
termed  the  Transmigration  of  character,  and  is  a 
shadow  of  the  Transmigration  of  soul,  a  doctrine  held 
by  Brahmanism  from  which  Buddhism  sprang, 
(d)  immor-      §  iQ.  (d)  Finally  there  is  the  immortalitv  of  sflory 

talityof  ,    ^,     ^    ^      ,  ^  .  .  1-       ',  1 

glory.  and  of  a  good  name.  As  poets  immortalize  themselves 
in  song;  as  heroes  by  their  glorious  deeds;  so  should 
we  by  a  noble  Hfe  seek  a  name  that  shall  live  forever. 
The  great  and  good  Hfe  we  led  wih  exert  the  moral 
influence  of  example  on  those  who  come  after,  and 
generations  yet  unborn  will  rise  up  to  caU  us  blessed.^^ 
nKfrtaSty  §  ^o.  This  is  the  immortaHty  of  Positivism.  Thus 
itMsni.  Compte  contends  that  "  Positivism  greatly  improves 
immortality  and  places  it  in  a  firmer  foundation  by 
changing  it  from  objective  to  subjective;  this  sub- 
jective immortality,  he  says,  exists  in  the  brains  of  the 
living.^^  The  immortality  of  character  is  weH  put  by 
G.  Eliot. 

16  Cf.  Cic.  Ques.  Tusc.  bl,  ch.  14,  15. 

17  Cf.   Compte   Catec.   of   Positiv.    ReHg.    con.   3;    A   Posi- 
tivist  Primer,  by  C.  G.  David,  p.  18. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  23I 

Oh,  may  I  join  the  choir  invisible 

Of  those  immortal  dead  who  live  again 

In  minds  made  better  by  their  presence;  live 

In  pulses  stirred  to  generosity, 

In  deeds  of  daring  rectitude,  in  scorn 

For  miserable  aims  that  end  with  self, 

In  thoughts  sublime  that  pierce  the  night  like  stars, 

And  with  their  mild  persistence  urge  men's  search 

To  vaster  issues.     So  to  live  is  heaven, ^^ 

IV. 

The  Fact. 
§21.  It  is  not  necessary  to  make  an  assumption  in 

The  basis 

the  effort  to  prove  the  immortality  of  the  soul.     The  of  our 
basis  of  our  reasoning  is  a  fact.     This  fact  becomes  the  for  immor- 
strongest  of  arguments  when  thrown  into  logical  form.  Ait^ 
It  may  be  thus  stated:    It  is  a  fact  that  all  nations,  at 
all  times,  have  always  believed  in  the  existence  of  the 
soul  after  death.    This  belief  prevails  among  the  most 
civilized  as  well  as  among  barbarous  nations.^^     The 
progress  of  education  and  the  march  of  civilization  far 
from  destroying  only  strengthens  and  perfects  the  be- 
lief.   It  is  a  belief  inseparably  connected  with  the  moral 
and  religious  convictions  of  mankind.^" 

§  22.  Now  it  is  a  law  of  sound  reasoning  that  a  con- 
viction concerning  a  moral  or  religious  truth,  which  m^nf? J"^ 
has  always  prevailed  among  all  peoples,  which  grows  "^^^®^- 

1^  Legend  of  Jubal, 

1^  Cf.  Cicero  Disp.  Tusc.  I ;  Tyler  "  Primitive  Culture,  vol. 
I,  p.  425:  II,  p.  18;  H.  Spencer  First  Principles,  p.  4,  13; 
Chateaubriand  Genius  of  Christianity  B  VI,  ch.  III. 

20 "  However  degraded  these  people  may  be,  there  is  no 
need  telling  them  of  the  existence  of  God  or  of  a  future  life. 
These  two  truths  are  universally  admitted  in  Africa.  If  we 
speak  to  them  of  a  dead  man,  they  reply  '  He  is  gone  to 
God.'  "  Livingstone  Explorations  in  S.  Africa.  Quatrefages, 
commenting  on  this,  says:  "All  the  testimony  collected  upon 
points  the  most  remote  by  different  travelers  confirm  this." 
cf.  Quatrefages  "The  Pigmies,  ch.  VII;  "The  Human 
Species,"  "  Hommes  Fossiles  et  Hommes  Sauvages." 


232 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


objection 
that  na- 
tions differ 
in  their 
concep- 
tions of  a 
future  life. 


objection 
that  indi- 
viduals 
have  de- 
nied im- 
mortality. 


Stronger  with  the  advance  of  civilization,  is  not  due  to 
a  temporary  or  accidental  cause,  but  must  have  a  rea- 
son for  its  existence  as  sound  and  as  universal  as  the 
belief  itself;  and  that  this  reason  can  be  no  other  than 
our  common  human  nature.  Therefore,  the  belief  in 
immortality,  inasmuch  as  it  possesses  all  these  charac- 
teristics is  the  voice  and  the  heritage  of  our  own  com- 
mon humanity. 

§  23.  It  is  by  no  means  true,  however,  to  hold  that 
all  peoples  have  held  the  same  conceptions  of  the 
future  life.  A  cursory  acquaintance  with  literature 
and  history  shows  that  the  contrary  is  the. case.  Thus 
the  Elysium  of  Homer  and  Virgil  ^^  difters  totally  from 
the  Paradise  of  Dante.^^  The  happy  hunting-ground 
of  the  American  Indian  is  not  the  Wandalla  of  the 
Norseman  or  the  future  state  of  the  Egyptian.-^  These 
differences  are  due  to  the  accidental  causes  of  temper- 
ment,  of  occupations  during  life,  etc.,  and  with  Dante 
to  the  light  of  Christian  Theology.  Nevertheless  the 
same  universal  fact,  that  we  live  after  death,  prevails 
throughout. 

§  24.  Nor  is  the  strength  of  the  argument  weakened 
by  the  assertion  that  some  have  denied  a  future  life. 
We  contend  only  for  a  moral  universality.  This  admits 
the  possibility  of  individual  exceptions.  Individuals 
have  been  found  who  from  one  reason  or  another 
have  refused  to  believe  in  immortality.  Their  isolated 
stand  only  emphasizes  the  fact  that  all  others  do  accept 
it.  iNIoreover,  in  denying  the  true  conception,  they 
are  constrained  to  hold  a  substitute.  They  cannot  blot 
it  completely  from  their  lives. 


21  Cf.  Odyssy  B  XI:  Eneid  B  V. 

22  Paradise  XXXIII. 

23  Cf.  Book  of  the  Dead. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  233 

§  25,  A  difficulty  of  more  weight  is  the  contention  ^hirna^^ 
advanced  that  there  have  been  nations  who  have  not  ^^^1^.^^^ 
beheved  in  a  future  state.     Two  instances,  e.  g.,  the  i^^^orj^j. 
Jews  of  the  Old  Testament  and  the  Buddhists,  have  ^^y- 
been  cited.     Upon  examination,   however,   it  will  be 
found  that  this  objection  has  more  apparent  than  real 
force. 

1°.  The  lezvs. 

§  26.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Jews,  from  the  time  examined 
of  the  captivity,  have  believed  in  a  fifture  state  after  t^e  Jews 
death.    The  writings  of  the  period  give  unmistakable  captivity^ 
traces  of  this  belief.     The  contention  is  that  the  Jews 
before  that  time  had  no  such  conviction;  that  the  new 
doctrine  was  learned  from  other  nations.^^ 

§  27.  Nevertheless  a  careful  study  presents  reasons  (i)  from 

1-1  1      •      1-  1        r  11     •  intercourse 

which  strongly  mclme  to  the  fact  that  at  all  times  the  of  Jews 
Jews  held  the  same  belief.    Thus  (i)  Moyses  is  said  to  Egyptians, 
have  been  well  versed  in  the  learning  of  the  Egyptians 
and  we  have  indubitable  evidence  that  the  Egyptians 
held  the  existence  of  a  future  state.     (2)  It  is  hard  to  je^vs^were 
suppose  that  God  would  have  left  them.  His  chosen  §?osen 
people,  in  ignorance  of  a  truth  which  has  so  important  p^^p^®- 
a  bearing-  on  dailv  life,     (i)  Express  mention  is  made  C3)  the 

01,  "  ..;,.,,  Sadduces 

of  the  Sadduces  as  a  sect  which  denied  the  resurrec-  denied  this 

tion.     Now  how  can  we  explain  the  fact  that  a  few 

only,  and  for  unsound  reasons,  denied  future  existence, 

while  the  rest  of  the  Jews  held  the  belief,  unless  for 

the  same  reasons  which  account  for  the  prevalence  of 

the  doctrine  with  other  peoples.     (4)  In  the  early  books  the  pas- 

of  the  Bible  there  are  indications  which  assure  us  that  iariy 

belief  in  a  future  state  was  common.     Thus  divination 

is  severely  prohibited  f^  Saul  is  instanced  calling  up  the 

24  Cf.  Mallock  "  Is  Life  Worth  Living,"  p.  27. 
25Deut.  XVIII:  Leviticus  XX. 
30 


234  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

witch  of  Endor;^^  the  patriarchs  are  "gathered  to  their 
people  "  and  "  buried  with  their  fathers." 
jews^^  §  27.  (5)  It  is  true  that  in  the  Pentateuch  temporal 

tateJfch^^"  blessings  and  menaces  are  the  sanction  for  the  observ- 
Theocmcy.  ^^^^c  of  the  law.  But  we  must  remember  that  the 
Jewish  nation  of  the  time  was  a  Theocracy.  Hence 
the  temporal  promises  or  punishments  were  addressed 
not  to  the  individual,  but  to  the  nation  as  a  whole.  A 
nation's  prosperity  and  destiny  are  earthly;  so  like- 
wise are  its  laws  and  means  of  government.  To 
transfer  these  to  the  individual  would  be  an  egregious 
error.  ■ 
The  con-  §  28.  The    conclusion    therefore    is    beyond    doubt. 

elusion.  '^  ^         ^  _  -^  ^ 

Only  a  partial  view  or  falsification  of  facts  could  induce 
the  statement  that  the  Jews  of  ancient  times  denied  a 
future  life. 

2°.  Buddhism. 

Buddhists!       It  IS  uccessary  to  draw  a  distinction  between  the 
tinction      philosophical   creed   of   Buddhism   and   the    common 
creed  of      belief  of  Buddliists  themselves.     To  confound  one  with 
and  the  ^   the  Other  is  to  commit  a  logical  blunder  and  open  the 
Buddhists,  way  for  confusion  and  error.   The  goal  of  Buddhism  is 
Meaning  of  Nirvana.  The  philosophical  meaning  of  the  term  is  dis- 
puted.    Some  writers  incline  to  the  view  that  it  means 
total  extinction  of  life  or  being.     Others,  e.  g.,  Cole- 
brooke,^^  Wilson,  Hodgson,  Vans  Kennedy,  Williams,^'^ 
maintain     that    it    is    a    state     of     apathetic     calm. 
Prof.  Davids,^^  Kellogg^"  and  Childers,^^  however,  say 

26 1.  Kings,  XXIV,  7. 

27  Essays. 

28  Buddhism. 

29  Cf.  Buddhism. 

30  The  Light  of  Asia  and  the  Light  of  the  World. 

31  Pali  Dictionary. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  235 

that  Nirvana  sometimes  means  a  mental  state  of  abso- 
lute calm  attainable  in  this  life,  a  state  which  infallibly 
issues  into  total  and  everlasting  extinction  of  being, 
i.  e.,  into  Parinirvana.  Finally  some,  e.  g.,  Brahmo- 
Somaj,  by  Nirvana  mean  the  peace  and  rest  which 

comes  from  the  subjection  and  conquest  of  carnal 
self.^2 

§  30.  But  if  we  examine  the  practical  belief  of  the  Bucfdhists. 
Buddhists  themselves,  there  is  no  doubt  that  they 
accept  the  doctrine  of  a  future  life.  Gotama  himself, 
who  preached  the  gospel  of  annihilation,  is  worshipped 
as  a  God.  The  heaven  of  the  Buddhist  is  an  abode 
with  Buddha,  attainable  after  a  long  series  of  transmi- 
grations. Their  descriptions  of  it  are  very  fanciful  and 
often  ludicrous.  Nevertheless  it  is  a  contribution 
which  swells  the  universal  accord  in  the  existence  of 
another  life.  Thus  Max  Muller  sa3''s :  "  Even  if  Nir- 
vana, in  its  original  meaning,  were  an  utter  blank,  then 
out  of  that  very  nothing  human  nature  made  a  new 
Paradise." '' 

§  31.  Plence  we  may  safely  conclude  to  the  fact  that  of^the^^*°° 
belief  in  the  immortality  of  the  soul  is  universal.     But  Sfm^ni* 
this  universal  belief  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  fact  ^®^^^^  ^^^*- 
that  some  have  denied  it.     Moreover,  the  belief  has 
been  fashioned  and  colored  by  circumstances  of  race, 
of  time,  and  of  place;  but  in  most  cases  it  appears  as 
a  belief  in  a  shadowy  existence  in  some  under-world. 
Finally  the  belief  has  been  purer  and  more  in  accord 
with  truth,  in  proportion  as  peoples  have  held  a  purer 

32  To  P.  Deussen  Nervana  is  the  goal  of  morality.  His 
works  is  a  blending  of  Kant,  Schoppenhauer  and  the  Vedante. 
cf.  Elements  of  Metaphysics  by  P.   Deussen. 

33  Cf.  Muller  Science  of  Religion  "Buddhist  Nihilism;" 
Chips  from  a  German  Workshop,  vol.  I,  Lecture  XI. 


236  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

conception    of    God    and    possessed    a    more   perfect 
standard  of  morality.^* 

V. 

Reasons  for  the  Belief. 

aM  E?  §  3^-  Scholastic  writers  make  a  distinction  between 
mOTtaiity^,"  ^^^  intrinsic  and  an  extrinsic  immortality.  Thus  the 
soul  is  said  to  be  intrinsically  immortal  because  its 
nature  is  such  that  it  cannot  cease  to  exist  by  a  disso- 
lution of  parts  or  by  its  separation  from  the  body. 
It  is  extrinsically  immortal  because  it  cannot  be  anni- 
hilated by  another  power,  i.  e.,  God. 

1°.  Intrinsic  Immortality. 
FnSinsic^^       The  considerations  which  are  brought  forward  to 
tSi?*^^'      prove  that  the  soul  is  immortal  are  drawn  from  various 
nature^f    sources    and   have   a  cumulative  force,     (a)  From  the 
the  soul,      nature  of  the  soul:    The  first  proofs  proposed  by  St. 
S^no?"^     Thomas   for  the  immortality  of  the  soul  are   drawn 
S^^artf     from  its  nature  as  a  spiritual  entity .^^    He  says  that  the 
The  soul     ^^^^    ^^    ^    simple   spiritual   entity  not   made   up   of 
dependent  P^^^^ ;  hence  it  is  not  corruptible,  because  decay  has 
on^the        effect  Only  in  compounds  which  are  dissoluble.    Again 
he  says  that  the  soul  is  a  subsistent  entity,  i.  e.,  it  is  a 
spiritual  being  independent  of  the  body;  hence  it  does 
not  cease  to  exist  by  its  separaton  from  the  body.    The 
conclusion,  therefore,  is  evident  that  by  its  nature  the 
soul  is  capable  of  an  immortal  existence.    The  immor- 
tality of  the  soul  is  therefore  the  logical  and  inevitable 
consequence  of  its  spiritual  and  inorganic  nature.^®  The 
latter  leads  to  the  former.    Now,  as  the  spirituality  has 

3*  Cf.  Alger,  Doctrine  of  a  Future  Life. 

35  c.  Gent.  Ill,  ch.  55,  79;  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  75,  a  6. 

36  S.  Thomas  S.  Theolog.  I,  q.  105,  a  4.  < 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  237 

been  placed  be3^ond  doubt,  we  must  also  accept  the 
immortality.^^ 

§  34.  Prof.  Ladd  approves  the  Hne  of  reasoning.  He  £i"of . 
holds  that  all  inquiry  into  the  reasonableness  of  the  position. 
belief  in  immortality  should  take  its  ^start  from  the 
psychological  point  of  vew.^^  Yet  he  maintains  that 
immortality  of  mind  cannot  be  proved  from  its  nature 
as  that  of  a  real,  self-identical  and  tmitary  being;  nor  is 
its  permanence,  as  known  to  itself,  of  an  order  to  allow 
the  sure  inference  of  its  continued  and  permanent  ex- 
istence after  death.^^ 

§  35.  The  reasons  alleged  for  this  view  are  princi-  His 
pally  (i)  the  existence  which  we  call  ''  Mind  "  is  never  ^®^^'^"^- 
known  —  even   when   observed   in    its    most    exalted 
states  and  in  the  exercise  of  its  most  highly  spiritual 
activites  —  as  released  wholly  from  bodily  conditions.*" 

(2)  The  deniers  of  immortality  are  strongest  in  their 
appeal  to  facts  of  physiological  psychology  and 
Psycho-Physics.  For  the  fact  appears  to  be  that  under 
certain  material  conditions  the  mind  ceases  from  all 
that  in  which  its  only  known  and  intelligible  being 
actually  consists.  Hence  he  concludes  that  in  the 
arena  of  Psycho-Physics  it  is  a  drawn  battle.*^ 

§  36.  These  two  reasons  have  no  real  weight  against  The  value 
our  thesis.     They  were  carefully  examined  in  treating  reasons, 
the  spirituality  of  the  soul.     Their  force  was  seen  to  be 
more  apparent  than  real.     If  they  could  not  weaken 
that  thesis,  a  fortiori  they  have  no  power  to  overturn 

37  We  do  not,  therefore,  as  Lotze  seems  to  think,  draw  the 
immortality  from  the  S'uhstantiality  of  the  soul.  cf.  Outlines 
of  Psychology,  ed.  by  Ladd,  p.  112. 

3^  Ladd  Philosophy  of  Mind,  p.  397. 

39  lb.,  p.  398. 

4'^Ib.,  p.  400. 

^1  Pp.  402,  403. 


238  .      CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

our  present  contention.  The  source  of  Prof.  Ladd's 
difficulties  is  the  failure  to  grasp  the  true  nature  of  the 
soul,  to  see  it  as  a  simple  spiritual  entity, 
the  moral  §  37-  (b)  From  the  moral  order:  The  existence  of  a 
order.  nioral  Order  in  the  world  is  a  fact  which  cannot  be 
conscience!  denied.  There  is  in  the  soul  of  every  rational  creature 
a  hidden  monitor  which  proclaims  the  ineradicable  dis- 
tinction between  good  and  evil.  Its  voice  is  heard  at 
every  waking  moment,  directing,  urging,  constraining 
us  to  good  acts;  restraining  from,  forbidding  bad 
actions;  praising,  rewarding  for  work  well  done  with 
peace  and  buoyancy  of  mind;  or  reproaching  and 
punishing  with  the  sting  of  remorse  and  sorrow.  It  is 
the  judge  of  our  every  thought  and  act,  and  its  deci- 
sions are  the  promulgations  and  applications  of  an 
eternal  law  which  is  grounded  in  the  very  depths  of 
our  being.  We  may  fly  to  the  ends  of  the  earth,  we 
cannot  escape  its  vigilance  or  its  sentence.  Hence  the 
commands  of  "  duty,"  the  consciousness  of  moral  obli- 
gation —  the  "  ought "  or  "ought  not "  which  is  never 
absent.  Kant  felt  the  force  of  this  categorical  impera- 
tive, and  from  it  reasoned  to  the  existence  of  God.*^ 
In  the  laws      s  og.  What  the  conscience  of  the  individual  so  clearly 

and  cus-  ''  •-'  •    •  1 

tomsof       reveals  pervades  the  laws,  literature  and  religious  be- 

mankmd.  ^  ,         . .     .        . 

liefs  of  mankind.  Everyw^here  is  found  the  distinction 
between  good  and  bad;  everywhere  the  indelible  marks 
of  a  morally  constituted  world.  If  peoples  differ  as  to 
the  morality  of  individual  acts,  the  difference  is  due  to 
the  difference  of  circumstances  or  to  an  error  of  judg- 
ment. The  great  fundamental  distinction  between 
good  and  bad  is  never  obliterated.*^ 

42  Chateaubriand  Genius  of  Christianity  B  VI,  ch.  II;  cf. 
Knight  "  Essays  in  Philosophy,"  p.  300;  Newman  Grammar 
of  Assent,  p.  106  sq. 

43  Cf..  Mivart  Truth,  p.  282. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  239 

§  39.  But  a  law  so  universalj  so  imperative  is  its  be-  "1^^  sane- 
hests,  must  have  a  sanction.  Ethics  show  that  sane-  ^^o'^- 
tion  is  an  element  which  is  of  the  essence  of  a  law. 
Now  in  this  case  our  present  life  contains  no  sufficient 
sanction.  The  distribution  of  the  goods  of  this  world 
is  not  just.  The  virtuous  suffer  throughout  life  and 
the  wicked  are  prosperous.  The  reader  can  recall 
instances  where  noble  and  pure  lives  go  down  to  the 
grave  unrewarded,  or  perhaps  aspersed  by  calumnious 
and  envious  tongues.  The  conditions  under  which 
men  enter  life  are  unequal.  Worldly  advantages  of 
wealth  and  social  position,  endowments  of  body  and 
of  mind,  opportunities  for  education  and  self-improve- 
ment are  not  the  same  for  all.  So,  too,  we  pass  through 
life  at  times  under  great  disadvantages.  To  many  life 
is  an  arena  of  tentative,  bailed  and  incomplete  effort.^'' 

xr  1  1  1  r     1  •  1       This  found 

§  40.  How  can  the  moral  order  of  the  universe  be  in  another 
true,  if  those  who  violate  it  prosper  and  those  who 
strive  to  obey  its  commands  suffer  miserably?  Hence 
we  infer  the  existence  of  another  life  where  virtue  shall 
receive  its  full  and  just  reward,  where  the  inequalities 
of  the  present  existence  §hall  be  removed.  sopWcaf 

§41.  (c)  Philosophical:  Under  this  heading  are  ^^^j^ 
grouped  all  those  considerations  which  arise  from  the  gj-nd''^  ^^' 
study  of  the  great  powers  with  which  man  is  endowed. 
Of  all  creatures  inhabiting  the  globe  man  alone  pos- 
sesses intelligence.  Mind  is  a  supreme  and  unique 
gift.  Its  powers  can  never  be  exhausted.  The  thirst 
for  knowledge  is  never  satisfied;  the  capacity  for  it  is 
infinite.  Swifter  than  the  flash  of  light  is  the  course 
of  thought.    Boundless  is  its  range.     It  penetrates  the 

**Cf.  the  Psalms;  Martineau  "Study  of  Religion,"  vol.  II, 
p.  370;  Newman  "  Grammar  of  Assent;  "  Mivart  Truth,  pp. 
487,  251. 


will 


240  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

heavens  above  and  the  earth  beneath.  In  restless  ac- 
tivity it  ever  seeks  new  worlds  to  explore  and  to  sub- 
due.*^ The  material  universe  does  not  furnish  sufficient 
food  for  thought.  The  mind  passes  its  bounds,  con- 
templates and  puts  into  consistence  the  great  truths  of 
the  moral  order,  e.  g.,  justice,  goodness,  merit,  reward, 
punishment,  morality;  nay  even  rises  to  God  and  dis- 
courses on  His  infinite  perfection.^^ 
po°5^rs  of  §  42.  Again  man  has  a  will  which  tends  to  and  seeks 
the  good.  He  is  capable  of  love  in  all  its  forms  and 
fullness.  These  higher  emotions  common  speech  lo- 
cates in  the  heart.  Here  is  found  the  meaning,  the 
depth  and  the  perfection  of  a  Hfe.  Whence  come  the 
beautiful  and  noble  emotions?  The  objects  we  see 
about  us  only  occasion  their  exercise.  They  can  never 
satisfy  us.  The  heart  is  too  great  and  deep  to  find  in 
the  passing  pleasures  and  objects  of  life  the  satiety 
which  it  longs  for.  The  author  of  Ecclesiastes  had 
sounded  all  the  sources  of  life's  pleasures,  and  they 
brought  him  "  sorrow  and  affliction  of  spirit."  "  Ad 
altiora  nati!  "  was  the  exclamation  of  a  Pagan.*'  The 
aspirations  of  a  life  so  vari^  in  passing  forms,  reach- 
ing back  to  the  earliest  childhood,  increasing  in  vigor 
and  definiteness  as  the  years  turn  into  youth  and  man- 
hood, taking  color  maybe  and  affected  to  some  extent 
by  the  circumstances  of  our  condition,  standing  out 

^5  Aug.  Soliloq.  1.  II,  n.  i.  From  the  perpetuity  of  truth 
S.  Augustine  draws  an  argument  for  immortality  of  the  soul. 
cf.  SoliL,  n.  3,  4,  24,  33. 

^  lUuc  (i.  e.,  ad  Deum)  perge,  anima,"  exclaims  S.  Aug., 
"  contemptis  ceteris  vel  etiam  transcencis;  illuc  perge.  Nihil 
potentius  ista  creaLura,  quae  mens  dicitur  rationahs.  nihil  hac 
creatura  subHmius;  quidquid  supra  ipsam  est,  jam  Creator 
est."  In  Joan  tr.  xxiii,  n.  6;  S.  Thomas  S.  Theolog.  I,  q.  75, 
a  6. 

47  Cicero  de  Finibus  1.  II,  n.  113. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  24I 

like  stars  which  guide  our  footsteps  and  incite  us  ever 
onward  —  all  tell  with  persistent  and  increasing  force 
that  this  world  is  not  an  abiding  dwelling-place;  that 
life  is  only  a  pilgrimage;  that  the  fruition  and  rest  lie 
beyond. 

§  43.  Finally  there  is  implanted  in  our  souls  a  desire  ^^°^*^| 
for  happiness.  Instinctively  and  irresistibly  we  seek  happiness, 
what  shall  make  us  happy.  This  yearning  is  not  blind 
and  irrational;  it  is  the  bloom  of  our  inteUigent  nature. 
The  longing  for  happiness  is  universal  with  mankind, 
and  appears  in  strongest  and  purest  light  with  those 
who  try  to  lead  a  noble  and  virtuous  life.*^ 

§  44.  But  the  happiness  of  this  world  is  fleeting  and  true  happi- 
partial.     Individual  experience  is  proof  that  a  heavy  found  in 
load  of  sorrow  presses  upon  the  children  of  men.    We 
may  strive  for  days  and  for  years  in  the  hope  of  en- 
joying a  little  happiness;  when  it  comes  some  new  care 
dispels  the  purity  of  our  joy.    The  truth  of  this  is  seen  coi^ciusion. 
in  the  philosophy  of  Pessimism,  which  has  taken  a 
deep  hold  on  the  minds  of  the  present  century;  in  the 
fact  that  the  aim  of  our  Christian  religion  has  ever  been 
to  make  men  truly  happy;  in  the  conduct  of  our  Divine 
Redeemer,  who  appealed  to  this  insatiable  desire  of 
the  human  heart  in  the  beautiful  opening  of  the  Ser- 
mon on  the  Mount,  his  first  authoritative  promulgation 
of  "The  Kingdom.'^ « 

§  4S.  Unless,  therefore,  the  desire  for  happiness  be  a  This  con- 

^"^  ^^  elusion 

delusion  and  folly,  we  must  admit  a  future  existence  strength- 

.  .     .  .    ened. 

where  it  can  be  realized.  That  it  is  not  a  delusion  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  it  is  the  common  possession  of 
humanity.  If  to  these  considerations  we  add  the  slow- 
ness of  human  growth,  the  difficulties  attending  on  the 

*8August  Serm.  150,  n.  4;  Card.  Newman  Apology,  p.  267. 
*8  Cf.  Matthew,  ch.  V,  "  Blessed  are  the  poor  in  spirit,"  etc. 

31 


ture. 


242  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

development  of  our  higher  powers,  the  shortness  of  the 
period  during  which  they  can  be  exercised,  the  argu- 
ment derives  a  strength  and  cogency  which  convinces 
an  impartial  mind.^^ 
o?  LiSra-^  §  46.  Thcsc  thoughts  find  expression  in  the  most 
beatiful  passages  of  Literature.  Socrates  on  the  eve 
of  death  strengthens  his  soul  with  these  reflections. 
Plato  has  preserved  them  for  the  delight  of  future  gen- 
erations.^^ Cicero  tells  that  Plato  seems  to  have  con- 
vinced himself  and  to  have  made  others  wish  he  were 
right.^^  It  comes  out  in  Miss  Proctor's  ''  Incomplete- 
ness; "  in  Longfellow's  "  Psalm  of  Life;  "  in  Words- 
worth's "We  Are  Seven  "  and  ''  Intimations  of  Immor- 
tality; "  in  Addison's  "  Cato;  "  in  Gray's  "  Elegy."  It 
faintly  shines  through  Emerson's  essay  on  Immortality 
and  lines  on  death  of  his  child.^^  Tennyson  reasons 
that  we  cannot  conceive  of  love  as  perishable,^^  ex- 
presses the  comfnon  aspiration  of  the  human  race  in 
''  The  Tw^o  Voices,"  and  faces  death  with  the  hope 
strong,  though  vague  within  him. 

"  That  I  shall  see  my  Pilot  face  to  face 
When  I  shall  cross  the  bar."^^ 

It  has  inspired  Mrs.  Browning's  "  Sleep,"  and  im- 
parts the  subtle  magic  charm  to  the  most  beautiful 
hymn  in  the  English  language,  "  Lead  Kindly  Light. '^ 

50  Cf.  Knight  "  Essays  in  Philosophy,"  p.  289  sq. 
5iCf.  Phaedo,  Republic. 

52  Quest.  Tuscul.  I,  21.  "  Ut  enim  rationem  Plato  nullam 
afferret  (vide  quid  homini  tribuam)  ipse  auctoritate  me 
frangeret.  Tot  antem  rationes  attulit,  ut  velle  ceteris,  sibi 
certe  persuasisse  videatur.'" 

53  Cf.  Brownson's  Quarterly  Rev.,  vol.  I,  p.  262,  new  series. 

54  Cf.  "In  Memoriam;"  cf.  Rob.  Browning's  "Evelyn 
Hope,"  "  Reverie." 

55  Q{    ''  Crossing  the  Bar." 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  243 

§  47.  (d)  From   Analogy  —  The    Physical    sciences  ^^Jjjy 
do  not  give  proofs  properly  so-called  for  Immortality. 
They  move  in  a  different  sphere.     Nevertheless  they 
present    some   striking    illustrations    which    to^  some 
minds  add  a  certain  weight  to  the  main  Hne  of  thought. 
Thus  science  has  shown  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  f^jf^J®  ^Jt 
death  in  the  sense  of  annihilation.     Death  is  only  a  gJcifword 
dissolution,  a  transformation,  a  change  in  the  mode  of  the^Jeme^^ 
existence.     The  conservation  of  matter  and  of  force  gfiatio^* 
are  truths  of  science.     In  the  vocabulary  of  science, 
therefore,     there   is    no    such   word    as    annihilation. 
Now  the  soul  is  a  spiritual  entity  having  its  own  sub- 
sistence.    Hence  to  affirm  that  it  ceases  to  exist  at  the 
dissolution  of  the  body  is  a  gratuitous  assumption  un- 
supported by  a  single  fact  and  directly  opposed  to  the 
known  truths  of  science.     This  is  the  line  of  argument 
followed  by  Bishop  Butler  in  his  "  Analogy  ;"^^  and 
more  recently  was  set  forth  by  H.'Drummond  in  his 
suggestive    work,    "  Natural    Law    in    the    Spiritual 
World." '' 

§  48  (e)  Finally  the  belief  in  Immortality  is  not  iso-  ^^l  int? 
lated.     It  permeates  our  intellectual  and  moral  life;  u  J^ctfon^of 
is  inseparably  connected  with  other  truths,  e.  g.,  God.  J^^^J"^^^* 
Liberty,  Justice,  Providence,  Morality.     To  suppress  truths, 
one  is  to  suppress  all.    They  stand  or  fall  together.     If  I 
admit  one,  I  must  admit  the  others.     This  very  con- 

56  Ch.  I  "  Of  a  Future  Life." 

5''  Some  writers  draw  an  argument  for  Immortality  from  the 
theory  of  evolution.  To  them  man's  place  in  nature  is  the 
last  and  best;  all  lower  creations  lead  up  to  him;  he  is  the 
crown  and  the  explanation  of  the  whole.  Hence  they  argue 
that  the  whole  process  loses  its  meaning  by  the  denial  of  the 
persistence  of  the  spiritual  element  in  man.  Thus  they  are 
led  to  accept  Immortality  not  as  a  demonstrable  truth  of 
science,  but  as  a  supreme  act  of  faith  in  the  reasonableness  of 
God's  work.  (Cf.  Fiske's  "  Destiny  of  Man;  "  Tennyson 
"  In  Memoriam;  "  T.  Hunger  "  The  Appeal  to  Life."  P.  245, 
281  sq.) 


244  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

nection  adds  a  special  force  to  the  independent  argu- 
ments. 

2°.  Extrinsic  Immortality. 
conclusion       8  40.  We  therefore  conclude  with  absolute  certainty 

for  intnn-  '^  ^^  J 

sic  immor-  that  the  soul  shall  survive  its  dissolution  from  the  body. 

tality.  -^ 

But  shall  its  existence  be  eternal  and  immortal;   i.  e., 

can  we  infer  that  God  will  not  annihilate  the  soul?  The 
reasons  which  go  to  prove  the  eternal  duration  are 
drawn  from  the  nature  of  immortality,  and  from  the 
attributes  of  God.  Immortality  means  eternal  felicity. 
The  desire  for  happiness  so  strong  and  insatiable  could, 
not  be  satisfied  with  less.^^  To  suppose  that  God 
would  have  created  man  with  a  nature  which  in  every 
way  and  form  seeks  an  eternal  existence/^  and  would 
then  annihilate  him  is  to  affirm  that  God,  who  is  Wis- 
dom itself,  w^ould  do  things  foolishly,  that  God,  who  is 
all  Justice,  would  deprive  man  of  what  He  has  given 
intimations  and  hopes.^"  Everything  we  know  of  man 
demands  immortaHty;  everything  we  know  of  God  as- 
sures us  that  the  demand  is  not  futile  and  will  have 
fumilment.^1 

58  S.  Thomas  S.  Theol.  I,  q.  75,  a  6. 

5^  S.  Thomas  C.  Gentes  1.  II,  ch.  55. 

^°  "  Quae  (ImmortaHtas),  si  nullo  modo  dari  homini  posset, 
frustra  etiam  beatitudo  quaereretur;  quia  sine  immortalitate 
non  potest  esse."    Aug.  de  Trin.  1.  XIII,  n.  10. 

^1  Prof.  Ladd's  conclusion,  therefore,  is  not  correct.  He 
says  "  The  so-called  arguments  for  the  immortality  of  the 
human  soul  really  consist  of  a  variety  of  considerations  which 
tend  to  render  reasonable  the  faith  or  hope  that  it  is  so;  to 
say  that  they  demonstrate  the  soul's  power  to  exist  after  the 
bodily  substrate  has  been  removed,  is  to  af^rm  of  them  more 
than  they  can  sustain.  But  to  deny  that  they  suggest  the  pos- 
sibilities, or  even  the  probabilities  of  this  continued  existence, 
is  to  deny  to  them  more  than  there  is  need.  And  so  we  may 
return  from  the  discussion  of  the  question  on  grounds  of 
science  and  metaphysics  of  mind  with  a  faint  but  reasonable 
confidence  in  the  possibility  of  its  affirmative  answer  as  one 
net  result."  Phil,  of  Mind,  pp.  397-403-  cf.  Fr.  Hecker  Aspir- 
ations of  Nature,  ch.  X,  XI. 


PERSONALITY. 

§  I.  Personality  is  a  term  of  peculiar  and  significant  Person 
force.  We  speak  of  animals  as  beings,  of  inanimate  man  alone, 
creation  as  things;  man  alone  is  called  a  person.  There 
is  a  reason  for  this  constant  and  characteristic  use  of 
the  word,  since  language  is  the  expression  of  thought. 
Now  mind  is  the  mirror  of  matter.  Therefore,  words 
tell  of  external  objects,  and  the  nature  of  the  object 
explains  the  peculiar  use  and  meaning  of  the  word. 

§  2.  In  a  general  way,  personality  seems  to  express  i^g  general 
all  those  attributes  which  mark  man  as  different  in  na-  "^®^^i°s» 
ture  from  the  brute.  At  times  also  it  is  employed  to 
designate  a  man's  character;  thus,  ex.  gr.,  we  speak 
of  an  attractive  personality.  Nevertheless  it  has  its 
own  special  philosophical  meaning;  it  expresses  the 
true  worth  and  dignity  of  man,  the  highest  perfection 
of  his  rational  nature. 

§  3.  The  problem  of  personality  is  a  very  difficult  its 
one.  The  history  of  its  development;  the  various  ex- 
planations advanced  especially  by  modern  writers;  the 
danger  of  confounding  conceptions  of  things  closely 
connected  show  the  difficulties  attending  its  solution 
and  at  the  same  time  invest  the  subject  with  a  certain 
charm. 

TI16  work 

§  4.  The  examination  and  solution  of  the  notion  of  of  Ohris- 
Pei^sonality  is  the  work  of  Christian  Philosophy.     In  PhUoso- 
the  Pagan  writers  we  find  no  discussion  bearing  upon  ^  ^* 
it.     Aristotle  and  Plato  do  not   touch    the    question. 
With  the  Incarnation  of  the  Son  of  God  new  light  was 
thrown  upon  the  problems  of  mind,  as  well  as  upon  the 
principles  and  motives  of  life.     The  great  task  of  the 
early  Christian  Church  was  to  prove  that  and  explain, 


246  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

as  far  as  human  reason  could,  how  the  Second  Person 
of  the  Blessed  Trinity  assumed  our  human  nature. 
For  four  centuries  the  conflict  between  truth  and  error 
raged;  one  after  another  the  false  views  were  exposed 
and  condemned;  until  in  the  Council  of  Calcedon,  451 
A.  D.,  the  full  truth  was  defined  amid  the  plaudits  of 
the  assembled  Fathers.  The  definitions  of  the  Church, 
the  explanations  scattered  through  the  writings  of  the 
Fathers  were  collected  by  the  Schoolmen  and  thrown 
into  systematic  form.  The  teaching  is  found  in  the 
writings  of  St.  Thomas  in  all  its  precision,  lucidity  and 
fullness 

I. 
Locke. 
Looke.  g  2^  Locke  is  called  the  ''  Father  of  Modern  Psy- 

chology." ^  In  the  Essay  on  the  Human  Understand- 
ing, his  aim  was  to  investigate  the  sources  of  knowl- 
edge, to  account  for  its  certainty  and  extent,  to  ex- 
plain the  grounds  and  degrees  of  beHef,  opinion  and 
assent.^  The  purpose  here  is  not  to  inquire  whether 
his  work  was  well  done,  and  satisfactory.  We  are  con- 
cerned only  with  his  definition  and  exposition  of 
Personality. 
PersoS-^^  §  6.  Locke  holds  that  personal  identity  consists  in 
**^'  consciousness,  but  especially  the  consciousness  which 

consists  in  reaches  back  in  memory  to  what  has  passed.     "As  far 
memory.     ^^  ^^^.^  consciousness,"  he  writes,  "  can  be  extended 
backwards  to  any  past  action  or  thought,  so  far  reaches 
the  identity  of  that  person ;  it  is  the  same  self  now  it 
was  then."  ^     Hence  personality  is  constituted  by  con- 

1  Transcendentalism  in  New  England  by  O.  B.   Frothing- 
ham,  p.  3. 

2  Essay  BI,  ch.  L 

3  Essay  BII,  ch.  27,  n.  9. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  247 

scious  memory,  i.  e.,  "  by  the  present  representation  of 
a  past  action."  ^  He  holds  that  if  the  same  conscious- 
ness be  preserved  whether  in  the  same  or  different  sub- 
stances, the  personal  identity  is  preserved.^  Con- 
sciousness alone  can  unite  remote  existences  into  the 
same  person;  therefore,  whatever  has  the  conscious- 
ness of  present  and  past  actions,  is  the  same  person  to 
whom  they  both  belong.  Hence  self  is  not  determined 
by  identity  or  diversity  of  substance,  which  it  cannot 
be  sure  of,  but  only  by  identity  of  consciousness.^ 

§  7.  Consciousness  of  the  past  does  not  constitute  critcism. 
personal  identity;  on  the  contrary  it  supposes  this 
identity.  How  could  I  be  conscious  of  past  acts  as 
mine  if  they  were  not  united  by  a  bond  which  made 
my  recognition  possible?  My  mind  does  not  make 
truth,  it  finds  truth.  So  my  personality  is  a  fact  pre- 
supposed by  conscious  memory.  I  may  remember  or 
forget  the  past;  that  does  not  change  what  has  actu- 
ally taken  place.  Again,  if  personality  depends  on 
memory,  what  happens  in  case  the  power  of  remem- 
bering the  acts  of  my  past  life  be  lost?  Yet,  according 
to  Mr.  Locke,  I  should  become  a  different  individual. 
Again,  how  could  I  advance  in  a  court  of  justice  or 
even  to  any  sensible  person  that  I  did  not  commit  a 
certain  action,  because  I  have  no  memory  of  having 

4  lb.,  n.  13. 

5  lb. 

^  lb.,  16,  23,  24.  Mr.  James  Mill  says  that  the  Self  is  "  a 
train  of  ideas  which  run  as  it  were,  into  a  single  point."  This 
point  is  memory,  cf.  Jas  Mill  Analysis  I,  p.  331.  J.  S.  Mill 
holds  that  "  The  phenomena  of  Self  and  that  of  Memory  are 
merely  two  sides  of  the  same  fact,  or  two  different  modes  of 
viewing  the  same  fact."  cf.  Jas.  Mill's  Analysis  with  notes 
of  J.  S.  Mill,  vol.  II,  p.  175.  The  difficulty  of  this  position 
he  himself  recognizes,  and  attempts  a  solution  which  is  a  con- 
fession of  its  weakness,    cf.  Exam,  of  Hamilton,  p.  263. 


248  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

done  so?    Yet  I  could  use  this  argument,  if  I  were  a 
consistent  upholder  of  Mr.  Locke's  view.^ 

11. 

Kant. 
jj.^  §8.  The  efforts  of  Locke,  Berkeley  and  Hume  to 

system.  form  a  theory  of  knowledge  had  failed.  Kant  felt 
that  the  problem  should  be  placed  on  a  different 
basis.  He  attempted  in  Philosophy  a  revolution 
analogous  to  that  brought  about  by  Copernicus  in 
Astronomy.^  Kant  held  that  the  failure  of  the  English 
writers  was  due  to  the  subordination  of  mind  to  the 
external  world.  He  proposed  to  turn  attention  from 
the  objects  of  knowledge  to  the  constitution  of  the 
human  mind,  to  make  mind  the  centre  around  which 
external  things  should  revolve,  to  make  "things  con- 
form to  cognition,  not  cognition  to  things.''  Hence, 
the  system  of  Transcendental  Philosophy,  "  which  con- 
cerns itself  not  as  much  with  objects  as  with  our  mode 
of  cognition  of  objects."  That  the  mind  may  obtain 
knowledge  of  things  through  experience,  Kant  pos- 
tulated certain  categories  or  subjective  conditions. 
He  called  them  the  forms  of  all  knowledge.  With 
these  forms  the  mind  invests  or  clothes  the  objects 
it  conceives.  The  mind  never  sees  the  pure  objects, 
i.  e.,  the  objects  in  themselves  as  they  really  exist.  It 
perceives  the  objects  only  as  they  are  clothed  by  the 
ideal  forms.  Hence  the  proper  objects  of  the  mind 
is  the  ideal  appearance,  or  phenomenon,  as  he  terms 
it.     This  will  enable  the  reader  to  rightly  estimate  the 

^Cf.  Butler  Analogy,  "Disser.  on  Personal  Identity,"  p.  334. 
^  Cf.  Preface  to  26.  Edition  of  Critic  of  Pure  Reason,  Mul- 
ler's  Trans.,  p.  693. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  249 

definition  Kant  gives  of  Personality  and  his  criticism 
that  it  is  a  paralogism  of  pure  reason. 

§  9.  To  him  consciousness  constitutes  the  essence  cSSuteS 
of  Personality.  '"  Whatever  is  conscious  of  the  nu-  sJiouSaess. 
merical  identity  of  its  own  self  at  different  times  is 
in  so  far  a  person."  He  says  that  in  his  own  con- 
sciousness the  identity  of  person  is  inevitably  present. 
What  makes  me  a  person,  therefore,  is  consciousness 
and  the  possession  of  consciousness  is  the  constitutive 
element  of  my  personality.^ 

§  10.  But    he    contends    that   consciousness    proves  ^^*  con- 

'^  ^  sciousness 

only  the  logical  identity  of  the  I,  not  the  numerical  proves  only 
identity   of   my   subject.     The   subject,  he   maintains,  ^JP^^' 
may  change.     The   consciousness  I   have  is  not  the 
consciousness  constitutive  of  real  ego,  but  only  of  a 
logical  ego;  hence,  I  cannot  infer  the  identity  of  the 
person  or  the  real  ego. 

§11.  It  is  false  to  hold  that  consciousness  consti- ^^i*^<^^sm. 
tutes  Personality.     Else  how  explain  the  fact  that  per- 
sonality abides  despite  the  loss  of  consciousness,  e.  g., 
in  sleep?     Or  how  is  it  that  I  am  the  same  person,  al- 
though consciousness  may  testify    to    the    so-called 

®  "  The  consciousness  of  self  and  the  knowledge  of  self,  i.  e., 
*  The  synthetic  unity  of  apperception,'  which  binds  our  states 
of  consciousness  together,  which  enables,  that  is  to  say,  the 
series  to  be  aware  of  itself  as  a  series,  is  the  underlying  unity 
produced  by  the  knowledge  that  these  states  successively  and 
altogether  belongs  to  me."  cf.  Courtney  Studies  in  Phil- 
osophy, ch.  VII. 

1° ''  The  concept  of  Personality  is  transcendental,  i.  e.,  a 
concept  of  the  unity  of  subject  which  is  otherwise  unknown 
to  us.  In  this  sense  such  a  concept  is  necessary  for  practical 
purposes,  and  sufficient,  but  we  can  never  pride  ourselves  on 
it  as  helping  to  expand  our  knowledge  of  our  self  by  means 
of  pure  reason  which  only  deceives  us  if  we  imagine  that  we 
can  concluse  an  uninterrupted  continuance  of  the  subject  from 
the  mere  concept  of  the  identical  self."  (Cf.  Critic  of  Pure 
Reason,  Muller's  trans.,  p.  294  sq. 

32 


250 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


The  error. 


change  of  one  personality  to  another  or  to  the  phe- 
nomena of  double  personality? 

§  12.  The  mistake  is  made  in  confounding  the  Per- 
sonality with  the  means  by  which  I  am  made  aware 
of  it.  Thus  consciousness  testifies  to  my  personality, 
but  by  no  means  constitutes  it.  The  personality  is 
supposed  as  already  existing,  and  consciousness  in 
stating  the  existence  of  the  fact  does  not  thereby  make 
it  exist.  The  peculiar  distinction  between  the  logical 
and  real  ego  on  which  rests  the  paralogism  of  Person- 
ality is  the  result  of  Kant's  peculiar  theory  on  the  con- 
stitution of  knowledge.  The  influence  of  this  theory 
on  subsequent  philosophy  has  been  most  deleterious. 
Even  the  ardent  sympathizers  of  Kant  acknowledge  it 
as  the  least  satisfactory  part  of  his  system. 


Modern 
writers. 


The 

Bampton 
Lecturer 
of  1891. 


III. 

Bampton  Lectures  of  1891. 

§  13.  Later  writers  seemed  content  in  reproducing 
the  thoughts  of  the  two  great  thinkers  whose  opinions 
have  been  criticised;  or  in  exposing  the  defects  in  their 
definitions,  ex.  gr.,  Butler,^^  or  in  confessing  their  ina- 
bility to  give  a  logical  definition.^ 

§  14.  But  the  subject  is  too  important  to  be  passed 
over  in  silence.  The  defects  pointed  out  in  the  current 
explanations  of  Locke  and  of  Kant;  the  Theological 
necessity  of  setting  forth  the  doctrines  of  the  Trinity 
and  the  Incarnation,  demanded  a  clear  and  precise 
definition  of  Personality.  This  was  attempted  by  the 
Bampton  Lecturer  of  1891.^^ 


11  Cf.  Analogy. 

12  Cf.  Stewart  Phil,  ess.,  p.  77- 

13  Cf.  Personality  Human  and  Divine  by  lUmgworth,  M. 


A. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  2^1 

§  15.  At  the  outset  the  writer  gives  a  general  no-  ofM?n- 
tion  of  what  he  means  by  Personahty.     To  him  Per-  lingworth. 
sonaHty  is  "  the  unifying  principle,  or,  to  use  a  more 
guarded  expression,  the  name  of  that  unity  in  which 
all  man's  attributes  and  functions  meet,  making  him 
an  individual  self."  ^^     From  these  words  it  is  evident  criticism 

"the  name 

that  he  is  aware  of  the  delicate  e^round  on  which  he  is  ot  a 

°  umty." 

treading.  Yet  it  is  difficult  to  understand  how  "  the 
name  of  a  unity  "  is  a  more  guarded  expression  than 
"  the  unifying  principle  "  itself.  Is  the  writer  a  Nomi- 
nalist in  his  theory  of  intellectual  notions,  and  does  he 
imagine  that  by  considering  Personality  as  a  tag  mark- 
ing out  a  thing  as  distinct  from  other  things,  he  is 
shielding  himself  the  more  from  adverse  criticism  ?^^ 
The  very  contrary  is  the  case. 

§  16.  Indeed  the  unity  he  speaks  of  is  not  a  simple  ^^^.^^^^ 
but  a  synthetic   unity.    This    he    himself    acknowl-  thetic. 
edges.^^     Personality,  therefore,  in  his  definition,  is  not 
a  distinct  perfection  in  man,  it  is  only  a  sum  of  certain 
attributes,  or  "  to  use  a  more  guarded  expression,"  the 
name  of  this  sum. 

§  17.  In  the  analysis  of  the  notion  the  author  adopts  ^g^thodto 
the  correct  method  in  appealing  to  the  historic  develop-  gf^anlng  of 
ment  of  the  Incarnation.     Nevertheless  his  acquaint-  ^^^  ^°^^- 
ance  with  the  important  contributions  on  the  expo- 
sition of  the  notion  scattered  through  the  writings  of 
the  Fathers  and  of  the  Schoolmen,  seems  to  be  very 
superficial.     He  fails  to  expose  their  teaching  on  Per- 
sonality.    On  the  contrary  he    hastens    to    Kant,  in 
whom  he  finds  the  most  satisfactory  and  complete  ex- 
position in  the  evolution  of  the  concept. 

14  P.  6. 

15  On  nominalism  cf.  Fr.  Clarke's  Logic  Stonyhurst  Series. 
1®  Cf.  p.  29. 


252 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


His 

analysis. 


The  bond 
of  this 
synthesis. 


criticism. 


§  1 8.  He  finds  the  fundamental  characteristics  of 
PersonaHty  to  be  self -consciousness,  desire,  self-determi- 
natio7t;  hence  the  three  elements  which  constitute  the 
notion  are  thought,  desire,  will}'^  But,  he  continues, 
these  faculties  are  never  separated  in  act;  they  more  or 
less  interpenetrate ;  they  are  found  more  or  less  united. 
Thus  as  an  actual  fact,  he  says,  there  is  a  synthetic 
unity  in  Personality  which  is  further  emphasized  by 
the  sense  of  personal  identity.-^^ 

§  19.  How  comes  this  unity  and  what  is  the  bond 
uniting  these  elements?  He  proceeds  to  tell  us.  "  I 
am  one,"  he  writes,  "  in  the  sense  of  an  active  unifying 
principle  which  can  not  only  combine  a  multitude  of 
present  experiences  in  itself,  but  can  also  combine  its 
present  with  its  past."  ^^  To  him  character  is  the  issue 
of  personality's  growth,  being  the  result  of  the  living 
interaction  of  its  elements.^*^  For  he  writes  that  Per- 
sonality is  at  first  a  mere  potentiality  which  gradually 
develops  or  realizes  itself.^^  It  is  not  necessary  for  the 
present  purpose  to  follow  the  writer  in  his  appHcation 
of  this  conception  of  Personality  to  the  Trinity  and  the 
Incarnation.  That  would  take  us  into  a  question  of 
Theology.  We  confine  ourselves  simply  to  the  analy- 
sis he  gives  of  the  notion  itself.  He  has  made  a  new 
attempt  at  a  definition,  or  to  speak  more  correctly,  he 
has  thrown  old  explanations  into  a  new  form. 

§20.  (i)  He  considers  Personality  as  a  synthetic 
unity,  whose  elements  are    reason,    desire    and    will. 


17  P.  29. 

13  lb.  "  Our  personality  is  a  synthesis,  an  organic  unity  of 
attributes,  faculties,  functions,  which  presuppose  and  involve 
and  qualify  each  other,  and  never  exist  or  operate  apart." 
P.  75- 

19  P.  38. 

20  P.  41. 

21  P.  70. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  253 

But  reason,  desire  and  will  are  activities  of  the  soul. 
From  the  nature  of  these  acts  the  proof  for  the  spiritu- 
ality of  the  soul  is  drawn.  Again  it  has  been  shown  ^lity  ^o^t^^' 
that  the  soul  is  not  a  synthetic  unity  but  an  indivisible  *^®  ^°"^- 
entity.  Its  activity  is  manifested  in  various  ways. 
Desire,  reason  and  will  are  only  modes  of  its  manifes- 
tation. They  are  not  different  activities  which  com- 
bine into  a  synthetic  whole.  Now  the  soul  is  not  the 
same  as  Person.  We  cannot  explain  the  concept  of 
Personality  by  explaining  the  nature  and  meaning  of 
soul.  They  are  different  words  and  they  have  different 
significations.^^ 

§  21.  (2)  He  considers  reason,  desire  and  will  as  ele-  (2)person- 

^   ^  ality  not 

ments  of  Personality.  But  why  could  they  not  be  con-  nature, 
sidered  as  activities  of  our  human  nature?  In  point  of 
fact  I  ascribe  the  difference  between  man  and  brute  to 
the  difference  of  their  natures.  I  say  that  a  man  exer- 
cises the  higher  powers  of  reason  and  of  will  because 
he  possesses  a  nature  of  a  higher  order  than  the  brute. 
If,  therefore,  these  activities  can  be  referred  to  nature, 
why  are  they  considered  to  be  the  characteristic  ele- 
ments of  Personality?  Human  person  is  not  the  same 
as  human  nature.  There  is  a  distinction  between  these 
concepts.  Personality  is  a  perfection  and  the  highest 
perfection  of  our  nature.  But  it  shows  a  confusion  of 
thought  to  explain  personality,  which  is  one  perfec- 
tion of  human  nature,  by  the  attributes  which  are  com- 
mon to  hum.an  nature.     The  mention  of  one  may  call 

22  Dicendum  quod  anima  est  pars  humanae  speciei,  Et  ideo 
licet  separata,  quia  tamen  retinet  naturam  unibilitatis,  non 
potest  dici  substantia  individua,  quae  est  hypostasis,  vel  suh~ 
stantia  prima;  sicut  nee  manus,  nee  quaecumque  alia  partium 
hominis.  Et  sic  non  competit  ei  neque  definitio  personae 
neque  nomen.    St.  Thomas  Sum.  Theol.  I,  q.  29,  a.  I.  ad  5. 


(3)  he 
unites 


254  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

the  Others  to  mind ;  it  does  not  give  us  sufficient  reason 
to  identify  them. 

§21.  (3)  Since. PersonaHty  is  a  synthetic  unity,  he 
L??ke^'''^  fii^ds  it  necessary  to  explain  the  bond  uniting  these  ele- 
ments into  a  whole.  The  explanation  advanced  can  lay 
no  claim  to  originality;  it  is  rather  an  attempt  to  recon- 
cile the  opinions  proposed  by  the  two  thinkers  already 
mentioned.  Mr.  Illingworth  finds  in  Kant  an  advance 
on  all  that  had  been  written  concerning  personality. 
Nevertheless  he  is  an  EngHshman,  and  more  or  less 
acquainted  with  Locke.  Kant  placed  personality  in 
consciousness;  Locke  finds  its  essence  in  conscious 
memory.  Mr.  Illingworth  unites  the  two  and  main- 
tains that  his  personal  identity  consists  not  only  in  the 
combination  of  present  experiences  but  rather  in  the 
combination  of  the  present  with  the  past.^^  But  by 
uniting  these  two  theories  he  exposes  himself  to  the 
criticisms  urged  against  both.  The  main  defect  is  in 
holding  that  consciousness  and  memory  constitute  the 
person;  they  do  not  constitute  it,  they  only  make  us 
aware  of  our  personality, 
aiity  n?t*a  §  ^^-  (4)  Finally,  he  assumes  that  personality  is  a 
growth.  growth,  and  that  character  is  the  result  of  this  growth. 
But  this  is  not  true;  it  betrays  confusion  of  concepts; 
and  their  natural  consequence,  false  views.  The  child 
of  one  year  is  a  person,  as  well  as  the  man  of  eighty. 
In  the  young  man  we  find  personality,  nature,  char- 
acter. But  one  is  not  the  other.  Nature  is  the  fun- 
damental concept;  personality  is  a  perfection  of  na- 
ture and  character  is  nothing  more  than  the  sum  of 
the  habits  acquired  in  living.  Character  is  not,  there- 
fore, a  direct  modification  of  personality  but  rather  of 
nature.     We  may  say  that  a  person  possesses  a  cer- 

23  P.  38. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  255 

tain  character;  but  upon  examination  we  find  that 
character  bespeaks  certain  habits  of  mind  and  of  will; 
now  mind  and  will  are  faculties  of  our  human  nature. 
We  do  not  deny  that  a  person  has  a  human  nature, 
i.  e.,  mind,  will,  bodily  faculties,  and  also  an  acquired 
nature,  i.  e.,  a  character;  but  we  maintain  that  these 
in  themselves  do  not  constitute  personality,  that  over 
and  above  them  there  is  an  element  or  principle  which 
is  their  natural  perfection,  and  which  in  union  with 
them  forms  the  human  person. 

IV. 

Theory  of  Evolution. 
§  23.  The  theory   of  evolution   has  been   advanced  Mr.  Ribot 

1  1    •         111  11  r   1  •  r  1       r  on  Persou- 

m  our  day  to  explam  all  the  problems  of  life  and  of  aiity. 
mind.  It  was  reserved  for  M.  Ribot  ^*  to  apply  it  to 
the  notion  of  Personality.  To  him  personality  is  an 
aggregate  whole  made  up  of  organic  emotional  and 
intellectual  conditions.^^  It  is  not,  therefore,  a  tran- 
scendental entity;  nor  is  it  a  mere  "bundle  of  sensa- 
tions," as  Hume's  followers  hold.^^  M.  Ribot  com- 
pares personality  to  an  orchestra  composed  of  many 
pieces  which  nevertheles  unite  in  maintaining  a 
harmonious  tone.  Yet  it  is  not  so  much  the  aggre- 
gate of  pieces  as  the  consensus  and  harmony  of  the 
whole.  The  parts  and  functions  of  the  body  are  the 
elements;  their  harmonious  consensus  is  the  personal- 
ity itself.^''     In    this  way  he  accounts  for  the  charac- 

24  Diseases  of  Personality. 

25  Cf.  M.  Ribot,  pp.  3,  84. 

26  P.  85. 

27  P.  loi.  This  opinion  is  criticised  by  St.  Thomas,  who 
attributes  it  to  Empedocles  and  Dinarchus.  cf.  Contra  Gen- 
tus  II,  64;  St.  Augustine  de  Gen.  ad  Lit.  lib.  x,  n.  :i^']. 


256  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

teristic  trait  of  personality,  viz.,  its  continuity  in  time 
or  permanence,  which  is  called  identity,^ 
method.  §  ^4-  According  to    the    teaching    of  evolution  the 

the  higher  forms  of  individuality  must  have  proceeded 
from  the  lower.^^  Thus  the  elements  of  personality 
are  to  be  sought  f9r  in  the  most  elementary  forms  of 
life.  Hence,  the  ruHng  idea  of  his  study.^°  The  fun- 
damental form  of  personality  he  finds  in  the  sense  of 
the  body  or  general  sensibility;  hence  he  speaks  of 
physical  personality.^^  The  sense  of  the  body  or 
coenesthesia  is  the  great  woof  which  sustains  and 
unifies  every^thing.^^  He  denies  that  physical  con- 
sciousness or  memory  constitute  personality.^^  To 
him  coenesthesia  is  the  general  consciousness  of  the 
organism/^  hence,  rather  a  vital  feeling.^^  This  vital 
feeling  or  organic  individuality  is  the  basis  of  all  the 
highest  forms  of  personality,  which  are  only  the  pro- 
ducts of  its  perfection .^^ 
ces^so?"  ^^5*  ^^  ^^^  lowest  stage  of  the  process  there  is  a 
formation,  mass  of  elements;  gradually  the  common  vital  feeling 
is  formed  analogous  to  the  development  of  a  strong- 
centralized  power  in  an  association  of  states  in  the 
political  order.^''  The  factor  of  co-ordination  is  the 
nervous  system,  its  development  is  a  sign  of  progress 
to  a  more  complex  and  harmonious  individuality.^ 
"  The  co-ordination  of  the  nervous  actions  of  the  or- 

28  p.  85;  cf.  Chapter  on  Positivism,  §  14. 

29  P.    139. 

30  p.    19. 

31  P.   21. 

32  P.    105. 
36  P.   90. 

34  P.   89. 

35  P.   88. 

36  P.   90. 

37  P.    143. 

38  P.    144. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  257 

ganic  life,  by  means  of  the  spinal  chord  is  the  basis  of 
the  physical  and  psychical  individuality;  all  other  co- 
ordinations rest  upon  and  are  added  to  it;  it  is  the 
inner  man,  the  material  form  of  his  subjectivity,  the 
ultimate  reason  of  his  manner  of  feeling  and  acting, 
the  source  of  his  instincts,  his  sentiments,  his  passions 
and  his  principle  of  individuation."^^ 

§  26.  Psychic  individuality  is  only  the  subjective  ex-  Phy^cai 
pression  of  the  organism,^"  nor  is  it  a  complete  expres-  ^^^^^^' 
sion ;  it  is  rather  an  extract  or  synopsis  of  all  that  takes 
place  in  the  nervous  centres.^^  The  consensus  of  con- 
sciousness is  subordinate  to  the  consensus  of  the  or- 
ganism; therefore  the  problem  of  the  unity  of  the  ego 
is,  in  its  ultimate  form,  a  biological  problem.^^  Con- 
sistently with  these  principles  he  maintains  that  to  the 
normal  individual  the  idea  of  the  ego  is  always  an 
effect,  a  result,  terminus.*^ 

§  27.  Thus  personaHty  is  a  progress  from  below  and  ^^J^mary. 
completes  itself  in  full  consciousness.^*  He  compares 
the  complete  ego  to  a  piece  of  tapestry,  of  more  or  less 
intricacy,  woven  over  the  organic  sense,  which  is  at 
once  its  basis  and  bond  of  union.*^  Hence  he  con- 
cludes "  The  unity  of  the  ego  is  but  the  co-ordination 
of  a  certain  number  of  incessantly  renascent  states 
having  for  their  support  the  vague  sense  of  our  bodies.*® 
In  a  psychological  sense,  it  is  the  cohesion,  during  a 
given  time,  of  a  certain  number  of  clear  states  of  con- 
sciousness, accompanied  by  others  less  clear,  and  by  a 

39  Pp.  148,  149. 
*"  P.  145. 
''  P.  53. 

*2  p.    157. 

43  p.    118. 

44  P.    121. 

45  Pp.   89,    156. 

46  Cf.  Mandsley  Physiology  of  Mind,  chap.  I. 

33 


258 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


'Criticism, 
(i)  false 
definition. 


The  error. 


multitude  of  physiologic:.!  states,  which  without  being 
accompanied  by  consciousness  Hke  the  others,  yet 
operate  as  much  and  even  more  than  the  former."  *^ 

§  28.  (i)  He  defines  Personality  as  a  consensus  or 
harmony  of  the  organism;  a  feeling  which  results  from 
the  co-ordination  of  all  our  activities.  But  this  is  false. 
The  ego  is  not  a  result.  The  infant  of  a  day  is  a  per- 
son, yet  there  is  no  organic  feeHng  or  harmony  of 
which  he  is  conscious ;  nor  is  there  any  opportunity  for 
a  co-ordination  of  elements  to  take  place  and  constitute 
a  distinct  personality. 

§  29.  M.  Ribot  confounds  the  ego  with  the  states  of 
the  ego.  The  former  is  the  real  subject;  the  state  of 
the  ego  is  the  apparent  subject.  He  overlooks  the 
real  subject  and  tries  to  explain  the  apparent  subject. 
Thus  to-day  I  am  sad,  to-morrow  joyful,  next  day  I 
may,  in  a  fit  of  insanity,  look  upon  myself  as  another 
person.  But  there  is  no  change  in  the  real  person;  I 
am- the  same  throughout;  there  is,  however,  a  change 
in  my  states;  they  succeed  each  other  constantly. 
Ordinary  language  and  common  sense  bear  witness 
that  a  person  may  become  insane  and  yet  be  the  same 
person.  The  fact  that  the  insane  man  forgets  his  for- 
mer states  and  imagines  himself  to  be  other  than  he  is, 
does  not  make  him  a   different   person.     M.    Ribot's 

^^  P.  157.  Akin  to  this  is  the  opinion  of  Hoffding:  "The 
unity  of  mental  life  has  its  expression  not  only  in  memory  and 
synthesis,  but  also  in  a  dominant  fundamental  feeling,  charac- 
terized by  contrast  between  pleasure  and  pain,  and  in  an  im- 
pulse, springing  from  this  fundamental  feeling,  to  movement 
and  activity."  Thus,  the  nervous  system  and  consciousness, 
i.  e.,  coenesthesia  are  the  uniting  bond.  cf.  Hofifding  Outlines 
of  Psychology,  p.  49.  For  Mr.  James'  opinion  the  reader 
had  better  consult  his  Psychology,  vol.  I,  ch.  X.  It  would 
be  impossible  to  do  justice  to  the  writer  in  a  brief  summary. 
It  is  hard  to  conceive  how  a  thinker  could  formulate  such 
teaching.  He  goes  to  any  extreme  rather  than  admit  the 
existence  of  a  soul.     Ch.  also  vol.  I,  ch.  IX. 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  259- 

"  Diseases  of  Personality "    inay    be    more    properly 
termed  *'  Diseases  of  Memory."  ^^ 

§  30.  (2)  In  considering  Personality  as  the  outcome  (g)  con- 
of  Evolution  these  writers  fall  into  the  vital  mistake  of  thought 
making  thought  of  the  same  nature  as  organic  activity,  organic 
Reason  and  volition  are  higher  powers  of  man,  differ-  ^^"ct^<^^^- 
ent  in  kind  from  organic  functions.     This  has  been  set 
forth  already.^^     Again  the  theory  of  evolution  cannot 
explain  the  origin  and    nature    of    reason.     Thought 
does  not  differ  from  organic  acts  in  complexity  only.^*^ 
There  is  a  difference  in    kind.     Evolution   has   failed 
miserably  in  the  attempt  to  solve  man's  nature.     It  is 
based  on  assumptions,  its  arguments  "  beg  the  ques- 
tion "  to  be  proved :  its  conclusions  are  wide  of  the 
premises. 

§  31.  This  is  the  judgment  upon  the  evolutionist  ex-  conclusion, 
planation  of  Personality.  Its  initial  point  is  "  Ignoran- 
tia  elenchi,"  in  as  much  as  it  confounds  the  states  of 
the  ego  with  the  ego  itself,  and  instead  of  proving  the 
latter,  sets  forth  a  theory  to  account  for  the  former. 
The  method  of  investigation  runs  on  the  lines  of  evo- 
lution ;  it  thus  assumes  that  intelligence  is  only  a  higher 
form  of  feeling;  it  seeks  in  the  lowest  form  of  life  for 
the  germs  of  man's  highest  perfection ;  and  this  without 
giving  the  slightest  proof  for  its  position. 

V. 

Theory  of  Christian  Philosophy. 
§  32.  St.  Thomas  defines  Person  in    the   words    of  ?/|?;"°° 
Boetius  ''  A  singular  substance  of  a  rational  nature."  ^^  Thomas. 

^^  Griesinger  in  "  Mental  Diseases  "  confounds  the  phe- 
nomenal with  the  real  ego.  cf.  Amer.  Society  for  Psychical 
Research,  vol.  I,  pp.  366,  552. 

49  Ch.  V. 

^^  Ribot,  p.  139. 

51 1,  q.  29,  A.  I. 


26o 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 


At  first  sight  the  definition  seems  somewhat  obscure. 
To  grasp  its  full  meaning  it  is  necessary  to  examine  it 
in  parts. 
Its  ex-  §33.  Person,    therefore,    embraces    (a)    a    rational 

planation.  ti  1  /  ■  ■, 

(a)  rational  iiature.      i  he  elements  of  a  rational  nature  are  intelli- 

nature.  .  .       ,  .    ,  .       .     , 

gence,  i.  e.,  the  higher  powers  of  mmd,  and  wUl,  i.  e., 
the  higher  aiTections  and  emotions.  Now  rational 
natures  are  not  all  the  same;  they  can  differ  one  from 
another;  in  matter  of  fact  they  do  so  differ.  Thus 
there  is  the  Divine  Nature,  the  Angelic  Nature,  the 
Human  Nature.  The  nature  of  God  is  purely  spir- 
itual, infinite  and  uncreated;  the  angelic  nature  is 
purely  spiritual,  but  created  and  finite;  rational  human 
nature  is  not  purely  spiritual  but  composite,  in  the 
sense  that  it  has  a  spiritual  soul  intrinsically  destined 
to  animate  a  material  organism;  this  union  of 
body  and  soul  constitutes  our  human  nature.  The  dis- 
tinction of  nature  is  very  important.  It  is  not  ex- 
pressed in  the  definition  of  St.  Thomas.  The  reason 
is  that  the  Angelic  Doctor  gives  a  definition  of 
person  in  general;  he  does  not  aim  at  explain- 
ing human  person  only.  On  the  contrary,  in  the 
passage  cited  he  is  dealing  with  divine  personality. 
But  in  as  much  as  person  supposes  a  rational  nature, 
it  will  readily  be  understood  that  a  difference  in  the 
rational  natures  is  the  cause  of  the  difference  in  the 
person 
iiduaf "  §  34-  (b)  Person  embraces  also  "  an  individual  sub- 

substance.  g^^j^^^g  ?5       'pj^-g   jg   ^j^^    characteristic   element   in  the 

notion;  by  it  person  is  distinguished  from  rational 
nature.  By  "  individual "  is  understood  a  singular 
concrete  entity.  By  "  substance ''  is  meant  not 
essence  as,  ex.  gr.,  if  I  ask  you  to  give  me  the  "  sub- 
stance" of  a  sermon,  I    should    expect    to  hear  the 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  261 

main  ideas  or  lines  of  thought  which  made  the  sermon 
what  it  was ;  but  by  "substance "  is  understood  the 
supposition  or  subject  or  the  thing  itself  of  which  we 
were  speaking;  thus,  ex.  gr.,  when  I  say  the  "  stone  was 
very  valuable,"  I  simply  mention  a  thing,  about  which 
we  were  speaking,  and  do  not  enter  into  an  examina- 
tion of  its  essence  or  constitution,  by  reason  of  which 
it  becomes  valuable.  "  Individual  substance,"  there- 
fore, means  a  concrete  actually  existing  substance,  or 
a  substantial  individuality 

§35.  After  this  exposition  of  the  meaning  of  the  its  mean- 
words,  Person  may  be  defined  as  "  a  rational  nature 
possessing  its  own  individual  subsistence."  The  "  indi- 
vidual subsistence"  is  the  distinctive  element  of  person- 
ality; it  constitutes  the  rational  nature  in  its  actual 
concrete  existence;  it  imparts  to  the  rational  nature 
a  principle  by  which  this  nature  has  the  control  of  its 
own  acts,  is  std  juris,  and  as  a  result  is  held  account- 
able or  responsible. 

§  36.  Thus  Personality  is  distinguished  from  rational  illustrated 

^  ,  -^  ^  in  the  In- 

nature.  Rational  nature  may  be  considered  as  the  carnation, 
thing  itself;  personality  as  the  mode  of  its  subsistence. 
This  distinction  has  its  source  in  the  revealed  doctrine  from^Sf^ 
of  the  Incarnation.  The  Second  Person  of  the  Blessed 
Trinity  assumed  our  human  nature,  not  the  human 
person.  In  Christ  there  is  a  perfect  human  nature  with 
its  attributes  of  intellect  and  will;  nevertheless,  in  Christ 
there  is  only  one  mode  of  subsistence,  only  one  subject 
acting,  only  one  principle  which  controls  His  actions, 
giving  to  them  a  value  and  merit;  and  this  subject  or 
principle  is  the  Personality  of  the  eternal  Word.^^ 

§37.  The  exposition  of  Personality  just  set  f orth  (2)  in  civu 
finds  an  illustration  and  also  a  confirmation  in  lan- 

52  S.  Thomas  Sum.  Theol.,  p.  3,  q.  2. 


262  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

guage.  Thus  the  civil  code  speaks  of  PersonaHty;  in 
fact  passes  special  legislation  for  those  whom  it  does 
not  consider  as  persons.  Let  us  examine  what  is 
understood  by  a  person  in  the  sight  of  the  civil  law. 
The  fact  is  better  grasped  if  the  concrete  case  be  taken. 
A  boy  of  ten  years,  ex.  gr.,  is  not  regarded  as  a  civil 
person.  Yet  the  boy  has  inteUigence  and  conscious- 
ness; he  possesses  also  a  rational  will  or  motive  power 
of  action  and  a  memory.  The  law,  however,  does  not 
consider  these  to  be  sufficient.  It  regards  the  child  as 
dependent  upon  others,  as  under  the  guidance  and 
control  of  others.  As  long  as  the  child  is  in  this  con- 
dition, it  is  not  a  person  before  the  law.  Over  and 
above  intellect  and  will,  the  civil  law  requires  that  the 
person  should  have  the  dominion  of  his  own  actions, 
should  be,  sui  juris,  his  own  master, 
from  this         §  38.  Personality,  therefore,  means  the  possession  of 

fact 

a  principle  which  gives  to  a  man  the  control  of  his  own 
actions  and  renders  him  accountable  for  them  in  a 
court  of  justice.  When  he  obtains  this  power  of  acting 
he  enters  upon  the  full  exercise  of  his  civil  manhood 
and  is  considered  a  perfect  man  before  the  law.^^ 
personai^^^  §  39.  Again  wc  use  the  expression  "  moral  person- 
*^y-"  ality."     By  this  is  understood    a    community    which 

53  "  In  general  only  those  human  beings  are  by  law  denomi- 
nated Persons  who  can  be  the  subjects  of  rights.  According 
to  the  law  of  nature  every  man  is  capable  of  rights,  and  is, 
therefore,  a  person  in  a  technical  sense.  Positive  law  may 
change  this.  Thus,  the  slave  is  a  man;  yet,  by  the  Roman 
law  he  was  incapable  of  rights,  therefore,  tvas  not  a  person, 
cf.  Mackeldey  Roman  Law,  14  ed.,  §§  128-133,  who  cites  as 
authorities  §  4  I.  i.  16,  of  Theophilus  ad  §2  I.  2  14;  Nouvel. 
Theod.  Const.  24,  §  2;  Cassiodorus  Var.  VI  8;  Gaius  I,  §  9; 
fr.  I  3;  frag.  3  II.  I.  5.  Austin  admits  that  in  modern  juris- 
prudence the  term  Person  is  limited  "  to  human  beings  con- 
sidered as  invested  with  rights."  cf.  Austin  "  Jurisprudence,'^ 
ed.  by  R.  Campbell,  vol.  I,  Lect.  XII;  cf.  also  Savigny 
"  Roman  Law." 


CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY.  263 

possesses  intelligence  and  will,  by  reason  of  the  mem-  the  infer- 
bers  composing  it,  and  also  has  the  power  of  ruHng  this  fact, 
itself,  of  making  its  own  laws,  of    determining    their 
sanction,  and  of  acting  more  or  less  as  an  independ- 
ent body.^* 

§  40.  Finally  Rhetoric  mentions  a  figure  of  speech  (4)  in 
called  '*  Personification,"     We  are  said  to  personify 
things,  when  we  attribute  to  inanimate  objects  the  at- 
tributes of  a  person.     Thus,  ex.  er.,  in  the  fables  of  inference 

^  .        1  1  .         from  this 

Aesop  plants  and  animals  are  represented  as  actmg  fact, 
like  human  beings,  so  also  this  figure  of  speech  is 
found  in  some  of  the  noblest  productions  of  genius,  ex. 
gr.,  Dante.  Now  in  personification  we  give  to  inani- 
mate creatures  not  only  a  human  nature,  e.  g.,  intellect, 
will,  but  we  also  attribute  a  personality,  i.  e.,  we  con- 
sider them  as  distinct  individuals  having  the  guidance 
and  control  of  their  actions  and  as  a  consequence,  re- 
sponsible for  what  they  do. 

§  41.  In  explaining  the  notion    of    nature,    it    was  Human 

1  1  '1  1  •  rv  rr^t  f  ^^^  Divine 

pomted  out  that  rational  natures  differ,  ihereiore.  Personality 
as  Personality  is  the  mode  of  subsistence  of  a  rational 
nature,  the  difference  in  the  nature  will  cause  a  differ- 
ence in  the  person  when  nature  and  personality  are 
viewed  in  their  concrete  actual  existence.  Thus 
Divine  Personality,  which  is  a  perfection  of  Divine 
Nature,  is  by  no  means  the  same  as  Human  Personal- 
ity, which  is  only  the  highest  perfection  of  human  na- 

54  "  The  positive  Roman  Law  applied  the  term  Persona  to 
such  men  only  as  had  the  capacity  for  rights,  and  at  the  sam.e 
time  extended  it  to  all  those  things  and  corporations  which 
are  regarded  as  subject  of  rights,  ex.  gr.,  municipalities." 
Note  to  Mackeldey  Civil  Law,  12  ed.,  §  116.  ''In  legal  lan- 
guage the  word  person  is  applied  to  those  things  and  cor- 
porations which  are  regarded  as  the  proper  subjects  of 
rights,  such  as  collegia,  municipia,"  7c.  cf.  Rathigan  Roman 
Law  of  Persons. 


264  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

ture.  Personality  is  a  perfection;  where  the  nature  is 
infinite,  the  personaHty  is  infinite;  thus  it  is  false  to 
maintain  with  Schelling,  Hegel  and  Schleirmacher  that 
personality  of  itself  means  limitation.^^  But  human 
Personality  is  the  subsistence  of  a  human  nature. 
Human  nature  is  composed  of  body  and  soul,  hence  the 
human  person  implies  a  body  and  soul.  If,  therefore, 
one  should  deny  the  existence  of  a  personal  God,  be- 
cause he  cannot  admit  a  God  with  a  body,  he  errs  by 
considering  human  personality  to  be  personality  itself; 
as,  ex.  gr.,  I  call  all  existing  things  by  the  name  of 
being,  but  I  do  not  mean  that  all  beings  are  alike.  In 
like  manner  I  say  God  is  a  person,  and  man  is  a  per- 
son, but  I  do  not  mean  that  the  personality  of  one  is 
identical  with  the  personality  of  the  other.  On  the 
contrary  the  appellation,  person,  is  true  of  God  in  a 
way  far  exceeding  that  of  the  creature.^" 


^5  Cf.  German  Philosophy  bj^  Stuckenberg,  p.  87. 

^^  Respondeo  dicendum,  quod  persona  significat  id  quod  est 
perfectissimum  in  tola  natura,  scihcet  siihsistens  in  rationali 
Qiatiira,  Unde  cum  omne  illud  quod  est  perfectionis,  Deo  sit 
attribuendum,  eo  quod  ejus  essentia  continet  in  se  omnem 
perfectionem,  conveniens  est  ut  hoc  nomen  (persona)  de  Deo 
dicatur,  non  tamen  eodem  modoquo  dicitur  de  creaturis,  sed 
excellentiori  modo.     St.  Thomas  I,  q.  29,  a  3  c. 


christian  philosophy.  265 

Conclusion. 

Such,  therefore,  is  the  teaching  of  Christian  philos-  christian 
ophy  concerning  the  human  soul.  Clear  and  definite  ^  ^  ^^^^ 
it  appeals  to  men  of  to-day  with  the  same  force  as  to 
the  minds  of  Justin  and  Augustine.  The  advance  of 
time  has  made  no  change  in  its  fundamental  tenets. 
It  has  seen  the  rise  and  fall  of  system  after  system. 
Its  vitality  is  due  to  the  power  of  truth.  Progress  in 
knowledge,  and  especially  in  the  physical  sciences,  has 
served  to  make  its  outlines  bolder  and  to  add  new 
arguments  to  its  well-known  conclusions. 

This  has  been  called  an  age  of  transition.     Lines  of  character 

°  of  our  age. 

demarkation  are  no  longer  drawn  hard  and  fast. 
What  has  satisfied  the  past  generation  is  insufficient 
for  the  present.  The  mental  unrest  is  expressed  in 
various  forms.  Men  have  outgrown  the  teaching  of 
the  past  generation.  They  seek  something  more  per- 
manent, more  in  consonance  with  mind  and  heart. 
The  marvellous  progress  of  the  physical  sciences  has 
drawn  attention  to  the  material  side  of  life.  The  study 
of  the  forces  of  nature,  of  the  human  body  has  taken 
possession  of  the  field  of  thought.  Man  has  been 
considered  a  mere  animal.  Works  like  Huxley's 
"  Man's  Place  in  Nature  "  and  Romanes,  "  Mind  in 
Man  and  Animals  "  have  attempted  to  set  forth  this 
position  in  a  scientific  form.  Such  teaching  cannot  be 
lasting.  It  stifles  the  highest,  noblest  aspirations,  it 
lowers  man. 

To  our  times  Christian  philosophy  brings  its  mes-  chrfs^fan^ 
sage  of  light.    It  tells  us  what  man  really  is.    Its  view  fo^ophy. 
is  comprehensive,  not  partial.     It  proclaims  that  man 
is  a  spiritual  being.    It  emphasizes  the  fact  that  we  are 
creatures  of  God,  and  are  made  in  His  likeness.^'' 

^^  S.  Thomas  I,  q.  93,  a  4;  Aug.  in  Joan.  tr.  3,  n.  4;  de  Gen. 
ad  Lit.  1,  6,  c  12;  de  Civ.  Dei  xii,  ch.  23. 


266 


'--  CHRISTIAN    PHILOSOPHY. 

These  pages  contain  nothing  new.  The  outlines 
and  main  trend  are  famihar  from  childhood.  The 
sublime  philosophy  of  Christianity  is  unfolded  in  the 
catechism.  The  only  effort  made  is  to  show  that  the 
teaching  of  our  early  years  is  in  harmony  with  the 
results  of  scientific  thought.  Hence,  when  we  grow 
to  manhood  and  mingle  in  the  great  world,  whether 
in  high  schools,  universities  or  in  the  busy  walks  of 
professional  life,  we  should  not  forget  or  throw  aside 
the  beautiful  lessons  of  our  nature  and  dignity.  True 
progress  is  not  had  in  asserting  that  we  are  on  the 
same  level  with  the  brute.  True  philosophy  is  Chris- 
tian philosophy.  The  true  philosopher  is  one  who 
understands  and  lives  up  to  the  teaching  of  the  cate- 
chism ;  who  holds  firm  and  fast  the  truth  so  simple  and 
profound  that  we  are  creatures  of  God,  composed  of 
body  and  soul,  that  our  soul  is  made  in  the  likeness 
of  God,  because  it  is  a  spirit  endowed  with  intelligence, 
and  free-will  and  is  immortal,  that  is  to  say,  it  can 
never  die.^^ 

^  58  Nunc  tamen  de  anima;  nihil  confirmo  nisi  quia  ex  Deo 
sic  est  ut  non  sit  substantia  Dei;  et  sic  incorporea,  id  est,  non 
sit  corpus,  sed  spiritus,  non  de  substantia  Dei  genitus,  nee 
de  substantia  Dei  procedeus,  sed  factus  a  Deo;  nee  ita  factus 
ut  in  ejus  naturam  natura  ulla  corporis  vel  irrationalis  animae 
verteretur;  ac  per  hoc  de  nihilo:  et  quod  sit  immortalis  secun- 
dum quemdam  vitae  modum  quern  nullo  modo  potest  amit- 
tere."  Aug.  de  Gen.  ad  Lit.  1.  VII,  n.  43;  1.  VI,  c  12;  In  Joan 
tr.  3,  n.  4;  S.  Thomas  S.  Theol.  I,  q.  93,  a  4.  "  Fecerat  homi- 
nem  ad  imaginem  suam;  quod  utique  secundum  animam  ra- 
tionalem  fecisse  intelligitur."  Ep.  166,  n.  12;  de  quant,  an., 
n.  3;  S.Thomas  S.  Theolog.  I,  q.  93. 


INDEX 


Abnormal  acts,  11. 

Abstract  sciences,  110. 

Accidents  and  substance,  25,  29, 

Affections,  Psycholgy  of,  17. 

Agnosticism,  40,  58,  95. 

Agraphy,  137. 

Ambiguity,  danger  of,  15. 

Analogy  and  immortality,  243. 

Anatomy,  9, 12. 

Animated  organism  the  principle  of 

sensation,  190. 
Annihilation,  theory  of,  325. 
Aphasia,  136. 
Apperception,  43,  48. 
Association  of  ideas,  13,  15  ;  school  of 

association,  26,  44. 
Atoms,  65. 


B. 


Bain.  44,  52,  61. 

Bampton  Lectures,  250. 

Barker,  Prof  ,  on  thought  and  mo- 
tion, 205. 

Being,  27,  30. 

Blindness,  verbal,  138. 

Body  and  Soul,  168;  the  problem,  168; 
theory  of  exaggerated  spiritualism 
169  ;  of  accidental  union,  172  ;  mon- 
istic theory,  176;  its  reasons,  177;  its 
different  forms,  178  ;  scholastic  the- 
ory, 184. 

Brain  63,  66;  brain  and  thought,  121  ; 
quantity  of  matter  of,  121  ;  qual 
ity,  129  ;  brain  of  woman,  124  ;  of 
different  races,  124 ;  of  different 
individuals,  126;  growth  of  brain, 
127  ;   physical  qualities,  132. 

Buddhist  theory  of  soul,  47  ;  view  of 
man,  48,49,239,234. 


Catechism,  32,  264. 
Chemistry,  40,  55. 
Christian  philosophy,  364  sq. 
Classification  of  mental  phenomena, 

14. 
Classification,  tendency  to,  115. 
Cognition,  Psychology  of,  17. 
Comparative  philology,  10. 
Compte,  4,  85. 


Conscience,  116,  238. 

Consciousness,  2,  3,  15,  30,  43,  74; 
stream  of,  44;  testimony  of,  58,  72; 
unity,  76;  with  Spencer,  319;  and 
personality,  348. 

Conservation  of  energy,  389;  of  mat- 
ter, 338,  343 

Contradiction,  principle  of,  51. 

Creationism,  313,  214,  222. 


Deafness,  verbal,  137. 

Death,  end  of  all,  225. 

Degraded  life  and  immortality,  234. 

Des  Cartes,  IG.  20,  51,  63.  169. 

Description  and  definition,  23. 

Determinists,  16. 

Double-aspect  theory,  61-177;  differ- 
ent forms,  178;  of  Clifford,  178;  of 
Bain,  180;  of  Spencer,  183;  its  argu- 
ments, 183;  its  consequences,  184. 

Duality,  in  substance,  186;  in  man 
189. 

Du  Bois,  Raymond,  on  cerebral  mo- 
tion, 307. 


Education  and  Psychology,  16. 

Ego,  30,  31,  33;  its  permanence,  47; 
reality,  47;  unity,  70;  of  Positivists, 
75;  states  of  Ego,  75;  normal  and 
hysterical,  75;  with  Compte,  94. 

Elementary  concep  ions,  33. 

Emanation,  theory  of,  811. 

Emerson,  160. 

Empiricism,  58,  67. 

Errors  on  soul,  36. 

Eternal  duration  of  soul,  344. 

Ethics  and  Pyschology,  16. 

Evolution,  64;  and  soul,  216;  and  per- 
sonality, 255. 


Ferrier  on  cerebral  motion,  208. 

Fichte,  20,  151. 

t  orces,  66;  simple  material  forces,  80; 

immaterial  forces,  81,  89. 
Form    and    matter,    19;    substantial 

form  of  body,  19. 
Free-will,  16. 
Free-thinker,  224. 


268 


INDEX. 


Gall,  93, 

Generation  and  Soul,  212-214,  215. 
Glory,  immortality  of,  230. 
Gotama,  47-48. 

Government,  science  of,  and  Psychol- 
ogy, 17. 
Green,  Prof.,  68,  165. 
Growth  and  mechanical  motion,  55. 


Haeckel,  53-64. 
Hamilton,  4,  20,  84,  39. 
Happiness,  desire  of,  241. 
Hegel,  20,  154,  155 
Heredity,  law  of,  218-221. 
Hierarchy,  of  beings,  188. 
Hume,  20,  26,  44,  51 . 
Huxley,  20,  26,  40. 


I. 


I,  the,  80,  31,  32,  70. 

Idealism  of  Berkeley,  20. 

Immortality  of  soul,  223;  theories, 
224;  substitutes,  228;  a  universal 
fact,  231;  proofs, 236;  and  literature. 
242;  not  isolated,  243;  eternal,  244. 

Impulse,  its  effects,  205. 

Incarnation,  245,  261. 

Individual  substance,  260. 

Instinct  Avith  Spencer,  217,  219. 

Intelligence  with  Spencer,  217. 

Introspection,  4,  6,  13;  and  retrospec- 
tion, 5 

Intuitions,  basis  of  knowledge,  33; 
meaning  of  the  word,  35,  note;  with 
Kant,  38. 


Jamei  on  Introspection,  6;  on  value 
of  introspection,  7;  on  Psychology, 
18:  on  soul,  26;  o  j  potency,  31;  on 
substance  of  soul,  32,  36. 

Janet,  67,  6^ 

Jews,  and  immortality,  233. 


K. 

Kant,  20,  86;  his  modern  disciples,  37; 
his  theory  of  soul,  37;  his  criticism 
of  souPs  substantiality,  38;  criti- 
cism of  Kant,  39;  meaning  of  phe- 
nomena, 40;  of  intuition,  41;  his 
critic,  51;  and  personality,  248. 

Karma,  230. 

Koelpe  on  Psychology,  8. 


Ladd,  soul,  18;  on  definition  of  soul, 
24;  on  soul  and  body,  174;  on  cere- 
bralmotion,  210. 


Language,  10;  of  Psychology,  15;  its 
roots,  120. 

Law  and  person,  civil,  262, 

Leibnitz  on  soul  and  body,  170. 

Lewes  and  soul,  36-t3l. 

Life,  grades  of,  1;  mental,  2;  its  prin- 
ciples and  laws,  14;  facts  complex, 
15;  partial  conceptions,  16;  mechan- 
ical theory,  55;  chemical  theory,  57. 

Localization,  7,  13,  15,  93  134;  of  Gall, 
134;  of  cerebral  Physiology,  136;  of 
sensations,  136;  of  nervous  move- 
ment, 138;  of  reason,  139;  and  spir- 
itualiiy  of  soul,  140. 

Locke  and  soul,  26;  on  soul  and  body, 
173  ;  on  personality,  246. 

Logic,  relation  to  Psychology,  16; 
logical  definition,  23. 

Lotze,  55;  on  soul  and  body,  173. 

M. 

Malebranche,  on  soul  and  body,  170. 
Man  in  Christian  philosophy,  264;  in 

Buddhism,  48. 
Manifestation,  theory  of,  213. 
Material  objects,  how  conceived,  110. 
Materialism,  history,  49;  ancient  and, 

modern,  49;   leaders,  52;   scientific 

materialism,  54,  225;  its  doctrine,  59; 

two  schools,  6-;  its  arguments,  61; 

criticism,  64;  influence,  67;  material- 
ists, 12,  16,  26. 
Matter,  54;  and  form,    19,    186,    187; 

and  force,  59,  184,  185;  not  free,  118. 
Me,  the.  30;    and  its    modifications, 

30,31,43,73. 
Measurement  of  skull,  128. 
Memory  and  personality,  247, 
Mill,  4,  21.  44,  66. 
Mind,  2,  17;  power  of  mind,  111,  239; 

mind  and  body.  62, 168;  with  Spencer 

220;  in  psychology,  2,  17. 
Mind-stuff,  178,  180. 
Monism,  176. 
Motion,   65;    and   life,    65;    cerebral 

motion,  203. 
Movement,  nervous,  138. 

N. 
Nature.  260;  not  personality,  258,  261' 
Neo-Hegelian,  21,  68. 
Neo-Hegelian  School,  164;  pantheistic, 

165. 
Neo-Kantian.  21,  68. 
Neo-Platonists,  211. 
Nervous  movement,  188. 
Nirvana,  234 . 
Nouns  abstract  and  concrete,  42. 

O. 

Objective  and  subjective,  2 
Objective,  sour*  es  of.  Psychology,  7. 
Object,  proper,  of  Psychology,  12. 
Observation,  internal,  13. 
Ontology,  41. 

O  atory,  relation  to  Psychology,  17. 
Order,  moral,  and  immortality,  238. 


INDEX. 


269 


Pantheism,  148;  modern  pantheism, 
149;  influence,  158;  Pantheism  of 
Emerson,  160;  of  Royce,  162;  criti- 
cism, 166;  Pantheists  and  soul,  211; 
and  immortality,  226. 

Pathology,  10 

Personality,  245;  problem  of  Christian 
philosophy,  245;  with  Locke,  246; 
with  Kant,  248;  with  Illingworth, 
250;  and  Evolution,  255;  physical 
and  psychic,  257;  diseases  of,  259; 
with  S  Thomas,  259;  human  and 
divine.  263. 

"  Phenomena"  with  Kant,  40. 

Phenomenal  theory  of  soul,  43;  phe- 
nomenal idealism,  47. 

Philosophy,  modern,  a  failure,  20;  its 
errors  on  soul,  25 

Physical  science,  40. 

Physiology,  9,  12, 18,  63. 

Plato,  on  soul  aod  body,  169. 

Positivism  48;  notion  of  ego,  75; 
origin,  88;  doctrine,  90,  230;  law  of 
three  states,  90;  classification  of 
science,  92;  this  teaching  on  man, 
93;  on  intellect,  94;  relation  to  ag- 
nosticism, 95,  96;  influence,  97,  98, 
99;  criticism.  100,  101. 

Potency,  27-80. 

Principles  of  mental  life,  14. 

Principles  of  reason,  41. 

Psychology,  1,  2,  4,  *-,  12,  16,  22. 

Psychology  without  a  soul,  18;  scho- 
lastic psychology,  19. 

Psychology,  English,  34. 

Psycho-Physics,  141;  its  basis.  142;  its 
origin,  142;  its  value,  146,  147. 


R. 

Reason,  its  localization,  139;  with 
Rpencer,  217;  practical  and  specu- 
lative, 151. 

Reflex  action,  217,  219. 

Relativity  of  knowledge,  89. 

Retrospection  and  introspection,  6. 

Ribot  and  personality,  256. 

Roots  of  language,  120. 

Rotsmini  on  soul  and  body,  194. 

Royce,  162, 


S. 


Scepticism  of  Hume,  20;  immortality, 
226. 

Schelling,  152. 

Scottish  school,  6,  7. 

Self-consciousness,  13,  112;  not  mat- 
ter, 113, 114;  higher  self,  158. 

Sensations  differ  in  quantity  and 
quality,  142,  145;  intensity  of,  143, 
197;  and  impulse,  144;  duration  of, 
145, 197;  extension,  147, 197;  quantita- 
tive, 196;  its  organ,  198;  simple  sub- 
ject of,  195. 


Simplicity  of  soul,  70. 

Skandhas,  48  49. 

Skull,  weight  of,  122:  measurement 
of,  128. 

Soul,  psychology  of,  17,  22;  impor- 
tance, 18;  Ladd  on  soul,  18;  sub- 
stantial form  of  body,  19,  189;  a 
substance,  25,  32;  and  modern  phil- 
osophy, 25;  and  scholastic  philos- 
ophy, 25;  a  logical  subject,  26;  a 
heap  of  qualities,  26,  44;  unknow- 
able, 26;  does  not  exist,  26;  errors 
on  soul,  37?  not  extended,  77;  Budd- 
hist conception  of,  159;  place  in 
body,  190;  origin,  211;  nature  of, 
286. 

Sources  of  psychology,  13. 

Speech,  human,  119. 

Spirituality  of  soul,  106;  spirit,  106; 
spirit  and  soul,  107;  spiritual  and 
immaterial,  108;  proof,  109. 

Stability,  27,  31. 

Stories,  211. 

Substance,  25,  28,  42;  and  essence,  33. 


T. 


Thought;  chemical  theory,  129;  and 
brain,  192;  not  sensation,  199,  200; 
and  body,  201;  imagination  and 
thought,  202;  not  cerebral  motion- 
not  i-eflex  action,  204;  not  a  phy- 
sical force,  204;  and  heat,  206  ;  not 
organic  function,  259. 

Traducianists,  212. 

Transcendentalism,  33,  57;  in  America, 
163. 

Transcendental  theory  of  soul,  37, 

Tyndall,  54,  208. 


U. 

Ulrici,  67. 

Unity,  immaterial,  80;  collective,  71; 
Compters,  94;  Kant's  objection  to, 
78;  kinds  of,  71;  of  consciousness,  76, 
185;  of  positivists,  74;  of  soul,  70; 
simple  unity,  70,  76;  Spencer  and 
unity  of  ego,  218, 

Upanishads,  156;  problem  of,  157; 
value  of,  156. 


Vedanta,  156,211. 

Verbal  deafness,  137;  blindness,  138. 

Virchow,  66. 

Vogt,  52. 

W, 

Wallace,  68. 

Ward,  Dr.,  68. 

Weber's  law,  cubicism  of,  143, 

Will,  psychology  of,  17;  acts  of,  115; 

free  will,  117;  powers  of,  240, 
Worldly-minded  and  immortality,  224. 
Wundt,  36,  43,  68.